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**THE
QUARTERLY
REVIEW**

VOL. 235.

COMPRISING Nos. 466, 467,

PUBLISHED IN

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1921

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

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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

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
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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 466.—JANUARY, 1921.

Art. 1.—THE REORGANISATION OF EUROPE.

1. *Peace Treaties*: With Germany, at Versailles, June 28, 1919; with Austria, at Saint Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919; with Hungary, at Trianon, June 4, 1920; with Bulgaria, at Neuilly-sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919; with Turkey, at Sèvres, Aug. 10, 1920; and other treaties. H.M. Stationery Office.
2. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley. Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.
3. *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*. By Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord. Harvard University Press, 1920.
4. *Peace Hand-books*, Nos. 1-162. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.
5. *League of Nations Official Journal*. No. 1. Harrison, February 1920. With Special Supplements: No. 1. The Aaland Islands Question (August). No. 2. Draft Scheme for . . . the Permanent Court of International Justice (September 1920).

DURING the negotiations at Paris for peace with Germany the press and the public in England, and probably in other countries, constantly complained of the delays between the Armistice of Nov. 11 and the restoration of peace with the principal enemy belligerent. Although the treaty with Germany was signed on June 28, 1919, it did not come into effective operation until Jan. 10, 1920. This interval was necessary in order to procure the ratification of the

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2 THE REORGANISATION OF EUROPE

treaty by at least three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Germany ratified it on July 10, 1919, Italy on Oct. 7, Great Britain on Oct. 10, France on Oct. 12. There were, however, certain unexecuted clauses of the Armistice agreement which Germany had to fulfil before the Peace Treaty could take effect; and, until that result was obtained, by means of urgent pressure on the German Government, the *procès-verbal* of deposit, which custom requires, could not be signed. Thus the total period consumed between the termination of active hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations with Germany was one year two months and nine days.

Although the Armistice was concluded so early as Nov. 11, 1918, it was obvious that peace negotiations could not be commenced until the arrival in Europe of President Wilson. He landed in France Dec. 13, came to London a fortnight later, left for Paris and Rome on the last day of the month, and finally returned to Paris on Jan. 7. The members of the British delegation began to arrive there on Jan. 4; but the Prime Minister was a week later. Mr Wilson had taken a leading part in the negotiation of the preliminaries of the Armistice. It was to him that the German Government had addressed itself on Oct. 5, 1918. Correspondence between him and the German Government on the one hand and the Governments of the Allies on the other followed; and it was agreed by the latter that the Armistice Convention and the Treaty of Peace should be based on his addresses and speeches and on the recent diplomatic correspondence. To understand what this basis was, Part IV of Chapter IX of Volume I of the 'History' must be carefully studied. It shows clearly that with the exception of the reservation of the European allies with respect to No. 2 of the famous Fourteen Points, namely, the so-called 'Freedom of the Seas,' the President had been allowed to formulate the principles on which peace should be concluded. Europe expected him to arrive with a thoroughly worked-out scheme of negotiation. But it appears that he brought nothing of the sort with him. No doubt the separate Governments had each formed an idea of what they would demand, but nothing had been settled between

them, and it is pointed out in the 'History' (I. p. 237), that such preparations as had been made by them were

'necessarily of a very general character, made for the most part by subordinate departments, without the direction of the heads of States, without inter-allied consultation and co-operation, and with only a vague idea of how the schemes would be applied in practice. Their influence on the Conference must not, however, be under-estimated. Their labours had produced an enormous amount of material for the use of the men of action; and, though much of this work was wasted, much proved to be of the greatest value.'

No doubt the writer of these lines had in mind the series of Peace Hand-books produced by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, established for the first time in 1917. Very valuable and interesting as these Hand-books are, it must have been quite impossible for the actual negotiators to become acquainted with even a small portion of their contents.

In any case, it must be evident that the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers had to begin their work by coming to an agreement as to the procedure to be adopted for negotiation among themselves of the provisions which would be embodied in the Peace Treaty, and that this was a difficult task, as the various countries concerned had suffered in quite different ways from the violence with which the war had been carried on by their adversaries, notably by Germany. Compare the devastation of North-Eastern France, the destruction of public buildings in Belgium, the carrying away of public and private property from these two countries, with the almost entire freedom of the British Islands from damage on land at the hands of the enemy; though, on the other hand, the destruction of a great portion of the British mercantile marine was a very serious blow to the prosperity of the country. To reconcile the French and Belgian demands for reparation with the much smaller requirements of Great Britain must have been no easy undertaking, requiring long discussion and much give and take between the representatives of the Allies.

It may seem a very small thing, but it is probable that the want of a common language between the

principal plenipotentiaries must have been an obstacle to a complete and speedy understanding. Only one of them spoke both English and French. Two others understood English only, the fourth was unacquainted with anything but his own language and French. Consequently their conversations had to be carried on with the assistance of an interpreter; and any one who has ever had experience of conversing through that medium, must be aware what a difficult process it is, frequently involving unavoidable misunderstandings.

Some doubt has been expressed with regard to the proper designation to be applied to the negotiations between the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of agreeing on the specific demands to be presented to Germany and her allies as forming the terms of peace. The Foreign Office List for 1919 gives a List of the British Delegation and Staff, under the heading of 'Peace Congress.' It is conceivable that a Congress of all the belligerent Powers might have been summoned to meet at Paris; and by some persons this was no doubt expected. On a previous occasion, that of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, its formal assembly had been preceded by somewhat lengthy negotiations in London, which failed to produce an agreement on all the points under discussion, which are well described by Mr Webster in a paper read before the Royal Historical Society in March 1913, and again in his admirable account of Congress of Vienna published as No. 153 of the Peace Hand-books. This problem, of which the resolution presented difficulties that spun out its duration by several months, reminds us of the similar trouble that was caused by the Fiume question.

Peace Congresses, beginning with that known as of Westphalia, have usually consisted of all the belligerent Powers meeting on a footing of equality, and mostly ending in the signature of a single treaty signed by all of them. This procedure was not adopted on the recent occasion, and it is obvious that it may have to be modified in accordance with the relative position of the parties when hostilities are terminated by the conclusion of an Armistice Convention. The introduction to Vol. I of the 'History' tells us that, according to the stricter interpretation, it was a Congress, and not a Conference,

that met at Paris. With this view we find it difficult to agree. Up to the time when the draft treaty was presented to Germany on May 7, the proceedings must be held to have consisted of a conference between the Allied and Associated Powers. Then it may perhaps be regarded as assuming to some extent the shape of a Congress, although it more closely resembles the negotiations for the second Treaty of Paris, when the Allied Powers presented their demands to the French Government and the latter was forced to accept them. The Conference continued its labours, and drafted treaties of peace, which were presented successively to the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Governments on June 2, 1919, Jan. 15, 1920, Sept. 19, 1919, and May 11, 1920, respectively. In each case discussion followed with the delegation of the Power on which the treaty was to be imposed, as the result of which modifications were introduced; and these discussions may be regarded as assimilated to the proceedings of a Congress, although the parties thereto were far from being on a footing of equality. On the whole, therefore, it seems more in accordance with facts if we continue to speak of the Peace Conference of Paris, especially as the public voice from before the meeting of the Assembly had used the term Conference.

Although the Congress of Berlin of 1878 furnishes the best model for the conduct of debate, that of Vienna in 1814 presents closer resemblance to the Conference of Paris. The parties to the Congress of Vienna were to be 'all the Powers which had been engaged on either side in the war terminated by the Treaty of Paris of May 30.' This was interpreted in such a liberal fashion that two hundred and sixteen *chefs de mission* made their appearance. The difficulty of carrying on discussions between the members of such an unwieldy assembly was so great that the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers which were parties to the Treaty of Paris took on themselves to represent the whole of Europe. But the real Congress consisted of the Five Great Powers. The Committee of Eight, as Mr Webster tells us, met only eight times, while the Committee of Five held forty-one meetings. How business should be carried on at a Congress is well explained in Mr Woodward's

account of the Congress of Berlin (No. 154 of the Peace Hand-books). At Paris, in 1919, there were plenipotentiaries of Five Great Powers, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, described as the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers'; and with them, constituting the full assembly or *Plenum* of the Conference, were the plenipotentiaries of Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay, being minor Powers that had either declared war against, or broken off relations with, the Central Powers, or been recognised by the Entente Powers, as constituting with the Principal Powers already mentioned 'the Allied and Associated Powers.' Beside these, various other claimants laid their views before the Conference as opportunity offered, such as the Zionist Jews, the Armenians, the Esthonians, Lithuanians and Letts, the Ruthenians and the Georgians, and other subject nationalities of the former Russian Empire, with the Syrians and Lebanese, the Ukrainians, the Aaland Islanders and the Schleswigers. Owing to the difficulty of transacting business in such a large gathering and in public, the Conference was split up into a number of Commissions. The Conference as a whole met only seven times; at Vienna there was never a meeting of the whole Congress.

At Vienna there were present the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, but they did not attend the meetings of plenipotentiaries, at which they were represented respectively, Austria by Metternich, Russia by Razoumoffski, Stackelberg, and Nesselrode, Prussia by Hardenberg. Alexander I completely directed and controlled the action of his plenipotentiaries. Talleyrand was there for France, and Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a vigorous personality, for Great Britain. At the Conference of Paris the United States of America was represented by the President, perhaps a more powerful personage than even a Russian Emperor; the British Empire by the Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George; France by M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister of War; Italy by her Prime Minister, Signor Orlando;

and Japan by Marquis Saionji, a former President of the Council of Ministers.

It was on Jan. 12, 1919, that the Conference opened with a meeting of the Four Great Powers of America and Europe and their Foreign Ministers, and on the 13th Japanese Representatives were added. Thus was formed the Council of Ten, of which M. Clemenceau was formally elected President in conformity with precedent. This lasted until the middle of March, when it was found that it was too large a body to deal effectively with all the business, and it had also been found impossible to keep its decisions from publication in the press. So the Council of Four was substituted for it. This body consisted of the American President and the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Italy. During the absence of Signor Orlando between April 24 and June 20 it became a Council of Three. It had a secretariat, on which the Five Great Powers were represented and which recorded the conversations between the members of the Council of Ten, and of the Council of Four which replaced it; but these records have not been published, and possibly never will be. Only a few Committees were at first set up, firstly the League of Nations Commission, next others on the Responsibility for the War, on Reparation, on International Labour Legislation, and on the International Régime for Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

The question of the official language caused some difficulty. At previous Congresses and Conferences French had as a matter of course been recognised as the sole language. This time the Anglo-Saxon Powers maintained the necessity of giving an equal position to the English text of documents, an essential consideration in a treaty which had to be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent before it could be ratified by the President. The Italian delegation asserted the right of Italian to rank as official if to English was accorded equality with French. In the end both the French and English texts of the treaty with Germany were declared to be authentic, and so also in the case of the Treaty of Peace with Poland. The remaining peace treaties were drawn up in the three languages, the French text to prevail in case of divergence,

except in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Part entitled Labour, where the English and French texts were declared to be of equal force. A similar provision is contained in the Treaties of Sept. 10, 1919, with Czecho-Slovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the treaty of Dec. 9, 1919, with Rumania. Of all these treaties only a single copy was signed, to remain deposited in the archives of the French Government, authenticated copies being furnished to each of the Signatory Powers.

In addition to the Committees already mentioned, a Supreme Economic Council was formed, Territorial Commissions were set up for Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, for Rumania and Yugo-Slavia, for Greece and Albania, for Belgium and Denmark, besides Military, Naval, and Air Commissions. Perhaps the most important of all was the Drafting Commission, on which the five principal Powers were represented. Subordinate to this were the Economic and Financial Drafting Commissions. Besides all this machinery, a Council of Five was formed out of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which followed the procedure of the original Council of Ten. This was the organ for the insertion in the Treaty of clauses omitted by an oversight, and while the Four were employed in the negotiation with Germany was able to proceed with the discussion of the Austrian Treaty.

Mention must also be made of the rules which were drawn up by representatives of the Foreign Offices for conducting the work of the Conference, including the number of plenipotentiary Delegates to be allowed to each Power. It seems that these regulations, published in 'The Times' of Jan. 20, 1919, governed the proceedings at plenary meetings of the Conference, and that the Councils of Four and of Three discussed the questions that came before them independently of any formal rules. A very useful account of these matters is to be found in No. 139 of the documents published by the American Association for International Conciliation.

With the completion of the draft Treaty with Germany it may be held that the Conference had come to a close so far as that Power was concerned, and that with the delivery of the text to the German Delegation on May 7 it had developed into a Congress. Three weeks were

allowed to the Germans for the presentation of their comments, which were to be made in writing, no oral discussion being allowed. Their final counter-proposals, a very bulky document, were delivered on May 30. They maintained that the draft treaty was in contradiction with President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his subsequent declarations, which they regarded as the legal basis, with previous assurances of the Entente statesmen and the general ideas of International Law. Careful consideration was given to the German arguments and the reply of the Allies and Associated Powers was handed over on June 16. It left the draft treaty practically intact, though important concessions had been made. The 'History' (I, cap. 9) gives a detailed discussion of the German assertions; and Part IV of that chapter, which contains a complete analysis of the addresses and speeches of President Wilson in 1918, and of Notes exchanged between him and the German Government in October and November 1918, should be carefully studied. The conclusion that the Armistice Agreement and the Peace Treaty are in complete conformity with the basis accepted by the Entente Powers will be seen to be irrefutable. The Treaty as it was signed on June 28 has been examined, in all its more important parts and especially in the territorial clauses, in this 'Review' for July 1919.

The Treaty of Vienna (1815) was signed by the principal belligerents, and to it were annexed all the ancillary treaties and particular agreements entered into during the Congress, which together with the main treaty formed a whole binding on all the parties to it. To have attempted to frame on the present occasion a single instrument comprising the terms to be imposed not only on Germany but on each of her allies, and the subsidiary treaties with the new states formed from the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires and a resuscitated Poland, would have proved a hopeless task. To ensure the effect produced by the signature of a single treaty on the Vienna model, the following article was inserted in Part XV, *Miscellaneous Provisions*, of the German Treaty:

'Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and Additional Conventions which may be

concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers who fought on the side of Germany, and to recognise whatever dispositions may be made concerning the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, of the Kingdom of Bulgaria and of the Ottoman Empire, and to recognise the new States within their frontiers as there laid down.'

The same is the wording, *mutatis mutandis*, of Arts. 89 and 90 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, similar provisions being inserted in the Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey. In this manner the same result appears to have been obtained as would have been secured by the signature of a single comprehensive treaty, covering all the achieved purposes of the Peace Conference.

The German Treaty naturally served as a general model for the Peace Treaties with the remaining enemy belligerents. A study of Chapter VI of Vol. II of the 'History,' and especially of its Part VI, p. 341, ought to convince any impartial reader that the Peace Treaty with Germany, and the remaining Peace Treaties, which follow the same lines, are, with one exception, in accordance with the agreed basis of peace, constituted by President Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses, as modified by 'the Memorandum of the Allies of Nov. 5, 1918. By this they reserved to themselves complete freedom on the subject of what is so ambiguously called the 'freedom of the seas,' and stated that by the President's declaration that 'the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed,' they understood 'that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.' President Wilson stated that he is 'in complete agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted.' According to the 'Matin' of June 6, after examining the German counter-proposals in detail he declared as follows: 'Our Treaty violates none of my principles. If I thought otherwise I should not hesitate to confess it and should try to retrieve this error, but the Treaty we have drawn up is entirely in accord with my Fourteen Points.'

The exception alluded to above is Art. 80 of the German Treaty, providing that the independence of Austria shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and Art. 88 of the Austrian Treaty equally declaring the independence of Austria to be inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League. Art. 73 of the Hungarian Treaty is similar. This undoubtedly conflicts with the principle of self-determination, and it is impossible to see how the provision can be justified.

The Austrian Treaty was reported to be ready on May 12 (while the German Treaty was still unsigned), and the Austrian Delegation arrived at St Germain on the 14th. Yet it was not till the 29th that an incomplete copy, which did not contain the Military, Reparation, and Financial clauses, was presented to the seventh plenary meeting of the Conference. On June 2, the draft was handed to the Austrian Delegation, and discussion began. The concessions already made to Germany had been introduced into it. On the 25th, the 'Big Three' discussed the measure of Reparation to be required from Austria. In response to the observations of the Austrian Delegation, changes in the Economic clauses were made on July 8, and the revised and amended treaty was delivered to the Delegation on the 20th. They made counter-proposals, to which the Allies replied on Sept. 2; and on the 4th the Austrian National Assembly, after recording a protest, authorised its signature. This formality was completed on Sept. 10.

The conclusion of the treaty with Hungary, which closely follows the lines of the Austrian Treaty, was nevertheless subjected to great delay. This was caused by a Bolshevist movement. From May to July its leader Béla Kun defied the authority of the Supreme Council. Various attempts at setting up a stable administration followed; but it was not till Dec. 1 that the Supreme Council decided to recognise the Hungarian Government. The Peace Delegation arrived in Paris on Jan. 7, 1920. As the result of their representations the Supreme Council decided on certain modifications, and the terms of the Peace Treaty were delivered to the Delegation on Jan. 15. In March a report was presented by the proper Commission on certain observations on Part XII (Ports,

Waterways, and Railways); but, as all the concessions which it had been found possible to make to either Germany or Austria had already been embodied in the treaty, no further alterations were agreed to. The 'History' does not reveal the causes which led to the signature being further postponed to June 4.

The Draft Treaty with Bulgaria was handed to the Bulgarian Delegation on Sept. 19, 1919. It contained all the concessions granted to Germany and Austria, so far as they applied. The Bulgarian observations were held not to justify any alteration of the articles; and, readiness to sign having been expressed by the Delegation on Nov. 14, signature took place on the 27th.

A Turkish Delegation was summoned to Paris and stated its views to a revived 'Council of Ten' on June 17, 1919. They provoked merely a sharp rejoinder and the Delegation left Paris on the 28th. The Turkish Treaty was not signed till Aug. 10, 1920. This long delay may have been caused by difference of opinion among the Allies with respect to the future of Constantinople.

In all the Peace Treaties the most important provisions that excited opposition from the defeated belligerents related to Reparation and the Territorial Clauses. The latter were, generally speaking, the effect of applying the principle of 'self-determination' to subject peoples and races, though there were certain exceptions, the most flagrant of which was perhaps the cession of South Tirol, a purely German territory, to Italy. Reparation is the title of that part of the Peace Treaties which provides for the compensation of damage done to the Allied and Associated Powers and their peoples. Certain acts of damage specified in the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and the Regulations thereto annexed, render the belligerent party liable to make compensation. This covers responsibility for all such acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. Among them are included bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, habitations or buildings; pillaging of towns or places even when taken by assault; destruction or seizure of the enemy's property unless such act is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; the confiscation of

private property; the violation of family honour and rights; taking the lives of individuals or their property; and the infliction of general penalties, pecuniary or otherwise, on the population on account of acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible. All appliances for the transport of persons or goods if seized must be restored, and indemnities for them regulated at the peace; all destruction or intentional damage to institutions dedicated to religious worship, charity, education, art and science is forbidden. Such damage on a huge scale in Belgium and North-Eastern France was wilfully caused by the invaders, to say nothing of other violations of international law and conventions. Evidently the claim for compensation cannot be entirely met by money payments, and must be provided for by the delivery of other forms of property. And this is stipulated for in the various Peace Treaties, as follows:

Germany, Art. 231.—The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by Germany and her allies.

Art. 232.—The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation of all such loss and damage.

In the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties the corresponding articles are identical with this, except that 'all' is omitted before 'loss' in both places.

The corresponding provisions of the Bulgarian Treaty are:

Art. 121.—'Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make reparation.

'On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation.'

Whereas the amount of compensation to be paid by
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each of the first three Powers above named is to be fixed by an Inter-allied commission set up for that purpose, Bulgaria's quota is fixed at 2,250,000,000 francs gold.

In the Turkish Treaty the admission of responsibility and recognition of insufficiency of resources are expressed in identical terms with those of the Bulgarian Treaty, except that there is no mention of Associated Powers. But

'inasmuch as the territorial arrangements resulting from the present Treaty will leave to Turkey only a portion of the revenues of the former Turkish Empire, all claims against the Turkish Empire for reparation are waived by the Allied Powers, subject only to the provisions of this Part [Financial Clauses] and of Part IX (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.' Such are 'all loss and damage suffered by civilian nationals of the Allied Powers, in respect of their persons or property, through the action or negligence of the Turkish authorities during the war and up to the coming into force of the present Treaty,' also 'such restitutions, reparations, and indemnities as may be fixed by the Financial Commission [set up by Art. 231, 4th paragraph] in respect of damages inflicted on the European Commission of the Danube during the war.'

The maps annexed to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties show what portions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire have been detached in favour of Italy (the area of which has yet to be settled), Czecho-Slovakia, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and Rumania. These leave the Austrian and Hungarian Republics without any sea-ports. To remedy this inconvenience

'Free access to the Adriatic Sea is accorded to Austria and Hungary [by Art. 311 and Art. 294 of the respective Treaties] who with this object will enjoy freedom of transit over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . . Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.'

It is when we come to examine the Turkish Treaty of Peace that the losses of territory are found far to exceed what either Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria has had to accept. These are contained in Part III Political Clauses, Part II Frontiers of Turkey, and are delineated on the maps annexed to the Treaty.

Firstly, as regards Constantinople. It is an open secret that the question whether the possession of this Imperial City, fitted by its geographical position to be the capital of a mighty State, should be left to the Turks, remained undetermined until a very short period before the draft was finally settled. It is greatly to be regretted that no better solution could be found in present circumstances. The notion that the Ottoman Sultan is the recognised head of Mohammedanism, and that his seat, if he be such a head (it is well known that the Mohammedans of Morocco have never recognised him in that capacity), must necessarily be at Constantinople and nowhere else, is as devoid of foundation as the corresponding imagination that the Head of the Roman Catholic Church must be permanently and unalterably established at Rome. The presence of the Ottoman Turk on the northern side of the Bosphorus since 1453 has been the provocative cause of all the wars that have been waged in that part of Europe; and the pacification of the Balkan Peninsula has been despaired of as long as he remains there. It is useless for his partisans to descant upon his social virtues. Every nation has the government that it deserves; and, if he is such a virtuous person as they maintain, how comes it that he has produced such a succession of tyrannical, sanguinary-minded, and corrupt rulers?

Art. 36 provides that:

‘Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and to maintain there the capital of the Turkish State.

‘Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty, or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connexion.’

The frontiers of Turkey in Europe are defined by the Black Sea from the entrance of the Bosphorus to a

point about four and a half miles north-west of Podina, and thence an irregular line terminating on the Sea of Marmora about 25 miles west of Constantinople, thus including an insignificant portion of suburban territory.

The Southern limits, marked on Map No. 2, run from point Karatash Burun, nearly opposite to Alexandretta approximately along the parallel of latitude of 37° eastwards to the Persian frontier, and cut off the Hedjaz, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. Armenia is declared independent, the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, with access to the Black Sea, being reserved for arbitration by the President of the United States. The right to independence of the Kurdish areas east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia, and north of the Turkish frontier with Syria and Mesopotamia, is placed under the protection of the League of Nations. Smyrna and the adjacent territory remain under Turkish sovereignty; but Turkey transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty over the city and its territory. Thrace outside the boundary of Constantinople and up to the southern frontier of Bulgaria as defined in the Peace Treaty with that Power falls to Greece. This acquisition of territory, it will be noted, includes Adrianople. Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title to the islands mentioned in Art. 122 (the Dodecanese and Castellorizzo), which are inhabited by Greeks. In favour of Greece Turkey renounces her rights over the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria.

During the recent war and for many years before the Turkish Sultan had exercised the power of closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the ships of other nations, and especially to war-vessels, on the pretext in later times of 'an ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,' never before described in those terms until the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Jan. 5, 1809. By Art. 37 it is provided first, that

'the navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open,

both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.'

Second, that

'these waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.'

By Arts. 38 and 39 the Turkish and Greek Governments, so far as they are respectively concerned, delegate to a Commission to be called the 'Commission of the Straits,' the control of all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus, and the waters within three miles of each of these mouths; and the authority of the Commission may be exercised on shore to such an extent as may be necessary for this control.

Art. 40 stipulates for the composition of the Commission of representatives appointed respectively by the United States (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter states become members of the League of Nations), each Power appointing one representative. The representatives of the Great Powers are each to have two votes, the other four Powers one vote each. The Commission will be completely independent of the local authority, having its own flag, budget, and separate organisation. Art. 43 enumerates the duties of the Commission, other articles define its powers and rights. Arts. 57 to 61 lay down regulations respecting belligerent warships and prizes passing through the aforesaid waters.

In order to ensure maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, Art. 179 defines the zone of operation of the Commission, as shown on Map No. 1. Briefly speaking, it comprises Constantinople and the 'adjacent Turkish territory, the coast districts of Thrace ceded to Greece by the Treaty, including the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the coastal districts of Turkish territory in Asia Minor, starting from the Gulf of Adramyttium and

extending eastwards and then northwards to a point on the Black Sea, two kilometres east of the mouth of the Akabad River. Again, from the mouth of the Biyuk Dere on the Black Sea, the line runs in a south-westerly direction to Karachali on the Gulf of Saros. All works, fortifications, and batteries within this zone and on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, and Mytilene are to be disarmed and demolished within three months of the Treaty coming into force. There are also certain important provisions regarding roads and railways in the above-mentioned zone, which are placed under the authority of France, Great Britain, and Italy. These three Powers also have the right to maintain in the said territories and islands such military and air forces as they may consider necessary. In the event of the Commission finding that the liberty of passage is being interfered with, it will inform the diplomatic representatives of the three Allied Powers, who will concert with the naval and military commanders of the occupying forces such measures as may be necessary.

The Treaties with Poland, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania, may be regarded as subsidiary to the Peace Treaty with Germany, with Austria and Bulgaria respectively; and a series of treaties of similar import will, it is to be expected, be concluded with Greece as receiving a large accession of territory, and with other States which are formed out of the remaining sacrifices of territory made by Turkey. The basic principles of such Treaties are explained in the covering letter of M. Clemenceau to M. Paderewski, dated May 24, 1919, which was presented to Parliament together with the text of the Treaty; and it is pointed out that it is the established procedure that, when a State is newly created or receives large accessions of territory, it may be required, as a condition of recognition, to undertake compliance with certain principles of government. Accordingly, an article was inserted in the Peace Treaty with Germany, to which Poland was to be a party, whereby the latter State agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provisions for protecting the interests of racial, linguistic, or

religious minorities, and for the protection of freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations.

Such stipulations will be perceived to form an important section of the Peace Treaties. They are to be found in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Consequently, Art. 2 of the treaty with Poland, 'guarantees to all inhabitants the elementary rights that are secured in every civilised State.' Clauses 3 to 6 are designed to ensure that all the genuine residents in the territories now transferred to Polish sovereignty shall be assured of the full privileges of citizenship. Arts. 7 and 8 assure equality of rights to racial, linguistic, or religious minorities. Art. 9 provides for education of the children of a linguistic minority through the medium of their own language, and for the enjoyment of an equitable share of public educational funds by such minorities. Arts. 10 and 11 confer special protection on the Jews of Poland. Art. 12 places the foregoing stipulations under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and may not be altered without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League.

Chapter II contains economic clauses designed to facilitate reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation, for ensuring freedom of transit of persons, goods, and of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services. Poland by Art. 18 agrees to apply to the river system of the Vistula the régime applicable to international waterways set out in the Peace Treaty with Germany, and Art. 19 provides for the adhesion of Poland to certain international conventions.

The remaining three subsidiary treaties are framed on the same model, with certain necessary modifications. Thus in the Treaty with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Art. 10 provides for the special interests of Musulmans. Art. 12 recognises as binding on the new State all treaties, conventions, and agreements between Serbia and any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which were in force on Aug. 1, 1914. In the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia, Arts. 10 to 13 provide for the fullest degree of self-government of the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians, compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Treaty with Rumania has an Art. 7

by which Jews inhabiting any Rumanian territory who do not possess another nationality are to be recognised as Rumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality. And as Arts. 8 and 9 correspond to Arts. 7 and 8 of the Treaty with Poland, their rights as Rumanian citizens are fully assured to them. Art. 11 accords to the communities of the Saxons and Szecklers in Transylvania local autonomy in regard to scholastic and religious matters subject to the control of the Rumanian State. Finally, Art. 16 corresponds, as regards the river system of the Pruth, with Art. 18 of the Polish Treaty.

The problems discussed in the volume which stands third on our list relate exclusively to the territorial settlements made by the Peace Treaties (excepting the Turkish Treaty, to which America was not a party). It contrasts favourably with 'The History' inasmuch as it is the work of two writers, each of whom undertook one half of the chapters of which it consists. A general unity of style and treatment accordingly pervades the whole, which is more than can be said of the larger book.

No one will doubt that universal compulsory military service enabled the militarist Great Powers gradually to increase the numbers of their trained men, and eventually to realise the theory of 'the armed nation,' which led to the war being conducted on such a ruinous scale. It must be regretted, therefore, that the 'History' has a whole paragraph devoted to the glorification of this.

'There is only one vital argument against universal military service, that it increases the chances of war by developing the martial instinct of nations, and by placing in the hands of ambitious rulers a powerful instrument for imposing their will on weaker Powers.'

Perhaps it will be alleged that, most, if not all, of the autocratic rulers having disappeared from the stage, the danger of their example being followed has vanished. But history teaches that nations are just as easily led away by the love of domination as individual rulers, and this passion is also found to animate individuals in a position to aim at its gratification.

ERNEST SATOW.

Art. 2.—TWO DOMINION STATESMEN.

I. SIR WILFRID LAURIER.

SIR WILFRID LAURIER, as was the case with at least two of his predecessors in the premiership of the Dominion of Canada—Macdonald and Mackenzie—began his political career with neither material nor social advantages in his favour. Macdonald was the son of an emigrant, who was a wage-earner at Kingston, Ontario, almost to the end of his working life. Mackenzie was a stonemason, who, like the parents of Macdonald, emigrated from Scotland; and he was at work at his trade until he became actively interested in politics. Laurier was the son of a land surveyor, Carolus Laurier, who earned only a meagre income by the practice of his profession. He was born in 1841, at St Lin, a picturesque and typically French-Canadian village, in the county of L'Assomption. His mother, who was of Acadian descent, died when Laurier was only four years old.

Until Laurier made his first communion, he attended the parish school at St Lin. The next three years of his life were passed at a Protestant school at New Glasgow, a small town eighteen miles from his birthplace. At the end of his schooling (1854) he entered the College of L'Assomption. He remained there for the full classical course of seven years. At the age of twenty, he began his short career at the Bar, entering the office at Montreal of Rudolphe Laflamme, who was afterwards a member of the Liberal Administration at Ottawa (1874–1878). While in Laflamme's office, Laurier took the law course at McGill University, and achieved some distinction as a student. He was admitted to the bar in 1864, and in 1880 was raised to the rank of Q.C.

Laurier practised law first in Montreal, and later at Arthabaska. He was, however, at no time really prominent among the lawyers of the Province of Quebec; nor was he ever, from the point of view of income, more than moderately successful in his profession. Ten years after the completion of his studies at McGill, he was elected to the House of Commons (1874), and politics thereafter were his absorbing interest. During the greater part of his life he lived on his salary (\$1250) as a Member of Parliament, with the addition, during his

Premiership, of a Premier's salary (\$7500), and during his last phase, as Leader of the Opposition, of the salary of \$5000 paid since 1904 to the holder of that position.

Laurier's career in Dominion politics extended over forty-five years. It is a career, in this respect, without parallel in the history of Canada. It is, moreover, without parallel in the history of the Oversea Dominions, as regards its permanent influence on the relations of all the Dominions with Great Britain. Laurier had no part in Confederation. He was beginning his career as a lawyer when the British North-America Act (1867) was passed by the Parliament at Westminster. But no Canadian statesman of his time had more influence on the relations of the Dominions and Great Britain in the twenty-five years that preceded the Great War, than the French-Canadian Premier of 1896-1911.

The long career of Laurier at Ottawa easily divides itself into three well-marked periods. The first extends from 1874 to 1896. Except for four years (1874-1878) the Liberals were in opposition during this period; and for nine of these years (1887-1896) Laurier was leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, and national leader of the Liberal party. The second period extends from the general election in 1896, to the defeat of the Liberals, on the Taft-Fielding reciprocity agreement, at the general election in September 1911. This was the Laurier era, as the period from 1867 to 1891 had been the Macdonald era. It was the era during which Laurier left his mark on the relations between the Dominions and Great Britain, and, through the British preferential tariff of 1897, on the foreign commercial policy of Great Britain, and also on the trade policy of four of the five Oversea Dominions. The third period extends from the formation of the Borden Government, in the autumn of 1911, to Laurier's death in February 1919. It was marked by the division of the Liberal party over the Conscription Act, and generally by disruption and misfortune without parallel in the history of Liberalism in Canada.

Laurier was thirty-three when, in 1874, he entered the House of Commons. He was returned at the general election in that year by Drummond and Arthabaska, the riding in which he had practised as a lawyer;

in which he achieved the only prize in his profession that ever fell to him—election as *batonnier* by the Bar of the county; and in which also he had unsuccessfully attempted to establish a Liberal newspaper, published in the language of the province. It is the riding, moreover, in which Laurier established his first home; for in 1868 he was married to Miss Zoe Lafontaine, and until the end of his life his country home was in Arthabaska.

Politics were not a new interest with Laurier when he first entered the House of Commons as a supporter of the Liberal Government of 1874–1878—the Government which had been returned to power as the result of the widespread popular indignation at the grave scandal arising out of the granting, by the Macdonald Government, of the first charter for the Canadian Pacific Railway. In his earlier years in Montreal, and as a lawyer and a newspaper editor at Arthabaskaville, Laurier was a Radical, at times an extreme one; and it was in this period of his career that his Radicalism, especially in the domain of ecclesiastical politics, brought him into collision with the authorities of the Catholic Church.

Before he was elected to Parliament he had served one term of three years (1871–1874) in the Lower House of the Legislature at Quebec. It was his first and only service in provincial politics. In one important respect it was a helpful and memorable term; for, while he was a member of the Legislative Assembly, he greatly distinguished himself by a speech that was remembered to his credit as long as he lived. It was on the relations of French-Canadians in Quebec with the people of the sister provinces—Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia—and on the relations of the Dominions with Great Britain.

In 1871, the year in which Laurier made what became known as his 'United Canada' speech, Confederation was still in some degree an experiment. Not all the old British North-American provinces at this time had thrown in their lot with the newly-created Dominion. Nova Scotia was still complaining that it had been hustled into Confederation against its will; British Columbia was driving a hard bargain with Ottawa; and there were still some unsettled and disturbing questions, mostly affecting provincial rights, arising out of Confederation as

organised and worked under the British North America Act of 1867. Laurier's speech sounded the key-note of many subsequent speeches on the same subject, made, some in Canada, some in England, after he had established his position in Dominion politics, and, as a political leader, had become as acceptable to the English-speaking provinces as to Quebec.

At this time Laurier was on the back-benches in the Legislative Chamber. His speech, as remarkable for its grace of style as it was for its frankness, brought him into a prominence that extended beyond the boundaries of the French province. He ranked thereafter as an advocate of a united Canada—as a French-Canadian who was opposed to a continuance of the old racial and religious divisions between French and English-speaking Canadians. He showed himself also an admirer of British political institutions and British civilisation, who from his study of English history could state the grounds on which his admiration was based; and an outspoken upholder of the tie between the Dominion and Great Britain.

Laurier's Quebec speech—his first speech that was of more than provincial interest—together with his distinguished personal appearance, his genial temperament, and his grace of manner, soon made him acceptable to his fellow-members from the English-speaking provinces in the House of Commons of 1874–1878. He had the instinct for parliamentary procedure which is characteristic of French-Canadians, and a love for the usages and traditions of Parliament; and he possessed these qualities to a degree that was remarkable even among the men of his province. Moreover, he was a polished and graceful speaker and formidable in debate. He was equally attractive whether speaking in the House of Commons or on the platform in the constituencies. In some respects he was not the intellectual equal of Blake or Cartwright, but he could hold the attention of the House as well as either of these contemporaries; and from his earliest years at Ottawa he was always careful not to weary his audience—a remark that could not uniformly be made of either Blake or Cartwright.

In the Parliament of 1874–1878—the only Parliament in the period 1867–1896 in which the Liberals were in

power—Laurier's success was almost immediate. In a comparatively short time his mental equipment for parliamentary life, and its obvious value to the Liberal party at this juncture in its history, were recognised by Mackenzie and his colleagues of the Cabinet. In October 1877, Laurier was appointed Minister of Inland Revenue; and from 1877 until 1918, the last session in which he attended the House, he was a front-bench member. His seat for Drummond and Arthabaska was regarded a safe one at the time when he received his portfolio as minister; otherwise Mackenzie, whose administration was at this time much assailed, might not (to use an Ottawa phrase) have 'opened' the constituency. But the Church had not yet settled its account with Laurier for his contumacy while he was engaged in the practice of the law at Montreal, and while he was editor of a newspaper at Arthabaskaville. It opposed his return; and, when he sought re-election, he was defeated by a majority of forty. This failure, however, involved no break in his parliamentary or ministerial career. A vacancy was created for Quebec East. Laurier was successful there; and he represented this constituency continuously for forty-two years.

It was about this time that Sir John A. Macdonald and his followers of the Conservative Opposition began the agitation for a tariff for the protection of Canadian industry. There had been tariffs for the protection of home industries during the era of the United Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (1841-1867). The first of these tariffs was enacted in 1858, the second in 1859. There were duties as high as 20 and 25 per cent. in these tariffs; and the duties were imposed avowedly for the protection of manufacturers in Upper and Lower Canada. But between 1866 and 1878 most of these protectionist duties had been eliminated, because the Maritime Provinces were then hostile to protection. During the lifetime of the Parliament of 1874-1878, there were few duties in excess of 17½ per cent. Notwithstanding much pressure from the manufacturing interests, the Mackenzie Government, in which Sir Richard Cartwright was Minister of Finance, refused, in the session of 1877, to call upon Parliament to enact any protectionist duties. Mackenzie's refusal to accept the principle of protection,

and to embody that principle in the tariff, gave the Conservatives an opportunity. Acting in the spirit of opportunism, Macdonald promptly committed the Conservative party to protection.

Macdonald and the Conservatives thus thrust a new issue into Dominion politics, an issue on which the two parties were to be sharply divided for the next eighteen or nineteen years. The general election of 1878 was fought on what in Canada for forty years has been known as the National Policy. It was the first election in Canada, or in the British North-American provinces, at which protection was the issue. The Liberals were overwhelmingly defeated. Macdonald again became Premier; and he held that office until his death in 1891.

The first National Policy tariff, with protectionist duties ranging from 25 to 35 per cent., was enacted in 1879, a year after the return of the Conservatives to power. From that time, the Conservative party had the unwavering support of all the interests, industrial and financial, that directly or indirectly derive advantage from National Policy tariffs. Despite the fact that there were general elections in 1882, 1887, and 1891, the Liberal party was continuously in opposition until 1896. In the Parliament of 1878-1882, the Liberals, then led by Mackenzie, numbered only 69, in a House of Commons containing 206 members. Mackenzie, who among other distinctions had that of being the only Premier of Canada to decline a knighthood, soon wearied of the uphill task of leading the Opposition, almost a forlorn hope in those years. He retired in 1882, and was succeeded by Edward Blake, who was leader until after the general election of 1887. Blake then retired, because of ill-health. At a caucus of the Liberal members, whose numbers had been increased to 87 at the last election, Laurier was chosen as Blake's successor. He had been elected leader of the French-Canadian group of the Liberal party in the House of Commons in the first session of the 1878 Parliament.

It has always been the rule at Ottawa to elect party leaders in a caucus. In Canada the caucus is older than Confederation. In the course of a parliamentary session at Ottawa, much business comes before the caucus of each party. The Government unfolds its legislative

policy and plans in caucus ; and in caucus the Opposition discusses legislation proposed by the Government, and decides on its policy and House of Commons tactics in respect to such legislation. Each party, when in opposition, chooses its leader in caucus ; and generally it may be said that the caucus is as firmly established and as frequently in service as it is at Washington.

Laurier, on Blake's retirement (1887), was not anxious to change his position as leader of the French-Canadian group for that of leader of the Opposition. He was aware that it was an excessively difficult position for a French-Canadian. He pleaded first the condition of his health, which from the time when he removed from Montreal to Arthabaska had never been robust. Next, he advanced the fact, already well known, that he was not a man of independent means. Finally, he agreed to accept the leadership for a session, pending an improvement in Blake's health. But Blake was not willing to resume the position. In the early days of the session of 1888, Laurier was re-elected by the Liberal caucus ; and thereafter his leadership of the party, whether it was in opposition or in power, was unquestioned. There were, moreover, no divisions in the party until the question of Conscription came before Parliament in the session of 1917.

During the long period of eighteen years through which the Liberals were in opposition, only two questions which have any large place in the political history of the Dominion occupied for any considerable time the attention of Parliament. One was the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and the policy of the Macdonald Government in regard to that undertaking ; the other was the so-called National Policy, with its tariff protection to Canadian manufacturers, and (after 1883) bounties from the Dominion Treasury in aid of the iron and steel industry in Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Ontario.

At every session from 1878 to 1885 there were long and often acrimonious debates in the House of Commons on the first of these questions. There were Liberals, of whom Cartwright was the most prominent, who were opposed to the Canadian Pacific as planned and supported by the Conservative Government. These Liberals held that a less costly scheme could be devised to fulfil the

conditions made with British Columbia when that remote and isolated province agreed to come into Confederation. It was a conviction with these members of the House that the Canadian Pacific Railway could never pay; that the Company would become bankrupt; and that the Government would be deeply involved in the failure of the undertaking. Laurier never seems to have gone as far as this in his opposition to the scheme, but he was opposed to the land grants, to the subsidies, and also to the section in the Act which exempted the Company for many years from taxation of its lands and its railway properties. The railway was, however, made; and its success justified the foresight of its promoters.

From 1879 to 1896 the one continuing cause of contention was the National Policy tariff. The Liberals were not free-traders; they always agreed that there must be duties on imports in order to raise revenue. What they objected to was the fiscal system established by Macdonald and the Conservatives in 1879, which was so framed as to afford protection to Canadian industries. Their alternative policy was a fiscal system, with duties on imports devised solely for the raising of revenue, and with no concern on the part of the Government for the interests of Canadian manufacturers. They condemned protection on the ground that it corrupted politics, fostered the growth of trusts and combinations to advance prices, increased the cost of living, retarded immigration, and was responsible for the large and continuing exodus to the United States of native-born Canadians, and also of new-comers from the United Kingdom.

At no time during Laurier's career was he regarded as an authority on trade or commerce, or on the details and operation of tariffs. These were not subjects to which he applied his mind, either when in Opposition or as head of the Government. In Opposition, from 1878 to 1896, Cartwright and Mills, who had both been members of the Mackenzie Administration of 1874-1878, were the foremost authorities on trade, tariffs, bounties, and reciprocity. When the Liberals were in power, Laurier left the details of tariff and bounty enactments, as well as of reciprocity agreements with France and the United States, almost exclusively to his subordinates, H. S. Fielding, Cartwright, and Paterson.

Laurier seldom intervened in debates on tariffs and bounties after the Liberal party, in April 1897, had accepted the National Policy of the Conservatives and, with singular completeness, abandoned or repudiated the fiscal principles advocated by Liberals in Canada from the enactment of the Cayley tariff in 1858 to the Ottawa Conference of 1893 and the general election of 1896. But between 1878 and 1896 he frequently took part in tariff debates in the House, and also made many speeches against the National Policy in the constituencies. In these speeches he invariably confined himself to general principles and broad statements, which, however, made it clear that the principle of protection, and the corruption and exploitation which usually develop when it is embodied in fiscal systems, were to him accursed things. In and out of Parliament, he denounced protection in all its aspects, in terms as vigorous as were ever used by Cobden and Bright, by Peel, Gladstone, Russell, and Grey, by President Cleveland and President Wilson ; or, to come to more recent times, by 'The Grain-Growers' Guide' of Winnipeg and 'The Farmers' Sun' of Toronto, the chief organs of the agrarian movement * of the present day.

At the National Liberal Conference, held at Ottawa, in June 1893, one of the strongest of many speeches against the National Policy was made by Laurier, who as leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons issued the call for the Conference, and presided over its three days' deliberations. The memorable Ottawa programme, modelled to some degree on the Newcastle programme of the Liberal party in England, was framed at this Conference, and was widely promulgated in anticipation of a general election that was expected to come in 1895 but did not come until June 1896. It was

* This movement, which in 1920 is represented by an independent group of nine members in the House of Commons at Ottawa, and also by a majority of the members of the Legislature of Ottawa, had its origin as a political movement ten years ago. It developed as a movement in Dominion, as distinct from provincial, politics, out of the pronounced and continuing hostility of grain-growers of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, and of farmers in the provinces east of the Great Lakes, to the high protectionist tariffs and the system of lavish bounties to the iron and steel industry, for which the Liberal Government of 1896-1911 was responsible.

in this programme of 1893 that the Liberal party of Canada, as a Dominion-wide organisation, defined its attitude towards the National Policy of the Conservatives. The Liberal party, it is well to point out, did not promise to open the ports by abolishing all import duties. Import duties have been continuously levied in Canada since 1846, when, by the Enabling Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Legislatures of the old British North-American provinces were empowered to enact their own tariffs. In the Ottawa Liberal programme, there was no promise to establish free trade as it existed at that time in the United Kingdom. Exigencies of revenue made impossible any such sweeping reform of the fiscal system, as it had existed since 1879; but the party gave an unequivocal pledge to the electorate that it would, if returned to power, eliminate the principle of protection from the fiscal system of the Dominion. With this object a widely-extended propaganda programme was carried on during the next three years. Laurier, as leader of the Opposition, was at the height of his popularity, and spoke frequently in the constituencies. In 1894 he went as far afield as Winnipeg, and it was in that city that he held protection up to odium as a form of slavery.

There was no surprise in Canada, not even among Ministers at Ottawa, at the success of the Liberal party at the general election of 1896. The party was ably led. Laurier was popularly regarded as the Gladstone of the Dominion. Cartwright had a strong hold on Ontario. Mr Sifton (now Sir Clifford Sifton) was then a power in Manitoba. The late Israel Tarte, editor of a French-Canadian weekly newspaper of wide circulation, was Laurier's lieutenant in Quebec; and 'down by the sea,' in the Maritime Provinces, Mr W. Blair, Premier of New Brunswick, Mr Fielding, then Premier of Nova Scotia, and Mr Davies, an ex-Premier of Prince Edward Island, were acceptable and able leaders. Moreover, the three years' campaign in support of the Ottawa programme infused more enthusiasm into the Liberal party than had existed at any time since Confederation, or has existed at any time since 1896.

The Conservative party, on the other hand, had manifestly been running to seed since the death of

Macdonald in 1891. Its strength and cohesion in the years 1878-1891, and its successes at the election in 1882, 1887, and 1891, were due to the personality of Macdonald, and to the support it received from the protected manufacturers. Since 1891 the party has never developed a leader comparable in any degree with Macdonald, whose personality in the House and on the platform was quite as attractive and quite as holding as that of Laurier. From the death of Macdonald to the end of the Conservative regime in 1896, the Conservatives had had four leaders—Abbott, Thompson, Bowell, and Tupper; and in the last two years it was lamentably short of men of Cabinet rank. Moreover, its leaders had been quarrelling among themselves; and, what was worse from the point of view of the party as a whole, they had been taking the Dominion into their confidence regarding the causes of these quarrels. Bowell, who succeeded Thompson as Premier at the end of 1894, resigned in April 1896, because of difficulties with several members of his Cabinet, whom he publicly denounced as traitors. He was succeeded by Tupper, who had been High Commissioner for Canada in London. Tupper hoped to retrieve the fortunes of the party, and secure for it another lease of power; but the electorate was thoroughly weary of the Conservative regime; and the Liberals had a majority of 34 in a House containing 230 members.

The Laurier régime extended from July 1896 to October 1911. There were four general elections in these fifteen years—1900, 1904, 1908, and 1911. On the first three of these occasions the Conservative Opposition made no additions to its strength in the House of Commons; and the hold of the Liberals on the constituencies was well maintained. Trade was flourishing. Two additional trans-continental railways were under construction. Tens of thousands of people were acquiring fortunes—on paper—from the long-continued boom in real estate in the provinces west of the Ottawa river. Immigration from England and Scotland, and from several countries of Continental Europe, was unprecedentedly large. Most satisfactory of all, the grain-growing industry in the prairie provinces—the mainstay of Canada, as regards export trade—was being greatly extended, to the manifest advantage of Ontario and

Quebec, the central and pre-eminently manufacturing, mercantile, and money-handling provinces of the Dominion.

At the end of 1910, when Fielding and Paterson were negotiating for reciprocity with the United States by an agreement which both political parties would have been eager to conclude at any time from 1866 to 1910, it seemed as though the Laurier regime might continue for years to come. But there was an unexpected development in connexion with the agreement. The protected manufacturers and the financial and transport interests strongly objected to it. All these interests were apprehensive that reciprocity * might weaken the tie between the Dominion and Great Britain. Above all, the manufacturers and the banking companies, whose interests are closely interwoven with those of the manufacturers, were in dread of the inroad that reciprocity might ultimately make in the policy of the Dominion.

The Liberals, it will be recalled, had, thirteen years earlier, abandoned their old fiscal principles and also their former hostility to bounties. In 1897, they made the National Policy their own; and, by the enactment of higher duties in that year and in 1907, they made it of more service to the manufacturers than it was from 1878 to 1896, when the Conservatives were in power. The only innovations in the National Policy made by the Liberals were (1) the introduction of anti-dumping sections in the Tariff Acts of 1897 and 1907—an innovation manifestly in the interest of the protected manufacturers; and (2) the enactment of the British preferential tariffs of 1897 and 1898. Now the manufacturers never liked the preferential tariff. There were woollen manufacturers who, in 1897, threatened to close their mills because concessions had been made to British manufacturers. At no time, moreover, from 1897 to the beginning of the war, did manufacturers in Canada conceal the fact of their dislike. Their persistent demand was for adequate protection against competition whether from Great Britain or from the United States. They regarded such protection as essential to the

* There has been reciprocity in wheat and wheat produce since April 1917, and in potatoes since June 1919.

continued prosperity of manufacturing enterprises in Canada; and, in response to their demands, material curtailments of the preference were made in 1904, and again at the general revision of the tariff in 1907.

But, except as regards the preference, from 1897 to the introduction of the reciprocity resolutions into the Canadian House of Commons in the session of 1911, the protected manufacturers were as well satisfied with the fiscal policy of the Liberals as they had been with that of the Conservatives from 1879 to 1896. The clash between the Laurier Government and the protected manufacturers and the financial and transport interests arose entirely over the proposed reciprocity agreement. The Government, apprehensive of incurring the hostility of the organised grain-growers and farmers, was compelled to adhere to its policy. The opposing interests insisted upon the abandonment of the agreement. The result was that at the election in September 1911, the Liberals were defeated; and the Conservatives, who had suddenly and unexpectedly abandoned their old attitude towards reciprocity, and espoused the cause of the manufacturing, financial, and transport interests, were returned to power with Sir Robert Borden as Premier.

It has seemed expedient to recall these details of the fiscal and trade policy of the Laurier Government for an obvious reason. Laurier gave hearty and loyal support to the British Government during the Boer War of 1899-1902; and in 1910 he was responsible for an act,* which went into effect only in part, for the creation of a Canadian War Navy, which was to be under control of the Dominion Government. The raising and equipping by the Ottawa Government of volunteers for the Boer War, and the Naval Act of 1910, afforded proof that the Dominion, under Laurier, realised and was ready to accept its imperial responsibilities and obligations. But it was manifestly through his fiscal and trade policy that Laurier permanently influenced the relations between the

* The Naval Act was passed in March 1910, but only part of its provisions went into effect, because in the winter of 1910-1911 there came the contest in the House of Commons over the reciprocity resolutions; and in September 1911, as has been stated, the Government was defeated at the general election, and the Laurier regime came to an end.

Dominions and Great Britain, and indirectly influenced the trade relations of all the Dominions, except Newfoundland, with Great Britain, and also the commercial diplomacy of the mother country.

All the influence in this direction that Laurier exercised—and it was undoubtedly a greater influence than has ever been exercised by a premier of Canada or by a premier of any other Dominion—developed out of the British preferential tariff of 1897. The Canadian tariff of 1897 was not the first preferential tariff enacted in a colony that is now of the Dominions. For two or three years after the Enabling Act of 1846 was on the statute book, the Legislature of Newfoundland passed Tariff Acts in which there were preferences for imports from the United Kingdom. But these Newfoundland Tariff Acts of 1848–1850 had been long forgotten when the Parliament at Ottawa, in April 1911, enacted the first preferential Tariff Act of the Dominion.

The Act came as a surprise to Canada. It was quite as much a surprise to the people of the United Kingdom, and to the Australasian and South African colonies. It can now be stated with authority that even the Colonial Office had had no intimation through the Governor-General that in the first Tariff Act of the Laurier Government preferential terms were to be conceded to imports from the United Kingdom. It was apprehended by the Cabinet at Ottawa that the Colonial Office would object to the new departure because of its disturbing effect on the commercial treaty with Germany, and also on some twenty other commercial treaties which were in force in 1897. Hence, contrary to usage, no summary of the changes made by the new tariff was communicated by cable to the Colonial Office before Mr Fielding, the Minister of Finance, submitted it to the House of Commons.

The Fielding tariff had the effect that had been foreseen. It brought about the immediate denunciation of all the older commercial treaties; for, with these treaties in operation, all the countries which were parties to them could have claimed—as Germany did claim—the right to the same tariff concessions as were made to the United Kingdom. Laurier's name must consequently always have place in the history of the commercial

diplomacy of Great Britain; for it was by the stand he took in April 1911, that a clean sweep was made of a score or more treaties that had fettered the action of the self-governing colonies from the time fiscal freedom accrued to them as a result of the free-trade legislation at Westminster of 1846.

Laurier has still another claim to distinction in the history of the commercial diplomacy of the Empire. For sixty years—1847 to 1907—first, the old British North-American provinces, and afterwards the Dominion of Canada, were pressing for the right to make their own commercial treaties. There were many partial and qualified concessions to this demand, from the time of the negotiation of the first treaty of reciprocity between the British North-American provinces and the United States (1847-1854), to the negotiation in 1893, by Sir Charles Tupper, of the reciprocity treaty with France. Full and complete concession to it came in 1907, when Laurier, Fielding, and Brodeur negotiated the second commercial treaty with France. It was carried through without material aid from the British Ambassador at Paris, and without intervention, as regards the details of the treaty, from the Foreign Office in London.

Developments in Canada since 1911—the complete and costly breakdown of Laurier's railway policy; the disruption of the Liberal party over Conscription, which Laurier opposed; and the revolt of the agrarians against high protectionist tariffs, for which Laurier was responsible—make it difficult as yet to determine Laurier's right place in the political history of the Dominion. But his place as a Canadian statesman, who greatly and beneficently influenced the Empire as a whole, is assured.

EDWARD PORRITT.

II. GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

GREAT men in all ages have been rare, and the achievements that justify the title vary in character. 'Events make men,' according to Herbert Spencer; but men undoubtedly influence events, though their share in proportion to that of circumstance may be indeterminable. The greatest of men are in no small degree children of fortune; and the effect of their actions, no matter how judiciously conceived, is in a large measure governed by the way in which surrounding factors tumble into the arena, not unlike pieces of glass in a revolving kaleidoscope. Neither results nor man's share in their accomplishment can be truly gauged at short range. These reflexions are inspired by the desire, in framing these brief notes upon the late General Louis Botha, to do justice to him and to his admirable qualities, on the one hand, without prejudicing the work of future historians by contemporary exaggeration, on the other.

First, with regard to his appearance and personality. He stood about six feet in height, broad-shouldered, heavy-boned, deep-chested and muscular, with large blue eyes that looked straight at one, and a delightful winning smile; a round face, small nose, black hair and tanned complexion. He was very intelligent and irresistibly attractive in lighter, happy moods; dark and taciturn in rare moments of anger. Keenly alive and virile, he centred his whole heart on the occupation of the moment, whether on State or other serious affairs or on diversions. In spare moments golf or bridge greatly amused him. I met him once under treatment at Kissingen; he followed the régime scrupulously. Bright-minded and companionable, genial and kindly in his outlook, he was a magnetic being, charming in everyday intercourse, and, in spite of not having had the advantages of public-school training or higher education, dignified in bearing and well-mannered, modest, unassuming, unspoiled by adulation. He had, moreover, a keen sense of humour, coupled with an ample fund of sound common-sense and a practical mind characteristic of his race, and particularly of the portion bred under the friendly African sun on the broad veld. Only those who

are familiar with the gorgeous colouring, the invigorating air, and the immense structural scale of the wide plains and rocky eminences of South Africa, can realise how the environment has dominated the outlook of those nurtured in its amenities.

In this short review we may pass rapidly over the early life of General Botha. His father was a well-to-do farmer; and Louis, one of six brothers, was born at Greytown, Natal, in 1862. At the age of twenty-two we first hear of him as accompanying Lucas Meyer upon an expedition to Zululand, in support of Dinizulu against Usibepu. The assistance of the Boer Commando turned the scale in favour of Dinizulu, who, as a recompense, granted them an area of land, which they called the New Republic, with Vryheid as its capital. Vryheid was incorporated in the Transvaal in 1888, Botha being then twenty-six years of age. Some seven years later he went to Pretoria as a member of the Second Volksraad.

I must not linger over the burning questions of that period, which covered the development of the Witwatersrand gold-mining industry, and the advent of the 'new' population. Botha, even in those early years, was out of sympathy with the narrow and repressive policy which was then the keynote of President Kruger's administration. The President realised that the patriarchal system was threatened, but he was not of the stuff to part meekly with a cherished ideal. Bitter discontent arose, partly from reactionary legislation and the disabilities placed upon new-comers, partly from the insecurity of life and property. Titles to individual mining property were in constant jeopardy—in the main, be it admitted, from assaults by the new-comers themselves. In a heterogeneous community of fortune seekers, drawn from all parts of the world, there were naturally specimens of every moral grade, from the highly cultured gentleman to the most unscrupulous adventurer. Men of the latter class did not find the business of merely attacking the rights of their neighbours sufficiently attractive and began to divert their attention to the Volksraad. Here indeed was a fine field for predatory activities. Playing here upon the ignorance and there upon the cupidity of some of the members—simple peasants be it noted—they created a real danger, and

from time to time the legislature displayed signs of yielding to the allurements of concession-hunters. In one notorious case, that of the Dynamite Concession, President Kruger himself warned members that wrapped up with the granting of this concession was the independence of the State!

Dissatisfaction and grievances accumulated. The Volksraad was deaf to appeals and blind to consequences. Consciousness of the situation was, however, awakening. A section of the Volksraad, led by General Piet Joubert in the upper chamber, and Lucas Meyer in the second chamber, manifested its opposition to Kruger's repressive policy. Botha joined that section, but it failed to stem the reactionary tide. Anger on the part of the Uitlanders reached its breaking-point when Kruger endeavoured to force military service upon them, without, at the same time, granting them any rights of citizenship, and displayed the intention of fortifying the gaol which commanded the town. It was at this stage that steps were taken for the projected rising at Johannesburg; and any impartial student must confess that there was solid justification for the movement. The Jameson Raid ensued, a disastrous incident, which should not, however, be confounded with the original plan or the basis of the intended internal revolt. Whatever view may be held respecting that turmoil, there is no doubt that it enlightened the world upon President Kruger's aims and methods in South Africa, and his intercourse with foreign powers, particularly with Germany. Botha was undoubtedly in sympathy with the Uitlander cause, but the invasion impelled him to take up arms in defence of what he regarded (erroneously, it should be said) as an attempt to steal the country.

During the next few years he did not come into special prominence, but his chance came with the Boer War. Serving at first under Lucas Meyer, he was speedily chosen as the leader of that commando, and, after the death of General Joubert, he became commander-in-chief of the Boer Forces. In spite of his having had no technical military training, he manifested great skill in the field. His exploits in that arena need not be dwelt upon here, as they are upon record. That he should have led his people through an unsuccessful

war, and emerged still enjoying their confidence, is an accomplishment of a remarkable order, the more remarkable in view of the highly developed critical faculties of the Boers and their exceptional disregard of rank or position. It is, moreover, significant evidence of his wisdom, tact, and powers of leadership. From that time he became the recognised head of his people. Having played a distinguished part in the war, he was equally prominent in the peace settlement. He took a leading part in the negotiations that led to the Terms of Surrender; and the Ten Articles that were ultimately signed lent some colour to the claim set up later that this instrument constituted a Treaty of Peace. No useful purpose would be served by a technical discussion upon the differences between Terms of Surrender and a Treaty of Peace, but, in the light of later events, it may be interesting to recall a passage from the 'South African News,' a Bond organ, which shows how the concessions made by the British Government were magnified.

'As every person possessing an ounce of imagination has seen long ago, the main hope of the permanence of the structure, whose foundations were laid at Vereeniging, is just the fact that the Republicans were not beaten to their knees, but entered the British Empire "in cap and plumes erect and free," and, therefore, able to forgive and co-operate with those whose full-blood brethren and partners they then became.'

This is not true of the condition of the Boer forces when peace was sought, nor is it true, unfortunately, that the Boers as a whole became 'brotherly' in their attitude towards the British Empire. It may be interesting to remark that the correspondence preceding the agreement concerning the Terms of Surrender discloses the efforts of the Boers, first to retain their independence, then, while surrendering independence as regards foreign relations, to retain self-government under British supervision. Finally, finding themselves unable to make any headway upon such terms, they obtained powers from the burghers in the field to accept the conditions approved of by His Majesty's Government for the surrender of the Boer forces, and set forth in the Ten Articles. Botha himself, no doubt as a matter of good policy, always referred to this document as the Treaty

or Peace of Vereeniging; but it should be clearly understood that he never wavered in any of his utterances from the position that the Boers were bound by every dictate of honour to respect the obligations into which they had entered.

It was not surprising that, after the conclusion of hostilities, a sea of bitterness remained. Botha and the other Boer leaders stood aloof and denied their assistance to Lord Milner during the period of Crown Colony administration, and they declined the proffered seats upon the Legislative Council formed in 1903. About the beginning of that year, owing to the continued state of depression in the country, agitation for political reform began. Slack times find men without sufficient occupation for their thoughts in the business of life, and they turn to the contemplation of their misfortunes, fruitful foster-parents of political discontent. The British section of the South African population, therefore, split up into two groups, the one desirous of full responsible Government, the other, and, I think, the more thoughtful, of a half-way house in advance of Crown Colony administration as a first step. The divergence of views among the English encouraged General Botha to summon a Congress of the Boers, which was opened in Pretoria in May 1904. Towards the conclusion of his opening address, he said,

‘Our people have made great sacrifices; they have shed their blood and wept tears of bitter sorrow; but they must thoroughly understand that the lowering of their flag and the change of Government do not entail the renunciation of their traditions. Now is the time for us to prove to our new Government that we are and shall remain one people, of whom they must become proud. We have one object in view, and that is to live and to work in unison with the new population; and my earnest hope and prayer is that it may please the Almighty to inspire the entire white population in South Africa with feelings of unity, so that a nation may be born worthy to take its place among the nations of the world, where the name of “Africander” shall be heard with honour and applause.’

I quote this passage because, although Botha consistently pleaded for the unity of the white population, he did not

embrace the golden opportunity of that moment to join the Responsible-Government Party, with whose views he and his friends were in accord. If racial divisions could have been eliminated, there was no ground then for the formation of the third party, 'Het Volk.' It is impossible to say whether or not he could have induced his followers at that date to join with their English fellow-citizens, but at that Congress undoubtedly the first public step was taken to set up an organisation by which the two white races were kept apart. Botha, of course, knew his fellow-countrymen well, and may have had good grounds for considering that the memory of the war was too fresh to permit of a union.

The Progressive Party stood as a whole for the policy of Lord Milner. They were most anxious that the fabric of Government created by him should be fortified, because they foresaw in the consolidation of that system thoroughly progressive control in education, in agriculture and railway administration, in the department of justice, in short, in all those departments of State in which good government is eminent. But the time had arrived for giving to the people greater powers than they enjoyed as a Crown colony. The British Government framed what was known as the Lyttelton Constitution, which was transmitted to the Transvaal on March 31, 1905; and the Progressive Party favoured its adoption as a suitable bridge between the previous system and the grant of complete representative or responsible Government. But the Liberal Unionist Government was then tottering to its fall. The Liberal Party, thanks in no small measure to the effective if unscrupulous use made of the Chinese Labour cry, came into power with a very large majority in December 1905, under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. They made short work, without a trial, of the Lyttelton Constitution, and in December 1906, granted the full powers which General Botha and his compatriots, as well as the members of the Responsible Government Association, who had split away from the Progressive Party, had demanded.

A Commission, consisting of Sir West Ridgeway (Chairman), Lord Sandhurst, Sir Francis Hopwood (now Lord Southborough), and Colonel Johnston, was

thereupon sent to South Africa to delimit constituencies in view of the settlement of the Transvaal Constitution. After investigation, the Commission determined to discriminate to some extent in favour of the country districts. There was considerable force in the arguments used, namely, that the sparse population of the country districts would be at a disadvantage in exercising their voting rights, as against the population in the towns, and on this account were entitled to some consideration. The net result of the action taken was, however, to throw power into the hands of the South African Party, with which, to no small extent, those who had belonged to the Responsible Government Association threw in their lot. A good deal of heat was generated during the elections; and, in spite of all parties declaiming against the revival of old animosities, a great deal of racial bitterness ensued. Animosity was, perhaps, even stronger between the Progressives and Responsible-Government men than between the Progressives and the Boers. After the elections, Botha's party had secured 37 seats, the Progressives 21, and the Nationalist, Labour, and Independent Parties between them the remaining 11. Botha therefore commanded a majority, and became Prime Minister of the Transvaal in 1907.

When the House met the atmosphere was rather electric, and the leading men on either side hardly spoke to each other. The unfriendly state of feeling seemed to forbode evil consequences, and the situation was one that called for cool-headed judgment. I was not at this period a member of the House, nor had I taken an active part in the elections; I was therefore in an independent position and able to work for less inimical relations between the rival parties. After some time, I came to be on friendly and, indeed, intimate terms with General Botha and General Smuts, not without rather unhappy moments for myself from time to time, because the old and valued friends, with whose political creed I had always been identified, viewed my action with dislike, and even, at times, with suspicion. The effort, however was not altogether unsuccessful, nor was it, indeed, one-sided, because the Prime Minister discussed matters with me, which, on account of the strained relations, he would

not discuss with his political opponents. General Botha continuously and publicly avowed his desire to do justice to, and bring about a reconciliation between, all sections of the white people. Every one in South Africa realised that nothing could be worse for the country than the widening of the breach.

Happily, there came about a gradual amelioration in the state of feeling; and during those fateful years I learned to appreciate General Botha's breadth of view and his sincere desire to earn the confidence of British and Dutch alike. That, upon his assumption of office, he should have found it necessary to place a number of his own countrymen in positions of responsibility is not surprising; nor, indeed, would it probably be inaccurate to say that his inclinations also leaned in that direction. In any case, the victory at the polls necessitated and justified some consideration for the members of his party; and I do not think his action in this connexion can be deemed extravagant. Some of those to whom he gave appointments may not have been as competent as could be desired; but, be that as it may, one is bound to admit that he was faced with an extremely difficult task, and the manner in which he succeeded in carrying it out is a very high tribute to his statesmanlike qualities. The Progressive Party was naturally critical, because they believed that the welfare of South Africa was, to some extent at least, being sacrificed to political expediency. If exception may be taken to some of Botha's measures, one fact cannot be denied, namely, that he steadily gained in the people's confidence and rose in popular esteem. To him above all other men should be accorded the credit of rendering the National Convention possible.

Lord Milner relinquished office in March 1905, and was succeeded as High Commissioner by the Earl of Selborne, whose affable disposition, coupled no doubt with his knowledge and love of farming, rendered his appointment a very happy one in the circumstances. He set to work to cultivate friendly relations, not only with General Botha and his Cabinet, but also with the people at large. He travelled about the country, visiting the farmers, and contributed in no small degree to the establishment of a better state of feeling. The work of reconstruction and the forward railway policy of

his predecessor began to tell; and the growing commercial prosperity of the young colonies of the Transvaal and Orange River, due in a large measure to the use of Delagoa Bay, created much anxiety at the Cape and in Natal. Tariffs and railway rates caused considerable tension in the relations between the colonies—a tension not free from the danger of counter-steps, reprisals, and ultimately even of open hostilities.

General Botha was fully alive to the gravity of the situation. An Inter-Colonial Conference was held, but failed to find a solution of the problems. When it became evident that some form of political union was the only panacea, Lord Selborne contributed a very able paper to the public discussion then taking place in the press and on the platform. Want of space forbids any critical examination of the burning questions of the time. The general opinion seemed to incline towards some system of federation, but the objection to that form of union was obvious. The retention of colonial boundaries involved the annual publication of budgets which would have exposed the manner in which each colony was materially affected; and this condition alone might, and probably would, have sown the seeds of future disappointment, dispute, and even of disruption. Lord Selborne's sane outlook and unquestioned honesty of purpose were of great value at this critical juncture.

The National Convention assembled on Oct. 12, 1908, and culminated in the Union of South Africa. A truly remarkable feature of the Convention was the spirit of good fellowship that reigned. All racial animosity seemed to have vanished; the lion and the lamb—British Jingoism, on the one hand, and Dutch nationalism on the other—lay down together; and all was peace and amity. Many difficulties of the most serious character, arising from the different characters of what are now the respective Provinces and affecting their welfare in different ways, had to be surmounted. The wealthy Transvaal had to make concessions to its less fortunate neighbours, each of whom in its turn surrendered something. On the whole, it is unquestionably fortunate that complete union was agreed to. General Botha took a broad conciliatory line throughout the negotiations.

The Convention spirit was active, and public men of every party made speeches extolling the Union and uttering pæans of congratulation at the burial for all time of racial animosities. But the test of practical politics put an end to pious aspirations and comforting dreams. Elections for the Union Parliament took place in 1910, and it may be interesting to recall a dramatic incident. The seat at Standerton was a safe one for General Botha, but he decided, unwisely, as it turned out, to contest the Pretoria East constituency against Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. After an exciting fight, he was beaten by 95 votes, and, for the moment, he took the rebuff greatly to heart. The polls, however, were quite decisive, giving the South African Party 67 seats—a majority of thirteen over the rest of the House—which comprised, in addition, 37 Unionists, 13 Natal Independents, and 4 Labour members. The success of his Party restored General Botha's equanimity, and he then accepted the Losberg seat and became Prime Minister of the Union.

Aspirants for the fame and flesh-pots of office abounded; and no Cabinet of workable size could have been created that would not have left a good many ambitions unsatisfied, with the inevitable foundation for opposing factions to build upon. Still, the principles at stake were vital, and the psychological moment presented itself for a really great statesman to have taken the risk of drawing a diagonal line across racial boundaries once and for all. A man with the strength of character and vision of Lord Chatham would have taken the plunge, even had he been overwhelmed in consequence. General Botha preached goodwill and conciliation in season and out of season, but he failed at that moment to put into practice the one effective step towards harmony by disregarding the racial origin of his Ministers. While it is true that the seven members of the Cabinet were not exclusively Dutch South-Africans, they were predominantly so; and, with the exception of Mr Hull, who became Treasurer, they had all been, in previous days, exclusively identified with the South African Party. The one man whose inclusion in the Cabinet would have been accepted as the true emblem of racial union, Sir Starr Jameson, was omitted.

Thus it came about that the first elections for a Union parliament, held in September 1910, were fought practically on the old lines; and to-day we appear to be as far from the 'one-stream' policy as we were then. But appearances may be deceptive. Experience and education, not unmixed with lessons of the Great War, are at work; and, although no practical steps have yet been taken to bridge the gulf, there are not wanting signs of an impending change. The Dutch themselves have recently split into two factions; the one, styled the Nationalist Party, under General Hertzog, wishes to disregard the pledges given at Vereeniging; the other, called the South African Party, under General Smuts, respects them. The latter party, on account of its loyal attitude and more progressive outlook, has attracted to its ranks considerable support from the inhabitants of British birth or origin, with the general result that the English-speaking section has partly lost its identity in the South African Party, and is otherwise about equally represented by the Unionist and Labour members.

It is devoutly to be wished for South African progress and happiness that some means may be found of speedily bringing about more stable conditions in the political arena. The republican propaganda need not be viewed with undue apprehension, because a considerable section of the Dutch, born and bred under the British flag, would be against its disappearance. The whole of the English, of course, are of the same mind; and the natives would be most unquestionably opposed to the formation of what they would regard as a Dutch Republic. They have a lively recollection of their description as *scepsels* (creatures) in the old Transvaal *grondwet* (constitution). I am impelled to say at this point that Mr Bonar Law could hardly have given weighty consideration to the statement he made in the House of Commons on March 30 of this year (in the debate on Irish Home Rule), that, 'if the self-governing dominions chose to-morrow to say, "We will no longer make a part of the British Empire," we would not try to force them.' The Cape of Good Hope is one of the most important strategic points in the whole Empire; and its secession would probably be viewed at home and in the rest of the British Empire somewhat in the same light.

as that in which the North viewed the proposed secession of the South from the United States of America.

General Botha came over to England to attend the Imperial Conference in 1907 and 1911; and upon these as on all other occasions his romantic figure marked him out for special popularity in this country. The keynote of his attitude in regard to Imperial affairs has been freedom of action for the Dominions in their domestic policy, and unity in all external matters. His quarrel with Hertzog originated over the latter's unbridled anti-imperial speeches, particularly in connexion with the South African contribution to the Navy, and his 'two-stream' policy, under which he advocated racialism of the worst kind. Botha finally expelled him from his Cabinet. From that event sprang the consolidation and rise of what is now known as the Nationalist Party, led by Hertzog and represented in the House of Assembly to-day by no less than forty-four seats. It would be incorrect to say that the whole of the Nationalist Party would like to see the British flag expelled from South Africa. Some at least of the followers of Hertzog are sufficiently versed in the world's affairs to realise the defenceless position of a country like South Africa, in its present state of population and development, against attack by any first-rate Power, without the support of the British Empire. Still, the great majority of the members of that party are unsophisticated farmers from the back-veld, with little knowledge of the world, a belief that South Africa is the hub of the universe, a partiality for the patriarchal views of President Kruger, and a conviction that the Dutch of South Africa are exclusively 'the people' and should be endowed with exclusive rule. Power in the hands of a Government set up by such a party would bring about a repetition of many of the errors that led to the troubles of the past and might end in civil war.

In the Johannesburg labour troubles of July 1913, Botha at first failed to realise the penalty that always waits upon supineness on the part of the Government. The forces of disorder were allowed to accumulate, and the gold-mining industry was brought to a standstill. Extremist sections marched from mine to mine and forced the workers to come out on strike, until by the

end of the week everything was closed down and the market-square at Johannesburg, which holds tens of thousands of people, contained a seething mass of strikers and sight-seers, inextricably mixed up. At nightfall on the evening of Friday, July 4, the turbulent and destructive elements burned down the Park Station and the 'Star' offices, and were only prevented from wrecking the Corner House by the police using their fire-arms. On the following day, General Botha and General Smuts came over to the Rand and found that order could not be restored without a great expenditure of innocent blood besides that of the disturbers of the peace. Botha, not having realised the effect of previous inaction, was, I think, justified in refusing to face the horror then confronting him. He, therefore, surrendered to the strikers. Work was resumed on the following Monday under conditions better imagined than described. The white miners, who regard themselves as the workers, in spite of most of the work being done by the natives, were masters of the situation and did exactly what they liked. Within six months, a further strike was threatened, and indeed begun; but, profiting by the experience previously gained, the Government took adequate precautions, and the stoppage of the industry lasted only half a day. On this occasion, the leaders of the movement did not succeed in gaining anything by the turmoil they had created. The strikes of July 1913, and of January 1914, are remarkable examples of the effect of weak or of strong government; and no one, I think, grasped the situation more clearly than Botha.

While it would be out of place here to discuss at length the subject last referred to, it is worth while to point out that the white man in South Africa (who enjoys the position of a supervisor, on the one hand, but claims, on the other, all the rights of combination, copied from the procedure in England) is placing himself in a very dangerous situation, because he has but to teach the native worker (which he is doing) to follow his example, and some day he will find himself as well as his fellow-citizens in a most precarious position.

So much has been written of General Botha's course

of action since the outbreak of the world-war that it would be superfluous to dwell at length upon that period, but that he never wavered for one moment from his allegiance to the Empire is unquestionable. That the necessity for crushing rebellion among his own compatriots must have been abhorrent to him is equally certain. He was a man whose cast of mind turned to compromise, conciliation, and persuasion as the way of winning through. To be forced to pursue and destroy men of his own race, even in open rebellion, must have caused him the keenest pain, but he never hesitated. Great Britain was at war, and South Africa was at war; there could be no question in his mind of optional neutrality. He appealed to Mr Steyn, former President of the Orange Free State, to use his influence to bring the rebels to reason, but the answer was unfavourable, as Mr Steyn objected to General Botha's invasion of South-West Africa. Botha brought that campaign to a rapid conclusion in a series of brilliant tactical moves, with but little loss of life. He then deputed his chief lieutenant, General Smuts, to take control of the East African campaign, which proved to be a much more lengthy and arduous undertaking. Finally, when the horrors of the struggle in Europe and elsewhere were brought to a close by the Armistice of November 1918, General Botha came over to England for the Peace Conference, visiting countries in Europe where problems had to be studied in anticipation of the Treaty of Peace. He was welcomed here with all the marks of affection and esteem to which he had been accustomed on previous occasions, and, of course, had he so desired, would have received almost any honour or decoration to which he might have aspired. No doubt partly in deference to the views of his compatriots, he declined any titular distinction, but became a member of His Majesty's Privy Council, having previously accepted an honorary Generalship in the British Army, which he valued very highly as a mark of distinction rarely granted. His intimate friends were aware that the state of his health left much to be desired, but no one anticipated his early death, which took place at midnight on Aug. 27, 1919.

The briefness of this narrative necessitates the omission of a great many points in this distinguished

man's career which might otherwise have been included. Suffice it, in conclusion, to say that, in the history of his own people, no man is entitled to, or likely to be accorded, anything like the position of eminence that his memory should receive and, in the world of men, history will no doubt place him among the elect. His friends will always look back upon Louis, as he was familiarly called, as a most agreeable companion and as a fine example of sagacious and sturdy manhood. General Smuts paid the following touching tribute to General Botha's memory at the grave of his dead friend and leader :

‘After the intimate friendship and unbroken co-operation of twenty-one years, I have the right to call Botha the largest, most beautiful, and sweetest soul of all my land and days, great in life and happy in death.’

Lastly, General Botha's breadth of view and benevolent outlook were evinced in his farewell interview, published through Reuter in July 1919; and the following extract is memorable :

‘As Great Britain led the war, so she has led the peace, and we look to her to secure its just fulfilment. I do not pretend to agree with all the peace terms. Who does? But I would say to the Germans: Show by your conduct that you intend to carry out the terms in the spirit and in the letter, and you will find salvation. Evasion and shiftiness will not be tolerated, but in honesty of purpose and of fulfilment may repose for you relief. . . . While we all lift up our hearts in thankfulness that the nightmare of the last five years is past, let us remember that with the victors rests the supreme gift of mercy. Should Germany in the near future produce evidence of a changed heart and a contrite spirit, it should be the privilege of Great Britain, just as she has led in war, also to lead in the mercy of peace. The peace must not be marred by vengeance. . . . I go back to South Africa more firmly convinced than ever that the mission of the British Empire now and in the time to come lies along the path of freedom and high ideals. Britain is the corner-stone upon which our civilisation must rest.’

LIONEL PHILLIPS.

Art. 3.—THE GINESTRA; OR, THE DESERT FLOWER.*

APART from his poetry, which, like the modest flower on the cinder heaps above Pompeii that overlook the beautiful bay of Naples, brought sweetness and some contentment into his seared existence, Leopardi was one of the most unhappy men who have attained celebrity. Doubtless others have had misfortunes. Dante spent long years in exile, Tasso in imprisonment, Milton lost his sight. But these, and others nearly as eminent who have suffered severely, often had a brilliant past to look back upon; they had received good, should they not also receive evil? In the whole course, however, of Leopardi's life anything 'good' in the ordinary sense of the term would be difficult to find. Harsh parents, unsympathising associates, straitened circumstances, physical weakness and ill-health pointing inevitably to early decease, and the settled conviction that the world is governed without regard to individual welfare, constitute the essentially volcanic soil on which sprang 'The Ginestra'—yet within sight of the most enchanting prospects the world can show, mirrored in his imagination.

Of this poem, the last and longest among the more important Odes—perhaps also the most famous, at least on the Continent—very little need be said in explanation. With admirable lucidity it discloses, gravely and unhesitatingly, a conception of human affairs which sorrow had forced on the writer. It contains magnificent imagery and is enlivened with striking contrasts and similitudes, the moral inculcated being that men should devote their energies—without striving, each, for an undue share—to mutual assistance in the struggle with Nature, here regarded as our true Antagonist; in short, an idealised socialism. That a work of such high moral authority, power, and poetic beauty has not hitherto been made easily accessible may surprise some who now read it for the first time.

* This task of translating the principal Odes in Leopardi's 'Canti' being now completed, the writer wishes to thank Dr Mackail for guidance and encouragement when preparing the following version, and also those versions that have already appeared in this Review, and, more recently, in 'The Fortnightly.'

THE GINESTRA.

First published in 1845; written during the spring or autumn of 1836, in the year preceding the poet's death, while he was staying at a little house in the country situated on a spur of the mountain overlooking *Torre del Greco* and the sea.

'And men loved darkness rather than light.'—John iii, 19.

Here on the arid spine
 Of the dread mount
 Vesevo,* the destroyer,
 Which other flower or tree delights not, thou,
 Fragrant Ginestra, joyful in the wild,
 Scatterest thy solitary tufts around.
 So, lately, had I found
 Thy modest blossom, deck those sombre lands
 That gird the City which in other time †
 Was to all mortal men lady and queen,
 And seem with solemn mien
 A silent memory, the traveller heeds,
 Of her lost power and pride.
 Here in this waste I meet thee yet again,
 Lover of sad, forsaken, solitudes,
 Misfortune's constant friend !
 These fields that cinders strew—
 Unfruitful, hard o'erspread
 With lava, echoing to the wanderer's feet ;
 Where in the sun the snake
 Nestles, or writhes uncoiled, and rabbits make
 Their wonted burrows—once were pastures gay
 With villas, yellowed by the ripening corn,
 Gladsome with lowing kine ;
 Gardens and palaces
 There were, a loved repose
 Made for the mighty in their hour of ease ;
 Here famous cities rose,
 Which, thundering, this proud mountain overwhelmed
 With torrents from her fiery throat aflame,
 And those who dwelt therein. One ruin now
 Involves them all, where, gentle flower, thou com'st
 Wafting thy perfumed sweetness to the sky,
 As if compassionate of other's dole,
 These deserts to console.

* Vesevus, Latin for Vesuvius.

† L. had recently passed through the Roman Campagna on his way from Florence to Naples.

Before this steep
Let him then come who would exalt with praise
Our state, and see what share
In loving Nature's care
Is ours at need. Here he may justly weigh
And measure well the power and sovereignty
Given to this breed of man whose cruel nurse,
Suddenly moved, when least he fears, annuls
A portion of his race, and on the rest
Destruction in brief space
With but a touch can pour.
Of human progeny
'The lofty destinies progressive ever' *
Are written on this shore.
Here gaze, here see thyself
Elate and foolish age,
That from the path discerned
When thought revived, assigned to us of old,
Hast wandered, backward in thy course returned,
And, still retiring, sounded an advance.
Dreaming of liberty, thou wouldst enchain
THOUGHT, that has led us out from barbarous ways,
That gave us civil life, whereby alone
In public acts a more humane regard
For all may yet be shown.
The truth—the bitter lot,
The humble place Nature prepared for us—
Displeases thee. Whereat, in coward sort,
Thy back turned to the light that makes this clear.
Thyself a fugitive, thou call'st him slave
Who seeks the light, him sole magnanimous
Who, fool or rascal, mocking at his kind,
Or mocked himself, with vile or senseless praise
Our rank on earth above the stars would raise.
The man of modest means and sickly frame,
If honour and a lofty soul be his,
Calls not nor deems himself
With wealth and vigour crowned ;
Nor in the world makes an absurd pretence
Of sumptuous life and virile eminence ;
But, if a beggar in his purse and health,
Holds it no shame to let the truth appear,
Speaks openly of all

* 'Le sorti magnifiche e progressive dell' umanità.' A quotation from Terenzio Mamiani. It occurs in the dedication to the 'Inni Sacri' (1832).

And gives to things that matter their true name.
 Magnanimous indeed I cannot call,
 But stupid, a frail creature born to die,
 Nurtured in all distress,
 Who says he lives for joy ;
 And with foul-smelling pride
 Fills books that promise new felicities
 And glories all unknown
 (Not only on this orb
 But in the very sky,)

Here, upon earth, to beings whom a breath
 Malarial,* a wave
 Of turbulent ocean, or the rocking soil
 Which tremors shake, destroys so utterly
 That even their memory
 Great pains will hardly save.
 A noble heart is his
 Who dares, with mortal eyes,
 Look on the common fate ;
 With tongue unbound, nought taking from the truth,
 Confess the evils for our journey meant,
 Our weak and low estate ;
 One who in suffering is strong and great,
 And to our other ills
 That deeper misery,
 Fraternal ire and hate,
 Adds not, by charging those of his own kind
 With blame for any sorrows that are his—
 But her, the criminal
 Whose guilt it truly is, who stands to us
 By birth our mother, stepdame in intent !
 Calls her the enemy, against her rage
 Holds that society was first ordained †
 With love of each to each

* l. 139, Bk. II, 'The Task.'

With his breath he draws
 A plague into his blood ; and cannot use
 Life's necessary means but he must die.
 Storms rise to overwhelm him. . . .

The earth shall shake him out of all he holds,
 Or make his house his grave.

It is significant that the same sequence of ideas appears in the Italian, and interesting to compare the effect on Cowper's darkly devotional mind of a similar catastrophe.

† Rousseau's theories are here glanced at.

For prompt and mutual aid,
 Expected and accorded in the stress
 And peril of the war that all must wage;
 One in whose sight
 To arm the hand of man against his brother,
 Spread snares and stumbling blocks
 For mutual injury,
 Not less infatuate seems than in a camp
 Beleaguered, pressed, at hottest of the fight,
 If the defenders, careless of the foe,
 On their own soldiers levied hateful war
 And sought with fire and sword
 Their friends to overthrow.*
 When thoughts like these, made clear,
 Shine forth apparent to the general mind,
 And that first dread of Nature which combined
 Mortals in social bonds shall have returned,
 In part, through wisdom learned;
 Then civil intercourse upright and fair,
 Justice and piety, will have some root
 Better than haughty myths tradition feigns,
 Whereon much public probity is based
 With such security as all may see
 That which on error stands elsewhere attains.
 Oft on this barren shore
 Clad as in mourning by the lava's flow,
 That still a wavelike motion seems to show,
 I sit at night, and, o'er this wilderness,
 Austere and cultureless,
 See the clear stars in deeps
 Of purest blue come forth,
 Whereto the sea her mirror turns below;
 And in this glittering sphere
 Our universe appear,
 And vast serene of heaven, and all aglow.
 Then, on these lights I gaze which to my eyes
 Are only specks, although in truth so great
 That land and sea with such
 Compared, seem but a speck;
 To whom man and this globe,
 Where man himself is nought,

* l. 71, Bk. II, 'The Task.'

And 'tis but seemly that, where all deserve
 And stand exposed by common peccancy
 To what no few have felt, there should be peace,
 And brethren in calamity should love.

Are both alike unknown :
 And when I see
 Those yet again endless and more remote
 Clusters or knots of stars,*
 Each like a filmy cloud
 To us, for whom not man, nor earth alone,
 But all summed up in one,
 The greater stars, the nearer heavenly host,
 And golden sun
 Exist not, or but seem
 As they to us a point of nebulous light—
 O poor humanity,
 What art thou in my sight !
 When, further, I but think
 On thy estate below,
 Here imaged in the clod beneath my feet,
 How, on the other hand,
 Thou wouldst be lord and ultimate aim of all,
 Fabling so often, as thy pleasure is,
 That on this grain of sand
 Which 'Earth' we call
 The authors of the universe came down
 For thy behoof, and talked familiarly
 With thee in human guise—
 How, too, this age which others would excel
 In manners and a true regard of things,
 Renewing idle tales, insults the wise :
 What thought of thee, unhappy race of man,
 What feeling, at the last, my heart assails ?
 I know not whether pity or scorn prevails.
 As when at autumn, on the happy dwelling
 Of an ant-nation—in the crumbling glebe
 Hollowed with art and toil, competitive,
 By this assiduous race,
 And providently stored against the cold—
 From some high tree a little apple falling,
 By ripeness and no other cause brought down,
 Breaks, shatters and deforms it at a blow ;
 So, deluging from the dark sky above,
 All suddenly, ruin and night conjoined,
 Stones, pumice, cinders, streams of liquid fire
 Shot upward by the mountains thund'rous womb

* l. 214, Bk. III, 'The Task.'

I cannot analyse the air, nor catch
 The parallax of yonder luminous point
 That seems half quenched in the immense abyss.

Into heaven's vault on high—
 Or, overflowing down her flanks, immense
 A flood of molten metal, burning sand,*
 Over the tender grass
 Descended furiously,
 And those bright cities by the sea that stood
 On the land's furthest verge, in little space
 Crushed, covered and consumed.
 Above them now the goat
 Browses at will ; there other cities stand
 To which the buried are but as the soil,
 And on the prostrate ruin at her foot
 The giant mountain treads as if in pride.
 Truly no better care,
 Or tenderness has Nature for the seed
 Of man than for the breed
 Of ants, whom she esteems
 Like him, no more nor less.†
 And if such carnage be indeed more rare
 For man than for the ant, that puny race
 Than ours more fruitful seems.
 Full eighteen hundred years ‡
 Have passed since vanished thus,
 By force of fire o'erthrown these populous seats ;
 And still the villager who heedful rears
 His vines, to which on these gaunt fields
 The parched and lifeless soil with drudgery yields
 Poor nourishment, raises an anxious eye
 To that dark summit, in no way appeased,
 Still terrible, still menacing to pour
 Ruin and death on him, his little ones,
 And their scant household store !
 Often the jaded hind
 All night lies sleepless, starting up at times
 To pace the ground, or from his hovel's roof,

* Two forms of activity on the part of the volcano are here indicated. Burning material was thrown up into the sky and then descended in a fiery hail on the district. Lava also overflowed from the brink of the crater and poured down like a sea of fire to the coast.

† L. was well acquainted with Pope whose somewhat similar lines may recur to the reader :

'He sees with equal eye, as God of all,
 A hero perish or a sparrow fall.

And now a bubble burst, and now a world.'

‡ Accurately 1737 years at the date of the poem. A.D. 79 was the year of the eruption.

In the hot wind,
 Watch the descending track
 Of the dread current, seething, that o'erflows
 From the exhaustless womb
 Adown the ash strewn back,
 And burns, and glows,
 Shining afar o'er Caprian sea and land,
 Naples, the port, and Mergellina's strand.
 Then if he see it near,
 Or, from the bottom of the cottage well
 Ever a sound can hear
 Of water bubbling up,
 In haste he wakes his children, wakes his wife,
 With all that they can carry, swift! away! *
 And fleeing, sees far off his little field
 And dear familiar nest,
 Their sole resource from want,
 Become the prey
 Of the devouring flood,
 Inexorable, that hissing glides along
 And spreads itself o'er all, enduringly.
 Returns Pompeii, dead, to the heaven's light
 After oblivion of the ages flown,
 As from the earth a buried skeleton,
 Which piety or greed † has disinterred,
 Comes forth to open day;
 And in the desolate Forum where he stands
 Mid rows of columns broken or o'erthrown,
 The traveller from strange lands
 Gazes aloft at the divided steep, ‡
 And smoking crest,
 That threaten still the ruins round him strewed.
 There, in the dread uncertain hour of night, §
 Through empty theatres, disfigured shrines,
 And houses rent in twain,
 Where the bat hides her brood,

* The solicitude of the poor man for his children is here contrasted with nature's callousness.

† Piety: to provide more honourable sepulture.

Greed: to rob the dead.

‡ The top of Vesuvius presents a bifurcated appearance. The 'cresta fumante' is the crater.

§ At this point Dr Garnett's criticism comes to mind: 'In L.'s later days his horizon seemed to expand. . . . *La Ginestra*, inspired by the hardy and humble Broom-plant flourishing on the brink of the lava-fields of Vesuvius, is more original in conception and ampler in sweep than any of its predecessors.'

Like a funereal torch
Through silent palaces that flickering goes
Wanders the ominous lava's mournful gleam
And, reddening in the darkness from afar
Tints dimly all around.
Thus ignorant of man and of the ages
That he calls ancient, ignorant of all
The sons who follow as their grandsires led,
Stands Nature ever young—
Or rather she *proceeds*,* but by so long
A course she *seems to stand*.
Meanwhile the kingdoms fall,
Peoples decay, their languages are lost ;
She sees it not ; yet of Eternity
Man proudly makes his boast.
And thou that with thy fragrant woods adornest
These wasted lands, gentle Ginestra, thou
Must also yield to the relentless sway
Of the dread power beneath
Who, to the accustomed place
Returning, soon will spread
Over each downy spray
Her ravenous mantle's verge.
Under that mortal burden thou wilt bow
Thine innocent and unresisting head ;
Not meanly bent to supplicate in vain,
Ere it shall be the oppressor of that hour ;
Not led by pride to seek
Vainly the stars, nor scornful of the waste
Where, not thy will, but fortune placed
Being and birth for thee, that art indeed
Wiser than man, less weak
In this—thou deemest not thy feeble flower
Immortal made by Fate, or thine own power.

HENRY CLORISTON.

* 'Or rather she proceeds.' 'This is a correction or explanation of "stands." It means ; she does not stand still, she advances ; her path is, however, so limitless that the movement is indiscernible' (Straccali's note) (c.g. The 'fixed' stars).

Art. 4.—THE LAST OF THE HABSBURGS.

1. *Historische Aufsätze.* By Heinrich Friedjung. Stuttgart and Berlin : Cotta, 1919.
2. *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich.* By Aurel C. Popovici. Leipzig : Elischer, 1906.
3. *Im Weltkriege.* By Count Ottokar Czernin. Berlin and Vienna : Ullstein, 1919.

I. THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.

It has become the fashion in Austria and Germany to rail against the 'cursed race' of Habsburgs and to accuse them of every conceivable crime and wrongdoing. The foreigner who reads and hears this kind of thing cannot but believe that the House of Habsburg was the acme of inefficiency and wickedness; that, degenerate and corrupt, they ground down their people, thus bringing the Empire to ruin; and that, above all, they were guilty of having brought about the world-war. The foreigner who is not prepared to give unquestioning credence to these accusations will, indeed, wonder how the people of the Habsburg Empire could have put up with so depraved a race of sovereigns for so many centuries, and how it came about that, under their rule, this Empire attained importance and prosperity; how it was possible for it to become a great Power and even, at one time, to take the lead on the Continent of Europe. He will find an answer to these questions in history. In so far as we are concerned with the last rulers of the house of Habsburg—and it is against them, more particularly, that these accusations are aimed—an attempt will be made in the following pages to give the foreigner a sketch of their personalities to which he can supply the context for himself.

Franz Josef, the son of Archduke Franz Karl, one of Kaiser Ferdinand's brothers, and of the Archduchess Sofie, a Princess of Bavaria, was, by virtue of his whole personality, a living refutation of the reproach of degeneracy which has been made against his race, a reproach which was fully justified in the case of Kaiser Ferdinand alone. His father and uncles, with their

abnormally long faces, shapeless, box-like skulls, and drooping lips, gave the impression of degeneracy, outwardly at any rate, although they were in reality not degenerate—it is only necessary to recall Archduke Karl, the victor of Aspern, and Archduke Johann, the Vice-regent. In contrast to them, however, Franz Josef was very well built, an advantage which he owed to his mother. His slim, elegant figure, with the upright military bearing and elastic step which he retained to an advanced age, was combined with a normally shaped head and a handsome, sympathetic face, in which the characteristic Habsburg lip was only slightly indicated. Not one of the many portraits of Kaiser Franz Josef taken in his youth betrays signs of degeneracy. Again, his iron constitution which, in spite of the terrible accumulation of misfortunes heaped upon him, enabled him to reach a patriarchal age and at the same time to retain a remarkably strong memory, emphatically contradicts the reproach of degeneracy.

Just as his outward appearance showed no sign of morbid degeneracy, so neither did his mentality. Even as a boy of eighteen, when he came to the throne, contemporary accounts show that he gave evidence by his bearing of a personal majesty which was quite unusual in one so young. Although he was not by birth the son of a ruler, he was, nevertheless, a born ruler. This majesty of bearing and conduct, which placed an impassable gulf between him and the rest of the world, was one of his most characteristic qualities; it adhered to him during the whole of his long life and in course of time developed ever more markedly. Once Kaiser, he remained at all times and to all men, even to his nearest relations, always the 'Kaiser.' He dwelt, as it were, on inaccessible heights, and only occasionally condescended to relax a little within the circle of his own family. His need to be sometimes not only Kaiser but also man was practically limited to his pleasures as a grandfather when in the company of the children of his daughter Valerie, and his intercourse with his friend of many years' standing, Frau Katharina Schratt, an actress of the Hofburg Theater, in whose house he was a daily visitor.

But, however sharp and well-defined the gulf between himself and the rest of the world might be, it would be

a mistake to conclude from it that his manner towards others was such as to cause offence. This was by no means the case, for his strongly developed sense of the dignity of royalty was combined with great distinction of manner which could be, as occasion demanded, friendly, benevolent, and even charming. His courtesy towards women, in particular, was well known. Thus, the imperial halo surrounding him not only caused no feeling of resentment or even of estrangement, but served to strengthen the feelings of reverence and devotion to him. The public audiences, also, which he held every week and to which the lowest labourer had as much right of entry as the greatest magnate, so long as he had any reason to give for demanding it, must have helped to prevent the people from resenting this distance between themselves and the Kaiser. Those who had much to do with him, especially those in direct personal relation with him, regarded him with great devotion and affection, an affection particularly marked in the case of his servants and household guards, among whom there was hardly one who would have hesitated to give his life for him.

Towards those far beneath him in the social scale he could be particularly affable, because he was so far removed from them that he had no need to fear any loss of dignity. His perfect tact and his long schooling in self-restraint prevented him, also, from expressing his consciousness of sovereignty in so loud and insistent a manner as was habitual with Kaiser Wilhelm II, although this consciousness was no less strongly developed in him. Nothing could have been further removed from his distinguished nature, and, doubtless, nothing could have been more repugnant to him than such demonstrations. Although he never referred to the subject except perhaps in his most intimate circle, it can be safely assumed that the resounding trumpet tones in which Kaiser Wilhelm liked to make himself heard were repellent to him. No doubt he was unable to understand how a monarch could allow himself to indulge in such inordinate extravagance of behaviour. One is justified, therefore, in assuming that he was but little in sympathy with his ally's conduct as a whole, and that, on his part, the friendship between them was solely of an official nature. The contrast between the

characters of the two rulers was too great for it to have been otherwise.

In marked contrast to Kaiser Wilhelm, Franz Josef avoided any expression of opinion in public which might have far-reaching consequences. Statements such as the notorious 'Sic volo, sic jubeo,' or, 'Whoever is against me, him will I destroy' (*Wer wider mich ist, den zerschmettern ich*), were quite unthinkable as coming from his lips. Rather did he anxiously avoid giving any definite character to remarks made by him in public, so that they appeared colourless, conventional, insignificant, even sometimes ridiculous. But the derision which they occasionally excited was not in the least justified. It is true that he did not give an impression either of intellect or distinction when, at the innumerable exhibitions and ceremonies which he considered it his duty to open or to attend, he invariably made use of the same words: 'It was very fine,' or 'It has given me great pleasure.' But the mockers, had they been in his place, would in all probability have had nothing more intellectual or significant to say, if they had been opening and inspecting exhibitions and fêtes for more than half a century and had been obliged thousands of times to make gracious remarks to the exhibitors or the organisers of these shows. No doubt the Kaiser himself would often have preferred to say something quite different, even to express the wish to have done with such things for ever, and doubtless he often had grounds for expressing dislike or disapproval. But his tact and sense of duty prevented him from doing so, because he knew that to every word uttered by him great significance was attributed, and for this reason he wished to avoid causing injury to anyone by making disparaging remarks. Even when an exhibit was quite contrary to his taste, as for instance the crazy daubs of the secessionist painters, he confined the expression of his opinion to a smiling: 'That is too extreme for me.'

Where he did not feel himself to be, as it were, a guest, but on duty, above all in his capacity as Supreme War Lord at manœuvres and parades, he did not refrain from criticism, and let fall many an emphatic remark. His extraordinary quickness of vision where military formalities such as precision of movement and accuracy

in drill were concerned, seldom failed to observe faults in this direction, and for this reason was very much feared by the officers. The so-called 'Kaiser-Parade' of the Vienna garrison, which was held every spring on the 'Schmelz' parade-ground, cast many an ominous shadow before it. Not infrequently, on such occasions, an imperial storm burst over the head of one or other of the regimental commanders; but it should be added that, as a rule, these outbreaks had no further consequences for the victims.

It was not therefore lack of temperament, as might be supposed, which caused Kaiser Franz Josef to refrain from such expressions of opinion as were often uttered by Kaiser Wilhelm; but he always had his temperament so well under control that it never played him any tricks. Indeed his excessive reserve in speech and manner alienated many people, and even in Austria Kaiser Wilhelm was held to be by far the more distinguished monarch; this was especially the case in German nationalist circles and among the Magyars. There were indeed plenty of people who were not a little impressed by Kaiser Wilhelm's pompous manner and loud-sounding phrases, and who, because he spoke on every imaginable subject, considered him to be gifted both as man and ruler, which was in fact very far from the truth. Beside this loud and glaring personality, Kaiser Franz Josef, from whose lips a notable word was never heard to fall and whose sphere of interest was so much more restricted, did indeed appear pale, impersonal, even insignificant, quite apart from the fact that the great difference in age was to his disadvantage. Those, however, who did not permit themselves to be dazzled by Kaiser Wilhelm's versatility and excessive self-assertion, had to admit that he was something of a braggart, whereas Kaiser Franz Josef had a genuine individuality and was certainly the better and wiser ruler of the two.

It is indeed incontestable that he was lacking in originality; his was a more conventional nature which travelled along the well-worn grooves of tradition and carefully avoided any divergence from that path. Nevertheless, it would seem that, in his youth the Kaiser had a more definite personality, which was worn down and obliterated in the course of time by the many experiences,

mostly unhappy, of his long reign, so that the distinct colours which were perhaps there at first had faded more and more and gradually vanished. But this much is certain and cannot be denied, that his sphere of intellectual interests had always been a very narrow one. He never cared much for science or art, with the exception of painting; and it has never been reported of him that he expressed sympathy with this or the other poet. As a matter of fact, he had one favourite pursuit only—hunting, to which he remained faithful to the end of his life. Apart from this, he sought in the society of his friend Frau Schratt the relief and recreation in which his great sense of duty only permitted him to indulge to a limited extent.

His relations with this lady were an open secret, which no one took amiss, with the exception of the clergy. He himself made no mystery of it, and during his summer residence at Ischl he used to spend every afternoon at his friend's villa. An indication of the unusual nature of this relation was given by the fact that his wife knew of it and gave evidence of a real feeling of sympathy with Frau Schratt; that the Empress went so far as to present this lady with her portrait was surely by no means an ordinary occurrence. The people begrudged the Kaiser this relief all the less because it was well known how unhappy he was in his family life. His marriage with Princess Elizabeth of Bavaria had been a love-match on his part, which is not surprising in view of her extraordinary charm. But her independent and self-willed nature, which had developed in comparative freedom, could not feel at home amid the Spanish ceremonial of the Viennese Court, and put her out of sympathy with her husband, so that a feeling of coldness and estrangement arose between them, which led, in the course of time, to an actual though not official separation. They led their own lives apart and met but seldom. If the Kaiser was in any way to blame for this state of affairs it was certainly much against his will, for, just because he had at other times always to be the 'Kaiser,' he occasionally felt the necessity of being human also; and, as he could not satisfy this need at home, he sought to do so elsewhere and found what he sought in the company of Frau Schratt.

In spite of this estrangement, he felt the tragic death of his wife very deeply; perhaps, as a man, he felt it even more deeply than that of his only son Rudolf. The effect on him of the news of Archduke Rudolf's death is said to have been terrible; but here it was doubtless rather the monarch who found himself bereft of his sole heir than the father who had lost an insubordinate and troublesome son; for the relations between father and son had been very unhappy. Like his mother, whose nature he had apparently inherited, Rudolf felt ill at ease in the strict, narrow-minded atmosphere of the Court; and in his rebellion against it he turned to a far worse extreme—a deliberate contempt and scorn of those considerations which were due to his position. Such behaviour was especially calculated to offend and embitter the Kaiser, who set such store by dignity and the duties of royalty, so that a gulf stretched between them which grew ever wider and deeper. The Kaiser, however, cannot be altogether absolved from blame for this unhappy estrangement, for, by the very fact that he jealously kept his son apart from affairs of State, he naturally helped, though unintentionally, to drive him deeper and deeper into the wild Don Juan-like paths which led to so tragic a conclusion. It was the ugly and painful circumstances attending the Crown-Prince's death that probably caused his father the bitterest suffering of his life, suffering more bitter than could have been caused by his death alone. For how deeply must the Kaiser have suffered—with his proud nature, his dignified reserve, his horror of anything which might excite scandal—through the enormous sensation caused by this death, which stirred the whole world with its blood-stained eroticism, and unloosed a perfect deluge of the most revolting type of sensational journalism.

Of the population of his kingdom, numbering over fifty millions, there can, indeed, be but few who have experienced such an abundance of tragedy within their own family circle. His brother Maximilian, executed as Emperor of Mexico; his wife killed by the hand of an assassin; his nephew and heir also; added to these, other painful events in his family, not to speak of the heavy blows dealt him by fate in his capacity of ruler. The whole constituted such an immense tragedy that it would

not have been wonderful if he had collapsed beneath it. The wonder was that he did not collapse—a miracle to be explained not only by the extraordinary elasticity of his physical constitution, but doubtless also by the self-sufficiency and calmness of his nature which gave him a spiritual equilibrium that even the most terrible blows of fate could not permanently injure. This tragedy helped, moreover, to gain for him, through pity, feelings of sympathy which would otherwise probably not have been accorded him to such an extensive degree. People saw a crown of thorns upon his grey head, from which a radiance emanated. This radiance added a warmer tone to the frigid halo which had encircled him, and thus increased his popularity. For popularity he enjoyed, however far removed from the people his nature essentially was. In the early days, indeed, especially at the time when he was under the evil influence of General Count Grünne, there were few signs of popular favour. It only became evident in the course of years, and was perhaps mainly due to the force of habit. His people had become used to regarding him as their ruler; three generations, from childhood to age, had known no other Kaiser; and they could scarcely imagine that there would ever be any other Kaiser in Austria than this kindly old gentleman with the characteristic white whiskers, who had suffered so many misfortunes and still had to endure so much as sovereign, owing to the difficulties of his position. Thus custom and pity wove about him a species of popularity which his own personality would scarcely have won.

II. ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.

ALTHOUGH Archduke Franz Ferdinand never came to the Habsburg throne, nevertheless in considering the last of the Habsburgs he must not be omitted; for, in spite of the fact that Franz Josef's jealous love of power limited his sphere of action, he succeeded, as he apparently, in making his influence felt very effectively, and would have been destined to play an important part on the political stage. To the public, Franz Ferdinand appeared as a sort of shrouded figure like that of Sais, whose veils their fingers were always itching to lift.

But these veils were never to be completely raised, this curiosity was never to be entirely satisfied, for Franz Ferdinand passed into the great darkness before the *chiaroscuro* in which he was hidden during his lifetime could be illuminated. Those, however, who were closely connected with him, or who had any opportunity of considering him attentively and impartially, even if it were through the veils which shrouded him from publicity, were able to perceive the outlines of his personality so clearly that for them it had no mystery, and they realised that his individuality was the most remarkable produced by the House of Habsburg since the Emperor Josef II.

The tragic death of the Crown Prince Rudolf on Jan. 30, 1889, caused Archduke Franz Ferdinand to take a prominent place before the world. Although the next heir to the throne would, in fact, have been the Emperor's brother, Archduke Karl Ludwig, it was taken for granted that the latter would resign his right to the throne in favour of his eldest son, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, especially since, in view of the Emperor's vigorous constitution, he would not have succeeded until he was well advanced in years. The public knew little of Franz Ferdinand, and that little was not calculated to excite sympathy for him or to cause any great hopes to be set on him; for rumour attributed to him, as to his younger brother Otto, all manner of frivolous escapades in which he had played no very creditable rôle. When it became known that he was suffering from tuberculosis, a disease which he had inherited from his mother, who had died while still in her youth, and that on this account he was obliged to go south, it was generally believed that there was no question of his succeeding, even if he survived the Emperor; and his younger brother Otto, who was married and had sons, was regarded as the future sovereign. But this belief was, before long, seen to have been erroneous, for Franz Ferdinand soon let it be known that he was not prepared to renounce the throne to which, after the death of his father, he had become the immediate heir.

The first time that he courted publicity was when he accepted the patronage (*Protektorat*) of the Catholic Schulverein and, on this occasion, let fall a significant

remark on the 'Los von Rom' movement, so active at that time. 'Away from Rome,' he said, 'is equivalent to "Away from Austria!"' In this *mot* he hit the nail on the head, for the propaganda against the Catholic Church set on foot by the Pan-Germans was solely to be attributed to the fact that the latter regarded the Catholic Church as the greatest obstacle to the spread of Pan-German thought among the people. The object of this school of thought, however, was none other than to hurl the Habsburgs from the throne and to affiliate Austria to the German Empire as a vassal State. But this movement naturally roused the indignation of the heir-apparent and provoked him to severe condemnation of the Pan-German propaganda. His words called forth a very vehement and hostile response from the public. The Liberal Jewish press, at that time leading opinion in Austria, vied with the Pan-German and Social-Democratic press in expressing its indignation that the future sovereign should, in accepting the patronage of a confessedly Catholic association, have taken up a definitely partisan attitude, and they disputed his right to do so. There is no question that, if he had accepted the patronage of a Liberal or German-nationalist association, and had given utterance to opinions in sympathy with these, the very same journals would have hailed his utterances with enthusiasm; as, however, he had adopted the contrary standpoint, they assumed an air of virtuous indignation and demanded impartiality. Indeed, the Liberals, Social-Democrats, Jews, and—a strange medley—Pan-Germans were all beginning to have fears for the future, which held no promise of good to them when Franz Ferdinand should come to the throne. Hence the commotion.

The Magyars were also to have a foretaste of this future, which was but little relished by them and gave them much food for reflexion; for, when the Archduke was about to pay a visit to the court of the Tsar at Petersburg and chose Count Zichy, a man of his own political views, as his Hungarian Lord-in-Waiting, the Liberal clique in Hungary expressed themselves as highly offended, brought a protest before the Emperor, and demanded that the Archduke should make his choice from their ranks. This objection was so far successful

that the Archduke was obliged to exclude Count Zichy from his retinue, but, in spite of this, he would not have a member of the Liberal party, to which he was antagonistic, forced on him, and, rather than suffer this, he decided to have no Hungarian Lord-in-Waiting to accompany him, so that Hungary was not represented in his retinue at all. It was the first time for decades that the Magyars had met with opposition at Vienna; they now became aware that a strong man was there who, once he came to power, would brook no interference.

By these two indications of his views and aims the Archduke had slightly raised the veils in which his personality had hitherto been shrouded and had given a hint of what was to be expected of him as ruler. By his marriage with the Countess Chotek, which he finally achieved after a long and difficult struggle, in spite of the vehement opposition of the Emperor and the Court in general, the Archduke showed that he was capable of obstinacy not only in political matters but also in regard to his personal affairs, even when in conflict with the most powerful man in the Empire. Although this alliance was dangerous and regrettable from a political point of view, because it was calculated to render Austrian politics, already difficult and complicated enough, more confused than ever, yet, judged from the other, the human standpoint, it did great credit to the Archduke's constancy and will-power.

It may at once be said that it proved an entirely happy marriage; and the Archduke was never so contented as when in his family circle, especially at Schloss Konopischt in Bohemia, which he had bought and furnished with extravagant magnificence and exquisite taste. He withdrew from life at Court, not only to avoid the painful disputes as to precedence, and to spare his wife the slights to which the stiff Court etiquette would have exposed her; but also because he did not feel at ease in the atmosphere of the Court and did not get on particularly well with the other Archdukes. At Schloss 'Belvedere,' once the seat of Prince Eugen of Savoy, he held, when he was in Vienna, his own rigidly restricted Court, which was to a certain extent, and occasionally very markedly so, a direct contrast to that of the old Emperor. Indeed, the relations between the

Emperor and his heir were anything but friendly, not merely by reason of his unsuitable marriage, but also because the old man recognised in him an opponent whose energy and perseverance made themselves unpleasantly felt when any debatable question arose, and through whom his autocracy was threatened and obstructed. Had he been a younger man, the conflict between him and Franz Ferdinand would probably have become serious. As it was, however, he was too weary and broken to take up the challenge; and thus their relations continued, outwardly at least, to be more or less friendly, however strained they may have been in reality.

If the Archduke stood in the Emperor's way, the Emperor stood no less in his, not only because his succession to the throne was deferred, but also because he was forced to look on helplessly and see how the timid policy of the old man, who avoided the solution of all serious problems for fear of possible strife, was making it more and more difficult for him, when the time came to assume power, to straighten out the ever-increasing tangle of intricate political problems, and to find for them even a partially satisfactory solution. The Emperor was blind to the dangers with which he and his Empire were threatened by the inflammable material which had been accumulating for years, or at any rate he refused to see them; but Franz Ferdinand saw them, and realised the enormous danger menacing the Monarchy if these explosives were not unloaded in time by an expert hand. But it was such aims as these that were obstructed by Franz Josef, who would not hear of these dangerous things being handled at all. Of such a nature were the various national problems, the solution of which was growing more and more necessary; the Southern-Slav question, in particular, was becoming urgent, and also the highly complicated Hungarian problem, so closely connected with it. Then there was the question of *Italia Irredenta*, which tended to exacerbate the relations of the Monarchy with Italy.

To be a powerless and inactive onlooker while the ship of state became ever more and more involved in the whirlpool of national currents, must have been nerve-racking to a man of such insight and energy as the

Archduke, and must have exasperated and embittered him, especially as he had a definite political programme in view. This programme was called 'Great Austria,' a title adopted by a Hungarian of Rumanian origin, Aurel C. Popovici, who, in his book, 'Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich,' had proposed a complete reformation of the Habsburg Monarchy on an ethnographical basis. His view was that each nation in the Empire should, as it were, find its soul in its own way, its boundaries being fixed on ethnographical grounds, and full national autonomy being accorded. But, in order that this conglomeration of nations should not fall to pieces, they were to be bound together by a strong cement; and this cement was to consist of the institutions common to *all* the nations of the Monarchy, such as national defence, transport, currency, and trade. The central point of this *Austria rediviva* was, of course, to be Vienna, and the diplomatic language was to be German, not out of regard for the Germans, who were not to take front rank by any means, but because it is a widely-spoken language—an advantage that cannot be claimed for the Magyar or the Rumanian tongue, any more than for the various Slav dialects. Popovici's scheme was a happy union of the ideas of federalism and centralisation, and it was unquestionably capable, as no other scheme had been, of satisfying the just national demands of the various nations in the Empire. This scheme appealed very strongly to the Archduke, although he did not propose to carry it out quite so radically as Popovici suggested. The complete abandonment of Crownland boundaries in favour of a purely ethnographical division was repugnant to his highly developed historical sense.

When the Archduke's preference for the Great-Austria programme became known in Hungary—Popovici's book had been placed on the index there—the public, naturally, were not too well pleased, and looked forward to his accession with increasing anxiety; for an essential condition of this programme was the transformation of Hungary in accordance with a nationalist sentiment. But it was common knowledge that nothing enraged the Magyars more than any rash attempt to interfere with the political ideal of the Magyar

'National State.' The Czechs, on their side, were no more enamoured of a 'Great Austria' than the Magyars, in spite of the fact that a rigid division between them and the Germans in the Sudetes region would have put a satisfactory end to the vexatious disputes about language. For they too had a nationalist ideal—the Bohemian constitutional principle, which would not admit of the division of Bohemia into two territories, in one of which the Czech language, and in the other German, should be spoken. On the other hand, Popovici's scheme met with all the more sympathy from the peoples of Hungary who were oppressed by the Magyars, and from the Slovaks, Rumanians, and Croats, who saw in the Archduke their future saviour.

In foreign politics Franz Ferdinand turned his attention first of all to Italy. He was under no illusions as to what the Monarchy might expect from this 'ally,' and believed that the latter was only lying in wait for the moment when she could take the Monarchy unawares and attack it, of course with the help of another Power. Italy's expedition to Tripoli gave him, indeed, a foretaste of what awaited the Monarchy at Italy's hands under certain conditions, and must have strengthened him in his feeling of distrust and resentment. It was not surprising, therefore, that the official political attitude of the Monarchy in regard to Italy enraged him, for this attitude was in keeping with the Emperor's desire for peace at any price. The Archduke did not conceal his displeasure from Count Aehrenthal, the chief representative of this conciliatory policy; and, as the Count obstinately persisted in it, there were some sharp disputes. In the eyes of the public it was Count Aehrenthal and the Chief of Staff, Baron Conrad, who were in opposition, but behind the scenes it was, in fact, the Emperor and the heir apparent who were in conflict. At first Franz Ferdinand was obliged to give way, for Conrad was forced to retire, and Aehrenthal continued to hold office and to carry out his policy. But the Archduke was not the man to admit defeat for long; a year later, Conrad was again Chief of Staff, and Aehrenthal's hour would undoubtedly have struck had not a higher power removed him from office for ever.

The leading Vienna papers sided, of course, with

Aehrenthal in this dispute, and were never weary of assuring their public that Italy was the Monarchy's best friend, that aggression was far from her intentions, and that the Italian danger was a bogey set up by the clergy and by ambitious generals so as to mislead the public and to conceal their own sinister designs. These people—they called them the 'War Party' in public, but referred to them privately as the 'Belvedere Party,' recognising the Archduke to be their moving spirit—had in view, so they said, nothing less than the invasion and annihilation of Italy, in order to reinstate the Pope's temporal power on her ruins. And, since the indiscriminating masses are always ready to believe the most improbable lies, they swallowed this bait readily enough, and thought the Archduke was really an agitator and a fool, who was ready to plunge the Monarchy into war for the sake of the Pope.* As a matter of fact, Franz Ferdinand, in spite of his energetic nature, was by no means of a warlike disposition. He gave proof of this at the time of the annexation crisis (1908) when, in spite of a favourable opportunity—Russia was still disabled by the Japanese war and Italy would not have dared to attack the Monarchy single-handed—he could not make up his mind to seize his advantage and settle the account with Serbia.

As regards Germany, Franz Ferdinand was certainly in favour of maintaining the alliance, but not on the terms of German supremacy. Germany's dominating influence in this alliance must have been a thorn in the flesh for a man of such strong individuality; and there is no doubt that, if he had ascended the throne, he would have taken good care to put an end to Austria-Hungary's tutelage to Germany. No real intimacy, such as the official press persisted in proclaiming so emphatically, ever existed between him and the Emperor Wilhelm; their characters differed too widely for that. His reserved nature, averse from all theatrical display, must have been repelled by the Emperor's boisterous

* I published a full account of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy in this Review in January 1911 under the title 'Austria-Hungary and Italy'; this article pleased the Archduke so much that he wished to have it made known in Austria, whereupon I published a second article to the same effect in the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau.'

manner and heroic postures, especially as he was inclined to sarcasm, which such behaviour could not fail to evoke.

He had few friends in his immediate entourage, but found full compensation for this lack within his family circle. He set little store by popularity, less than was wise in a future ruler; and a regrettable pettiness in regard to matters of economy helped still further to make him disliked and to draw upon him the reproach of miserliness. Moreover, his positively morbid passion for the chase, or rather for killing, was not calculated to embellish that portrait of him formed in the public mind, the sinister tones of which, displaying not a single sympathetic feature, were in urgent need of a redeeming ray of light.

Although the general public did not trouble very much about him, because he was too far removed from them, certain officials at the Court and in the Government looked forward to his accession with great anxiety, for they knew that, even during the Emperor's lifetime, a strong breeze blew from Belvedere; what would happen, therefore, when the Emperor was dead and the Belvedere breeze could wander unhindered among the Court and State officials and sweep away the antiquated wigs! Not a few of these officials had already had a foretaste of what was to come. Even personages whose position might have been regarded as unassailable had experienced the weight of Franz Ferdinand's displeasure. Such was Baron Beck, for many years Chief of Staff, who was in high favour with the Emperor, but had been obliged to give way to Conrad, in whom he had placed absolute confidence. This trial of strength proved conclusively that Franz Ferdinand had sufficient courage and strength to show his disapproval even of those whose persons the Emperor's favour had apparently rendered sacred, if they appeared to him to be incapable of filling their office. The Minister of War, General von Schönaich, also felt the weight of his hand when he coquetted too flagrantly with the Magyars over the Army question. The same fate had already overtaken Count Goluchowski, Aehrenthal's predecessor at the Ballplatz.

Very few people had an intimate knowledge of the Archduke, but these few, although aware of the darker

side of his character, knew his good qualities also, and were able to estimate his importance correctly. One of these good qualities, and one which would have been of special value to him in the future as ruler, was his dislike of sycophants and flatterers, who merely strengthened his contempt for men. On the other hand, he could bear sharp criticism from those whom he esteemed—their number, it is true, was not great—and, if he was offended at the time, he bore them no grudge for it. In contrast to other great personages, he was in the habit of going to the root of matters and did not content himself with a superficial knowledge; this characteristic, though praiseworthy, was nevertheless extremely inconvenient to his courtiers. Thus, should some event have aroused in him a desire for information on any question, scientific or otherwise, the lot of the officer on his military staff concerned with such matters, and on whom this difficult task fell, was not an easy one; for he had to acquaint himself as thoroughly and quickly as possible with the subject so as to be able to satisfy his master on any point. To deceive him, as other people in high places are often deceived, was quite out of the question; and he who ventured to attempt it inevitably brought about his own downfall. Again, contrary to the usual custom of princes, he required his officials to tell him, not only what was pleasant, but the truth, even if it were disagreeable and not at all flattering to himself.*

* I may give, from my own experience, a small example of this characteristic of the Archduke's. When he was nearing his fiftieth birthday (Dec. 18, 1913), the editor of the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau,' Baron Chlumecky, a first-rate publicist who was in great favour with the Archduke, decided to publish a special number in his honour for the occasion. In this number Franz Ferdinand's personality was to be shown from various sides, from that of a soldier, promoter of the Navy, patron of Art, sportsman, etc. Each of these sections was to be written by a different author, after the consent of the Archduke had been obtained, for no one would venture upon such an undertaking without his knowledge. These articles were to be prefaced by a biography, and the Archduke decided of his own accord that I was to write it, although my name had not appeared in the list of suggested authors laid before him. This in itself was evidence of an independent judgment unusual in a prince; but the reason which guided his choice was still more significant. Shortly before this I had published, at the request of the firm of Cotta, an article on the Archduke for their new journal 'Der Greif,' which was not by any means in the customary Byzantine manner, but which had met with his approval for this very reason. For the purpose of carrying out this work a number of

When the Emperor Franz Josef became so seriously ill in the spring of 1914 that, in view of his great age, the worst was feared, many at the Vienna Court, in Hungary, and in all the extreme national strongholds of the Monarchy, must have trembled, not because of their affection for the Emperor, but because of their fear of his heir, in whom they recognised their most powerful opponent. Other hearts must have beat high with hope because at last the Habsburg throne was to be occupied by the man who alone was capable of saving from destruction the Empire now rocking on its foundations. But their wish was not destined to be fulfilled; the Emperor recovered, and Franz Ferdinand's enemies could breathe again.

During those critical spring days the hour of the Monarchy had struck; Franz Josef's life signified Franz Ferdinand's death. If Franz Josef had died then, instead of two years later, his successor would probably not have gone to Serajevo and would not have been assassinated there; * the world war, if inevitable, would have broken out at another time and under different conditions; and the Habsburg Empire might still have been in existence to-day. These are, it is true, fruitless speculations after the event; but they may well be correct, for it is quite probable that, if Franz Ferdinand had ascended the throne he would have endeavoured to arrive at an understanding with Russia, and he would have made a special effort to be on friendly terms with England, for which country he had a special affection and to which he had paid a protracted visit not long before his death. The murderer of Franz Ferdinand did not know that he had killed a man who not only was no enemy to Serbia, but was also one who, when on the

albums at Belvedere were placed at my disposal, in which all the references to the Archduke which had appeared in the papers since the year 1895 had been collected and pasted. Among these—and this is the significant point—were included those in which mention was made of the miserliness of himself and his wife, and even one, from a French newspaper, in which he was described as a *crétin*. It is obvious that the officials entrusted with the collection of these cuttings would never have dared to show him any of such a nature if they had not had strict orders to include every mention of him, even the most insulting.

* It is questionable whether Franz Ferdinand would have escaped his fate in any case. His name had long been on the death-list, not only of the actual conspirators but also on that of the continental Freemasons.

throne, would have restored their rights to the Southern Slavs. But he did know that in striking him he struck at Austria, for Franz Ferdinand was the embodiment of the idea of the Austrian State.

III. KARL THE FIRST AND LAST.

When Archduke Karl, son of Archduke Otto, the younger brother of Franz Ferdinand, found himself unexpectedly, through the assassination of the latter, in the position of heir apparent, he scarcely realised the difficulty and magnitude of the task which presumably awaited him in the near future, and entered upon his office to all appearances without misgiving. All his portraits of this period and of the period immediately following his accession wear a contented, smiling expression, showing clearly how pleased he was with his new and exalted dignity, and how little, in spite of the terrible war which raged around him and shook his kingdom to its deepest foundations, he felt as yet the burden he had taken upon his shoulders. Not so much his youth as the easy-going temperament inherited from his father prevented him from realising the immense difficulties of his task and the fearful possibilities of his situation. If he is to be blamed at all for this lack of perception, a great part of the responsibility must fall on those who encouraged him in his optimism by fooling him with Byzantine flatteries and concealing the dangers which threatened him on every side. He was greeted with enthusiasm wherever he appeared; and those who read the daily papers and considered them worthy of credence must have thought the young Emperor and his wife the most popular royal couple under the sun. This Byzantine cult reached its climax on the occasion of Karl's coronation as King of Hungary, which was staged with a display of magnificence worthy of the Middle Ages, and, in the 20th century, had the effect of a provoking anachronism, which, moreover, was a positive mockery of the terrible gravity of the situation at that time.* The young Emperor and his consort

* As a matter of interest it may be mentioned that the Byzantine manner was extended even to the menu cards for the banquet, which furnished remarkable examples of servility and bombast.

were the centre of orgies of servility. If he had not possessed so modest and unassuming a nature, these endless panegyrics, these stifling clouds of incense must have completely stupefied him and deluded him into the idea that he was an omnipotent and omniscient being. He was even glorified as a great general, at the expense of the real generals who had carried out the successful offensive in South Tirol in May 1916.

If, in these circumstances, it might almost be called a miracle that the young sovereign did not give way to crazy dreams of his own greatness, it was quite natural, nevertheless, that he should cherish pleasing illusions as to the position of himself and his kingdom, and that he should be quite unable to realise how closely disaster was dogging his footsteps. The glamour of the celebrations, however, was quickly followed by cruel disillusionment; and only a few months later, in the spring of 1917, he knew that his country would not be able to bear the strain of the war much longer, and that the time was approaching when peace would have to be considered, whether it was to be a 'victorious' peace or not.

When Count Czernin had explained to him the gravity of the situation, he made it clear to the Emperor Wilhelm that Austria-Hungary could only hold out until the autumn of the year 1917. Full of anxious fears for his throne and Empire, no doubt he would have preferred to conclude peace with the Entente at once, especially since co-operation with Germany was growing increasingly difficult to him. He, too, experienced the well-known Prussian arrogance and quarrelsomeness, which must have wounded his self-conceit all the more because, though not naturally excessive, it had become sensitive from constant flattery. He felt most bitterly of all the subordination of the joint armies in the East to the command of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. It can readily be understood, therefore, that he was anxious to be delivered as soon as possible from this oppressive and insulting tutelage.

This state of mind furnishes the explanation of his letters to his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus of Parma, the publication of which were to do him so much harm and to cause Germany to reproach him with treachery. A storm of resentment passed through Austria and

Germany when these letters were made public, a storm which was aroused and kept going factitiously by the Pan-German party, and did more to shake the Habsburg throne than any previous event. Quite wrongly, for the Emperor's good intentions were obvious; and it was ungrateful and foolish of the people, who never ceased to wait for peace and to grumble at the unbearable burden of the war, to reward with reproaches and abuse their Emperor's efforts to obtain this peace for them.

This was the first severe shock sustained by the Habsburg throne. The second was not long in coming. It was the failure of the offensive on the Piave in June 1918. The foolish and disastrous system of deception in force in Austria shrouded this tragic catastrophe in mysterious darkness, which, naturally, had far worse consequences than the truth, however sad, would have brought in its train. For out of this darkness there crept sinister rumours which, encouraged by Pan-German and socialistic agents, crystallised into the legend that the Empress Zita, in league with her two brothers fighting in the opposite camp, had betrayed the offensive to the enemy. To this story an air of false probability was given by the fact that the two Princes of Parma were really serving in a foreign army, and that the Empress came of an Italian royal house and had been brought up as an Italian. 'The Empress has betrayed us!'—such was the explanation found by the people for the defeat on the Piave, an explanation which, encouraged by the hatred of the Pan-Germans and Social-Democrats for the Habsburgs, and rooted in the ignorance of the masses, became a smouldering fire which ate away the foundations of the Habsburg throne.

If the people—and this applies not only to the uneducated masses but also to the so-called intelligent classes—had not been deprived of all power of judgment by this hypnosis, they would surely have realised that the Empress would not do anything so mad as to undermine the throne occupied by herself and her husband, to which her eldest son would presumably succeed. And, if they had only known a little history, they would have been aware that, although the Empress was an Italian, yet she came of a royal house which had been deprived of

its throne and country by the House of Savoy, and that there was absolutely no reason why she should assist this family, so hostile to her own, to triumph over Austria in general and the Habsburgs in particular. But the people were far from possessing such insight and historical knowledge; they adhered obstinately to their fable of treachery, and, led on by the German nationalists and Social-Democrats, they coupled this with the Emperor's supposed betrayal of Germany. Of these two calumnies they concocted an accusation against their own royal house which was eventually to become a bomb for its destruction.

The wrath of the German nationalists against the Emperor was of longer standing and had its origin in the amnesty granted by him to the Slav leaders, which had evoked vehement expressions of anger from the Germans, who considered that this action had put a premium on high treason. This point of view was erroneous, for, in acting thus, the Emperor's intentions had been good and, in themselves, by no means unwise; by this means he had hoped to conciliate the disloyal Slavs and win them back to allegiance to Austria. The worst thing about it was the clumsy, hasty manner in which the act of mercy had been carried out. Before putting it into force it should have been ascertained whether the Slavs were prepared to be conciliated by these means, and it should not have been undertaken until sufficient guarantee of this result had been given. As, however, these precautions were not taken and the Slavs continued to maintain a hostile attitude, this act of grace proved a vain attempt and merely roused the resentment of the Germans.

In order to win back the Germans, whose behaviour appeared to cause the Emperor no uneasiness, Dr von Seidler, the Austrian Prime Minister and the Emperor's most influential counsellor, hit on the naïve and unlucky idea of declaring solemnly that, henceforward, Austria would follow the lead of Germany. This declaration did indeed call forth the tempestuous approval of the Germans, who had always been Austria's most short-sighted politicians; but it naturally destroyed the last remnants of loyalty among the Slavs. Subservience to Germany in a kingdom inhabited by 10 million Germans and about 18 million Slavs (reckoning those in Cisleithania

alone), Slavs, moreover, who were on the point of forsaking the country ! A more unfortunate remedy could not well have been chosen. But the Emperor in his distress grasped at any and every means suggested by his counsellors ; and, as he lacked experience and perhaps, like Franz Josef, did not possess the gift of judging men and making good use of them, he sought advice and support from inept and even frivolous persons, who led him to make one mistake after the other.

One such mistake was the unlucky Manifesto of Oct. 17, 1918, in which he announced to his people the reconstruction of Austria on a national basis. This was a most superficial piece of work which, apart from the fact that it came much too late, was rendered valueless because it only took into consideration the nations of Austria and not those of Hungary, who were to continue to suffer under the Magyar knout. This Manifesto had, therefore, only one result, in direct contradiction to the effect intended ; and this was to cause the people of Austria to find in it a welcome summons to break asunder, a summons which they obeyed with alacrity.

All the unhappy young Emperor's efforts to maintain his crumbling Empire and tottering throne were in vain. In such hopeless conditions as these a continuation of the war was not to be thought of, and he was forced to plead with the Entente for peace. But this merely gave the Germans in Austria and Germany another opportunity to cry 'Treason' and to heap hatred and abuse on him and his house. Once more the crazy and revolting scene was enacted in which the very same starving people who were longing for peace showed their gratitude to the man who was endeavouring to procure it by branding him as 'Traitor.' There could, indeed, be no question of treachery on his part, for so early as the spring of 1917 he had informed Germany that he could not hold out after the autumn of that year. The fact that, in spite of this, he had continued to fight beside Germany for a whole year beyond that period, was sufficient evidence of his loyalty as an ally.

Many a ruler has had to learn the lesson of the uncertainty of popular favour by personal experience—it is only necessary to recall the classic example of Louis XVI—but never has the change been brought about so

suddenly ; no monarch has ever been hurled so suddenly as was the Emperor Karl from the summit of popularity to the depths of ostracism and execration ; no one, perhaps, has experienced mankind's shameful lack of principle in so crude a form. Surrounded by servile, fawning courtiers as he was, he found himself, when the storm broke out, almost entirely deserted, and not one raised a hand to help him. In his need he recalled the days of rejoicing at Budapest at the time of his coronation and sought refuge with the Magyars, who had taken every opportunity of assuring him of their 'intense love' and 'humble loyalty.' There, in the midst of this devoted people, he hoped to find a refuge for himself and his family. But he had scarcely arrived before a retreat was forced upon him, which in truth was a flight, a flight from the fate of Tisza. He remained for a short time in Austria, not at Vienna or Schönbrunn, but at a lonely castle called Eckartsau, cut off from all intercourse. When he left Schönbrunn for the last time the sentries did not even salute him ! But neither was he to remain at Eckartsau ; even there his life was in danger. Under British protection, and pursued by the vilest accusations, he left Austria, which was engulfed behind him in the seething, crimson morass of anarchy.

THEODORE VON SOSNOSKY.

Art. 5.—THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENT IN CANADA.

1. *Deep Furrows*. By Hopkins Moorhouse. Toronto and Winnipeg: McLeod, 1918.
2. *Wake up, Canada! Reflexions on Vital National Issues*. By C. W. Peterson. Toronto: Macmillan, 1919.
3. *Profitable Grain-growing*. By Seager Wheeler. Winnipeg: Grain Growers' Guide, Ltd., 1919.
4. *Farm and Ranch Review*. Calgary.
5. *Grain Growers' Guide*. Winnipeg.

THE prosperity of Canada must always be a subject of vital interest to residents of Great Britain in several respects, firstly, because of the close ties between the Mother-Country and the Dominion, both in peace and in war; secondly, because of the importance of the Canadian farms as a source of food supply; thirdly, because of the wide-open field for emigration and development by personal exertion or capital investment, provided by the varied and to a large extent unexplored natural resources of British North America.

There is no good reason why the history of the agrarian movement in Canada should not be discussed in a purely English publication. England, indeed, is full of potential Canadian citizens. The man who has thought of emigrating, the man who might emigrate some day, the man who intends to emigrate soon—all these should know as much as possible about matters under discussion in the country of which they may become actual citizens. Moreover, since the whole movement represents an attempt by the newer citizens of Canada—by those who have settled and pioneered within the last thirty years—to drive from power the old Canadians of the eastern provinces (whose Canadian citizenship dates from thirty to three hundred years further back), and, since it has its root in economic conditions which official propaganda has always been careful to conceal, the struggle is bound to be the personal concern of the Canadians of to-morrow.

There was an old saying in British Columbia that 'a mine is a hole in the ground the owner whereof is a liar.' It is assuredly not in this sense that Mr Moorhouse's book '*Deep Furrows*' is hereby recommended to

the curious reader as a mine of information. Dedicated to the 'Men and Women of the Soil,' it 'tells of pioneer trails along which the farmers of Western Canada fought their way to great achievements in co-operation.' Mr Moorhouse has dug deep, and brought up masses of stuff that must be pronounced genuine. Making full use of printed records, the author has supplemented this scanty material by personal contact and familiar intercourse with the pioneers of the Grain Growers' Associations in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. It is largely from their lips that he has learned the story of their pressing needs, their purposes, their early mistakes, their continual struggle, their final success. Concerning each, he has some vivid anecdote to tell; and every anecdote helps to form an atmosphere of raw beginnings and primitive conditions, of which people who have not lived and worked in them can have no conception.

I cannot resist giving a short sketch of the career of one old-timer, a man whose name deserves to be known in the land of his birth, a man who by patience and a dogged fortitude and contempt for immediate reward, through long years of penury, hardship, and a combination of almost incredibly adverse conditions, fought his way to victory at last, and in doing so conferred upon the land of his adoption benefits of a permanent and far-reaching nature. This man is Seager Wheeler, of Rosthern, Saskatchewan, cereal-growing wizard, who has originated three or four new varieties of hardier, earlier-maturing, heavier-yielding wheats, and has obtained yields of forty bushels per acre and more, on three inches of rainfall. Born of a sea-faring family in the Isle of Wight, news-boy for five years at a W. H. Smith & Son's book-stall, he joined an uncle in Saskatchewan about 1885. The uncle was not yet a millionaire, but he had a roof over his head. It was a sod roof; the rest of the house was made of logs.

'The first harvest at which he helped,' writes his biographer, 'was thirty acres of wheat. He and another man cut it with cradles and tied the sheaves by hand. The hay was cut with scythes, and raked with hand-rakes. Grain was sown broadcast and harrowed in with branches of trees. Wheat-birds, blackbirds, and later on gophers, went after

the wheat. They raced wild geese and crows to see who could get most of it.'

There followed for Wheeler the usual incidents of a poor settler's life—two or three years of labour as a farm-hand, a season or two on a railway construction gang; and then, with just enough money saved to pay down \$10 for a homestead entry, and perhaps an instalment on a team of horses and a plough, he took to farming on his own account. From the very first he was a pure seed enthusiast, a believer in careful farming. He would only sow the best seed on the best-prepared land. He picked over his seed grain by hand, kernel by kernel, throwing out all impurities. In a period of careless and hit-or-miss farming, where the accepted practice was to throw any kind of seed on the largest possible area, in the least possible time, and trust to luck for a yield, his neighbours looked upon him as crazy. With luck, they might reap a crop large enough on a big acreage to 'make a stake.' But what sort of a stake could Wheeler make, with the best possible crop, off the thirty or forty acres which was all he had?

The strength of a character is measured by its resistance to the contagion of accepted ideas. Herein consisted Wheeler's great originality. While everybody else trusted to luck, and gambled in wheat-growing with the usual result of gambling in the long run, Wheeler set to work to eliminate every element of chance, in seed, in seed-bed, in climate, in rainfall. Through years of semi-starvation, he clung to his purpose with the obstinacy of a maniac. In those days, the worst enemy was frost. 'Red Fife,' the best available spring wheat of the period, did not ripen early enough. Two years out of three the frost would destroy the crop a week or two before it was ready to harvest. The first problem, then, was to find a wheat of equal milling quality, of equal or better yield, but ripening earlier. Wheeler set out to discover for himself the principles of seed-selection and improvement. He was unaided, unknown, without any resources except his energy, perseverance, and enthusiasm. 'He worked (says Mr Moorhouse) like the proverbial nigger! He was at it all day, and, when it got too dark to see, he went into his little bachelor shack,

lighted the tin lamp, got out his wheat selections and kept right on working half the night, minutely examining and sorting wheat kernels and tying wheat heads in tiny bundles and writing down comparisons and endless data.' There was a small mortgage on his farm. More than once, it was nearly sold over his head. It was years before he could afford to build himself a decent house.

His first real success was in obtaining a pure red strain of 'Preston' wheat, which had the merit of ripening earlier than 'Red Fife.' This was about 1907-10. Thereafter his progress in the field of scientific achievement was rapid; and prosperity followed, though with laggard feet. In 1911 he won with a sample of 'Marquis' wheat the world's championship and a prize of \$1000 in gold offered by the C.P.R.—the largest amount of money that had so far come in his way. After that he acquired the regular show habit, and usually swept the board. It is chiefly due to these awards for all manner of field produce, including old and new varieties of cereals, grasses, and potatoes, that his name has become a household word in Western Canada. But it will be remembered still more on account of the permanent contribution he made to the list of plants likely to thrive on a commercial scale in a rigorous climate with a short growing season, and the enormous improvement in methods of cultivation which enabled him to grow a good crop of wheat even in years of severest drought. In the end, he accomplished to the full what he had set out to do. He eliminated from wheat-growing the two most familiar gambling elements: he overcame the danger of frost by developing wheat strains that mature from fifteen to twenty days earlier than 'Red Fife,' and defeated the handicap of deficient moisture by his special summer-fallow system.

To pass from Seager to other leaders of agriculture—such as W. R. Motherwell, for several years Minister of Agriculture in the Saskatchewan Provincial Government, founder in 1901 of the Territorial Grain Growers' Association; E. A. Partridge, who first conceived the idea of a Farmers' Company to market the farmers' own wheat, and started the Grain Growers' Grain Company in 1906; and Charles A. Dunning, the Leicester lad, who

devised the scheme of co-operative hail insurance, and organised the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Co., deserve a more than local fame.

Quite apart from physical or climatic risks—drought, hail, frost, gophers, mosquitoes, bad roads, remoteness from railways, and so on—the early pioneers were beset with enormous economic difficulties. They had no capital, and there was no local market for their product. They could get no price for oats or barley or wheat or hogs or cattle, unless these goods could find an export market. Fifteen or twenty cents a bushel was a common price for oats, for which there was no export market twenty years ago. Hogs were often worth no more than five cents a pound dressed. In theory there was an export market for wheat, the price of which ought presumably to have been based upon the world-price, but the world-market could only be reached through the elevators and the railways; and the elevators generally managed to control the price in their own districts by more or less express agreements between themselves. Besides arbitrary prices, the grain-growers suffered at the hands of the local buyer through excessive dockage, exorbitant storage charges, even short weights. Before 1901 they were completely at the buyers' mercy. The first step in the farmers' emancipation was taken in that year, when the just organised Territorial Grain Growers' Association compelled the Railway Company to distribute freight-cars as and when required to farmers who desired to load direct, instead of being forced to sell to the local elevator. There had never previously been any real competition among buyers for the farmers' grain; each elevator enjoyed a local monopoly. The monopoly was now broken, but only for a time; it was quite possible for separate elevators to combine under one management. They were very soon combined; and the old antagonism broke out again on a different level.

The farmers' counter-stroke came in 1906, with the formation of the Grain Growers' Grain Company, a joint stock company composed wholly of farmers, with a capital of \$250,000 in \$25 shares, no member being allowed to hold more than four shares. It started business with a paid-up capital of \$2500, supplemented

by the unlimited liability of its enthusiastic promoters, whatever that might be worth, in a small Saskatchewan village, with Partridge as its first President.

To the critical student, the whole plan appears so destitute of all the acknowledged elements of success as to be farcical. The grain trade had long been a strongly organised business, supplied with ample capital, with the Winnipeg Grain Exchange as the focus of chains of local elevators. The Farmers' Company had no capital to speak of. The \$250,000 were purely nominal; only about 10 per cent. had been paid up; the rest might or might not mature. The executive officers knew something about growing grain, but they had no business training whatever; common-sense was their sole endowment. The only real assets were the good-will of other farmers having wheat to sell, and their determination to stick together and see the thing through. Carrying war into old preserves of vested interests, they could expect no quarter, and got none. Vulnerable, owing to their inexperience, in half-a-dozen places, their unavoidable blunders left them open to attack on many sides. They committed a technical breach of the rules of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The Exchange excluded them from membership, and only reinstated them when the Manitoba Government threatened to suspend the Charter of the Exchange. As heavy borrowers without security beyond the good-will of their business, they were at the mercy of their Bank; and the Bank, dominated by the elevator interests, suddenly requested them one day to close their accounts. The story of the first two or three years is one of hair-breadth escapes.

Under the direction of T. A. Crerar, whom Partridge selected to succeed himself in the president's chair (1907), co-operation and the Grain Company marched in step with each other; the success of the Company destroying the remnants of scepticism among farmers as to the possibility of close co-operation, and the spread of the co-operative idea adding to the capital, increasing the clientèle, and widening the sphere of action of the Company. Henceforth the story of its growth on all-fours with the life history of any business supplying a real need in a practically virgin field—a story of logical development, of progressive aggregation, each step in

advance leading to the next, each hard-won position disclosing a new position within easier grasp. If a Farmers' Company could sell grain on commission to millers or exporters at Winnipeg, what was there to prevent it from selling this grain to the ultimate British importer? If it could dispense with one set of middlemen whose charges were comparatively small, why not dispense with another set of middlemen whose charges were comparatively high? For the margin between the price at which the exporter bought in Winnipeg and the price at which he sold in Liverpool was, even after deducting ocean freights, the heaviest charge on the whole grain trade. It is true that the business was speculative and complicated, and called for large capital. The Grain Growers' Grain Company launched into the export trade and eventually placed it on a paying basis.

Since the life-blood of co-operation is propaganda, and the enemies of the Grain Growers' Company were well supplied with newspapers and magazines, the institution of a farmers' paper, owned exclusively by farmers and devoted solely to their interests, was a highly advisable measure. Accordingly, the 'Grain Growers' Guide' was founded, with the effervescent Partridge as its first editor (1908). To-day, with a circulation of 70,000 copies weekly, it is the most potent political force in the West. As a factor in emancipating the farmers, as a distinct economic group, from the guidance of other people, the importance of the 'Grain Growers' Guide' can scarcely be exaggerated. There were plenty of rural papers before the 'Guide,' but they were controlled and subsidised by, and edited in the interests of, governments or railway companies or Manufacturers' Associations who wished to fill the country with settlers, and were anxious that these settlers should produce as much as possible, but not so anxious that they should thrive to the extent of acquiring mental and financial independence.

Accordingly, while such papers were often full of excellent matter on the side of farming technique, they closed their eyes resolutely to the economic aspect of farming. Their backers laboured under the strange delusion that they could succeed for ever in attracting settlers to the West from the four corners of the globe

on the plea that farming in Canada was a money-making business, and yet reconcile these men, once safely fixed on Canadian soil, to a condition of permanent economic serfage. The man on the land was to produce for a bare living, or less than a bare living, the raw materials of industry. To the traders, manufacturers, and financiers were to belong all the profits of the industry. The aim of all immigration propaganda was to create in one-half of Canada a race of peasants subservient to a race of business men in the other half. Such was the real reason for the flood of Ukrainians, Galicians, Mennonites, Doukhobors, with which the country was deluged during the Laurier régime. These people, at all events, would prove docile; starved and beaten in the countries they came from, they would not kick over the traces in their new country, where they were not beaten and only half starved. As for politics, they did not understand the English language; they were absolutely devoid of democratic instincts; and their votes were as cheap as dirt. Fifteen years ago, the British were not wanted as immigrants. They were too stiff-necked, too obstinate; their economic standards were too high; they would never fit in with the plan. And indeed, had none but aliens from Russia and Austria invaded Western Canada, there would be to-day no co-operation, no farmers' economic movement.

If it were possible to eliminate middlemen on the grain-selling side of the farming business, why should it not be possible to eliminate middlemen on the purchasing side? Many of the things needed were handled in great quantities by a host of small traders all over the country. But lumber, coal, flour, apples, agricultural implements could all be bought in large quantities, and distributed co-operatively through the farmers' elevators. This was a logical step, and it was the next to be taken. Timber limits were purchased in British Columbia, and saw-mills installed, supplying the grain-growers with lumber for their barns, their grain-bins, their houses, without the intervention of half-a-dozen middlemen. Apples were purchased by the train-load in Ontario or British Columbia and distributed direct to the consumer, at an enormous saving. Other staples were gradually added to the list—cement, sashes and doors, hardware and

builders' supplies, oil, salt, sewing-machines, type-writers, and so on. Anything for which there is a universal demand, and which is more or less standardised, can be and before long will be distributed through the Farmers' Companies in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Still greater economies and higher efficiency were bound to result if, instead of acting separately, they were all amalgamated into a single body. The final step was taken in 1917, when the Grain Growers' Grain Company, the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, and the Alberta Co-operative Elevator Company were all merged in a new body under the name of 'United Grain Growers, Ltd.,' with a paid-up capital of \$5,000,000.

A few years earlier, the Canadian Council of Agriculture had come into existence. It did not spring into immediate spectacular prominence. Hardly any one foresaw the weight that would come to be attached to its pronouncements. Most people have only become aware of it in the course of the last two or three years. It was an outgrowth of the various Territorial Farmers' Associations, a committee formed from among their officers, for the purpose of sifting, discussing, and codifying any resolutions passed by local conventions concerning desired reforms which could only be brought about by Federal legislation. It was a new form of lobbying, a method long known and brought to a fine art at Ottawa; but it was lobbying by the pressure of opinion, not by bribery. The Council acted as political spokesman on behalf of the Grain Growers, standing strictly aloof from any ties with either of the old political parties. Farmers, as a class, were practically unrepresented in the Legislature. If we accept Mr Charles W. Peterson's data in his 'Wake up, Canada!', while farmers in 1918 made up 46.5 per cent. of the total adult population, their percentage of total representation (Provincial and Federal) was but 18.3. Business and professional classes, on the other hand, making up but 16.7 per cent. of the adult population, engrossed no less than 81.2 per cent. of the total representation. The lawyers alone, numbering less than 5000, monopolised 25 per cent. of the total representation. It is clear then that the Council of Agriculture performed a very necessary service in counterbalancing the inadequate representation of farmers in Parliament.

In the third year of the war, its influence had already become so considerable that Sir Robert Borden, when forming the Unionist ministry, found it advisable to include some of its leaders. Mr Crerar took the portfolio of Agriculture; Mr Dunning joined the Board of Food Control.

The most contentious issue, then as now, was of course the Tariff. By their own efforts, along the lines of business co-operation, the United Farmers had removed many a handicap; but the most serious of all could only be removed by Federal legislation, by a complete reform of the fiscal system. No impartial student has ever come forward to defend or even to excuse the Canadian Tariff. It transgresses every known canon of sound taxation. It has signally failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was supposed to be created. It was an economic blunder from the first; it has become a serious political danger. Introduced by the Conservative Party under Sir John A. Macdonald as a national policy of protection for infant industries, perpetuated by the Liberal Party under Sir Wilfrid Laurier as a revenue-producer, this hybrid system, which only produces revenue by accident in so far as it does not protect, and protects only in so far as it fails to produce a revenue, has succeeded in dividing the country into two sharply-opposed camps, of which Winnipeg is the dividing point, and has succeeded in nothing else. The infant industries of fifty years ago claim to be infant industries to-day and clamour for still higher protection. The possible benefits of protection, supposing there were any, are purely local in character and extent, for the object of the system is to secure the home market, that is to say, the farmer-consumers; while the farmers' market is not in Canada but overseas. One-half of the total population is thus taxed, with no counterbalancing advantage, in order to bolster up the prosperity of a few towns in the East. And as the general cost of living is artificially increased to the extent of 40 per cent. all round, the advantage to mechanics and labourers who form 37 per cent. of the total population is illusory. Their real wages would be higher in the United States. Regarded as a system of taxation, it will not bear discussion. It strikes with blind indifference alike at implements

of production, and at articles of consumption ; and every dollar it brings into the State Treasury from a limited proportion of the population, costs the general body of consumers at least two dollars and a half.

But its greatest failure from a business point of view lies in its effect on the development of western farming. The aim and hope of the protected interests has always been to create a large clientèle west of the Great Lakes. This aim was illusory from the first. For, if a large clientèle did come into existence, if the prairies filled up to even 20 per cent. of their capacity, the western voters, being in a majority, would quickly seize the reins of power, and consign 'the robber tariff' to the limbo of hated tyrannies. And, if the prairies have failed to fill up as was expected, it is largely on account of the Protective system. For its effect has been, and must clearly be, to destroy any differential advantage in the production of food-stuffs that virgin soil possesses over the soil of older countries. Whatever part of the world the settler might come from, he found that, while the price obtained for his products in Canada was from 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. less than the price he would have obtained at home, every tool that he used in production, every article that he and his family consumed in the course of the year, cost him from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. more. Small wonder, then, that the prairie populations are still largely nomadic, that, almost as fast as new people come, old-timers go, and that, while in the last ten years 1,250,000 immigrants came in from the United States, during the same period there were nearly 1,000,000 emigrants from Canada to the United States.

Here, then, is a pretty dilemma : if the West fills up, the Tariff will go, and if the Tariff does not go, the West will not fill up. The country, as a whole, will have to make a choice before long. The mind of the West is fully made up. Partly from interested motives, easy to understand, partly from a wide survey of all the facts of the case, the West is solidly in favour of a lower tariff, and will presently be in favour of no tariff at all, of reciprocity with the United States, and of Free Trade with Great Britain. For indeed, if, owing to the Tariff handicap, the West fails to fill up, Canadian manufactures in

general must always remain comparatively insignificant. Apart from a few which are to-day quite able to hold their own against outside competition, the remainder never can hope for an outlet beyond the home market. Excluded from the export market in normal times by their lack of coal, their bad strategic position, and the inferior quality of their products, they cannot expand except inside the Tariff wall; and the Tariff wall prevents any large increase in their home clientèle. It is not along that blind alley that Canada, as a whole, can hope to extend her material prosperity. Her real wealth lies in her untilled fields, in her vast stretches of virgin land, in the development of her almost limitless agricultural resources; and these must remain untapped for many years unless the Tariff handicap is removed.

With such or similar arguments, the Council of Agriculture has been approaching the Federal Legislature for several years past. Persuasion fell on deaf ears. The Tariff was sacrosanct; it was out of politics altogether; Conservatives and Liberals were alike wedded to it. The only Free-Trade members of the Lower House were the half-dozen farmer members from the West. Clearly the Tariff had to be dragged into politics again. Logic failing, there was no choice left but a recourse to the force of votes. Thus the Council of Agriculture, mouth-piece of the co-operative associations, after remaining aloof from politics for many years, was forced at last to enter the political field in opposition to both the old parties, as well as to the fusion of the two old parties, and to appeal to the electorate with a comprehensive National Platform.

Let us now pass to a short examination of that Platform, in such a way as to give the English reader some idea of the complex and divergent forces at work in Canadian political thought to-day. The first and foremost plank refers, of course, to the Tariff, and the farmers' demands are formulated as follows:

- (a) An immediate and substantial all-round reduction of the customs tariff.
- (b) Reduction of the customs duty on goods imported from Great Britain to one-half the rates charged under the general tariff; then gradual reduction so

as to ensure complete free trade between Great Britain and Canada in five years.

- (c) Reciprocity with the United States.
- (d) Abolition of import duties on agricultural machinery, vehicles, fertilisers—in a word, all the implements and raw materials of agriculture—and also upon the raw materials used in the manufacture of such goods.
- (e) All tariff concessions granted to other countries to be immediately extended to Great Britain.

The Reciprocity Agreement negotiated by the Liberal Government in 1911 was rejected on political grounds. The same Agreement would be rejected again to-day unless combined with clauses (b) and (e). Free Trade with Great Britain would be a sufficient safeguard against Americanisation, in the two respects of economic influence and voting strength. Offshoots of British factories would rapidly be established in Canada, instead of the field being left in the undisturbed possession of Americans. British goods would be on view in every shop-window, to the general delight of all Englishmen in Canada, who, if they want English boots or clothes, must send their orders to a London shop. British immigrants would pour into the vacant country, would regard it as their permanent home, and stay there, infusing into the whole heterogeneous mass that love and respect of British institutions, of toleration and personal freedom which is the most precious as well as the exclusive inheritance of the sons of Britain. If combined with Imperial Free Trade, Reciprocity would probably receive the support of the British-born. When it is remembered that a very large proportion of the C.E.F. was British-born, that the returned soldiers, through their Great War Veterans' Associations, are a political influence of no mean strength, that these men are not fervent worshippers of democracy *à l'américaine*, it may be safely surmised that they would consent to reciprocity only on condition of simultaneous Free Trade with Great Britain.

The next planks of the new Platform deal with Taxation matters, some of them not contentious, others contentious in the highest degree. They advocate:

- (a) A direct tax on unimproved land values, including all natural resources.

- (b) A graduated personal income tax.
- (c) A graduated inheritance tax on large estates.
- (d) A graduated income tax on the profits of corporations.
- (e) No more natural resources to be alienated from the Crown, but brought into use only under short-term leases.

The income tax was late in gaining a foothold in Canada. It was regretfully and after much hesitation introduced by Sir Thomas White as a war measure. Himself a high protectionist, he no doubt foresaw that to inaugurate a system of direct taxation was to sap the foundations of the indirect system. But it is easier to put on a tax than to take it off. The income tax has come to stay. It is no longer a political question. The only thing that remains to be done, in Canada, is to collect it. The graduated income tax on the profits of corporations may be passed over as not worth discussion. It is a mere piece of corporation-baiting, a clumsy attempt at vote-catching. There is no sound economic reason why the shareholders of corporations should be taxed twice over, if that is the object.

It is the direct tax on unimproved values which is the *pièce de résistance* of the new Platform. How such a proposal came to be introduced in a programme supposed to be drawn up by farmers, in the interests of farmers, it is almost impossible to understand. Rent is the result of any differential advantage in production. Even supposing that the farmers, the largest land-owners in Canada, have not enjoyed in the past, and do not yet enjoy to-day, any differential advantage in production, even supposing that they are not to-day in receipt of rent, they will not always remain in this condition. Indeed, all their economic and political efforts are directed to the removal of this condition. In so far as they become really prosperous, it can only be from the realisation of rent. Do they actually propose that the State should absorb all rent in taxation? The question answers itself. But it is not merely actual rents that are aimed at by this measure, it is potential rents; that is to say, the speculative value of land that is idle. But no land would be idle in Canada if it were possible to turn it to beneficial use. Moreover, a tax on the supposed value of idle land is the worst possible form of tax; it

is a direct tax on capital, a direct confiscation of capital, since, if the land held speculatively does not increase in value at least to the extent of the tax *plus* interest, the tax comes out of the capital of the present holder; and, if it does increase in value, the tax comes out of the capital of the next holder.

There are two classes of speculators in land—the small man and the large capitalist. The latter can always hold out and finally collect interest, tax, and profit out of the future settler. The small man, who has bought on margin, and whose resources are slender, will not be able to pay the tax for many years in succession, and will be crushed. If the object, then, is to force large land-owners like the railway companies and the Hudson's Bay Company to part with their holdings, the tax would have to be so large as to wipe every weak holder out of existence. The disastrous experience of all municipalities throughout the West should have been a sufficient warning. Practically their only source of revenue is this very tax; and precisely on this account they draw nearer to the inevitable bankruptcy year by year. Most of them carry on their books as assets uncollected taxes to the tune of 30 per cent., 40 per cent., or 50 per cent. of the total revenue. These taxes are uncollectible. The land-owners have fallen into arrears; they cannot pay; the land reverts to the municipality, but it cannot be sold, for the tax has destroyed its capital-value. It is an economic axiom that a tax on capital is self-destructive in the long run.

How, then, did such a tax find a place in a Farmers' Political Platform? How long will it stay there? The answers to these enigmas are purely conjectural; there is no documentary evidence to guide us; the hidden hand of Socialist Labour may be guessed at, but it is nowhere manifest. Indeed, if it is there, it dare not manifest itself, since farmers as a body are anything but Socialists. They are individualists to the marrow of their bones, perhaps the only real individualists left. Socialism, in order to capture the farmers' vote, must adopt the methods of 'Pussyfoot,' tread softly and make no noise. Thus it is that we find in another section of this Platform the demand put forward for State ownership of all Public Utilities, of water-power, and of

coal-mines; but the demand suddenly stops at coal-mines, and does not proceed to include, as logically bound, all other natural resources, including land; for, if the demand had gone so far, the farmer would have taken alarm! And again, the unimproved land-values tax, borrowed from Henry George by muddle-headed demagogues, tends towards the confiscation of all rent, actual and potential; but not a word is said about land-nationalisation, which is its only logical and just consummation. For, again, the farmer would have taken alarm!

For a good many years past, there has been a kind of tacit alliance between some of the earlier farmers' leaders and the Socialist Labour wing. Partridge, the first editor of the 'Grain Growers' Guide,' was a Radical Socialist; and the 'Grain Growers' Guide' has carried on the tradition to this day, in spite of the fact that the United Grain Growers' Company has come to be one of the most powerful aggregations of capital in the country. But the truth is that there is no natural connexion, there can be no abiding connexion, between the Canadian farmer and Labour, for he is both capitalist and labourer, and occupies for the moment an intermediate position between two warring forces. And, considering that all his efforts are directed towards lifting him out of the inferior into the superior position, it is not difficult to guess on which side his sympathies and his interests will ultimately lie. It would, therefore, be premature for English readers to take it for granted that, because the taxation of unimproved land-values occupies an important place in the Farmers' Platform to-day, it would necessarily become Federal law if the Farmers' Party triumphed at the polls.

Two obvious and grave instances of the contagion of American ideas are the demand for the 'establishment of measures of direct legislation through the initiative, referendum, and recall,' and the demand for a 'bone-dry Canada.' In both these we can trace the insidious methods of American penetration. Prohibition, indeed, which has swept like a plague all over North America (with the exception of Quebec) is *prima facie* repugnant to the spirit of British institutions. It is an outrage on

the freedom of the subject; it is the denial of the private rights of the individual. Accept Prohibition as anything more than a temporary war measure, and the first breach has been made in that liberty of conscience which it has required so many centuries of struggle to win. The American view appears to be that a bare majority is to have the right of dictating to the private individual in the matter of his tastes and habits. Such a view is utterly at variance with British traditions. If it spreads in Canada, if it gains a permanent foothold, it can only be because Americans there outnumber the British-born. From the regulation of habits and tastes, it is only a step to the regulation of speech and thought. The tyranny that would ensue from the Pussy-footing of Canada is too horrible to contemplate.*

Direct legislation is equally out of harmony with British institutions. Indeed, it must in the end result in their complete overthrow. Responsible government would be destroyed; for the real leaders would no longer be the prominent men in Parliament, but the agitators and nameless conspirators who engineer referendums. Here, again, the people of Canada must make a definite choice. They cannot mould themselves at one and the same time on the pattern of British Democracy and on the pattern of American Democracy.

To complete the picture of the conflict and confusion of political ideas in Canada to-day, it is enough to add that the very Platform advocating the Referendum and Prohibition, which taken together strike at the roots of personal freedom and secure the tyranny of the bare majority, nevertheless advocates the removal of the press censorship and the restoration of the right of speech, and includes proportional representation among its items. Here, again, a choice must be made. The object of proportional representation is the adequate representation of minorities, the safeguarding of minority rights. The object of the Referendum is to ride roughshod over minorities of any kind, and to reduce them to impotence and silence. How can the two be reconciled?

A critical study of the Farmers' National Political

* Since this was written British Columbia has set an example to the rest of the Continent by rejecting Prohibition with a majority of two to one.

Platform thus reveals many divergent influences at work, many hands bringing from all directions pieces of lumber that may or may not fit into a lasting edifice. At first sight, the political struggle might appear as a plain case of West against East, a solid West battling for freedom from the economic strangle-hold of the East, and a solid East grimly resolved to preserve its vested interests. Closer examination shows that the West, while united on the negative side of the Fiscal question (namely, the destruction of the Tariff), is by no means united on the constructive side of the Fiscal question (new taxation) and still less on other matters of vital importance. Reciprocity with the United States appeals with special force to former citizens of that country. To conciliate the British element, the sop of Free Trade with Great Britain is thrown to it. But lest the American should take offence, the preamble of the whole document includes a strongly anti-imperialist pronouncement. The Labour-Socialist element has its finger in the pie, preparing the way for the full triumph of its own special tenets, but careful not to intrude itself too obviously upon the notice of the wary farmer; and the organisation of labour is almost purely American. As Mr Peterson says: 'Canadian labour organisations are international, which merely means that United States bodies dominate the situation. Whether Canadian labour may or may not strike is determined south of the line.'

The farmers' movement, which, in the sphere of economic co-operation, was purely agrarian in management and inspiration, appears to have lost much of its agrarian character in the political sphere. It has been skilfully diverted by hands working in the dark for purposes which have little in common with agrarianism, and cannot be called truly national. For to such an eclectic hodge-podge as the programme of the Council of Agriculture the epithet of national can scarcely be applied. Canada grew during the war to the full stature of a nation. She has nothing to learn from her neighbours south of the line. She must emancipate herself from the tutelage of American ideas; but can only do so with the help of a large influx of British-born population.

Art. 6.—THE MEANING OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE.

1. *Profils et types de la littérature russe.* By E. Combes. Paris : Fischbacher, 1896.
2. *The Collected Works of V. G. Byelinsky* [In Russian]. Second edition. Four vols. St Petersburg, 1900.
3. *Collected Works of A. M. Skabichevsky : Critical Essays, etc.* [In Russian]. Third edition. Two vols. St Petersburg, 1903.
4. *History of Modern Russian Literature, 1848–1908.* By A. M. Skabichevsky. [In Russian.] Seventh edition. St Petersburg, 1909.
5. *History of Russian Literature.* By A. N. Pypin. [In Russian.] Third edition. Four vols. St Petersburg, 1907.
6. *Sketches for the History of Modern Russian Literature.* By P. Kogan. [In Russian]. Moscow, 1910–12.
7. *Russian Literature.* By Prince P. A. Kropotkin. Duckworth, 1916.

THE English student of Russian life and character finds himself confronted by what appears at the outset a baffling enigma to which Russian history in itself does not supply a satisfactory clue. The science, the art, the music of Russia yield each something to his search, but it is only in the literature of the Russian people that he finds the master-key to the mind and heart of the nation. It is hardly too much to say that in no other language is the literature so expressive, so intimate and searching in its psychology, so true an index to the mentality whence it proceeds. In the words of Byelinsky,

‘Our social life finds its chief expression in our literature. Art with us is still a weak and tender shoot which has not had time to spread its roots, much less to develop into a fine and goodly-smelling flower. That does not mean that there is no art, but only that art in Russia is something of the nature of the Eleusinian mysteries, the exclusive possession of a small, select class.’

Of Russian literature, on the contrary, it may be said that at birth it sprang direct from the peasantry of the land, and after centuries of suppression and diversion from its original channel, it has returned in modern times to the source of its earliest inspiration, there to be strengthened, enriched, and revived beyond all

measure. To explain how Russia, with millions of her population steeped in ignorance, has come to possess a literature such as this, it is not enough to give a list of men of letters, or to describe their personalities and works. We must trace the growth of national thought and aspiration from the earliest dawn of Slavonic civilisation, before the fatal supremacy of the Mongol Khans, when nomadic tribes were in process of becoming communal settlers, when along the banks of the great watercourses prosperous cities spread themselves, and the boats or sledges of traders plied to and fro laden with merchandise.

To those far-off times, the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era, belong the epic songs of Russia, the *bylinys*, or metrical tales of "What was." They tell of the golden age of Kiev, under the rule of Prince Vladimir, whose conversion to Christianity was consummated by his marriage with a Byzantine princess. In the Kievan epic cycle, heroes endowed with super-human strength perform doughty deeds in the cause of Christianity, but their attributes are those of the Pagan demi-gods. The Greek Church gradually introduced changes of nomenclature, and saints in place of the ancient heroes; it could not so easily estrange the people from polytheism. The *bylinys* are full of rich and fanciful imagery, and picture the semi-barbaric splendour of the Kievan Court in language that often rises to a high level of poetic beauty. The knights vie with one another and deem it not unseemly to boast of their deeds and their possessions. Vladimir and his spouse, the fair princess Apraxin, bear a certain resemblance to King Arthur and Guinevere; but Vladimir is outshone by the heroes who surrounded him, by Mikula, by the protean Volga, and the mighty Ilya of Muroum. A large number of the *bylinys*, after descending for hundreds of years from father to son by oral tradition, have been collected in latter days by Slavophiles, and are now recognised as a priceless national inheritance. Several have been rendered into English prose, and deserve to be read by every student of Russian literature.

In speaking of what is usually regarded as the earliest written epic of mediæval Russia it should be said that there is a wide divergence of opinion among

Russian critics as to the period at which it was composed, but 'The chant of the band of Igor' is commonly supposed to date from the 12th century. It describes a defeat of the Kievans under their prince Igor, in an expedition against the Polovtsi, a hostile tribe in the South of Russia. There are many allusions to the ancient Slavonic deities—to the Sun-god Dajbog, Stribog, the God of Ocean, and Volos, guardian of the flocks and herds. The forces of nature league themselves with the enemy, and a witch-maiden, in the form of a swan, hovers over the Slavs to compass their destruction. Finally Prince Igor returns in safety to Kiev and the city is filled with rejoicing.

Among the few remaining secular works that survived the stormy period of the Middle Ages, is a code of laws, the *Russkaya Pravda*, dating from the 11th and 12th centuries. It records the scale of payment for labour, the legal procedure of the time with regard to the management of estates, and kindred matters. Apart from these exceptions, almost all the manuscripts of the period are religious in character, the monasteries being the sole repositories of learning, while the princes of petty states warred continually one against another, and hordes of Mongols and Tartars devastated the land.

But the fierceness of the conflict between Christian and Mongol absorbed the whole vitality of the Greek Church. There was practically no general education. Even in historic records like the 'Chronicle of Nestor,' every event is viewed from a theological standpoint. From Cyril and Methodius onwards Russian literature consisted of Scriptural paraphrases, selections from the Holy Fathers, and collections of prayers and homilies.

At length, towards the close of the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533-84), a printing-press was set up in Moscow; and among the earliest secular works to issue from it was a famous book known as the 'Domostroi, or Book of the House.' It was written by a monk named Sylvester, who was tutor to Ivan, and it contained precepts and maxims of conduct for the members of a family of the upper class. The husband was enjoined to treat his wife kindly, but at the same time he was free to inflict bodily chastisement on her, and she for her part must not show resentment or even ill-humour at

such treatment. The sons were taught to say prayers by heart and to perform martial exercises. The daughters had little teaching other than how to make garments and house-linen intended for their dowry.

The social conditions of the time rendered literary progress slow and fitful. No perceptible advance was made until the reign of Peter the Great, when there were signs of an intellectual awakening in response to the Tsar's stirring activities. A peasant writer named Possofchkov gave expression to views which were too much in advance of his generation to be appreciated. Not merely an iconoclast, he suggested means of improving the conditions of his class, but his theories fell on stony ground; his advocacy of compulsory universal education received no attention, and the appeal he made to land-owners to keep their peasantry well-housed and cared-for was equally unavailing. It was too soon to preach to Russian statesmen that education and economic prosperity must go hand-in-hand; and his contemporary, Tatischev, was equally disregarded. Tatischev also sounded the first notes of a cry for political progress and liberty, an appeal that was to go on gathering volume for two hundred years.

Peter the Great, while engaged in introducing better methods of shipbuilding, manufacturing, and all kinds of improvements in economic matters, cared little for purely intellectual acquirements. He brought in English, German, Dutch, and Swiss workmen, who disseminated new scientific ideas and introduced Western methods to Russian craftsmen; but he was ready to crush independence of thought whether in the Church or the laity. Nevertheless, at his death, Prokopovich, the Bishop of Novgorod, himself a man of distinguished learning, bore witness to the great Tsar's qualities of mind and heart.

'Oh! Russia,' he says, 'he is your Moses; are not his laws the firm protection of truth and the unbreakable fetters of wrong-doing? And are not his statutes clear, a light upon your path? And are not the high-ruling senate and the many institutions founded by him so many beacons on the road of progress, the warding-off of harm, the safety of the peaceful, and the unmasking of wrong-doers?'

But, in spite of what has been termed the renaissance

of Russia under Peter, the starting-point of the great classic literature of Russia cannot be placed much earlier than the latter half of the 18th century. To this period belong the initial stages of popular education, which owed much to the Freemasons, who included many men of intellect and of active benevolence. Byelinsky, the greatest literary critic that Russia has produced, dates the true beginning of Russian literature from the publication of 'The Ode on the Capture of Khotin.' This poem was from the pen of Lomonosov, a native of Archangel, of peasant birth, to whom was given the glory of first creating beauty of style from the Russian language. Lomonosov, though he stands so high in the annals of his native literature, is held in greater honour in foreign countries as a scientist. In the words of a learned American professor, 'Only when he described the phenomena of nature or scientific facts did he become truly inspired and write the poems that have survived him.'

Perhaps, at this point, we may digress for a moment, in order to draw attention to a curious lack in the history of Russian literature; it is the lack of influence, both as to form and matter, exercised by the Russian Bible. It has been often said that Shakespeare and the Bible are enough in themselves to form a literary style. In Russia, where this honour has been ascribed to Lomonosov, a man of only moderate genius, the Bible has played no such vitally important part; and this for several reasons. In the first place, the Russian Bible was not printed until 1580, more than a hundred years later than our own, and then in Slavonic only, which continues in use in the churches although it has long become a dead language to the laity. The Epistle to the Romans was printed in Russian in 1815, but it was not until 1875 that the Holy Synod published a complete Russian version of the Bible; and under the Imperial laws no other version of the Bible in Russian could be introduced into Russia. Thus a source to which English writers have owed so much has remained practically closed to Russian authors, who have nevertheless found in their native tongue an instrument capable of expressing the finest shades of meaning, with infinite varieties of rhythm and cadence.

It was the French literature of the revolutionary period that the Russians of the 18th century chose for their guide and model. Catherine the Great, who herself translated French plays for the Imperial stage, was for some years an ardent admirer of the French encyclopædists, of Voltaire, Diderot, and d'Alembert. But when the French revolution reached its climax, she became alarmed for her own security, and not only grew cold to the Continental progressives but proceeded to crush the society of Freemasons, which had grown rich and influential and exercised its power in the direction of spreading knowledge and publishing a quantity of books of an educational kind, at prices that brought them within the reach of the poorer classes. The leader of this altruistic crusade was a writer named Novikov, who became the head of a great printing and bookselling business in Moscow; but his former friendly relations with the Empress came to an end as soon as she realised that he was a serious reformer.

In spite of his widespread philanthropy and good works in a time of famine, Novikov was thrown into prison and condemned to death on a charge of conspiracy. The death sentence was not carried out, but he remained in close confinement in the terrible Schlüsselberg prison until Catherine was succeeded by her son, Paul I (1796). Another progressive writer of the same period, Radischev, was similarly treated, and after many years of exile in the remotest part of Siberia, was released at length, only to end his life by suicide, in despair of the conditions of his countrymen. The publications of both these men were confiscated and destroyed; but not before they had sown seed that was destined to flower in the inspired verse of Russia's greatest poet.

We have now reached the critical period of transition in politics and literature, and of open conflict between the forces of reaction and progress. It is a remarkable feature of Russian Liberalism that it has, as a rule, emanated in the first place from the upper ranks of society. The spirit of change, stirred into activity by the French revolution, was manifest among the highest in the land, long before it reached the lower class. The accession of Alexander I was signalised by the wane of

German influence in Court circles, where it had roused the bitter jealousy and enmity of the Russian nobility during the reign of Paul. Alexander set himself to the reform of abuses and the spread of popular education; but unfortunately the measures he passed were not sufficiently radical to fulfil their purpose. It is noteworthy that he found not only the military caste, but the leading writers of the time, in opposition to his reforms; but, in spite of lack of support from those who should have been most eager to second his efforts, he favoured the diffusion of knowledge to a degree beyond any of his predecessors. It was he who authorised the English Bible Society to extend its work to Russia.

The writings of two great men of letters, the historian Karamzin and the poet Batiouchkov, reveal how closely interwoven with social and political interests was the intellectual life of the early 19th century. In his 'History of Russia,' Karamzin upholds the autocratic system and extols the past glories of the Slavonic race. He may be said to have been the originator of Slavophilism in politics and literature.

'Russian history,' he writes, 'casts lustre on our land. How strangely and wonderfully drawn we are to the banks of the Volga, Dnieper, and the Don, knowing as we do what happened there in remote antiquity! Not only Novgorod, Kiev, and Vladimir, but even the huts of Eletz, Kozelsk, and Galich become of monumental interest. . . . The shadows of past centuries rise in visions before our eyes.'

The Napoleonic invasion roused the nation to patriotic fervour, which found expression in the poetry of the time; but unhappily little was achieved beyond the awakening of futile hopes, which finally culminated in the tragedy of the Decembrist conspiracy. Ryléev, a brilliant young writer, died on the scaffold in the prime of manhood, but was already known throughout Russia as the author of a number of fine patriotic ballads, and of a poem descriptive of the struggle for liberty of Little Russia under the famous Hetman Mazeppa, ending in the disastrous defeat of Charles XII at Poltava.

Ryléev died untimely, but he was followed and eclipsed by his friend and admirer Pushkin, by general consent the greatest of Russian poets. It is not too much

to say that Pushkin was the first truly national poet of Russia, and the first to make Russian poetry admired and honoured beyond her frontiers, just because he threw off the domination of foreign influence so noticeable in the works of his forerunners, and clothed his thought in purely Russian dress. Eugene Onéguine, Pushkin's chief hero, is typically Russian. He is the prototype of the superfluous man, of whom we have many later examples, such as the 'Oblomov' of Goncharov. Talented and amiable, but wanting in energy and steadfastness of purpose, he seems to have been oppressed and paralysed by the vastness and inertia of the land of his birth. It is a type that still exists in Russian life and fiction, that of the man who meditates on the meaning of life, without ever coming to a conclusion, who aspires to greatness and has transient fits of energy, but quickly lapses back into indolence and apathy. He is ever waiting for the vital spark that will fire his energies ; but in waiting life passes, and is ended before he is aware. The character of the heroine, with whom Onéguine only falls in love when she is married to another, shows on the other hand strength, dignity, and fortitude. The love she felt for Onéguine in her girlhood does not change, but she resists him none the less, when at length, too late, he returns it.

Pushkin owed much to childish associations, to the fireside folk-tales of his old nurse and the familiar talk of the peasants on his estate. Homely everyday modes of expression, details of life and character slighted by lesser men as unworthy of regard, all went to give his verse the essentially Russian spirit which till then had been absent from Russian poetry. The depth of thought and mystic intensity of a Milton, a Wordsworth, a Goethe, were not within his province, but his lyric melody, vivacity, and ease are untranslatable and perhaps unrivalled.

With Pushkin one associates the name of Lermontov, whose poem on the death of the former occasioned his exile to the Caucasus. Lermontov has been compared to Byron, but probably, if a comparison is worth making, he had more in common with Shelley than with any other English poet. He was a devoted lover of the wild beauty of the Caucasus ; and his finest poems, such as 'The

Demon,' are those inspired by Caucasian legends. He is, however, better known to English readers as the author of a novel translated under the title 'A Hero of our Times.' The scene is laid at Piatigorsk, a fashionable inland watering-place at the foot of the Caucasian mountains, much frequented by Russians of the upper class. The hero Petchorin is of the usual type. A military dandy, well-born, intellectual, cynical, and inconstant, his love-affairs end in satiety, and the story closes in the vein of melancholy characteristic of Russian novels.

After Pushkin and Lermontov, the whole range of Russian literature widens out. Literary stars appear not singly but in groups and constellations, and their light penetrates to the lowest planes of the social scale. The general tendency and character of Russian literature in recent times may be defined as realistic, psychological, and pessimistic. The most uncompromising realism is evident in the studies of actual life taken from all classes of people. Idealism, as we understand it, is practically absent; while the psychology of the Russian school of fiction is carried far deeper than anywhere in English literature.

Turguenev, in his 'Sportsman's Tales,' which are presented as light sketches of country life, incidentally exposes the cruelty and selfishness of the landlord class, and the miseries of the serf. Gogol, his senior by nine years, had undermined the whole fabric of Russian society by attacking the serf-owner; and Tolstoy, after apparently acquiescing in the *status quo* of rich and poor in 'War and Peace,' and 'Anna Karenina,' became the greatest iconoclast of these three. These great pillars of the Temple of Russian literature undoubtedly prepared the way for a social revolution, by sweeping aside the glamour that surrounded an hereditary landed aristocracy, and, not satisfied with arraigning the ruling section of the community, poured unmeasured scorn upon the idlers, the futile dreamers and ineffectual altruists whose flow of talk achieved no tangible result whatever.

In Turguenev's principal novels we find a succession of Onéguines and Petchorins. Let us take Rudin in the novel of that name. Rudin associates with the nobility on terms of equality, without having an assured position

of his own. He is lazy, ill-educated, luxurious, and fond of displaying his gifts of eloquence and social charm. He goes from house to house, and finds enthusiastic listeners in every drawing-room he enters. He is incapable of any definite course of action and is lamentably lacking in will and character, yet he pleads the cause of patriotic endeavour with so much eloquence that he himself is woefully disappointed that nothing comes of it. Rudin is Turguenev's finest psychological study. Other personalities, less carefully drawn but true to type, are Daria Lasunsky, the lady with a country-place who entertains lavishly and is secretly detested by those of lesser position, who regard her as 'haughty, overbearing, and immoral'; Lejnef, also of the landlord class, honest-hearted, simple, and with a limited range of ideas; and Natalia, the embodiment of goodness, moral courage, and steadfastness. The plot of 'Dmitri Rudin,' like those of so many Russian novels, is little more than an essay in psychology, amplified by pictures of so-called good society. Rudin, the social favourite and to all appearance master of the situation, realises the falseness of his position the moment he aspires to marriage with Natalia, the daughter of his hostess. He has no means, no position, and the pride of the Russian aristocrat of fifty years ago rises in arms against such a *mésalliance*. Rudin, incapable of resistance to opposing forces, resigns his love without a struggle, but yet with a certain dignity which inspires respect. His weakness has been unsparingly exposed throughout; but, as age and misfortune close in upon him, the author sums him up in the words of his one loyal friend, with the sympathy that Russians invariably show towards failure and moral laxity.

'It is not the spirit of idle restlessness, it is the flame of the love of truth that burns in you, and clearly, in spite of your failings; it burns in you with greater fire than in many who do not consider themselves egoists, and dare to call you a humbug perhaps . . . and you have not even been embittered, Dmitri. You are ready, I am sure, to-day, to set to some new work again like a boy.'

Rudin is shot down at the barricades in Paris in 1848. He had long ceased to be an egoist and a parasite.

Again, in 'A House of Gentlemen,' Turguenev makes a study of the men and women of his own standing and

generation, and introduces us to Panshin, a smart young bureaucrat, bent on a career, and Lavretsky, the scion of a noble house who returns from his travels to live among his peasants, seeking to gain their confidence and spread the democratic views he has acquired abroad. But Turguenev, for all his sympathy with the oppressed *moujik* and serf, is not able to place himself on their level. He writes, glancing downwards from above, with pity but hardly with complete understanding.

The same, at the outset of his career as a writer, might be said of Leo Tolstoy. 'War and Peace' is a novel of high society. Levine, it is true, is a philanthropic landlord, who lives on his estate and seeks to help and benefit his peasants by every means in his power; but Levine is subsidiary to Pierre, the natural son of a nobleman, and Prince André, a young officer whose fastidious and arrogant spirit reflects the disposition of Tolstoy himself in early manhood. 'Anna Karenina' is similarly a novel devoted to the old exclusive, aristocratic and official class which disdained to associate with the merchants or even with the Intellectuals—the 'Intelligentsia' as they are called in Russia. I need not describe the characters in 'Anna Karenina,' a novel almost as well known to English as to Russian readers. Suffice to say that it is an admirable and faithful picture of a régime that is past and gone, and which had even then reached the verge of its downfall.

Not only the unrest that lay below the surface was working towards revolution, but the modern development of a middle class was changing the whole aspect of Russian life. A great industrial advance manifested itself when Russia recovered from the shock and strain of the Napoleonic invasion. Factories rapidly increased in number; banks and commercial enterprises of all kinds multiplied. Merchants and tradesfolk grew rich, and could no longer be left out of the reckoning. Their sons thronged the gymnasiums and colleges, fired by the desire for culture and expansion, and swelled the ranks of the Intelligentsia, a term which includes without distinction all men who devote themselves to literary pursuits. The old noble families were beginning to disintegrate. In many cases their estates passed out of their hands, or were preserved by means of intermarriage

with the sons and daughters of self-made men. Fiction ceased to concern itself principally with the doings of a privileged few, and presented an entirely new gallery of portraits. The lower ranks of the bureaucracy, the professional men, the trading community, in fine the 'bourgeois,' occupy the first places in these novels of the transition period.

Tolstoy wrote a short, pathetic story of a poor little clerk, whose idea of happiness had been to possess a fur-coat. He arrives at the moment when his savings suffice for the purchase, only to have it stolen from him, after which he loses heart for the struggle of life and dies for want of anything to live for. Later, Chekhov and Saltikov and Sologub, all masters of the art of the short story, devoted themselves almost exclusively to studies of intellectuals and bureaucratic underlings. Saltikov, during exile in Viatka, a remote provincial town, wrote the series of 'Provincial Sketches' which made his name famous throughout Russia. They constituted a formidable attack on the administration of local government, of which few men could be better judges, since he had occupied every official position in town-life, from clerk to governor. Saltikov had many imitators; and, step by step, the novel with a purpose came into being, as the sole outlet for the ventilation of grievances and for giving forth the aspirations of the progressive section of the nation.

Chekhov, a greater artist than Saltikov, is pre-eminently the novelist of the *Intelligentsia*. He views his own class as a weak minority, seeking a breathing-space between highly placed reactionaries and stagnating peasantry, and deplors their lack of energy and force of character. His novels are models of penetrating, incisive criticism in the guise of fiction, the best known among them being perhaps 'The Duel,' 'The Valet,' and 'Room No. 6,' and the play entitled 'Uncle Vanya.'

The leading part in 'Uncle Vanya' is played by a learned professor named Serebriakov, who is worshipped by his whole family on account of his genius. His brother-in-law manages his estate for him and, like the rest, makes sacrifices to provide him with money. The professor spends his time in writing a book on the sacred mission of art, regardless of the wants and

pleasures of any one. His is the life of pure egotism, given up to the phrasing of beautiful sentences. Finally, he gets tired of living in the country, and proposes to go abroad. To accomplish this he wishes to sell the estate, which in reality belongs to his daughter Sonia. He communicates his intention to his family, whose eyes are at last opened to the egoism of their idol, and an estrangement ensues. But shortly afterwards matters are adjusted and a reconciliation takes place. Sonya, who is the heroine of the drama, devotes herself to the village and its needs, while she shows herself willing and ready to face work. She is the one character in the drama who keeps firm hold of her father, in spite of personal unhappiness and disappointed love, and prevents those around her from being overwhelmed by despair.

Thus it may be seen that idealism is not in reality absent from the Russian novel, although it is of a character totally different from what we understand by that word. The Russian writer's idealism shows itself in a continual search for inner truth and for the highest pinnacle of justice. In Dostoevsky this search is everywhere evident; and he does not scruple to put his best and most elevated thoughts into the mouths of the fallen and the wretched. But Dostoevsky, one feels, great as he is, may be almost left out of the category. He is a psycho-pathologist of universally acknowledged genius, who devotes himself to the abnormal. Healthy, commonplace human nature is rare in his pages. His people are Russians, but Russians seen in a mirror which gives to those it reflects an appearance of malformation. My concern here is chiefly to choose from the vast mass of Russian literature studies of national types from highest to lowest, that are at once critical and just.

Such a writer is Ostrovsky, whose plays, few in number, must be numbered among the finest productions of the 19th century. His characters are mainly drawn from the newly-enriched merchant class. The elders are harsh, domineering, and unscrupulous; the young of both sexes are weak and subservient or silently strong and inwardly rebellious. There is rarely a scene in which love triumphs over an evil destiny, except by escaping, like Catherine in 'The Storm,' by the gateway of death. The heroines are either, as she is, under the

cruel yoke of a shrewish mother-in-law, or puppets in the hands of an ambitious father, like Avdotia, in the comedy 'Everyone in his Place,' who is driven to the verge of desperation by the discovery that she has sacrificed her honour and her father's affection to a worthless fortune-hunter who only eloped with her to secure a rich wife. The heroes, hardly to be called such, are ineffectual figures, lacking energy to overcome, or fortitude to endure, adversity. These are gloomy pictures, but they are alive and arresting.

The same criticism applies to Gorki, who depicts the bourgeoisie with equally relentless realism, but also reveals, as it were incidentally, a spiritual ideal never wholly eclipsed in the encompassing darkness. His 'Foma Gordeiev' is a minutely faithful picture of the tragedy of wealth allied to unbridled sensuality. Ignatius Gordeiev, the father of Foma, is a successful merchant, given to coarse pleasures and incapable of generosity or any unselfish action. His advice to his son is shrewd and unprincipled.

'It's utterly impossible to walk perfectly straight in a matter of business; one must be politic! So, my boy, when you approach a man, hold honey in your left hand, and in your right—a knife! Every man wants to purchase a five-kopék piece for two kopéks. . . . Life, my dear Foma, is very simply regulated: Bite everybody, or lie in the mud.'

The life-story of Foma Gordeiev is the story of a man of whom one may say that he never had a chance. But, although he passed through the same stages of debauchery and sensuality as his father before him, there is always a flicker of aspiration towards something higher, which struggles, although too feebly to be effectual, towards a better life. In the tragic hour when his reason becomes disordered, he utters the truth that is in him to a group of merchants who have set on him and bound him hand and foot.

'What justification have you all in the sight of God? Why do you live? . . . I have lived. I have observed. I have thought. . . . Now I am utterly worn out. . . . Something flared up within me; it has burned out and there is nothing left, nevertheless, although my truth against you is weak, it is the truth. You are accursed!'

By the mental collapse of Foma, his evil genius Mayakim gains control of his large fortune, amasses wealth and leaves a flourishing business to his children; but we are made to feel that in the despised and degraded Foma there is a spark of the divine fire, feeble but unextinguished. It is in this instinctive sympathy with moral weakness, with failure and crime itself, that the Russian writer appears most different from ourselves. English readers expect to find in fiction the golden prize of success and the happiness which has eluded their grasp in actual life. To men of British race failure is abhorrent, almost sinful; and moral lapses may be condoned but are not to be forgiven. Our modern fiction has sometimes sought to exalt the sinner, but the nation as a whole resents the attempt.

In placing Gorki before Uspenski and Zlatovratsky I have departed from chronological order, so as to present the social grades of the Russian people in due sequence from top to bottom. I am led to make this variation from the usual manner of treating my subject, because it is not merely a question of describing Russian Literature, but of defining its significance. It appears to me in the light of an unending struggle towards political liberty; a struggle originating with the educated upper class and slowly extending to the lower strata. It may be traced in the letters of the noble Chiuski written in exile to Ivan the Terrible; it strengthened the Freemason Novikov to brave his sovereign's displeasure; it led countless men of literary genius to endure exile, imprisonment and death, in the hope that they might thereby arouse their countrymen and free them from ignorance and slavery.

Russian literature is consistently saturated with politics in some shape or other, and in modern times has been devoted almost exclusively to the cause of the ignorant and down-trodden peasantry. The Russian phrase, 'going in among the people,' was not simply an equivalent for 'slumming.' It meant that men and women of education and refinement were exiling themselves to isolated villages far distant from the capital, becoming doctors, teachers, nurses, and fellow-labourers with untaught, uncomprehending *moujiks*, who were hard to

conciliate and slow to believe in their good faith. But the seeds of culture and political unrest sown year by year did gradually penetrate the soil. Revolution became not only inevitable, as it had always been, but imminent; and the signs of its approach were written large throughout the country.

Uspenski and Zlatovratsky are among those whose peasant stories are most instinct with reality. Of the two, the latter is on the whole the more optimistic; but neither writer gives way to sentiment. Each is giving utterance to his political faith disguised as a work of fiction. Zlatovratsky founded his hopes for the betterment of Russia on the communal life of the *moujik*. He rejoiced in all that made for unity of purpose, in the *artel* or workman's unions, in the co-operative farms and the *mir* or village council. He desired to see the Intellectuals associating themselves with the peasantry, and devoting themselves less exclusively to their own culture. But he makes no attempt to idealise the *moujik*. 'Foundations, the Story of a Village,' and 'Rural Week-days,' are two novels in which he puts forward these ideas with characteristic force. Peter, the hero of 'Foundations,' after receiving a rudimentary education, has been placed by his father in a business house in Moscow. His affairs prosper, and he presently returns home, becoming the owner of a farm and a man of substance. In this position he grows arrogant and merciless towards the poor and the drunken and unthrifty. The villagers grow restive when he wishes to reserve the communal land for those who will work it most profitably. He returns in disgust to Moscow. Zlatovratsky points out that his failure is due to want of education, and to a false idea of his own superiority.

Uspenski, a contemporary of Zlatovratsky, goes still further in the direction of unvarnished realism. Tolstoy in his short stories of peasant life had given the world many beautiful and pathetic pictures. He described the miserable condition of the *moujik* and at the same time held him up as worthy of imitation. In stories such as 'The Death of Ivan Ilitch' and 'The Snowstorm,' it is the servant and the man of humble birth who appears as a type of simple unconscious heroism and self-sacrifice. Uspenski saw the peasant as a less lovable being. In

his earlier works he describes him as a drunken sot, with hardly a redeeming quality. To him we owe a repulsive picture of the village bully, a word which, however, does not accurately define the exact meaning of the original. A *Kulak* is a well-to-do peasant, of a usurious turn. The whole village is under his thumb.

‘What is this phenomenon? What is a Kulak? The opinion obtains that the village is being ruined by a man who comes from outside. In truth, wonders are being accomplished before our eyes. Here is the Barin losing thousands of roubles on his estate, not knowing what to do; and here is a *moujik* making a fortune out of tallow candles. Yes, literally out of tallow candles. How is it possible to make a profit on a tallow candle, the price of which is a penny? Well, as every one knows, there are soirées on winter evenings organised by the village girls. As the young men have nowhere to go, they perforce attend these entertainments, the cost of which is borne by the girls, so that the prospective bridegrooms may be put to no expense. The girls pay for the hire and lighting of the room. For the former the charge is not high, about forty kopéks [1s.] a month, but the lighting is another matter; for this they go to the one practical man of the village. He provides the candles, doling out to each girl two or three, which she must pay for in labour, at the rate of five kopéks a candle. For each five kopéks’ worth of lighting the girls undertake to cut ten sheaves of corn. Now reckon up how many candles are burned and with how much labour they are purchased. This practical man of the village knows everything—when the hens lay, when the women want money; in a word, he knows the most secret thoughts of the village, and on this knowledge he thrives.’

And Uspenski sums up the Kulakchestvo as a ‘phenomenon that is native to village life; not a blot to be effaced, but an ulcer, a disease.’

Uspenski’s best novel is considered by Russian critics to be ‘The Power of the Soil.’ Written under happier auspices than his first novels, it sets forth a more sympathetic view of peasant life and character, although, like his predecessors, he still surveys the peasant from above. The hero of this story, Ivan Petrov, from leading a life of prosperity in a good position, becomes an agricultural labourer, and by close contact with nature is redeemed from the moral abyss into which he was

falling. He embodies, in fact, the new faith in 'The Power of the Soil' which Uspenski had learnt to feel. At the same time he is under no illusions as to the *moujik's* vaunted patriotism in war-time.

'No one ever explains anything to him and he himself has lost the habit of asking or finding out. I should tell an untruth if I were to assert that a desire to go to fight or the childish wish to defend the right is concealed in that absence of deliberation which we see in the people. There is nothing of the kind in him. No one knows why, nor what is the matter, but every one goes without a murmur, because he is accustomed to go; he is accustomed to pay when he is told to pay, and has quite lost the habit of asking whither, why, or wherefore. For the idea of a greater or lesser phenomenon happening in the general life of the empire has never reached his village. The village never even knows the circumstances which react on its own economical position.'

It is noteworthy that Russian realism has undergone a process of change during the past twenty years. The novels of Turgenev, Tolstoy, and others of their generation depicted the peasant in a light which the later writers regard as sentimental or unreal. Tolstoy, in particular, fell a victim to his own ideals. He drew the peasant, as Landseer drew dogs and horses, with super-senses to which they had no claim. He brought to the surface qualities that might be and probably were latent, but of which the ordinary observer could see little or nothing. In the novels of to-day another method is apparent. The peasant is still, or more than ever, the central dominant figure, but he is shorn and denuded of every vestige of false sentiment. Modern realism has retained the detailed description of nature, of dress and appearance, but the classical synthetic vision has given place to a thirst for individualism, to a beclouded dream of a free unfettered existence where the naked truth is to be enthroned and worshipped. Among the leading representatives of this latest development of Russian literature are to be numbered Veresaev, Saitsev, and Yushkevich.

Of the representatives of the younger generation, Yushkevich is one of the most gifted. He presents the sufferings of the individual, the stupefying effect of unremitting toil, the wail of the hungry, in a way that

brings it all home to the reader as the novelists of the previous decades failed to do. The faint rumble as of a distant storm has grown to a volume of sound such as rises from a modern battle-field. Boris Saitsev, again, like most of his contemporaries, devotes his talents to the description of the sufferings of the poor. Veresaev strikes deep into the heart of things. He describes in 'Pathless' how Chekanov, a philanthropic doctor, gives up his career to go and live in an isolated village, devoting himself to the peasantry, body and soul. They mistrust him, accuse him of poisoning them, and at length set on him and beat him to death. With his dying breath he forgives them and puts the case as he sees it to his cousin Natasha, a girl with aims similar to his own. 'So must it ever be, for we have ever been strangers to them, beings belonging to another world; we disdainfully avoided contact with them, without seeking to understand them; and a terrible gulf separated them from us.'

Russian literature represents a wonderful history of intellectual evolution. The writers whose works have built up that literature in the course of centuries began as a child begins, by being receptive and imitative. By slow degrees they freed themselves from outside influences and became at length exclusively pre-occupied with the problems of their national development. I have sought the answer to the inquiry underlying the title of this article in the fiction of Russia, because that fiction is essentially an historical panorama of the Russian people. Uspenski, says Kropotkin, is rather an ethnologist than a writer of fiction; and, generally speaking, the novelist in Russia is a social historian, a politician, a preacher. He is not 'out' to amuse the idle or to provide relaxation to the weary; he is 'out' to impress on one and all the woeful condition of his countrymen, to cry aloud for freedom and justice. This, is, I think, the meaning and intention of the Russian literature of the present day; and this, from the first, was the pathway of its destiny.

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

Art. 7.—THE REORGANISATION OF THE NAVAL STAFF, 1917-19.

1. *The Crisis of the Naval War.* By Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe. Cassell, 1920.
2. *Der Dienst des Generalstabes.* By Bronsart von Schellendorff. 4th edition; edited by Major von Schellendorff. Berlin: Mittler, 1905.
3. *Field Service Regulations*, Part II, 1914.
4. *Handbuch für Truppenführung und Stabsdienst.* By Cardinal von Widdern. Gera: Reisewitz, 1884.
5. *Le Grand État-Major Naval.* By Lieutenant de vaisseau Castex. Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1909.

THE direction of any large business, whether it be a government service or a great soap industry, or an oil company with branches all over the globe, involves numerous problems of organisation and management, whose elucidation has attracted increasing study and attention in recent years under a variety of forms. The careful observation of the motions involved in some ordinary task, such as bricklaying or shovelling, with a view to economy of effort and standardised conditions of work, has given rise to a branch of investigation* termed 'time-motion' problems. The welfare and contentment of personnel are universally recognised as another matter of primary importance, intimately related to political stability, as well as to industrial efficiency, and giving rise to numerous side-issues of investigation, such as the effects of fatigue and strain, not only on the output, but on the whole character and social outlook of the worker. But, though the wide scope of the subject is beginning to be appreciated, there is a failure to observe that, if principles of efficiency are discoverable, they will be discovered in the business of war, for war is a business terribly intense and stern. In trade, man contends with time and tide and circumstance, and with his fellow-man in terms of gain; in engineering and medicine and the physical sciences, he contends with nature and the stubborn texture of atoms; but only in war does he contend with

* 'Twelve Principles of Efficiency,' by Harrington Emerson, 1912.

human intelligence consciously intent on encompassing his immediate destruction, and directing every available means to this end.

War is not merely a business, but a terrible business, for an enemy determined to appeal to the arbitrament of force allows no time for deliberation or delay. In war, time is measured in seconds; and the soldier, therefore, was long ago compelled to discover the very elements of efficiency which now engage so much attention—for gun-drill is only a soldier's name for the 'time-motion' system of scientific management, whose object is to perform a given task with the greatest speed and least effort. The tendency of a navy or army in peace time to fall into artificiality and formalism should not blind us to the fact that a great war-service, emerging from a long war, is almost bound by the nature of things to bring with it certain principles of efficiency hammered out on the anvil of hard and bitter experience. But a clear conception of such principles is not a monopoly of the victorious side, for the vanquished may discover them if they study diligently the causes of their defeat. At Jena the sun of Prussia suffered a disastrous eclipse; 'A nation breathed on us,' said Heine, 'and we melted away.' But the lesson was not forgotten. The ablest thinkers in Germany set to work to analyse the causes of defeat; and the principles they evolved were embodied by Scharnhorst and Moltke in the Prussian system of staff organisation (not to be confused with the spirit of Prussian militarism), which has been adopted by all modern armies, and may rightly be regarded as one of the monumental achievements of the 19th century.

The master-key of this system lies in one fundamental principle—the necessity of a clear-cut distinction between fighting and supply; that is, between the general direction of operations on the one hand, and routine and technical services on the other. The general direction of operations is the business of the Chief of the General Staff; and ranged beside him are the great quarter-master services of administration and supply. The Chief of the General Staff stands at the right hand of the Supreme Command, co-ordinating the work of the whole towards a single

end ; and closely in touch with him is the Quartermaster-General, responsible for the important background of transport, equipment, and supply.

This great triplicity of service is the hall-mark of an efficient organisation. At the head is the Commander-in-Chief, unburdened and unfettered by details, and bringing to difficult problems at a critical hour a large reserve of authority, and a clear outlook undimmed by a hundred minor matters of routine. At his right hand is his Chief of Staff, a master of the use of the instrument, responsible for a correct appreciation of the situation and for the general conduct of operations ; and behind him is the Quartermaster-General, responsible for the gigantic task of supplying the instrument and keeping it efficient.

It may be legitimately argued that, if this is a general principle of efficiency, it will not be confined to the army alone, but will be discernible in all successful organisations of any size. And, in some form or other, this appears to be always the case. In a great newspaper, for instance, the editor may be regarded as the Chief of the Staff ; and his work corresponds to the 'operational' aspect of the machine. The managerial or 'maintenance' aspect is concerned with the supervision of personnel, the conditions of service, the supply of all the equipment required, and the general superintendence of the work of printing, issue, and despatch, which involves the technical aspect of the whole craft and mechanism of printing. Again, in a large store, it is probable that the managing director is chiefly concerned with markets, sales, and the analysis of profits and loss, for these constitute the operational aspect of a business ; and it may be assumed that he leaves to others such questions as the upkeep of the buildings, and the regulation, entry, and training of personnel, which concern the maintenance of the business rather than its extension and development. These two aspects may be given a variety of names,* but the fundamental distinction lies in the fact that the one is concerned with the use of the instrument, the other with its supply and maintenance in an efficient state. The analogy may even be carried further. In the work

* The Army term is General Staff and Administration, usually designated G. and Q. (Quartermaster). The Admiralty in 1917 adopted the terms Operations and Maintenance.

of Christian evangelisation, one of the great dynamic movements in the history of mankind, the Apostles refused to leave the work of preaching in order to 'minister to tables'; and again, in the human body, which is the archetype of functional co-ordination, the automatic, unconscious, and what may be called the 'routine' processes of the body, such as the movements of the heart and lungs, are controlled by one portion of the brain, while the conscious, or what may be called the 'operational,' activities, such as walking and speaking, are directed by another.

It may appear at first sight that this principle would naturally commend itself to all administrators, but experience shows that this is far from being the case; men brought up in a small sphere of business, where they have been accustomed to exercise a large measure of direct and personal control, cling to a system of centralisation, and cling to it the more tenaciously the older they grow. They take a real delight in detail and in the exercise of personal supervision over every branch of work, and are never assailed by the desire to be free in order to think of things unthought of, or to study the wider aspects of their work. All the currents of the 19th-century Navy tended in this direction. The naval officer was brought up in a limited sphere of work; his education gave him a strong sense of personal responsibility; and his promotion was gained by personal attention to the paint and brass work of his ship. As a commander or a captain he learnt to love to pry into all the corners of the ship; as an admiral he still hankered after detail, and was apt to be absurdly busy and pre-occupied over all sorts of trifles. He was *maximus in minimis*—very great in very little things. Sir Percy Scott has pointed out how the admiral of the 19th century decided what clothes the men were to wear, what boats each ship was to use, whether awnings were to be spread, when and how washed clothes were to be hung up, and how insistently each ship had to follow the flagship motions, and to do exactly what the flagship did.*

This tendency to centralisation became an ineradicable

* 'Fifty Years of Naval Life,' 144, 198, 212. 'As regards housemaidling and tailoring, no inspection could have been more searching.'

trait of most flag-officers ; * and the average Commander-in-Chief lost himself in a morass of detail. Nor was this tendency confined to the British Navy. Moltke has pointed out that the Austrian staff orders in 1866 were not bad orders, but had one insuperable defect ; they went into enormous detail, and reached the Army Commanders only after the battle had been fought.† The same fault characterised our staff work in South Africa. The German official account, commenting on the Spion Kop operation orders, says : ' The above orders are typical of English methods ; they contain a mass of detail which could be perfectly well left to junior officers.'‡ Similarly, in the Russo-Japanese war, the orders issued by the Great Headquarter Staff dealt with a vast mass of local administrative detail. Kuropatkin states that ' the amount of writing done by the various staff officers was colossal ; they worked the whole evening and all night ; their effusions were lithographed and sent off in all directions, but they were rarely received by the troops in proper time.' At the battle of Telissu the operation orders never even reached the First East Siberian Division, and the battle was one long string of blunders from beginning to end. Compare this with Moltke's system. The order of Aug. 21, 1870, directing the movements of more than 200,000 men for the next four days, did not fill one printed page.

Brevity and despatch are the life of war ; and brevity and despatch are only possible if all extraneous effort has been eliminated from the controlling centre by the adoption of some vital principle of distinction, such as exists between operations and supply, that is, between the science of the use of the weapon and the science of its maintenance in an efficient state. Curiously enough, this very distinction, which is now one of the recognised principles of staff organisation, is to be found in the system of naval organisation established by Henry VIII in 1546, which held sway in our Navy down to 1832. It is true that the analogy must not be pressed too closely,

* ' I never omitted to analyse all shootings personally.' Bacon's ' Dover Patrol,' i, 93.

† ' It is lengthy documents which make the Austrians so slow.' Kraft, ' Letters on Strategy ' (1898), vol. II, 133.

‡ German official account, trans. Colonel H. Du Cane, 139.

for the circumstances of the time were different, but it is there, and is plainly discernible. In Henry VIII's organisation the Lord High Admiral represented the function of general control, while the actual administration was performed by the four Principal Officers, namely, the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor, and Clerk of the Acts, who were responsible respectively for finance, the general supervision of accounts, the building and upkeep of ships, and the record of naval business. These officials were known as the Navy Board. Another official acted as President of the Board, under the title of Lieutenant of the Admiralty.*

The offices of Lord High Admiral and of the Navy Board were sometimes in commission,† but this fact serves to distinguish the two separate functions all the more clearly. The supply system was doubtless often bad and insufficient—sometimes deplorably so; but its insufficiency seems to have been due rather to the inevitable limitations of the time than to any inherent defect of principle. There can be little doubt that the old conception attached to the office of the Lord High Admiral was that of general direction and command, and that the work of supply—victualling, equipment, pay, clothing—was kept separate from it. All our old wars were fought under this dual organisation, in which the Admiralty was responsible for the general direction, and the Navy Office for the maintenance and provision of all the multifarious requirements of war. It was under this system that Hawke and Nelson fought; and it was this system, in a modified form, which was finally adopted by Sir Eric Geddes and Lord Jellicoe in 1917 as the result of experience gained in the recent war.

In 1832, when the memory of the French wars was beginning to fade, Sir James Graham merged the Admiralty

* This officer would have been in general charge of all administrative or 'maintenance' functions; and the retention of the office might have served to remedy many of the subsequent defects in the system, but it fell into abeyance.

† The functions of the Principal Officers, for instance, were performed by Commissioners from February 1619 to February 1628. The office of the Lord High Admiral was in commission from September 1628 to March 1638. The Principal Officers were again replaced by Navy Commissioners at the outbreak of the Civil War by an ordinance of Sept. 15, 1642, and these Commissioners continued till the Restoration. Nine Commissioners of the Admiralty were similarly appointed by both Houses on Oct. 19, 1642.

and the Navy Board into one on the plea of economy and efficiency—a plea which seemed sound enough, and was made more plausible by the unsatisfactory working of the supply services.* This amalgamation was regarded as a master-stroke, but its real nature was not discerned. The Admiralty congratulated itself on swallowing up the Navy Board, but the work of the Navy Board swallowed up the real functions of the Admiralty. The successors of St Vincent became slaves of the lamp of administration and supply; and, to use a lowly analogy, the mistress of the house, because the range was out of order, installed herself in the kitchen to supervise the cook. The consequence can be traced in the naval literature of the 19th century, which is almost barren of any contribution to the science of naval war. The naval officer became more and more immersed in the business of peace administration; and the effect of the change was enormously accentuated as technical services multiplied.

Progress and development in the technical branches of naval knowledge had hitherto been relatively slow, but the advent of the steam engine, and what may be called the hydro-carbon era of industry, altered the whole aspect of affairs. Marine engineering thrust masts and yards into the background; ships and ordnance underwent an enormous change; technical crafts multiplied; the sciences of gunnery, torpedoes, hydraulics, electricity, and wireless telegraphy grew up almost in a night, and became transformed in a single decade. The naval officer of the past had aimed only at being a seaman. He now became imbued with the idea that it was his business to be a master of every craft practised on board a ship. The brains and talent of the service were mortgaged to the schools of gunnery and torpedoes †

* The faulty functioning of the supply services is remedied by reforming the supply services. If the Quartermaster General is inefficient, he must be replaced by one who is efficient. To make the Chief of the Staff do his work may remedy the evil, but it only introduces another—Who is going to do the work of the Chief of the Staff?

† It is interesting to observe the casual way in which electrical engineering became an adjunct of the torpedo branch. The first torpedo was towed, and fired by electricity when in contact with the enemy. Hence torpedoes became associated with electricity; and, as electrical science developed, the whole electrical service of the ship became an adjunct of the torpedo officer, though the torpedo itself is driven by compressed air, and quite independently of electricity. But, while the torpedo officer was

—schools very necessary in themselves, but representing only the technical branches of naval warfare. In this world of change and new fields of study there were, however, two factors which did not change. One was human capacity, the other was time. The brain could hold only a certain amount; the day was still only twenty-four hours long. The result was inevitable. The study of strategy and of staff work, which is the business aspect of war, was ignored, while navigation and hydrography, which are the handmaids of strategy and the real technical crafts of the sea, became the 'Cinderella' branches of the service, and for years were regarded with something like contempt.

Here again, if the evolution of these new technical branches be studied, the same neglect to distinguish between the use of the instrument and its construction and maintenance will be found retarding progress and development. From 1870 to 1900 the gunnery lieutenant concerned himself much more with the gun than with gunnery; and the gunnery that existed prior to the era of Sir Percy Scott was a mere exercise entirely divorced from reality, while the name of tactics was given to certain quadrille movements, useful enough perhaps as an exercise in handling ships, but with no earthly relationship to gunfire or to the actual movements of a fleet in battle. In the same way, the torpedo lieutenant spent his time in taking torpedoes to bits* and putting them together again, and had none left for the study of their use and tactical control in action.

The gunnery reform initiated by Sir Percy Scott about 1897 marked the genesis of a new era. In Lord Fisher, a kinetic man, eruptive and disruptive, there glowed an instinct for reform; but, though a big man, he lacked perspective, and was a man of action, indisposed to study a subject deeply and exhaustively. His early training had wedded him to a system of centralisation; and he was strongly opposed to the idea of staff organisation. There was something to be said for this view, for it may

worrying over a fault in the dynamo, he was neglecting the study of torpedo tactics and control.

* Not only the torpedo lieutenant. It is narrated of a distinguished Admiral of the Fleet that as a captain he would spend a spare forenoon in stripping and assembling a torpedo.

be doubted whether a service which had wandered for forty years in the barren deserts of technical knowledge could supply the capital of intellect necessary for the conception and initiation of a naval staff on the scale of modern war. The brains of the navy had been mortgaged almost irretrievably to technical subjects; gunnery, torpedoes, wireless, and ship administration were all sufficiently studied, or at least received a large measure of attention, but in the spheres of strategy and tactics little progress had been made.

It may be said with a large degree of truth that between 1830 and 1880 the words 'strategy' and 'tactics' passed out of naval vocabulary and were lost. One or two men like Sir Geoffrey Hornby and Philip Colomb sought for them, but they were not to be found. The dawn of a new era came between 1880 and 1890, and found its first expression in the Intelligence Department, instituted about 1886,* and later in the War College, which started about 1900. The development of these institutions would require a book in itself. The Intelligence Department was the forerunner of the Naval Staff, but it lacked a school of staff training, made no effort to compete with the great technical schools for the best brains of the community, neglected the vital principle of differentiation between Operations and Administration, and sank more and more into the position of a mere handmaid for the collection of data and the making of translations from the foreign press. The War College, which was started largely on the initiative of the late Rear-Admiral Henry May, supplied an element of organised instruction, but there was still no real Naval Staff; and the older admirals, wedded to the methods of individualism and centralisation, strongly opposed it.

The Agadir incident in 1911 revealed the bankruptcy of the no-staff system. Under the system of centralisation a 'great plan' was concocted, possibly very remote from reality and entirely independent of the other great departments of State. It was kept carefully secret, ready to be revealed at the critical hour. The critical

* It first appeared in the Navy List in 1887, but a Foreign Intelligence Branch had been started about 1883.

hour came in 1911. The secret safe was opened and was found to contain a military campaign of which the General Staff had never heard. According to common report it included a landing on the Frisian Islands—a long, low sandy group of islands fringing the German coast. The General Staff protested against it as inconceivable. What was the army going to do when it had landed on the Frisian Islands? Their arguments were irrefutable, and the broken shards of the plan drifted away, carrying much wreckage with them. A new Board was then created and a War Staff instituted. Unfortunately it had no commanding intellect like Lord Haldane's to watch over its cradle. Mr Winston Churchill supplied enthusiasm and energy, but he had never made a deep study of staff organisation, and his task was a difficult one. In spite of difficulties, however, he accomplished a great deal, and established the beginnings of a staff system. The term 'Staff' was introduced, and a Chief of the War Staff was appointed to co-ordinate the work of the three divisions of Intelligence, Operations, and Mobilisation, which were usually as intent on a war with one another as with the enemy. A system of training staff officers and a Staff Course were instituted, and had been in existence for two years when the war broke out; but the number of trained Staff officers were still insufficient, and this insufficiency was felt most acutely in the Admiralty. All the competent officers were snowed under with work. There was too little time for the present, less for the future, and none for the past.

From the very first day of the war the War Staff proved entirely insufficient in numbers to cope with the work to be done. The method of conducting the business had not been studied. On the first day of war a number of sections were bundled into a large room called the War Room, with the idea that they should be as close as possible to one another. The scene there, according to a trustworthy report from an eyewitness, may be compared with the state of things in the Grand Quartier at Metz in 1870, as described by General Fay :

'Never shall I forget the disorder and confusion which reigned in that room, its doors constantly opening to give passage to our chief, and strangers seeking the most futile

information. Orders and counter-orders literally collided with one another; the smallest telegraph despatch gave rise to feverish excitement entirely incompatible with that absolute calm which is one of the first essentials of a good staff.*

Admiralty experience and Mr Winston Churchill came to the rescue, and the War Registry was evolved. But there was still no division charged with the preparation and investigation of large plans. The Operations Division dealt with current work, but it was not possible for a Division loaded with the actual conduct of current operations to spend more than a very limited proportion of its time in the preparation and examination of schemes which might require three months' work to reduce merely to terms of time and supply. Committees are inefficient instruments for the purpose, for they rarely possess the capital of experience and information which a permanent Division accumulates.* Again, plans for the future must be kept in close touch with the present on to which they must be grafted; and those working at them must be in close touch with the Operations Division of the Staff.†

The result was painfully evident in the first year of the war, when the pressure of work in the Operations Division did not permit of an intensive investigation of big strategical questions lying beyond the horizon of immediate current work. The Dardanelles operations afford a conspicuous example of the possibility that, in an imperfect staff system, an energetic mind will override staff opinion, and of the inability of a 'division' absorbed in current work to cope with big questions requiring an immediate and decisive answer. Here an immense strategical effort was set on foot, based on a purely hypothetical and vastly exaggerated estimate of the bombarding capabilities of the 'Queen Elizabeth's' guns, an estimate unsupported by a single naval artillerist of repute. With no Plans Division to check it, the effort gathered way till it covered half the strategical

* A committee, if it fulfils a necessary and permanent function, tends to become a 'division,' as in the case of the Foreign Intelligence Committee of 1893, which became the Intelligence Department, and the Signal Committee of 1912, which became the Signal Section and later the Signal Division.

† Compare Lord Jellicoe's 'Crisis of the Naval War,' p. 16.

horizon and vied in importance with the Grand Fleet itself.

In 1916, when the menace of unrestricted submarine warfare hung darkly over our naval position, Lord Jellicoe came to the Admiralty. He diagnosed correctly the deficiencies of the staff system then in force; and the changes made by him in 1917 were of primary importance. First of all, the office of Chief of the Naval Staff* was merged with that of First Sea Lord. This was apparently a very simple measure, but it was one of great import, for it not only gave the Naval Staff a definite position on the Board but attached it to the principal naval member. The addition of a Deputy Chief and an Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with seats on the Board, meant a great acceleration of business, for they could act with Board authority and were able to relieve the C.N.S. of an immense amount of work.† The Anti-Submarine Division, instituted under Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, was generically merely a belated Plans Division directed towards a special objective. Under Rear-Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall the Intelligence Division greatly extended its activities; and its chief did much to introduce closer co-operation with the other divisions of the Staff.

It is important to remember that this system was introduced by Lord Jellicoe during war and was forced on us by the exigencies of war. It was not a question of this or that theory but a question of urgent pressing necessity and of minutes loaded with fate. There was a time in 1917 when one could almost see the sands running out, and could only hope that the moment of final exhaustion would never arrive. It never did. The sands ran out for Germany while we still had some grains in hand; and one of the factors which contributed to this result was the development of the staff system which took place both at the Admiralty and in the commands at sea between 1916 and 1918. Let us endeavour to formulate briefly in a general form the principles of the system adopted in 1917, which was in its main outline that of Moltke and Lord Haldane adapted to naval needs.

* The term 'Naval Staff' was substituted for the term 'War Staff.'

† See Lord Jellicoe's 'Crisis of the Naval War,' cap. I.

The principal aspects of the command fall under three categories—Operations, Administration, and Technical,—corresponding to three lines of practical cleavage.* The first enshrines the main purpose and policy of a business; the second is responsible for its maintenance and equipment in an efficient state; the third deals with the scientific aspect of various applied sciences associated with it. 'Operations' is the premier function; and its special task is to appreciate the situation continuously, to assist the Command in the consideration and definition of requirements and with the preparation and conduct of operations, and to convert the intentions, policy, and decisions of the Command into orders and instructions. It has further to keep a record of the positions, strength, and movements of its own forces, to visualise the situation clearly for all other divisions of the Staff on charts of the situation,† and to furnish timely information of all requirements to the administrative services.

The principal divisions of a Naval Staff are Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and the Staff Secretariat. The Trade Division, which deals with the question of maritime trade and acts as a link between the Admiralty and Mercantile Marine, is generically an aspect of Operations. The same may be said of the Mercantile Movements Division (now extinct), which dealt with the important task of controlling all movements of convoys and sea-borne trade. The Anti-Submarine Division (now also extinct) belonged generically to the Plans aspect of 'Operations.' The function of the Intelligence Division is implied in its name. Its business is to collect, sift, and distribute information as to the position, movements, and strength of the enemy, and to assist 'Operations' and 'Plans' to appreciate the situation. All information in the Operations Division ought to be

* The Secretariat and Financial aspects are omitted as being essentials of every organisation. In a big business or industry, operations become financial, for the main purpose is usually to supply some commodity with a certain degree of profit.

† Until the Anti-Submarine Division was created, there was no operations chart in which a staff officer could see, clearly visualised, the positions of enemy submarines so far as they were known. Such charts had been started at the beginning of the war, but 'pink' (i.e. secret) telegrams were not allowed to be inserted on them—a defect which rendered the charts worse than useless, for practically all information of importance was 'pink.'

open to it,* but it ought to abstain religiously from any attempt to conduct operations or to frame plans. Any tendency to do so means a drift towards an amalgamation of the three functions, which must be kept distinct in any large business if they are to be properly performed. Any tendency towards fusion inevitably means confusion, for each sphere of work requires an organisation and environment of its own.

'Administration' and 'Technical' connote all the great services of maintenance and supply; and it is their business to ensure that personnel and *matériel* are ready and fit to perform the work required of them by the Command. These include Personnel, Fuel, Victualling, and Stores. Personnel includes a number of important headings such as entry, recruitment, training, discipline, pay, pensions, leave, recreation, welfare, victualling, and clothing. It should also include a permanent and independent Court of Investigation for all complaints, and an investigatory section to deal with questions of welfare. The principal technical services are hydrography, navigation, engineering, naval construction, gunnery, torpedoes,† electricity, signals, and wireless.

It is a principle of staff work that each service is responsible for its own internal efficiency and methods of business; and the Chief of the Staff is responsible only for the general co-ordination of them all. All these phases of work offer ample field for energy and talent. Even in the Administrative branches, which are generally regarded as less interesting, there is wide scope for study in principles of discipline, improvements in recreation and welfare, systems of accountancy, canteen management, and the conditions of naval pay and service. No one branch is to be regarded as more important than another; like the brain, heart, and lungs, they cannot be compared in terms of importance, for each of the three is complementary to the other two. If there are

* This was one of the deficiencies of staff work at the Admiralty during the latter part of the war. Operations did not always keep Intelligence acquainted with its plans and movements.

† This includes electrical work, which might well be attached to engineering. Seamanship might be added, but it is rather an application of other applied sciences to their use at sea. Medicine is a technical service attached to personnel.

no ships and guns, there cannot be any operations; if the operations are badly conducted, the best gunnery will be of no avail; a new technical design may revolutionise operations; and all operations must rest on a basis of sound discipline and good administration.

Two other functions attach themselves to a staff—History and Staff Training. The object of History is to observe what has been done and reduce it to clear and simple expression. This is an absolute necessity. It is the ledger of the business. There is no greater stimulus to efficiency than an accurate record of the work actually done and the method of its execution; and the want of such a record greatly increases the difficulty of staff work. A Training and Staff Duties Division has therefore been found necessary, to deal with principles of training and staff organisation, and to supervise staff training and the compilation of a staff history and manuals.

In peace, the work of a staff is mainly directed towards the collection of information, the study of operations of war, staff training, and investigation and research. It has been suggested in some quarters that the Naval Staff might be reduced. It has been reduced. The Mercantile Movements Division, the Anti-Submarine Division, the Minesweeping Division, have all been closed; but a Staff must at the very least consist of an Operations Division, an Intelligence Division, and a Secretariat. Moreover, the Naval Staff must have a Planning Division or Section attached to it and detached from current work (witness the experience of 1911—the Agadir incident; also that of 1917 in Convoy and Anti-Submarine work, and Minelaying). These divisions must not be independent, or they will work in opposition to one another (as was shown in 1909–12). They must be co-ordinated under a Chief of the Naval Staff. The C.N.S. must evidently see eye to eye with the First Sea Lord, and must possess weight and authority sufficient to meet the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the same plane. In fact, he must be the First Sea Lord; witness the experience of 1912–16 and the appointment of Lord Jellicoe as First Sea Lord and C.N.S. in 1917. But the First Sea Lord has other functions to perform, and must therefore be assisted by a Deputy C.N.S., and, if the amount of work requires it, by an

Assistant C.N.S. This is the system which has gradually evolved itself from the Naval Intelligence Department of the eighties, as the outcome of actual war experience. It consists at present of eight divisions. Of these, five, namely, Operations, Plans, Naval Intelligence, Trade (all questions of maritime trade), and Local Defence (local defences, booms, mine-laying and mine-sweeping), are associated with strategy and the conduct of operations; two, the Gunnery Division and Torpedo Division, represent the principal weapons of offence and form a link with the technical departments; one, the Training and Staff Duties Division, deals with general principles of training and staff co-ordination, staff training and the compilation of historical monographs and manuals. Its essential form is based on two principles, namely, a distinction between 'Operations' and 'Administration,' and the attachment of the Office of Chief of the Naval Staff to that of First Sea Lord.

To regard this organisation merely as a naval or military one would be a narrow-minded point of view. It has a far wider aspect. It is a system of control which is found operative to some extent in all great houses of business, and whose study, with a view to its application, not merely to particular branches of industry, but to forms of government, will wonderfully repay study and investigation. It is to the credit of Sir Eric Geddes and Lord Jellicoe that they initiated rapidly and in time of stress a system which brought the war to a successful conclusion. On that great day in November 1918 (very different from 'Der Tag' as miraged in German toasts), when Admiral Beatty stood on the bridge of the 'Queen Elizabeth' watching in silence the German fleet being led captive into the mouth of the river inseparably associated with his name and fame—in that cloud of thought hovering around him, full of the battle-smoke of four long years of war, there must have loomed, bulky and immense in the background, the shadow, reaching out over all the oceans, of the Office of the Admiralty and the workings of its Staff.

ALFRED C. DEWAR.

Art. 8.—THE NEW GERMAN CONSTITUTION.

1. *Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches Vom 11 August 1919.* Taschenausgabe; Erläutert von Dr F. Giese. Zweite, verbesserte Auflage: Berlin, 1920.
2. *The German Constitution.* Translated into English. H.M. Stationery Office, 1919.

IN undertaking to provide themselves with a republican constitution, the Germans have assumed a task which, in the happiest circumstances, would have been one of great difficulty. But the document which they have elaborated in adverse circumstances holds the field at present as the constitution under which the largest incorporated state in Europe is organised; and it is of more than passing interest to inquire into the forces which have shaped it, and the form which it has actually assumed under the impact of those forces.

Among the most obvious of the difficulties under which the framers of this document laboured was the extreme pressure of time. The abdication of the Kaiser was officially announced in Berlin on Nov. 9, 1918, and was signed by him at Spa on the following day. The reins thus dropped by the monarch were not taken up by the Bundesrath or Reichstag, but were seized by anarchic committees, self-appointed and exercising local authority only, which arose, as if by magic, in every part of the land. These were the so-called Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, formed on the model of the Russian Soviets, and aiming at a dissolution of society, similar to that which Lenin had brought about in Russia. The effective opposition to these Red Republicans came from the Majority Socialists, who, joining in the formation of the Councils, laboured from within to ameliorate the system, and eventually succeeded in bringing about the calling together of a National Assembly on the footing of universal suffrage. The elections for that Assembly were held on Jan. 19, 1919. The Assembly met at Weimar on Feb. 8 following, and proceeded at once to regularise the position by adopting a provisional constitution for the new German State. After two days' debate that provisional constitution was adopted by the Assembly, promulgated by its President and treated as

the fundamental law on which the Assembly could ground its authority, and by which it could regulate its proceedings for determining the provisions of the permanent constitution.

The consideration of that more elaborate constitution made, of course, larger demands upon the time of the Assembly. But the work was carried out with astonishing despatch. It was on Feb. 24 that the subject was brought forward in an introductory speech by the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Dr Preuss; and the completed document was signed by the President on Aug. 11, 1919, so that less than six months was consumed by the Assembly in discussing and revising the draft and in coming to an agreement upon the final form of the law. This rapid rate of progress was made possible by the concurrence of three conditions which it is not unimportant to bear in mind when passing judgment upon the work of the Assembly.

In the first place, there was something like unanimity upon the main features of the change to be effected in the constitution. In the next place, the universally entertained desire to be clear of the war and to make a fair start with the work of repairing the havoc it had produced was felt by the German people of every class with overmastering urgency. In the third place, the Assembly was provided with a set of drafts embodying all the views it was necessary to take into account, two of which, having some sort of official character, became, naturally and in fact, the centres about which the elaborated document could crystallise. Thanks to these facilitating influences a result was reached within the time limit of an ordinary session of the British Parliament, which, in terms at least, remade the German State, converting it from a crowned federation of German States into a democratic organisation of the German folk.

It probably is not generally appreciated in this country how profoundly the political outlook of the German people changed in the course of the war. All shades of political opinion were, of course, entertained in that country before the war; and in the scheme of Government now adopted there is no feature for which

a powerful party did not contend in those far-off days. But the reputation of the administrators of the old Imperial system stood very high; and aspirations towards a fuller comprehension by the Government of the views of the people and of a fuller participation of the people's organ, the Reichstag, in the acts and responsibilities of Government were held as pious opinions. Even those who held them did not then expect to see them become effective. But the pressure of the war, and especially the adverse turn of events which heralded its termination, produced a revolution in this point of view; and, when it became plain that not the joys of triumph but the labour of rebuilding a ruined state would furnish the programme of the immediately ensuing years, the governing classes hastily divested themselves of the desire to preside over the course of public events, and their chief representative, the Kaiser, came forward with a project for shifting on to the Reichstag the responsibility for policy and administration, which, in happier days, had been monopolised by an aristocratic Bundesrath and an autocratically governed administration. When, under the influence of the blows which shattered Germany's military power, the last of her militarist chancellors, Count Hertling, tendered his resignation, the Kaiser, in accepting it, announced a scheme for 'parliamentarising' the Government by making ministers responsible, not, as under the then existing system, to the Kaiser, but to the people in the Reichstag. The liberal Prince Max of Baden was installed as Chancellor to carry through the change; and, although the administration to which he succeeded was too discredited in public opinion to be able to carry out the reform, the fact that it was made the chief feature of his policy is evidence of the extent to which public opinion, even in the governing circles, had been converted to the view that henceforth the German people must take the control of their public affairs into their own hands and exercise the power of selecting as public servants the men who had won their confidence.

Thus the great obstacle to radical reform, the natural unwillingness to part with authority of the class which had held political power, and had exercised it during the years of peace to public satisfaction, had disappeared of

its own accord. The men who would have seized the more easily appropriated fruits of victory, if Germany had been triumphant in the war, were not candidates for the unpleasing duties of making peace with a victorious foe, and thereafter presiding over the sordid task of making ends meet with means that were manifestly inadequate. To a large extent, therefore, the German people were of one mind; and, although the plan of popularising the Government, which commended itself to everybody, could be carried out in an indefinite number of ways, the differences would in this strange access of unanimity present themselves to the minds of members of the Assembly as matters of detail to be discussed in the conciliatory spirit in which co-workers endeavour to arrive at an agreement, and not in the obstructive spirit in which debate is employed by antagonists to wreck hostile proposals.

Not only was the way cleared of moral obstacles for the National Assembly; it was also made plain by the relegation to other authorities of some of the more troublesome questions to which the drawing-up of a constitution gives rise. The transitory provisions with which the document is concerned in its concluding articles are eloquent upon this point. Thus, the grouping of the German people into states or provinces is a matter which is left over for the decision of the Reichstag, to be effected hereafter by a system of local option, if that should prove practicable, or, if not, then by resolutions which are to be in the nature of amendments to the constitution. How extremely contentious a subject is here adjourned for more leisurely consideration may be realised by merely considering the overgrown condition of Prussia as we know it to-day. By various annexations, mostly ill-assimilated, Prussia had grown before the war to be the largest state in Germany, including a territory of 134,000 square miles and a population of between forty and fifty millions. Even in the reduced Germany of to-day it figures as a self-contained state of 40,000,000 inhabitants in a republic of 70,000,000.

It need hardly be said that the smaller States regard this predominance with jealousy, not to say with misgiving. Prussia was tolerated so long as Prussian policy and Prussian administration led to victories and

prosperity. But to-day, when the leadership of that State has conducted the whole German Commonwealth into a morass, there is a strong current of opinion which cries out against the headship of Prussia; and there will doubtless be, within the newly acquired provinces of Prussia itself, an equally strong desire to recover the old independence which was forfeited as the result of Prussia's military successes in war. It was necessary that a question of this sort should be left over for later discussion if the new German constitution was to make a timely appearance; but its existence in an unsettled condition exposes the Constitution itself to the perils of violent disturbance in the course of settlement.

Of similar import, under the present point of view, are the provisions which leave open to further negotiation and, in the ultimate resort, to the decision of the High Court, the terms upon which the post and telegraph services in Bavaria and Württemberg and the State railways and other means of transport in other parts of Germany are to be surrendered to the administration in Berlin. If these difficult questions had come on for discussion at Weimar, it may well be supposed that the debates would be proceeding at the present moment.

It is not only difficult questions of administration which were withdrawn from the cognisance of the National Assembly. A question equally difficult to resolve, if it were to be resolved on reasoned grounds, is the question how the Parliamentary suffrage should be distributed. Ultimately this is the most important of all questions for the success of Parliamentary government. That, like all other forms of government, can continue only under the condition that it places in the seat of authority those persons who under the conditions of the time possess the power to govern. The representatives of a constituency, however unanimous, which lacks the intellectual faculty to understand the political situation, the moral force to form and express opinion, or the physical power to make its will prevail, will be thrust aside, in the rush of affairs, either by representatives of a more energetic section of Society or by the promoters of mere anarchy, never wanting in times of feeble public control. A thinker desiring to set up a Parliamentary government would carefully consider to

whom the responsibility of choosing the members of the parliament could be safely entrusted. He would inquire where the ultimate sources of political power lay, and would take care that the easiest and most direct channel for the conveyance of authority from its sources in the opinion and power of the people to the instruments of government should be by the appointed channel of Parliamentary election. The National Assembly, however, did not even entertain this question. Before its members could be elected, an electoral system had to be put in operation; and, if the transition from the old state of Germany to the new had taken a peaceful course, it may be presumed that the pre-existing electoral law would have served the provisional purpose of election to the National Assembly, and that the distribution of the electoral franchise in regenerated Germany would have been one among the weightiest questions submitted to that Assembly. That, however, did not happen.

Germany since the war has undergone two revolutions. The first, which put an end to the Imperial régime, was brought about by the usurpation of power by self-constituted Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. They made a bid for establishing in Germany the conditions which have supervened in Russia, but they found that, as they were dealing with a social organism of a higher type than the Russian autocracy, they did not command the sources of political power and, after a few weeks of confusion, were constrained to make way for the more regular system which the National Assembly introduced. On one point, however, they were able to forestall discussion and to implant their theory in the future German system. Being in a position to superintend the elections for the General Assembly, the Workmen's Council of Berlin resolved that it should be held, not according to established law, but on the principle that every German man and woman of twenty years old and upwards should be entitled to vote. Naturally the representatives of such a constituency considered themselves absolved from discussing the merits of the system under which they had been chosen; and so the fundamental law of Germany is formulated in accordance with the views of the defunct Workmen's Council of the

Prussian capital. Whether it can give to Germany a parliament composed of members who will be able to handle affairs of state is, in the circumstances, a matter of pure chance, and, in any case, it raises a question which only the future can decide. If it should turn out that popular election leaves the effective political forces unrepresented in the Reichstag, we may expect to see the Reichstag of to-day set aside with as little consideration as was the Reichstag convened by the Emperor when it was opposed by an insurgent populace.

Putting aside these larger questions, the German National Assembly has addressed itself to those branches of constitution-making which relate to the substitution of the new posts and powers of President, new Reichstag, Reichsrath, and Judicature, for the Kaiser, subordinate kings, dukes, etc., old Reichstag, Bundesrath, and the old Judicature respectively.

The *ante-bellum* constitution of Germany was based upon the view that it was built up by the union, in a comprehensive federation, of a number of independently sovereign States. Prior to the Franco-German war of 1870 the union had been a simple confederation of those States—the German Bund—having as the organ of its common political life the Bundesrath. Every one of those constituent States had its own constitution comprising, as a rule, a deliberative as well as an executive council co-operating with the monarch in the exercise of sovereign authority. When, in 1870, Bismarck brought about the conversion of the confederated Germany into a federal Empire, he added to the system two organs of sovereignty, a Kaiser who assumed the personal headship of the whole State, and a supreme imperial Court of Law, the Reichsgericht. He also added a deliberative assembly—the Reichstag—for the whole Empire. The Kaiser, as head of the Imperial Executive, was provided with a staff of officers who were independent of the several States and administered those branches of the public business—Foreign Affairs, Imperial taxation, the Naval Service, etc.—which had been placed in the hands of the sovereign, while the Imperial High Court exercised a general power of appeal which reduced all State Courts to a secondary rank. The military control, vested in the

Kaiser upon the outbreak of war, was, in time of peace, divided in a complicated fashion between Empire and constituent States; and religious establishments were under State control, subject to an over-ruling authority in Reichstag and Empire.

In order to come to a practical understanding of the working of this somewhat complicated system, it is to be borne in mind that, throughout the whole history of this establishment, Prussia has exercised preponderating authority, an authority so preponderating that no other State has been in a position even to consider the carrying of opposition to Prussian wishes to any great length. The inter-state jealousies and rivalries that have arisen have therefore been confined within modest limits, and a system which on paper looks impracticably complicated has in fact been found workable.

When the Empire fell, the danger that the elaborately constructed unity from which the German people in the brilliant second half of the 19th century had derived so much power at home and so great a weight in the councils of the world would fall with it, was very obvious. The fear of this calamity seems to have been the principal consideration which destroyed the power of the usurping Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. The various independent governments which had replaced the sovereigns of the German States sent delegates to a central conference on Nov. 25, 1918, who passed, as the first result of their deliberations, the following resolution:

'The maintenance of the unity of Germany is of capital importance. All the German tribes are resolved upon a German Republic. They pledge themselves to work unswervingly for unity and to strive against separatist movements.'

In accordance with this view the unity of Germany was kept in mind as the object of the first importance in the Constituent Assembly; and in that body a powerful section aimed at eliminating the federal elements altogether from the constitution and building the new Germany upon the artificial basis of assumed homogeneity. In that case the Bundesrath would have disappeared altogether, and the new State would have consisted of Kaiser and Reichstag under new names, the State executives being merged in the unified executive

of the new Commonwealth or surviving only in the diminished rank of local government bodies. Here, however, the jealousy of Prussia intervened. If there was to be a completely unified Germany, that Germany would be an expanded Prussia; and Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony in 1918 would share the fate of Hanover and Hesse in 1866. Constituted as the Constituent Assembly actually was, that was clearly impossible; for a Bavarian, Ebert, occupied the Presidential chair, and, in deference to South German susceptibilities, the Assembly held its meetings, not in the capital of Prussia, but in the Thuringian town of Weimar. The issue of the discussion of the point was that the old designation for the constituent States (*Staaten*) was dropped, and they were recognised under the less significant name of Lands (*Länder*); the active functions of sovereignty were assigned to the central authority, but a council of the Lands' representatives was retained, under the style of Reichsrath, as a member of the constitution with large, but not unlimited, powers of veto upon legislation and ample means of expressing, in an authoritative manner, the views of the various local governments.

It is therefore approximately true to say that the old Bundesrath is represented now by the new Reichsrath; but the statement is inadequate, for the new Reichsrath enjoys very much less authority than did the old Bundesrath. In matters of Imperial concern the final word lay with the Bundesrath, and without its consent no legislative measure could be passed. The powers of the new Reichsrath are strictly limited, and may be said to be, in a general sense, of an advisory character. The Reichsrath can formulate statutes and bring them before the Reichstag, when, if they are approved, they receive statutory force by virtue of the Reichstag vote. On the other hand, a law introduced in the Reichstag, and passed there, does not need for its validity to be considered by the Reichsrath at all. Within a fortnight of its passing, the Reichsrath is empowered to lay before the President an objection to its becoming law; and, in that case, the inchoate statute must be laid again before the Reichstag for consideration. If this further consideration does not lead to an agreement between the two Houses, the President is empowered to bring the question before the

public for decision by Referendum. Should he refuse so to do, the fate of the disputed measure depends upon the strength of the vote cast for it in the Reichstag. If it has there been passed by a two-thirds' majority, it becomes law in spite of the Reichsrath veto; if it has been passed by a smaller majority than two-thirds it is destroyed by the veto. Such is the legislative competence to which the new representative of the old sovereign Bundesrath has been reduced.

The position of the Reichsrath is the key to the new German constitution. That being understood, the rest can be stated quite intelligibly in a few words. The sovereign power is divided between the President and the Reichstag, each being elected by the whole body of the German voters. The President is thus placed in a very autocratic position, for he is head of the executive and has a power of dissolution which he can exercise over the Reichstag. In the range of his executive authority he outdoes the Kaiser, for he exercises, in addition to supreme Imperial control, a very large authority which, under the Imperial system, was vested in the State Governments of Germany. He is elected for seven years, is eligible at the end of that term for re-election, and is responsible only to the whole German people. The only method of removing him from office, against his will, would seem to be by a plebiscite; and this can only follow upon a resolution of the Reichstag supported by a two-thirds' majority vote. There is indeed a provision that the Reichstag may impeach him before the Supreme Court for abuse of his office; but, as no consequence is prescribed in case the court condemns him, that measure does not appear to be very effective. Furthermore, the President of the Republic is Commander-in-Chief of the army. It is clear that a short step would in conceivable circumstances convert his office into a monarchy.

The large powers and inaccessible position of the President, if the Reichstag should prove itself feeble and the President be both popular and ambitious, would probably enable him, without serious difficulty, to revive the Imperial system which in future—the nearer future at least—will be regarded as having provided the Fatherland, while it lasted, with a golden age. In the meantime the position of the President, even if he aims at

no more than a septennial office, is out of all proportion great, and may well satisfy the ambition of any ordinary man. So long as he retains the support of a majority in the Reichstag he is irresponsible, for without their vote the law cannot be set in motion against him. Representative of the nation in face of foreign Powers, head of the fighting forces, chief of the administration, promulgator of the laws, he lacks nothing but the trappings of majesty to make him more than the equal of the Emperor whom Bismarck set up in 1871. Such seem to be the legal potentialities of this great office.

By way of indemnifying themselves for having set up a potentate with this immense authority, the German constitution-makers have encompassed him with verbal limitations. Thus, his acts, so far as they can only be carried out by written orders, must be countersigned by one or other of the Secretaries of State, who when countersigning must accept Parliamentary responsibility for the measure. In a constitutional monarchy this, as we in this country know by long experience, is a very effective check on the exercise of executive power. But whether it is to act as any such check at all must depend upon the capacity which the new Reichstag may display for making that responsibility effective. By way of promoting its efficiency the constitution lays down the rule that the Chancellor and Ministers must possess the confidence of the Reichstag, and that any one of them from whom that body by express resolution withdraws its confidence must vacate his office. This is again a good rule, but no machinery is devised for its enforcement; and apparently, if the administration should set it at naught, the Reichstag must think out some tactical method of enforcing observance of the principle.

The constitution abounds in propositions of that sort, which are rather in the nature of advice than of law. A conspicuous instance is afforded by Art. 21, which lays down the duty of a member of the Reichstag thus: 'The elected members are representatives of the whole people. They are responsible to their consciences and not bound by mandates.' This example may be held to justify the introduction, common enough in written constitutions, of matter which is in effect manifesto. Considered as an enunciation of principle, the dictum

seems so trite as to be unimportant. But read in the light of the circumstances of the Assembly, it is full of matter, for it marks the difference between the Soviet system, with its privileged class and factious tyranny, and the parliamentary system as developed under free institutions. But whether conscientious candidates who refuse to accept the mandate of a caucus will be able to secure election by the German constituencies is a very moot question. Equally sound in principle, but of even less obvious practical import is the dictum of Art. 153 that 'Property imposes obligations. Its employment must subserve the public good.'

The outstanding feature of the German constitution, then, is a powerful executive limited in theory to constitutional modes of procedure. The authority appointed to enforce that limitation is the Reichstag, but in the constitution of the Reichstag this critical function is but little taken into account. To the making of effective criticism two conditions must, in general, be satisfied by the critic, that is to say, he must criticise with the authority derived from experience and under the restraints imposed by responsibility. An Assembly, therefore, which is to exercise the function of criticism in reference to the conduct of the Administration should comprise a body of administrators out of office, that is to say, the body which we, in this country, recognise under the style of 'His Majesty's Opposition.' With the experience of administrative office to sharpen their discernment, they are, as a rule, the keenest members of the Chamber to discover the weak points of a policy or of a scheme, and, with the prospect of having at some future time to justify in office the principles and professions which they put forward in opposition, they criticise with caution and moderation. In the practical working of the parliamentary system this element of a responsible Opposition is of capital importance. But popular election alone does not secure the presence there of this parliamentary Opposition; and in the new German Constitution there does not seem to be any attempt to secure it. There is indeed no indication that the draftsmen of the Constitution were at all aware either of its intrinsic value or of its practical importance

to the permanence of their work. In the machinery which they have devised and in the rules of practice which they have suggested we look in vain for any attempt to secure a parliamentary Opposition. Comparison under this head with the English practice will make the point clear.

In this country Ministers are, by practical necessity, chosen from the ranks of the Legislature for the simple reason that no person outside the membership of the House of Lords or the House of Commons, as the case may be, has the right to address either of those assemblies in political session. Thus, if a Ministry is filled by an outsider, he must forthwith be provided with a seat in one House or the other, in order that he may be able to fulfil the parliamentary duties of his office. The German Constitution, following in this respect the precedent of the Empire, provides that Ministers, although not members of the Reichstag, may attend and address the meetings. Again, it provides for the individual, and against the collective, responsibility of Ministers. These provisions are evidently intended to perpetuate the Imperial system of expert Ministers, and to impress upon the new Reichstag the doctrinaire character which was so marked a feature of the old.

An aggravation of this lack of the responsible element in the representative body is the provision for free recourse to a plebiscite. Thus, any law passed by the Reichstag may be submitted by the President to a plebiscite if he thinks proper so to submit it. In the same way the decision of the Reichstag may be superseded if one-third of the membership of the Reichstag and one-twentieth of the enfranchised population, or, apart from the Reichstag, one-tenth of the population, denounces it. The provisional veto upon Reichstag legislation exerciseable by the Reichsrath has been already mentioned. Thus the Reichstag is regarded by the constitution-makers of Germany as a body upon which no effective responsibility is to be laid; and, if its conduct should hereafter justify the distrust with which they evidently regard it, the part which it will play in the exercise of any useful public functions is very small. The executive power being vested in an independently elected President, its faculty of criticism

being limited by the perspicacity of the hustings and its legislative competence restricted by the conditional presidential veto, the Reichstag seems destined in the future to play only such a part as it has played in the past; that is to say, its task will be the facilitating of public business by heedless support of the Administration or the impeding of it by doctrinaire criticism and factious opposition. It may be that, in spite of congenital defects and adverse circumstances, the new Reichstag will prove equal to the task of controlling executive action and restraining executive ambitions, but in favour of such a conclusion the most plausible argument is that 'the unexpected always happens.'

There is, however, another body set up by the constitution from which it would seem that greater things are hoped. That is the Supreme Court, which is authorised to deal in the way of judicial consideration and decision with matters of State. Before this tribunal the President, the Chancellor, or a Minister of State may be arraigned if the Reichstag should proceed to an impeachment. The same judicial body is to decide, in case of a conflict of authority, between the State and any of the Lands, or in a dispute of that sort between two or more Lands among themselves. Its decision is to be invoked in controlling the action of a Land Government if such a subordinate government neglects the remonstrances addressed to it by the Central Government. Its jurisdiction extends not only to the decision of purely legal questions, but in certain specified matters it even covers points of administration. Thus, to take one example, the Bavarian and Württemberg post and telegraph systems are to be taken over by the State this year. But, if the executive authorities concerned cannot agree upon the terms of the transfer, their difference is to be referred to the Supreme Court for its award. The organic law governing this institution is to be passed by the Reichstag; and, until the Supreme Court itself is duly constituted, a provisionally appointed body, called a Senate, consisting of seven members, to which the Reichstag appoints four and the Court of ordinary jurisdiction appoints three, is to exercise its functions.

While the constitution of this High Court, and also that of the Courts of ordinary jurisdiction, are left to

subsequent legislation by the Reichstag and the various Landtags, as the case may be, the makers of the constitution have taken measures to secure the independence of the courts so constituted. The clauses relating to the appointment of judges have been taken and, in large measure, taken textually, from the provisions of the old Imperial Constitution in reference to that matter. Thus, judges are to be appointed for life; they are irremovable except as a result of a judgment against them by brother-judges, and are declared independent and subject only to the law. In this respect, therefore, the Republic may be expected to carry on the tradition of the Imperial Courts. Certain guarantees for the personal fitness of candidates for judicial office may indeed be found to have been given up; for the appointment of new judges is vested without express conditions in the President, but the status of the judge, when appointed, is to be at least equal to that which he enjoyed under the Empire.

A strong executive and an independent judiciary are the striking features of the new German constitution, while the third element, the Legislature, enjoys, as has been seen, very limited authority. Nominally the legislative power is lodged in the hands of the Reichstag; but, as all its decisions are liable to be challenged by a Referendum, it is difficult to say where the legislative authority actually resides. The Reichstag can deliberate and decide provisionally, but the disapproval of either the President or of the Reichsrath may render its decision liable to be subjected to a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is taken, the people can decide, but they cannot deliberate. An arrangement by which one body deliberates and another decides seems more likely to be productive of effort than of result. In any case a people acting under such limitations, whether through representatives with restricted powers or by a direct vote 'Aye' or 'No,' is not likely to make head against a powerful Administration. Personal changes on a large scale have been effected by the German revolution, but the depository of power would seem to be, under the new constitution as under the old, not the German people, nor the elected representatives of the German people, but the German bureaucracy.

Among the institutions projected for the future of Germany is one the action of which will be followed with great interest by foreign observers. Art. 165 of the constitution calls upon the workmen and employes of industry to co-operate with owners in taking and administering measures for promoting the advancement and development of productive efficiency. With this object the organisations of both employers and employed are to be represented on industrial councils to be established in industrial centres and on a Central Industrial Council to be set up for the entire State. This Central Council is to be formed with powers limited to the care of industry, but powers, within those limits, very similar to those entrusted to the Reichsrath in respect of the local government interests. Thus, the Industrial Council is to be consulted by the Government upon all important measures within its province which the Government brings before the Reichstag; and its advisory powers include the right to lay its views before the Reichstag, even in opposition to the Government's proposals, and to submit, independently of the Government, not only its views but also projects of its own origination. This council is therefore intended to bring expert knowledge to bear at close quarters upon the discussions of social and industrial questions in the Reichstag, and to do officially and in set form for the German legislator what is unofficially and spontaneously done both in Germany and elsewhere by the press of the country. That any council will be able to supersede the press as the instructor of the public and of the legislature seems improbable; but it will be interesting to see what relations spring up between the Industrial Council and the press. Will the Council be able to present a more comprehensible or a more competent view of the situation discussed than that given by the press? Will the Council lead or be led by the press? Will it fall under the domination of factions or cliques? Will its advice be sagacious and public-spirited, or will it be the expression of narrow views and jarring interests? It would be foolish to prognosticate the upshot of the German experiment, but it will be of great importance to observe it.

A point of passing but immediate interest is raised by

the question: How is the constitution affected by the Treaty of Versailles? The answer is that the Treaty has in language been respected, but in substance opposed. Thus, the 178th Article includes a provision to the effect that 'the provisions of the Versailles Treaty signed on the 28th June, 1919, are not disturbed by the constitution.' But, on the other hand, Art. 112 provides that 'no German may be handed over to a foreign Government for prosecution or punishment,' thus negating the 228th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the handing over of war criminals for trial by the Allies. On this point the constitution-makers have prevailed, for the Entente Powers have agreed to abate the demand for handing over, in consideration of a German undertaking that a Court for dealing with these criminals shall be set up in Germany. Another Article provides for the interests of those persons when arraigned before the German Court, for Art. 116—which is emphasised in the document by the circumstance that it is headed by a rubric in Latin which reads *nulla poena sine lege*—lays down that 'any action can only be followed by punishment if the liability to punishment was expressly laid down by law before the act was committed.' Without cavilling at the success of the German legislators—for the two principles which they have acted upon are undeniably sound—it must be admitted that the Weimar Assembly has in this particular defeated the diplomatists at Versailles.

Another possible breach of the Treaty seems to be contemplated by Art. 61, which provides for the representation of German Austria in the Reichstag after her union with the German Commonwealth. It seems to have been with special reference to this clause that the German Representatives at Versailles on Sept. 22, 1919, signed a declaration that all provisions of the constitution which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty are null and void. If so, the declaration is entirely illusory, for the clause is not, in terms, in contradiction with the Treaty at all. The rights which it confers upon German Austria take effect only if she accedes, and after her accession to the Commonwealth, a condition which takes it out of the scope of the declaration; and indeed the Treaty itself provides that the Union of Germany

and German Austria may be hereafter sanctioned by the League of Nations. On the other hand, the two articles which refer to the War Criminals are clearly in conflict with the Treaty, but, as they are to be carried out by German officials, it is quite unimportant what view the Entente jurists may take of their validity. One of them has been already conceded, and, as to the other, it is certain that, whether the article of the constitution itself is valid or not, the sentiment which the Germans have thrown into a Latin dress will be held to justify the law. In fact, the use of a Latin rubric in connexion with this clause of the constitution—to all the others German rubrics are prefixed—may reasonably be supposed to be a cleverly thought-out vindication of the refusal of the German people to punish the men who fought for them or to permit them to be punished. The maxim is of old and acknowledged authority in German *strafrecht*, and will carry weight even in wider circles.

The translation of this document which has been issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office suffers, as official translations very commonly do, from the inattention of the translator to the significance of what he was translating. It would seem to have been the work of a scholar to whom the words are more familiar than the ideas, and consequently his choice of synonyms is often unfortunate. The translations of the words 'Reich' and 'Land' seem to have been made very much at hazard. For no obvious reason 'Reich' is rendered by 'Federation,' to which it is in no strict sense equivalent. It is quite true that the secondary sense in which alone the word 'Federation' could be the equivalent of 'Reich' is familiar in such a phrase as 'the Federation of British Industry,' used as the name of a particular society. But the word is only used when the society so named is constructed on a federal basis. It is therefore an unfortunate choice of a word for designating the new German body politic, for the question whether it, like the Russian Republic of Federated Soviets, is a federation or, like the French Republic, a unitary state, is a question hotly discussed and has been decided, so far as it is decided at all, in favour of the unitary state. The advocates of a Federation in the Weimar Assembly

were the Minority Socialists, who took their inspiration from Russia. They were beaten and turned out of the Government by the Majority faction, which carefully avoided any recognition of sovereign rights in the constituent 'Lands.'

This question of translation cannot be dismissed as one of mere verbal propriety, for the point of view from which the German system is regarded will be materially affected by the circumstance that it is called a Federation or an Empire, as the case may be. The truth seems to be that neither of these words is quite apposite. An Empire does not necessarily imply an Emperor, or we could not speak of the British Empire; and it is, no doubt, in that elastic sense that the word Empire is used to render the German word 'Reich' in the Versailles Treaty. But a federation implies constituent federative bodies, the character of which it simply reflects. A federation of academies should not include industrial corporations, nor should a federation of industrials include academies. A federated State consists, strictly speaking, of constituent States with general legislative powers; and in such a case the legislative powers conferred upon the federation are expressly delegated, as in the case of the Australian Commonwealth and the United States of America. When the general legislative power is conferred upon the central authority and only delegated powers of legislation are in the hands of the local assemblies, as in the case of the Dominion of Canada or the Union of South Africa, the whole body politic cannot be accurately called a federation, for it is a federation of provinces; and, although a federation of provinces may be the basis of a State, the State erected on such a basis is a unitary not a federated State. The new Deutsche Reich resembles the Canadian, not the Australian, model in this respect, inasmuch as full legislative authority resides in the Reichstag and only delegated legislative powers can be exercised by the Landtags.

The foregoing considerations would apply even if there were no historical considerations to be taken into account. But the circumstance has already been alluded to, that the exact nature of the Union was hotly debated in the Constituent Assembly and throughout Germany when the name of the new State was being considered.

Three parties contended for three different views. The Conservatives wished to erect a federation of sovereign States on the model of the Imperial Bund. The extreme Socialists desired to erect a Federation of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. A third, which may be called, for lack of a better term, the Prussian Party, desired to abolish historical boundaries and erect a unitary State. The outcome was a compromise which resulted, in the official 'Deutsche Reich'; and, if in rendering that in English the Treaty formula 'German Empire' is to be cast overboard, it would seem better to substitute some equally vague term such as German Commonwealth, instead of the singularly inappropriate 'German Federation.' It is a point not to be ignored in this connexion that the English word Commonwealth is very nearly the etymological equivalent of the German 'Reich.'

For the translation of the word 'Land' by 'State' there is more to be said, for this word 'State' is used in that sense in the Treaty of Versailles. But, as the status of these 'Lands' had not at that time been settled, it was doubtful whether they would become States in a true federation or provinces in a unitary State. The language of the Treaty is perhaps not quite conclusive on this point. What is now clear is that, whatever they are called, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, and the rest are now Provinces, not States.

Less defensible, as it seems to us, is the decision to omit from the translation the rubrics which are prefixed in the original to the several articles. The light which such headings throw upon the text is sometimes considerable; how considerable it is in the case of the article relating to war criminals, the foregoing discussion has shown. The omission of the Latin aphorism from that passage is very much like striking out the Prince of Denmark from the play of 'Hamlet.'

J. W. GORDON.

Art. 9.—BOLSHEVISM AND DEMOCRACY.

1. *The State and Revolution*. By V. I. Ulianov (N. Lenin). Allen and Unwin, n.d. Written August-September 1917.
 2. *The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade*. By V. I. Ulianov (N. Lenin). The British Socialist Party, n.d. Written November 1918.
 3. *The History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*. By L. Trotsky. Allen and Unwin, 1919.
 4. *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. By Karl Kautsky. National Labour Press, n.d. Written towards the end of 1918.
 5. *Terrorisme et Communisme*. Par Karl Kautsky. Paris: Povolozky, 1919.
 6. *Labour Conditions in Soviet Russia*. International Labour Office. Harrison, 1920.
 7. *Report of the British Labour Delegation to Russia*. Trades Union Congress and Labour Party, 1920.
 8. *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*. By Bertrand Russell. Allen and Unwin, 1920.
 9. *Through Bolshevik Russia*. By Mrs Philip Snowden. Cassell, 1920.
 10. *The Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic*. English translation in Publication No. 136 of the American Association for International Conciliation: New York, 1919. French translation in Buisson, *Les Bolcheviki*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1919.
- And other works.

THE first Revolution achieved by men calling themselves Marxists has been brought about in strange defiance of all the teaching characteristic of Marx. Marx, indeed, was two persons in one: a revolutionary agitator and an evolutionary philosopher. But it was his evolutionary doctrine which marked him off from his Communist predecessors: it was that which, in his eyes and in the eyes of his closest disciples, converted Socialism from a 'Utopian' dream to a 'scientific' theory. And, according to that doctrine, a country could only be transformed into a socialist or communist society—in his vocabulary the two adjectives had the same meaning—after it had passed through a capitalist stage, which had removed

from the workers all property in the instruments of production, concentrated wealth in the hands of a relatively small class, and converted the overwhelmingly large majority of those engaged both in agriculture and in manufacture into a wage-slave proletariat. He remained so far a revolutionary that he never believed the final transition could be effected by peaceful legislation: force, he declared, is the midwife of every old society when it is pregnant with a new one. But this very metaphor makes a long gestation the unescapable prerequisite: force applied too soon can only produce abortion. And Marx's passionate hatred of bourgeois self-satisfaction on the one side was equalled on the other by his cold scientific contempt for those who sought to 'clear by bold leaps, or remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of normal development.'

Russia, when the Bolsheviks seized power, was far from having reached the stage which orthodox Marxism had hitherto postulated as the indispensable preliminary to socialism. In proportion to its extent and population, it was less industrialised than any other considerable country in Europe. The country was still mainly an agricultural one: the peasants were commonly reckoned eighty-five per cent. of the population. In all other lands the peasants have been the despair of the socialist; and though in Russia the joint ownership of the parish or *mir* was only slowly giving way to individual property in the soil, there was no reason to suppose that Russian peasants would cling to their land less tenaciously than peasants elsewhere. In particular districts there were, of course, great large-scale manufactures, both textile and metallurgical. But numerically, the *Kustarny* or cottage industries were even yet considerably more important. They were going through the same evolution as 'the domestic industries' of other lands in earlier periods; they were being slowly detached from agriculture, and becoming more or less dependent on capitalist middlemen. But they were still very far from having reached the stage in which they could readily be socialised. A common estimate of the number of 'peasants engaged in one or other form of cottage industry' reckoned them at between ten and twelve

millions. The number of factory and mine workers, on the other hand, as given by official statistics, was under three millions, out of a population of some one hundred and thirty. By counting in agricultural labourers, the poorer among the cottage workers, and 'the intellectual proletariat,' it has been found possible to claim for the proletariat twenty-two per cent. of the nation. This was as early as 1900, but it included the more highly industrialised Poland, now detached from Russia. Such estimates are most insecure; but they are sufficient to show how far Capital was from having fulfilled the evolutionary rôle assigned to it by Marxist theory.

It is essential to realise this in order to understand the very remarkable fact that Bolshevism is opposed as much by the leaders of European socialism as by the organs of capitalism. Non-socialist criticism of Bolshevism, so far as it is intelligent, is based on the well-grounded belief that the institution of private property furnishes a useful stimulus towards the production of those material commodities on which rests the life of the whole community. It doubts whether, for a long time to come, that stimulus can be replaced by any equally effective force; and it believes that the evils attending capitalism can be vastly lessened without abolishing the existing system *in toto*. The socialist criticism of Bolshevism, on the other hand, while it assumes, as the Bolsheviks do, that capitalism is the enemy, disbelieves in the feasibility of introducing socialism in a country not yet ripe for it. As M. Martov, the leader of the Russian Mensheviks, has recently said:

'The Bolshevik party has seized the power of the state in a country where the numerical force of the proletariat is very small; a country where the economic and intellectual prerequisites for the organisation of socialist production are absent; and, running up against these objective conditions, they will find in them an insurmountable obstacle to the realisation of their ideals.'

The seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks in November 1917 had nothing novel or proletarian about it. It was simply a military *coup d'état*, like scores of others in times ancient and modern. There is no pretence among the Bolsheviks that it was anything else. Thus M. Trotsky writes:

'In the course of Nov. 7, the Winter Palace'—where 'the Government was still in session'—'was gradually surrounded from all sides by our troops. At one o'clock in the afternoon, *in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee*, I announced at the sitting of the Petrograd Soviet that Kerensky's government no longer existed, and that, pending the decision of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Government authority would be assumed by the Military Revolutionary Committee.'

There is again no mystery about the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Before it was allowed to meet, the middle-class Liberals, known as Cadets, had been put under the ban, their leaders arrested whenever they could be found, and their newspapers suppressed. That party had gained but few seats in the Assembly; but it had polled some 245,000 votes out of the 810,000 cast in Petrograd, and 260,000 out of 684,000 cast in Moscow. It was at first hoped that, having thus been purged, the Assembly would be amenable to Bolshevik domination; and it was not in fact dissolved until the anti-Bolshevik candidate for the presidency of the chamber had been elected by 244 votes to 153, and a series of anti-Bolshevik resolutions carried by 237 votes to 136. At the last moment, the explanation was vouchsafed by M. Lenin that the Constituent Assembly no longer represented the will of the people, because it had been elected on party lists drawn up before a recent split in the anti-Bolshevik ranks. But the revolutionary government had already subjected the Assembly to the right of 'recall,' and announced its intention to issue new writs, if half the electors in any constituency so desired. All the requirements of political equity could have been met by a number of fresh elections. The plain fact is that the Bolshevik leaders clearly perceived that no Constituent Assembly, elected with any semblance of freedom, would confirm them in power.

And there is no difficulty, in the last place, in understanding how it came about that the Bolshevik government got the support of the 'Soviets,' or Councils, of Workmen's, Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. These were bodies in which the middle classes were not represented: bodies which were flattered by the Bolshevik cry, 'All Power to the Soviets,' and which the Bolsheviks

had been bending all their energies to capture. It must not be supposed that it was the Bolsheviks who first created them. They had arisen, more or less spontaneously, in the revolutionary days of 1905, and had been employed to bring pressure upon the government to grant parliamentary institutions. They vanished when the reaction set in; but made their appearance again early in 1917. At first they were under relatively moderate socialist leadership; but M. Lenin was quick to see their capabilities for his purpose. By the time of the November *coup d'état* the Bolsheviks had already got themselves elected in sufficient numbers to the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets to direct their utterances. Everything now depended on the peasants, who would form a large element in the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets which was planned to come together at the same time as the Constituent Assembly, so as to be ready to be put in its place.

At the beginning of the century the peasants already owned well over sixty per cent. of the land of Russia suited for tillage. They were hungry for more—with or without reason we need not stop to inquire. When the Russian reverses in the war with Japan and the incipient revolution of 1905 withdrew for a time the hold of the administration from local affairs, agrarian risings took place over a large part of the country; risings which aimed at 'smoking out' the nobles and dividing their estates. In 1906 order was restored, and the peasants lost what had seemed within their grasp. The government then came forward with a constructive policy on large lines, which might have solved the problem, if only it could have been given time. In the first place, it remitted the six years' payment still due of the redemption charges imposed on the peasants at the Emancipation in return for the assignment to them of their proportion of the seignourial estates. In the second place, it passed laws to facilitate the withdrawal of land from joint village ownership. And, most important of all, it embarked on vigorous measures for the promotion of peasant holdings. In four years (1906-1910) three-quarters of a million acres of state domain were sold to peasants and ten million acres leased. At the same time a Peasants' Land Bank was hard at work, buying large

estates and cutting them up into small properties or holdings. By 1911 it had sold ten million acres. Altogether, in five years, between twenty-three and twenty-four million acres passed into peasants' hands, either in absolute ownership or with beneficial leases. It is doubtful whether any equally large land settlement has ever been carried through elsewhere.

The administrations which took the place of the Czarist autocracy were naturally anxious to expedite a process already so well advanced. To devise means by which this could be accomplished without entire confiscation of the rights of existing large landowners naturally took some time, especially as attention was distracted by the dangers on the Western front. The pressure from the peasants to make a clean sweep of the nobles was only held back by sharp differences of opinion within the revolutionary camp. The thorough-going Marxists, whether of the Majority (Bolsheviks) or of the Minority (Mensheviks), were loth to give the peasants more land, since they regarded peasant proprietors as essentially bourgeois, and a hindrance to genuine socialisation. The Social Revolutionaries—of course, like the Marxists, a party of town 'intelligentsia' but a party which championed the cause of the peasants—sought to reconcile divergent principles by an ingenious formula: 'Nationalisation of the land, but the use to the peasants.' And while the Kerensky government was still deliberating, the Bolshevik wing of the Marxists made up its mind to swallow its scruples and dish the rival party. Immediately after the *coup d'état* they issued a decree which in the same breath 'abolished private ownership' and 'turned it all over to the workers' without compensation, 'on the basis of equalised use of the soil.' 'Pending the decision of the land question by the Constituent Assembly,' the property of non-peasant owners was put at the disposal of the local councils (Soviets) of peasants' deputies. Thereupon, the peasants proceeded without more ado to take possession. Having got what they wanted, they had no more to hope for from the Constituent Assembly; and gratitude was sufficient for the time to bind them to their benefactors.

M. Lenin has explained explicitly again and again that the Bolshevik policy in this matter was dictated by

tactical considerations: he has always been great on 'tactics.' It was necessary to 'gain the adhesion of the peasantry' in order to put 'the proletariat,' i.e. the Bolsheviks, in power. They could not dispense with this 'temporary union with the peasants as a whole.' They realised that 'a common peasant revolution is still a bourgeois revolution, and cannot in a backward country be turned into a socialist one *without a whole series of transitions and successive stages*' (M. Lenin's italics). But they comforted themselves with the belief that, once in power, they could 'help the peasantry to test their petty bourgeois ideas, in order to pass from them as speedily as possible to the socialist demands.' One way of teaching them would be 'to rally to the Communist side the village poor against the village rich,' and 'carry through a social cleavage in the village': until this was done, 'the great agrarian revolution,' from the Marxist point of view, 'would inevitably remain a mere paper reform.' Squeamish people might accuse them of 'introducing civil war into the villages.' But this, says M. Lenin, 'we regard as a merit.'

Even with the support of the peasants assured to the government of the *coup d'état*, it may at first sight be difficult to understand why the 'capitalists' of the industrial centres were unable to put up a better fight against the combined processes of expropriation, requisition, and terrorism to which they were now subjected. In some ways such Capitalism as there was in Russia—*islands of industrialism in an agrarian sea*—was highly developed. Coming relatively late, it benefited by the newest plant and machinery, and the works were organised on a large scale. But it was in a sense exotic: the capital itself was very largely foreign in origin, so that the native shareholder element—one of the main forces on the side of the existing industrial order—was relatively far weaker than in more western nations. There were model factories here and there; but the evils of truck and of excessive fines which countries entering earlier upon the factory stage have generally abolished, were still very prevalent, as well as the more peculiarly Russian practice of personal chastisement. The *nouveaux riches* often aroused resentment by their ostentation, while they were devoid of that tradition of a share in

government which parliamentarism has given the business classes in other countries. The technical experts and superintendents were also largely foreign, without root in the country. Under such conditions, among a people accustomed to autocracy, weak-willed with a Slavonic weakness, a few hundred resolute men were able to have their way.

The history of Bolshevik rule during the past three years has been the nemesis of a false position—the false position of those whose political theory rests on economic conditions which have yet to be created. This can be shown in relation to the land, to the organisation of industry, to the army, to the tribunals, and to foreign affairs. On the present occasion we must confine ourselves to the constitutional machinery. And it may be remarked that there is small need to climb to the top of the Kremlin to learn the views of M. Lenin. I do not find that he has said anything to his visitors which cannot be learnt or anticipated from his writings. While the rôle of other leaders is to preside over city Soviets, to organise armies, to run railways, and to visit foreign capitals, his mission is to issue the Bolshevik gospel in a stream of new editions, and explain its foreordained adaptation to every human need. Many of the English translations of his pamphlets have been issued by obscure presses, with all the romantic charm of poor paper and worn type. But they have no other charm. All alike are cold and abstract, in form severely logical, full of formulæ and citations from the socialist scriptures of Marx and Engels. He delights in numbered ‘theses,’ for the acceptance of this or that congress or party convention. Only rarely does he condescend to argue with those outside the Bolshevik camp ; but, when he does, he is easy master of a rich vituperative vocabulary.*

* Beside the books cited at the head of this article, reference may be made to the following pamphlets, which are placed in the order of writing : ‘Towards Soviets’ (April 1917), British Socialist Party ; ‘Lessons of the Russian Revolution’ (July 1917), B. S. P. ; ‘Theses’ (January 1918), in Publication 149 of the American Association for International Conciliation ; ‘The Soviets at Work’ (April 1918), Social Information Bureau ; ‘The Chief Task of our Times’ (March, with speech added of May 1918), Workers’ Socialist Federation ; ‘The Land Revolution in Russia’ (December 1918), Independent Labour Party ; ‘Manifesto of the Moscow International

The official style of the present government is the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. According to M. Lenin and the Bolshevik propagandists, it is an 'immeasurably higher form of democracy' than the world has previously witnessed. Yet it is not a little remarkable that the feature in the Soviet system which has attracted most attention on the part of certain sympathetic writers in England is left very much in the background by M. Lenin himself. According to these English writers, its essential characteristic consists in its occupational constituencies. These, they say, represent real groups, with common purposes, in contrast to merely geographical constituencies, which, they assert, are meaningless agglomerations. M. Lenin does indeed make the occupational method of election one of the merits of the new system. But it does not bulk at all largely in his frequent expositions. And it will be better to follow M. Lenin's own line of approach.

Marx, he says, in 1848 had not got beyond the general idea that when the socialists should have seized power, the proletariat would be organised as the ruling class. He waited for experience to reveal the form which this rule would assume. The Paris Commune gave him what he was waiting for: 'the definite form of the proletarian Socialist Republic.' Its merits, in Marx's own language, and numbered for convenience of reference, were as follows:

1. 'The first decree of the Commune was the abolition of the standing army, and its replacement by the nation in arms.

2. 'The Council of the Commune consisted of municipal representatives elected by universal suffrage. . . . They could be recalled at any time.

3. 'From the members of the Council of the Commune down to the humblest worker, everybody in the public services was paid at the same rates as ordinary working men.

4. 'The Commune was to have been not a parliamentary but a working body, legislative and executive at one and the same time. Instead of deciding once in three or six years what member of the ruling class was to represent and repress the people in parliament, universal suffrage was to be the means by which the people, organised in Communes, was to

(March 1919), 'National Labour Press: another translation and M. Lenin's 'Theses' in Postgate, 'The Bolshevik Theory,' Richards, 1920.

seek out the foremen and clerks it needed for its gigantic business, in the same way as ordinary employers use their individual will (or suffrage) in choosing their servants.'

M. Lenin's advocacy of Soviets is based on 'their identity in type and socio-political character with the Commune'; so that we must now consider how far the Soviet government has in fact carried out the Commune principles.

Comment on the first point is hardly necessary, when we reflect that the Soviet government claims to have at its disposal a standing army of more than two million men, commanded mainly by officers taken over from the Czarist régime. In July 1917, M. Lenin taunted the Kerensky government with having 'no complete confidence in the elected soldiers' organisations, no full realisation of the principle of the election of officers by the soldiers themselves.' Nine months later M. Trotsky, now Minister of War, explained to the Communist party that the cry for elected officers had served its purpose :

'We were obliged to break, by means of the election of officers, the resistance which the personnel of the higher command always opposed. The new political power is in the hands of the working classes. Under the present régime of the army, the principle of the election of officers seems to me to have no political *raison d'être*. On the contrary, it is absolutely inimical to our present technical necessities. Besides it has already been suppressed by a decree.'

To the second point we shall return. The third, when M. Lenin wrote in 1917, he treated as the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*.

'Particularly noteworthy . . . is the lowering of the payment of *all* servants of the State to the level of the *workmen's wages*. Here is shown, more clearly than anywhere else, the *break* from a bourgeois democracy to a proletarian democracy. . . . And it is precisely on this most obvious point, perhaps the most important so far as the problem of the State is concerned, that the teachings of Marx have been forgotten. It is entirely neglected in all the innumerable popular commentaries. It is not "proper" to speak about it, as if it were a piece of old-fashioned "naïveté"; just as the Christians, having attained the position of a State religion, "forget" the "naïveté" of primitive Christianity.'

M. Lenin does not content himself with irony : he has an economic argument.

‘On the basis of Capitalism the great majority of the functions of the old State have been enormously simplified and reduced in practice to very simple operations, such as registration, filing, and checking. Hence they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for the usual “working man’s wage.”’

But as early as the spring of 1918 the Bolshevik government had learnt that to run great industrial and transport undertakings was by no means ‘within the reach of every literate person.’ They could not dispense with the experts, and to get good service out of them they had to pay them well. M. Lenin boldly faced the music his own earlier writings might not unnaturally awaken :

‘We were forced to make use of the old bourgeois method and agreed to very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. . . . It is clear that such a measure is a deflexion from the principles of the Paris Commune. . . . Furthermore, it is clear that it is not merely a halt in the offensive against Capitalism (for Capitalism is not a quantity of money but a definite social relationship), but also a step backward by our Socialist Soviet State.’

His consolation is that this also is one of the temporary arrangements of a transitional period. The time will come when the imperfect Socialist achievement—‘to every one according to his work’—will be replaced by the purer Communism—‘to every one according to his needs.’ Then things will so nearly run themselves, that the State, as we have known it, will have ‘withered away.’ But it is observable that this transitional period is progressively lengthening itself in M. Lenin’s mind. It has now become ‘a whole historical epoch.’

Meanwhile, in order that the recipients of these higher wages may have something to spend them on, ‘illicit markets’ have to be tolerated. In theory all food produced by the peasants above their own needs must be sold to the state for fixed prices paid in the depreciated paper-money of the government. More than one of the recent visitors to M. Lenin’s office at the top of the Kremlín have reported that the paper-money

payment strikes him as really humorous. In actual fact, the peasants keep back what they can and sell at illicit markets. From the point of view of the government two useful purposes are served: they get the services of technical experts and officials, for a consideration; and they can drop down on almost any one they wish to make uncomfortable, with a charge of 'speculation.'

But it is the composition and working of the Councils themselves which must be the centre of interest: let us fix our attention on the second and fourth of the merits of the Paris Commune, reproduced in the Soviets.

The Paris Commune did, at any rate, get its Council elected by universal suffrage, even if many 'bourgeois' had left Paris or abstained from voting. It was the constant assumption of Marx that by the time a country was ripe for socialism, the overwhelming mass of the population would be proletarian, and would completely dominate the situation when elections were held by a revolutionary government free from bourgeois influence. Hence Marx could use the phrase 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' without being conscious of any conflict with what we may call the numerical conception of democracy. In M. Lenin's mouth the proletariat sometimes means the *industrial* wage workers: but I cannot find that he has ever distinctly claimed that a majority of the proletariat *in this sense* has a right to govern the whole country, however small a proportion they may actually form of the whole population: though this position has been assigned to him by one of the ablest of his English admirers. More usually 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' is to be understood as short for 'the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry'—to quote from the Soviet Constitution (§ 9). And, in this sense, M. Lenin has persuaded himself that his government has the support of 'the great mass of the population.'

But he was not going to take any risks from the bourgeois vote. Accordingly, the Soviet Constitution openly disfranchises them.

'§ 65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for:

‘(a) Persons who employ hired labour, in order to obtain from it an increase in profits.

‘(b) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property.

‘(c) Private traders, middlemen, and brokers.

‘(d) Monks and clergy of all denominations.’

When we consider that many of the cottage craftsmen employ assistants, like the journeymen and apprentices of 18th-century England, and that many of the factory workers own their own houses or have (at any rate had) deposits in the People's Bank, it will be readily seen that this clause might easily be made to disfranchise a considerable number of working people. The possibility is not lessened by M. Lenin's assertion that ‘all bureaucratic formalities and limitations of elections are done away with; the masses themselves determine the order and time of the elections.’

Considering that the Constitution confirmed the Bolshevik Declaration of Rights of December 1917, by which the intention was announced of carrying out ‘a complete transfer of all factories, mills, mines, railways, and other means of production and transportation to the ownership of the Workmen's and Peasants' Soviet Republic,’ it was not perhaps surprising that the owners of the property to be confiscated should for the time be put out of the pale of citizenship. When the veteran German Socialist leader, Herr Kautsky, criticised such measures as a violation of the principle of democracy, M. Lenin replied that he only departed from ‘formal democracy’ and ‘excluded the exploiters’ in order to establish ‘democracy for the vast majority of the nation.’ And, in truth, the vast majority of the nation were the peasants, of whom only a relatively small proportion employ labour outside their own family.

Yet though kept in power by the acquiescence of the peasants, the Bolshevik government has never dared to trust them. The recent British Labour Delegation came back with news which some have found surprising: that in the elaborate Soviet hierarchy, passing from local through district and provincial Soviets to the supreme All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it is so arranged that the peasant vote shall count for only one-fifth of its numerical strength. But so it has stood in the Soviet

Constitution since it was formally adopted in July 1918.

‘§ 53. Congresses of Soviets are composed as follows :

‘(a) Regional : of representatives of the urban and county Soviets, one representative for 25,000 inhabitants of the county, and one representative for 5000 voters of the cities.

‘(b) Provincial (Gubernia) : of representatives of urban and rural Soviets, one representative for 10,000 inhabitants from the rural districts, and one representative for 2000 voters in the city.’

‘§ 25. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of urban Soviets (one delegate for 25,000 voters), and of representatives of the provincial Congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants).’

Not content with excluding all bourgeois and giving the peasants one-fifth of the voting power of the town workpeople, the Constitution makes assurance doubly sure by claiming for the government the prerogative of depriving any one of rights which can be used against it.

‘§ 23. Being guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the Russian Socialist Federated Republic deprives all individuals and groups of rights which could be utilised by them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution.’

And this prerogative it has not been slow to use. On June 14, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets voted the exclusion from the Soviets of the Right and Centre Social Revolutionaries, and a little later of the Left Social Revolutionaries, whose alliance had helped the Bolsheviks into power, and whose agrarian programme they had ‘conveyed.’ Since then local Soviets have frequently been dissolved, when an opposition majority managed to make its appearance. The Mensheviks are apparently not generally deprived of the franchise : in some of the big Moscow factories they can dispense with propaganda, and there are still 40 Menshevik representatives among the 1500 of the Moscow City Soviet. But all the primary elections are by show of hands, and, with a Revolutionary Tribunal in existence, it requires unusual courage to be independent ; opponents of the government cannot get halls for their meetings ; all their papers are suppressed ; and the Bolsheviks monopolise all the known printing presses. That again

seemed to surprise the Labour delegation ; but it is in the Constitution, quite nicely expressed :

‘§ 14. For the purpose of securing freedom of expression to the toiling masses, the Soviet Republic . . . turns over to the working people and to the poorest peasantry’ (i.e. to the Bolshevik rulers) ‘all technical and material means of publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books, etc.’

If in the rural districts an opponent is elected, it is easy to refuse him a railway pass. M. Lenin never wrote anything more to the point than his sentence as far back as 1905 : ‘Whoever wants to try any path to Socialism other than political Democracy, he will inevitably come to absurd and reactionary conclusions.’

The last of the novel merits shared by the Soviets with the Paris Commune is that they are ‘working bodies,’ not mere ‘talking shops’ : they are executive as well as legislative : and all that the officials have to do is to carry out their directions. Moreover, the members of the local Soviets each ‘represent not more than about five hundred votes’ ; according to the Constitution (§ 57) the minimum in cities is now a thousand. Representatives are all subject at any moment to the ‘right of recall’ and replacement. And the whole machinery, we are assured, ‘works centripetally ; the central body is controlled by the local constituent bodies.’ If all this is so, the Soviet system must be vastly superior, from a democratic point of view, to mere parliamentarism. Accordingly, M. Lenin, when meditating his *coup d’état*, wrote :

‘These last few days have brought face to face these two types of representation—on one hand the Constituent Assembly, in which one man represents 200,000 wills, and on the other the All-Russian Soviets, . . . whose every member is so closely connected with the very pulse of the people. The Soviet, being close to the people, must express realities literally, as the people itself expresses them. The Soviet is probably the most important contribution of the Russian Revolution.’

Such is the theory : probably at first the quite honest theory of idealists. But every one who has any experience of large elective bodies knows that it could not be realised in practice. A public meeting, in the very nature of things, cannot be an executive ; and the

Soviets of the great cities, like the All-Russian Congress itself, are so big as to be of the nature of public meetings. Such gatherings are bound to have committees and officials; and these officials and committees not only become the executive, but also guide the gatherings in their decisions. The recent Labour Deputation had an opportunity of seeing what actually takes place now. According to Mr Bertrand Russell, who accompanied them :

‘Although the Moscow Soviet is nominally sovereign in Moscow it is really only a body of electors, who choose the Executive Committee of forty, out of whom, in turn, is chosen the Presidium, consisting of nine men who have all the power. The Moscow Soviet as a whole meets rarely; the Executive Committee is supposed to meet once a week, but did not meet while we were in Moscow. The Presidium on the contrary meets daily. Of course it is easy for the Government to exercise pressure over the election of the Executive Committee and again over the election of the Presidium, owing to the absolutely complete suppression of free speech and free press.’

Still more evidently does the vision of a people directly ruling itself fade away when we come to the central government. Constitutionally the supreme power belongs to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This is elected, and meets for a day or so, every six months; and when it does come together, it is a large assembly which merely votes its approval, without discussion but with much band accompaniment, of the decrees put before it. In the intervals between the Congresses, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the ‘supreme legislative, executive and controlling organ of the Republic’ (§§ 30, 31). It is elected by the Congress; it is only required to meet every two months; and, according to the Constitution (§ 28), it consists of not more than 200 members: the recent visitors to Russia speak of 300. This is the body which in fact most nearly corresponds to a parliament; and when it is realised that it is the result of a series of indirect elections, so complicated as to need a genealogical tree to make them intelligible, it is clear that it is a long way off from the ordinary elector. As Dr Haden Guest, one of the secretaries of the Labour Delegation, has written :

‘The C. E. C. is much less directly in touch with the people of Russia than the British Parliament with the British people. It is perhaps rather less in touch with the Russian people than are the indirectly elected Port of London Authority, Water Board, or Metropolitan Asylums Board in touch with the people of London.’

In theory, the C. E. C. chooses the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. the Ministry. This Council has the power of issuing decrees, resolutions and orders (§ 38), and must immediately notify them to the C. E. C., which can suspend or revoke them (§§ 39, 40). But, whether this is an effective limitation of the power of the Commissars may be more than doubted when we observe (§ 41) that ‘measures requiring immediate execution may be enacted directly by the Council of People's Commissars’; and the still more remarkable fact that, between its sessions,

‘§ 36. The members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee work in the various departments (People's Commissariats), or execute special orders of the C. E. C.’

A controlling body, most of whose members are ordinarily working under the orders of the Ministers, is not likely to perform its controlling functions independently.

The impression made upon an acute and sympathetic observer, Mr Bertrand Russell, is that ‘the Soviet system is moribund.’ M. Lenin we may suppose to have been quite sincere when he declared that his aim was ‘to attract *every* member of the *poor* classes to practical participation in the management’ of the country's affairs; ‘to obtain the *free* performance of State obligations by *every* toiler, after he is through with his eight hours of productive work.’ But the fact is there are not enough Russians who are convinced Communists, ardent for the common good, and sufficiently intelligent to take part in the work of government, to man the Soviets with voluntary members, exercising an independent judgment of their own. Quite early M. Lenin had to complain that ‘the departments of the Soviets are turning in many places into organs which gradually merge with the commissariats,’ i.e. the civil service.

It is hardly necessary to go on to explain the real
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governmental system of Russia to-day. That is pretty well understood, as the result of the recent visit of the Labour Delegation, and of the Reports and books to which it has given rise. The government of Russia, whatever it is in form, is run in fact by the Bolshevik organisation, which now calls itself the Communist party, and which does not claim to have more than 600,000 members, and probably numbers far less. It consists of fanatics and time-servers: it fills the vast civil service and enjoys powers and privileges which make life comfortable even in a Socialist country; and it drives along all the unwieldy mass of nominally representative councils. Its Congress speaks as master, with no pretence of subjection to a higher authority: 'it finds necessary' this or that, and it 'therefore decrees it.' The Bolshevik leaders realise the danger such power gives to individuals, especially in a country with the all-pervasive tradition of corruption inherited from Czarist days. It is against this that their Extraordinary Commission is established, quite as much as to beat down open opponents. But terrorism has never formed an effective instrument of government for a long period; and it is probably only terrorism which stands between Russia and a government like that of Tammany. Tammany was a society which, in the guise of philanthropy, misruled New York, by driving respectable voters away from the elections and manipulating the votes of the rest. And Tammany had only the municipal taxes and city contracts to play with: it did not control the whole industrial and commercial life of a great nation.

WILLIAM ASHLEY.

Art. 10.—THE WAGES PROBLEM IN AGRICULTURE.

1. *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer, 1870-1920.* By F. E. Green. King, 1920.
2. *Village Trade Unions in Two Centuries.* By Ernest Selley. Allen & Unwin, 1921.
3. *Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee.* Cd. 9079. 1916.
4. *Corn Production Act, 1917.*
5. *Orders of the Agricultural Wages Board, 1918-20.*
6. *Wages and Conditions of Employment in Agriculture.* Cmd. 24 and 25. 1919.
7. *Report on Financial Results of Farming and Cost of Living.* Cmd. 76. 1919.
8. *Report and Evidence of Royal Commission on Agriculture, 1919-20.* Cmd. 345, 365, 391, 445, and 665.

IN the turmoil of social, political, and economic complexities which is vaguely termed 'the Labour question,' wages form only one ingredient, although necessarily the most apparent. Agricultural workers being the latest class of wage-earners to become organised, have so far been pre-occupied with a struggle for higher wages; and while having, through their leaders, some contact with industrial Trade Unions, cannot be said to have developed at present any line of action outside the improvement of their economic status. It follows that a consideration of the wages problem in agriculture comprises in effect a consideration of the general position of the farm labourer under present conditions.

It is desirable, at the outset, to note the fact that there is in connexion with agricultural wages a problem which differs in some respects from that presented in other industries, although certain broad principles are common to all classes of wage-earners. A living wage—using that ambiguous term as signifying a wage sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of life—and hours of employment which leave time for a fair amount of leisure, with provision for extra payment if such hours are exceeded, are among the demands of all workers, whether in the factory or the field. In the cultivation of the soil or the care of live stock, the conditions of employment are less under the control of

the employer than in other industries. There are, of course, other occupations in which the weather is an important factor. The work of a builder, for example, may be interrupted and his men become idle for considerable periods. But in farming there is not only interruption of work at certain times, but there is also the need for a compensatory excess of work at other times. If the building of a house is delayed by weather, its ultimate completion may be delayed for a similar period; but if work on a crop is stopped at one season, it by no means follows that its harvesting can be deferred for an equivalent time. Nature, not the employer, decides when it must be in-gathered. With live stock the helplessness of the employer is still more evident. A postponement of milking means not merely the breaking of a contract to supply milk, but in a very short period the total loss of the cows, which represent the cow-owner's capital. There is no other form of enterprise in which the employer's organisation of labour-power is so liable to disturbance from causes beyond his control. The special difficulties which arise in connexion with work on the land or with live stock do not, of course, prevent fair and satisfactory arrangements being made between employers and workers to meet them; but they necessitate recognition of the fact that the terms of employment in agriculture are subject to conditions which are exceptional and inexorable.

Another point of difference which has an important influence on the present problem is the fact that agriculture is the last of the great industries in which the workers have become organised. Attempts, beginning with the tragedy of Tolpuddle in 1833, were made from time to time to organise the agricultural labourers; but although some success was achieved it was but temporary. Six or seven years ago it is probable that not more than 10,000 farm workers were enrolled in any union, although in the time when Joseph Arch's campaign reached its highest level, about 1873, it was claimed that his union had a membership of nearly 90,000. It is natural, in the light of present-day knowledge, to look back, with regret, on the sorry history of the efforts of the agricultural labourers to combine, and the way in which those efforts were met. While it is possible charitably

to credit with honest convictions those who so strenuously opposed the men, it is not possible to acquit them of unwisdom. Their action left behind cruel memories, and the relations of farmers and labourers in many districts were embittered for a generation.

The nemesis of this delay has come in the guise of a further difficulty in dealing with the present situation. In other great industries the unions of the workers have been built up during a considerable period, with the result that their members have gradually acquired experience, and as numbers increased the organisation developed accordingly. In the case of agriculture, the growth of the unions has been so rapid that with the exception of a few leaders who have had an education in trade unionism outside agriculture, the whole body of members are inexperienced; and it is difficult to find amongst them a sufficient number of men qualified to represent the views of their fellows. In this connexion recognition should be made of the difficulty and responsibility of the task which has fallen upon the leaders of the National Agricultural Workers' Union and the Workers' Union. Any one who realises the possibilities which arise when, within the course of a couple of years, two or three hundred thousand men are organised, filled with expectations of immediate and tangible results, and excited by visions of a new heaven and a new earth, must recognise that they might be easily led into hasty and inconsiderate action. It is to the credit of those who have guided the counsels of the men that under circumstances of much difficulty, and at a time of great social and industrial unrest, they have carried on their campaign, on the whole, with moderation and discretion.

Nor are the difficulties arising from the rapid development of agricultural unionism confined to the workers' side. British farmers are the embodiment of individualism. They are probably the most obdurate class in the community to stir into collective action. They may be easily induced by some sense of grievance to hold meetings and express violent condemnation of the Government (whatever it may be); their indignation being frequently most hot against those who are attempting to further their interests. But for sustained action to achieve a definite and well-considered policy

they have in the past shown little aptitude. The majority of farmers have also inherited a mental attitude towards labour which renders it difficult for them to realise the change in all social relationships which the war so greatly accelerated. The dominance of the proletariat, to which all political forces have been tending during the past fifty years, has become complete and overwhelming. Like all political changes in this country, it came so gradually, that to those who lived in the backwaters of life it was almost imperceptible. The end of the war, and the return to civil life of the youth who had been for five years maturing in the hot-bed of war, brought about the completion of the development with apparent suddenness. The extension of the franchise, with its inclusion of women, signalised the event, but its full significance was not appreciated by farmers. Indeed, the experience of the war and the blandishments of which he was the object tended to arouse a belief in the farmer's mind that he would be in future a privileged person—a kind of national pet—to be humoured and helped and exempted from all the troubles which are the common lot of those who attempt to earn their living. The shock, therefore, was severe, when he realised that in the one phase of his business in which he had always felt free and unfettered—that of dealing with his men—he was to be subjected to drastic interference. That the law should compel him to pay a certain wage and should forbid him from making his own bargain with a man who wished to be employed, was almost inconceivable. No doubt, the control exercised over his freedom of dealing with his land and the produce thereof, had done something to inure him to State intervention in the conduct of his business; but, nevertheless, the idea of authority coming between him and his men was very startling. On the whole, farmers have accepted the new conditions, if not with cheerfulness, with surprising celerity. That the Orders of the Wages Board are obeyed with reluctance, and that attempts to ignore or evade them are common, is true; but this is not infrequently due as much to bewilderment as to deliberate resistance. The acceptance with so little disturbance of what is, in fact, a revolution in the economic relationship of farmers and labourers, is

largely due to the rapid growth of the National Farmers' Union and the wisdom of its directors.

No one now attempts to defend the rates of wages paid to agricultural labourers throughout the 19th century. In the current 'Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society,' Mr A. W. Ashby collects such materials as exist and gives the following figures, which represent the result of inquiries made at different periods by various authorities. They may be taken as approximately accurate, in the absence of complete data :

Year.	Authority.	Average weekly rate of wages.	
		s.	d.
1767-70	Arthur Young	7	3
1850-51	James Caird	9	7
1860	F. Purdy (Journal, R.S.S.)	12	3
1870-71	S. B. L. Druce (Journal, R.A.S.E.)	12	2
1880-81	S. B. L. Druce (Journal, R.A.S.E.)	14	2
1892-93	W. C. Little (R. Commission on Labour)	13	5
1898	A. Wilson Fox (Cd. 346)	14	5

Rates of wages, taken by themselves, are of little value unless they are related to the cost of living at the time, and to other factors which affect the economic position of the wage-earner. It is evident, for instance, that the rise in the real wage from 1860 to 1898 was much greater than appears from the mere average rate. The price of the 4-lb. loaf in 1860 was 9d., whereas in 1898 it was 5½d. Mr Green writes :

'Towards the end of this decade [the 'eighties], for the first time in their lives thousands of labourers who had hardly ever tasted any other meat than that obtained from the pig which they kept in their sties, or the rabbit which they snared in the field, began to taste mutton and beef sent frozen to England from the ends of the world. It is an ironical reflection on civilisation that the English labourer who fed the bullock in the yard which he overlooked from his cottage, and folded the sheep on the roots under his eye, had to wait until frozen meat came to him from the Antipodes or the ranches of America before butcher's meat became part of his diet, even once a week. This is no exaggeration, for men to-day have told me that the frozen meat which arrived in this country in the late 'eighties was the first time they had tasted mutton in their lives.'

While, however, the low wages paid for farm work may not be defended, it is not difficult to explain them. However reprehensible and, in the light of subsequent history, unfortunate was the resistance of farmers as a class to the attempts of farm workers to adopt the only means, that of combination, whereby they could hope to better their condition, they acted only in accordance with the principles of business then established, in paying no more than the 'market value' for the labour they required. The rise in farm wages which occurred during the latter half of the 19th century was mainly due to the fact that at the beginning of the period the number of men in the villages seeking employment was largely in excess of the demand for their services on the farms, and there was no alternative occupation for them in the country districts. This fact is demonstrated by the figures which I recently published * showing the relation of the number of agricultural labourers returned at each census in England and Wales to the extent of land occupied by farmers :

Year.	Cultivated Land.		Agricultural Labourers.	Labourers per 1000 acres.	
	Acres.		No.	No.	
1851 . .	34,000,000	. .	1,455,213	. .	43
1861 . .	33,000,000	. .	1,364,908	. .	41
1871 . .	30,839,000	. .	1,142,347	. .	37
1881 . .	32,212,000	. .	1,017,045	. .	32
1891 . .	32,919,000	. .	898,232	. .	27
1901 . .	32,417,000	. .	724,314	. .	22

As I pointed out in connexion with these figures :

'The census returns make no allowance for continuous employment. A man describes himself as an agricultural labourer, because that is his sole, or main, occupation ; but in the old days large numbers of such men were only employed seasonally, and were idle for a considerable part of their time. The general practice of "standing-off" men in wet weather enabled the farmer to employ a maximum number in fine weather, or at certain seasons, and to dispense with them when work was slack. . . . In the earlier period there was, in fact, always a large surplus of labour in the villages, but as time went on facilities for transport increased, and the rural

* Food Supplies in Peace and War' (Longmans).

outlook widened. Labour became more mobile, men passed from the country which offered so meagre a living, and the number of agricultural labourers accordingly fell.'

As the number seeking employment fell the level of wages rose; and, the same causes continuing, the average rate in 1914, as shown by the inquiries made into the Wages and Conditions of Employment in Agriculture in 1918, was 16s. 3d.

The exploitation by employers of the condition of the 'labour market,' for which causes beyond their control were responsible, did not therefore arise from any exceptional dose of original sin, or any peculiar hardness of heart. Farmers acted, as employers in all other industries acted, in securing their labour as cheaply as possible. In other industries there was no amelioration of the workers' conditions so long as the price of labour was determined by the wage which a man out of employment was willing to accept. Farmers, however, strengthened their position by developing a 'class consciousness' and a class loyalty which they resented when exhibited by their men. Many an individual farmer would have raised wages—and some did, often surreptitiously—but for the feeling that it was unfair to do so unless his fellow-farmers would take the same course. The mistake they made was in failing to realise that what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander, and that the spirit of combination and of class loyalty which they thought commendable in themselves was not less commendable when exemplified in others. Much trouble, in the past and in the present, would have been avoided; amongst other things a legal minimum wage might have been unnecessary.

The demand for the establishment of a legal minimum wage for agricultural employment is quite modern. There is no indication of it in the early records of farm workers' unionism. It was first given prominence in the Report of the Land Enquiry Committee, of which Mr A. H. D. Acland was chairman, in 1913. The Committee stated:

'It is not to be expected that (a) the growth of small holdings, or (b) increased agricultural prosperity, or (c) Trade Unionism will lead in a reasonable time to a rise in the wages of labourers sufficient to enable them to live in a state of

physical efficiency and also to pay a commercial rent for their cottages. The evidence goes to show that low-paid labour is not really cheap labour. This is shown by a comparison of the low-paid areas with those areas where wages are high, owing to the presence of competing industries, and also by the evidence from those who have had experience of farming both in low and high-paid counties.

'We therefore suggest: (1) That, in order to secure to the labourer a sufficient wage, it is necessary to provide for the fixing of a legal minimum wage, by means of some form of wage tribunal.

'(2) That it should be an instruction to such wage tribunal that immediately or within a short and defined period the wage should be fixed at least at such a sum as will enable the labourer to keep himself and an average family in a state of physical efficiency, and to pay a commercial rent for his cottage.

'(3) That it should be laid down as an essential feature of any legislation dealing with a minimum wage that a farmer who is able to prove that a rise in wages had put upon him an increased burden should have the right to apply to a judicial body such as a Land Court for a readjustment of his rent.'

These recommendations, with others made by the same Committee, obtained very little support from agriculturists generally, and, indeed, were so immediately involved in the bickerings of party politics, that serious consideration of them, on their merits, became almost impossible. The Report of the Departmental Committee on the home production of food (Cd. 8095) in 1915, referred to the importance of 'the retention of skilled workers on farms,' but said nothing about their wages. In 1916, the Prime Minister (Mr Asquith) appointed a Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne, with the following reference:

'Having regard to the need of increased home-grown food supplies in the interests of national security, to consider and report upon the methods of effecting such increase.'

The Committee was termed the 'Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee,' and was instructed to consider post-war conditions rather than immediate issues. The Report was characterised by a comprehensive survey of the agricultural problem, and exhibited some recognition of

the fact that the agricultural policy of this country has to be considered from a new standpoint. The Committee expressed the opinion 'that the conditions of agriculture must be made so stable that out of its profits the agricultural labourer can be assured a fair wage, the cultivator of the soil a fair return for his capital, energy, and brains, and the landowner a fair return for the capital invested in the land'; and they recommended 'that the State should fix a minimum wage for the ordinary agricultural labourer in each county, guarantee to the farmer a minimum price for wheat and oats, and take steps . . . to secure the increase of production which is the object of the guarantee.'

This recommendation was at once accepted by the Government, and formed the basis of the policy announced by the Prime Minister (Mr Lloyd George) in the House of Commons on Feb. 23, 1917, and subsequently embodied in the Corn Production Act.

By that Act, an Agricultural Wages Board was established for England and Wales—with corresponding authorities for Scotland and Ireland—charged with the duty of fixing minimum rates of wages for agricultural workers, such rates to be enforceable in a court of summary jurisdiction, under a penalty of a fine of 20*l.*, and of 1*l.* per day for an offence continued after conviction. Powers are given to the Wages Board to make the minimum rates applicable universally, to vary them according to districts, or kind of occupation, and to fix rates for overtime. The Board are also empowered to issue permits, exempting from the provisions of the Act workers affected by mental or other infirmity or physical injury. The Board were further authorised to establish District Committees for such areas as they may determine, and they have, in fact, established thirty-nine such Committees.

Apart from its other implications, the establishment of the Agricultural Wages Board marked a dramatic development in the history of the agricultural labourer in this country. For the first time he was officially recognised, not only as being intimately concerned in agricultural administration, but as entitled to an equal voice with farmers in the settlement of important questions of agricultural economics. It was a sudden change.

Many official bodies had been set up from time to time to consider agricultural questions, but it never occurred to any one that those who formed the large majority of the agricultural population should be represented in their counsels, or have a voice in their decisions. Now and again an individual, such as Joseph Arch, might be called to give evidence before a Royal Commission, or might even have a seat on an official committee. But, if so, he was always in a hopeless minority; and any idea that he had an equal interest, or was entitled to an equal voice, with farmers, would have been rejected.

The constitution of the Agricultural Wages Board not only establishes the status of the labourer as not less an 'agriculturist' than the farmer, but it introduces the principle of self-government in agricultural affairs, to a degree which is without precedent. Within the limits laid down by Parliament, the Board is independent and all-powerful. Its Orders have the force of law, and there is no appeal against them or their administration by the Board, except to a Court of Law. Its operations govern, in a large degree, the economic relations of over a million employers and workers, and thus affect directly or indirectly, the lives of at least five million persons. And this is done by a body consisting of representatives equally of farmers and labourers. The pregnant fact that these powers lie, not with a Minister or a Department, not even with the Cabinet, but with agriculturists themselves, is not commonly recognised. It is partly obscured by the presence of a minority (less than one-fifth) of non-representative members appointed by the Minister, to whom the actions of the Board are frequently attributed. It is overlooked, however, that if the representative members agree—as in the past they have done on many of the main issues—the appointed members are powerless; and that in any case, if they are called upon to intervene, they can only do so by securing a majority of the Board which involves the support, or at least the absence of opposition, of the representative members.

The abrupt intrusion into agricultural affairs of a body so constituted and so armed was naturally very startling. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the Wages Board has been the subject of severe and

persistent criticism and of a considerable amount of misunderstanding. No authority entrusted with responsibility for dealing with Labour questions in any industry during the past three years could expect to escape either. The actions of bodies representing other great industries—most of which have long years of experience to guide them—have not always commanded universal assent, and the wisdom even of the Cabinet itself in dealing with labour has been questioned by some. In their efforts to deal with the economic and social complexities involved in the task entrusted to them, the representatives of agriculture might perhaps claim some sympathy from those whose interests they are trying to serve. They are not, however, greatly surprised if they do not receive it.

The effect of the operations of the Wages Board on the wages paid to agricultural workers is inevitably a matter of dispute. Many farmers think that the Board has forced wages to a higher level than would have been otherwise reached; while, on the other hand, many labour leaders believe that if there had been no Wages Board, they would have been able by direct action to secure higher wages for the men. No one can seriously contend that, while the wages in all other classes of employment were rising by leaps and bounds, those of agricultural workers could, by any possible means, have been prevented from rising. It is extremely unlikely that farmers generally would have spontaneously and voluntarily increased wages; and it follows, therefore, that they would only have raised them under pressure. Whatever the result in the end, it would only have been attained after very serious disturbances throughout the country, and at the cost of irretrievable injury to the interests of agriculture. This is not a time, if ever there could be one, when a contest between farmers, on the one hand, and the forces of organised labour, which would have necessarily been drawn into the struggle, could be anything but disadvantageous to farmers as a class. If the Wages Board has been instrumental, so far, in preventing such a catastrophe, its members may claim to have done the State some service.

Of one fault, at least, the Wages Board has never been accused—that of inactivity. It is, indeed, fairly open to the charge of issuing an excessive number of

Orders. This was mainly due to the unavoidable circumstances of its institution. The minimum wage was dangled before the eager eyes of the agricultural labourer in February 1917; and there are still many simple souls—to be found not only in the country districts—who regard a statement by the Prime Minister as equivalent to an Act of Parliament. It was not, however, until August of that year that the promised measure became a statute. The Act fixed a statutory minimum of 25s.; but during its passage through Parliament the figure had been violently attacked as inadequate, and by the following year the case for its increase had been greatly strengthened. The result was that the Wages Board had to begin its work immediately; and, having decided to set up District Committees, it was bound to deal with the recommendations of each Committee individually, with the result that a separate Order had to be made for practically every one of the thirty-nine areas. It had also to deal, in similar detail, with rates for women and boys, special classes of workers, overtime rates, board and lodging allowances, cottages, and other ‘benefits or advantages.’ Gradually, the wide diversity arising out of the various recommendations of the Committees has been reduced, and the number of Orders materially diminished.

Since its establishment in December 1917, the Wages Board has fixed the general minimum for adult male workers four times. The first recommendation, received early in 1918, was from Norfolk, for a rate of 30s.; this was accepted by the Board, and subsequently applied to all areas, except those where a higher figure was recommended. A year later, the minimum was raised, after very considerable discussion, to 36s. 6d. In April 1920, it was again raised to 42s., and in the following August to 46s. 6d. In every case there were certain counties which had a higher minimum.

On the two first occasions these rates were fixed by agreement—reached after prolonged discussion and negotiation—between employers and workers. The increase in April 1920 was made in opposition to the workers, who demanded 50s., the employers eventually agreeing with the appointed members to fix 42s. In the latest case, all attempts at agreement failed. The workers' representatives demanded 50s., and would agree

to nothing less; while the farmers' representatives refused to assent to any increase on 42s. The appointed members, as in duty bound, made several suggestions with the view of bringing the sides together, but without success. In the end, the deadlock was overcome by the appointed members bringing forward on their own responsibility a proposal for 46s. 6d., and the representative members, on both sides, abstaining from voting. The appointed members subsequently published a statement, setting out the case as it presented itself to them, in which they said :

'All the increases made this year are based upon, and consequential from, the alteration in the lowest minimum rate for male workers of 21 years and over, which came into force on April 19th after prolonged discussion and deliberation. The employers' representatives then proposed 40s. and the workers' representatives proposed 50s.; and 42s. was eventually accepted by the employers' representatives, the workers' representatives refusing to agree.

'In bringing forward again their proposal for a minimum of 50s., the workers' representatives have contended :

'1. That the previous increase was inadequate.

'2. That even if it were then adequate the subsequent increase in the cost of living makes it now insufficient.

'3. That the statutory duty of the Wages Board is, by the terms of Section 5 (6) of the Corn Production Act, to fix such minimum rates of wages "as will enable a worker to maintain himself and his family in accordance with such standard of comfort as may be reasonable in relation to the nature of his occupation," and that the Board have no right to consider any consequences which may fall on the agricultural industry by the adoption of this principle.

'4. That the rise in the wages of agricultural workers since 1914 has not been in proportion to the rise in the cost of living, and that in any case it is not sufficient merely to place the agricultural worker in the same unsatisfactory economic position as in 1914.

'5. That there is evidence to show that farmers can afford to pay higher wages than those now fixed.

'6. That wages in other occupations, especially those of railway men, have risen much higher than those of agricultural workers, who are more skilled and equally deserving.

'To these contentions the employers' representatives have rejoined :

'1. That the increased cost of living does not press so hardly upon workers in agriculture as in other industries.

'2. That the provisions of the Corn Production Act must be considered as a whole, and that, in fixing minimum wages, the Wages Board must have regard to the effect which such wages will have on the production of food, and the employment of labour.

'3. That the rates fixed by the Board are only minima which must be paid to the least efficient workers, and that higher wages can be, and in many cases are, paid to the more efficient.

'4. That the weekly wages under the Board's Orders must be paid whether the worker can be profitably employed or not; and that in this respect agriculture differs essentially from other industries in which the workers are continuously employed on productive work.

'5. That there is evidence that the present rates of wages are causing land to be laid down to grass and throwing many men out of employment.

'6. That the increase in agricultural wages has been not less than in many other industries.

'7. That any further increase in wages must result in decreased production and higher prices of food.

'The Appointed Members have given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, and they fully realise the serious responsibility which falls upon them. They cannot but view with concern the reduction in the area of land under arable cultivation, and also of the number of men for whom remunerative employment can be found on the land. On the other hand, they cannot admit that the remedy for these evils can be found in the underpayment of the workers in agriculture. If the financial results of farming under the present conditions are insufficient to allow of the payment of adequate wages to the workers, it is the duty of the Government to take such measures as may be necessary to establish the economic position of the cultivators of the soil on a sound basis.

'The Appointed Members are bound to observe further, that if, as has been argued, the Board had to consider nothing in the Act but the terms of Section 5 (6), it would follow that the Board has no responsibility in respect of any workers, except those who are married and have families. They cannot accept this view, and they consider that the Board not only has responsibilities in respect of all workers in Agriculture, male or female, married or single, but that they must also have regard to the effect of their actions upon the interests of the industry as a whole.

'The Appointed Members made every effort to secure an agreement between the employers and workers, and made various suggestions with the view of attaining that object. Neither side, however, was able to make any approach to agreement. The employers were unable to agree to any advance on the present minimum rates, while the workers were equally unwilling to accept less than the advance which they proposed. It fell, therefore, to the Appointed Members to bring forward a compromise, and they submitted to the Board a motion that a proposal should be drafted and sent to the District Wages Committees for consideration, to increase the present minimum wage for male workers of 21 years and over in all areas by 4s. The effect of this, if adopted, would be to raise the present minimum for ordinary workers from 42s. to 46s. in 26 areas and in the remaining 13 areas to a higher figure.'

It was remarked, with perfect truth, that this statement did not explain why the figure of 46s., and no other, was adopted. That the cost of living had risen substantially since the former rate was fixed, was obviously a material factor in convincing the Appointed Members that a further increase was necessary, but it was not claimed that this consideration alone influenced them in their decision. The fact is, that the settlement of a fair and reasonable minimum rate of wages is not a matter of mathematics or logic. If it were, it would be comparatively easy instead of being extraordinarily difficult. It is often argued that some scheme should be adopted whereby agricultural wages should rise or fall automatically with the rise or fall either in the cost of living or in the prices of farm produce. Such schemes appear attractive until they are closely examined. The initial difficulty is to fix a datum line. On the cost of living basis, it is evident that it would be illogical to differentiate between workers on a farm, and other workers living in rural districts but employed in other occupations. The agricultural labourer is entitled to claim as high a standard of comfort as his fellow-workers in other industries; but it is obvious, for many reasons, that he cannot secure it, and that the result of attempting to enforce it would, under present conditions, only result in widespread unemployment. To relate wages to the prices of farm produce has often been

suggested; but an equitable basis would be very difficult to arrive at. Prices rise or fall from causes over which neither farmers nor labourers have any control, and are, in no sense, a measure either of the profits on the one hand or the value of services on the other.

If any sliding scale for the automatic adjustment of agricultural wages were adopted, probably the most equitable basis would be that of the gross output of the farm. It is true that this also is largely determined by causes beyond human control, the weather being still the dominant factor. But, taking one season with another, the efficiency of labour is probably the greatest of sublunary influences on the amount of produce obtained from the land. If it were possible to devise some means whereby the worker would have a pecuniary interest in securing the maximum output from the land on which he works, the advantages are self-evident. It is for this reason that the application of the principle of profit-sharing or co-partnership to farming attracts many of the wiser and more far-sighted occupiers of land. There will be no stability in British Agriculture, and no contentment among the rural population, until the workers on the land feel a direct interest in its production. Agricultural labourers are the largest class of food-producers in the country; but they have no real consciousness of it. When the farmer and the labourer establish co-operative relations, when each, in his degree, has an equal incentive to make the earth yield her increase, then, and not until then, will the labour problem in agriculture approach solution.

R. HENRY REW.

Art. 11.—THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE.

By establishing the Permanent Labour Organisation as a part of the machinery of the League of Nations, the authors of the Peace Treaty of Versailles were acting in accordance with the oft-repeated wishes of the organised international working-class movement. At international congresses and conferences of both Trade Unionists and Socialists the pressing need for an institution of this kind was frequently urged. Far-seeing and progressive employers had also demanded some form of international regulation and co-ordination of labour legislation; and since 1890, when the first international conference on labour legislation was held at Berlin, most of the industrial countries have been sympathetic to the idea. At the Berlin Conference, which was attended by Government representatives from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Norway (then united), and Switzerland, standards were adopted concerning the employment of women and children, work in mines, Sunday labour and factory inspection. But no conventions were then drawn up, nor were any further official conferences held for fifteen years. In the mean time, several unofficial conferences had been organised, and a pseudo-official body, the International Association of Labour Legislation, had been created for the purpose of bringing about the regulation of labour conditions by international agreement. This Association, however, carried on its activities in circumstances of great difficulty. Its office at Basel was chiefly supported by small subsidies from certain interested governments. Its total expenditure did not exceed 80,000 francs a year; while the staff consisted only of a Director with five or six assistants. In spite of its limited resources and powers, the Association, however, did excellent work. It issued a periodical Bulletin on Labour Laws in French and German, and, later, also in English, and published from time to time special reports on subjects, such as the systems of factory inspection in the various countries. But there was no driving force behind the Association. At the Official

Conferences it had no representatives, nor were employers or workmen represented. These gatherings lacked interest, and the officials who attended them showed little zeal for the subjects they were called upon to discuss. The results were disappointing. At the outbreak of the war the position, from the point of view of those who believed in international action for the improvement and general levelling-up of the conditions of labour, was entirely unsatisfactory.*

The new organisation brought into existence by the Peace Treaty is built on more solid foundations, and is furnished with a clear and definite mandate, as well as with the means for carrying it into effect. Part XIII of the Treaty, under which the International Labour Organisation is constituted, contains the preamble:

‘Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice;

‘And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provisions for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical education and other measures;

‘Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;

‘The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the

* ‘The International Labour Organisation: A Comparison,’ published by the International Labour Office, Geneva, gives a short account of the International Association for Labour Legislation and its work.

permanent peace of the world, agree to the following :’ (here follow the articles establishing a permanent organisation for the promotion of the principles set out in the preamble).

In Article 427 of the Treaty the following methods and principles are laid down as being ‘well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations’ and to ‘confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world’ :

‘1. The guiding principle . . . that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

‘2. The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

‘3. The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

‘4. The adoption of an eight hours’ day or a forty-eight hours’ week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.

‘5. The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.

‘6. The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

‘7. The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

‘8. The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

‘9. Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.’

This striking declaration of principles and methods obviously required for its execution the institution of an authoritative international body equipped with ample powers and resources. Hence the Treaty set up a Permanent Labour Organisation as a largely autonomous department of the League of Nations. The details of the Organisation, its constitution, powers, and duties are carefully worked out and set forth in forty-one articles

(387 to 427) of the Treaty.* It is provided that the original members of the League of Nations shall be the original members of the Organisation, and hereafter membership of the League of Nations shall carry with it membership of the Organisation. Germany and Austria, although the former has not yet been admitted to the League, are also members.

The Organisation consists of a General Conference of representatives of the members and an International Labour Office controlled by a Governing Body. Fifty States are now members; the United States and Russia being the only great States remaining outside it. All States, irrespective of size or importance, have equal rights at the Conference. Each is represented by two Government delegates, and one Employers' and one Workers' delegate, who vote individually. The Employers' and Workers' delegates have to be chosen by the Governments of each country in agreement with the industrial organisations which are most representative. In practice, for the Conferences which have been already held, the National Trade Union Organisations have appointed the Workers' representatives, and the National Employers' Organisations the Employers' representatives. The Workers' representative of Great Britain is selected in agreement with the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, the body having the greatest number of affiliated workers' organisations; the British Employers' representative is selected in agreement with the chief associations of the employers. In addition to the delegates, technical advisers may be appointed to assist in the discussions of subjects in which their expert knowledge would be valuable. A session of the General Conference must be held at least once a year.

The General Conference, which may justly be called an 'International Social Parliament,' cannot pass legislation immediately binding on its members. Every country still clings too firmly to its sovereignty to permit of this.

* For a complete statement of the constitution, powers, duties, and standing orders of the Organisation, see 'Permanent Labour Organisation: Constitution and Rules,' International Labour Office, Geneva, 1920. Also 'Labour and the Peace Treaty,' with an introduction by the Rt Hon. G. N. Barnes, issued by the Ministry of Labour, H.M. Stationery Office.

But the Conference discusses and votes Draft Conventions, by which States agree to observe strictly certain regulations, and Recommendations which should be taken as guides in framing and passing national legislation, or in issuing administrative orders relating to the conditions of employment or other matters affecting labour. These may, it is true, vary in different countries, but they have to conform to one and the same principle. The Parliaments of the member-States are not bound to adopt the Conventions agreed to by the General Conference; but if Governments refuse to submit them for their ratification, the States concerned incur the risk of having applied against them the economic penalties provided for in the Treaty (Arts. 409-420). Once the Conventions have been ratified by a State, or the Recommendations become the subject of special legislation, the State is bound to respect them. Any violation may bring the International Labour Office and its Commission of Inquiry and the International Court of Justice into action, armed with powers for enforcing the decisions of the Conference.

The International Labour Office, the secretariat and administrative machine of the Organisation, is under the control of a Governing Body of twenty-four persons, twelve of whom represent the Governments of the member-States. Of the remainder six are elected by the Employers' delegates to the Conference and six by the Workers' delegates. Eight of the persons representing Governments are nominated by the States of chief industrial importance,* and the remaining four are nominated by States selected for the purpose by the Government delegates to the Conference, excluding the delegates of the eight States mentioned above. The period of office of the Governing Body is three years. It meets every three months.

The functions of the International Labour Office include the collection and distribution of information on all questions relating to the international adjustment of industrial conditions of life and labour, and the conduct

* The eight States that rank at present as of chief industrial importance are Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, and Switzerland.

of such special investigations as may be ordered by the Conference. It is entrusted with the duty of seeing that the terms of the Conventions ratified are duly carried out, and it can, by means of commissions, conduct inquiries into any complaint of violations of ratified Conventions, and, if the complaint is found to be justified, it can, through the League of Nations, take measures to bring the defaulting nation to account.

It will be realised at once that the scope of the activities of the Office is wide and entails an enormous amount of detailed work. Contact must be kept not only with the Governments of the member-States, but also with the national and international organisations of employers and workmen. The great problems created by the war are, generally speaking, mainly economic in character, and affect the conditions of the masses in every country. As a result, the workers throughout the world are making demands for modifications of the existing industrial system, demands which the Peace Treaty recognises as in principle well-grounded. In order to meet these demands by sound constructive measures it is necessary to build on a foundation of accurate information regarding every aspect of the social and industrial conditions and problems of, at least, the chief countries of the world; a task of considerable magnitude, requiring the services of a large expert staff.

The International Labour Office has already organised two meetings of the General Conference: one, the inaugural assembly at Washington in October and November 1919; and the other, the Conference at Genoa in June and July 1920. The Conference at Washington met under less than favourable auspices. The League of Nations had not been formally established, and the debates in the Senate on the question of accepting the Peace Treaty, including the League of Nations, had aroused acute political differences in the United States. The foremost advocate of the International Labour Organisation in America, President Wilson, was too unwell to take part in the Conference. In spite of these untoward circumstances, the Conference was successful. It was unfortunate that, owing to the fact that its proceedings were overshadowed by events nearer

home, its significance was hardly recognised in England and Europe. Representatives of forty countries attended. Three important States, however, were not represented. The United States had no official delegates, as the Peace Treaty had not been ratified by the Senate; but the Conference was presided over by Mr W. B. Wilson, the United States Secretary of Labour. Germany and Austria (invited by an almost unanimous vote at the opening of the session) were not able to send delegates in time to take part in the business. The delegations, in normal cases, included representatives of employers and workers as well as of Governments, making in all 143 individual delegates.

In a session lasting one month the Conference discussed and passed six Draft Conventions, some on highly controversial subjects, and six Recommendations. In addition to these, it considered matters relating to the composition and standing orders of the Conference and the like. The Conventions agreed upon dealt with: (1) The application of the principle of the eight hours' day and the forty-eight hours' week. (2) The prevention of, or provision against, unemployment. (3) The employment of women before and after childbirth. (4) The employment of women on night work. (5) The minimum age of employment of children in industry. (6) The employment of young persons on night work. The Recommendations related to: (1) Public Employment Exchanges. (2) Reciprocity of treatment of foreign workers. (3) The prevention of anthrax. (4) The protection of women and children against lead poisoning. (5) The establishment of Government Health Services. (6) The application of the Berne Convention of 1906 on the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

The procedure adopted by the Conference was to appoint Commissions to prepare the Conventions and Recommendations. The discussions on these Commissions, to which technical advisers as well as delegates were elected, were extremely valuable. Points of difference between nations as well as between employers and employed had to be threshed out and drafts arrived at for submission to the plenary meetings of the Conference. 'Conventions were so thoroughly discussed

in the Commissions, and such a degree of agreement was arrived at, that with comparatively few alterations they were adopted by the General Conference.*

In spite of the mass of work accomplished in Washington it was not carried out hastily or superficially. The delegates were animated by good-will and a keen desire to achieve practical results. They threw into their task a remarkable degree of energy and zeal, and overcame with extraordinary success the most difficult obstacle of international assemblies—diversity of language. The business was rendered especially complicated by the necessity of taking into account and making exceptional provisions for the conditions prevailing in backward countries. The constitution of the International Labour Organisation declares that ‘in framing any Recommendation or Draft Convention of general application, the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organisation and other special circumstances, make the industrial conditions substantially different, and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.’ In drawing up Draft Conventions the various Commissions had, therefore, to make special provisions for Japan, India, and other countries where the industrial system and the regulation of the conditions of labour are less highly evolved than in Europe or America. For the eight-hour day question a separate Commission on Special Countries was set up, the Recommendations of which were afterwards embodied in the Draft Convention drawn up by the Commission on the eight-hour day. Japan, which showed its interest in the Conference by sending a delegation numbering, with its technical advisers, secretaries, and interpreters, more than fifty persons, naturally took a conspicuous part in the debates on this subject. A majority of the Conference agreed with the view held by the representatives of the Japanese Government and Employers’ representatives that Japan could not be expected to advance in two years so far as countries which had been developing

* ‘International Labour Conference, 1919. Draft Conventions and Recommendations ; with an Introduction.’ H.M. Stationery Office.

their systems of industrial law for half a century. The decision finally reached represents relatively greater progress for Japan than for almost any other country. The working hours in the Japanese silk industry are to be reduced from the present total of 93 per week to 60, and a 57-hour week is to be introduced in other industries. Young persons under 15 and all underground workers in mines are to be granted the 48-hour week. The Japanese delegates also agreed to the introduction of a weekly rest period of 24 hours—an important point for Japanese workers, who have no customary rest from labour on Sundays.*

The representation of women was a feature of the Conference, and was rendered possible by the institution of technical advisers empowered to act in the place of delegates on occasions when questions in which they are specially competent arise. Thus women technical advisers took part in the Commissions on the Employment of children, Childbirth, and Maternity, and were largely responsible for the preparation of the Conventions on those subjects.†

The results of the Washington Conference, although not fully appreciated by the general public, are rapidly becoming recognised, especially by organised workers, as of paramount importance for the welfare of the working classes of the whole world, those of the Orient as well as those of Europe. The Washington Conventions are known in Labour circles in Great Britain as the 'International Labour Charter.' The report of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, adopted at Portsmouth in 1920, is interesting:

'The Washington Conference was not only unique from the international standpoint, but without parallel; and, as

* As evidence of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to carry out the obligations incurred by members of the Permanent Labour Organisation, it should be mentioned that the Government has established at Geneva an Office with a large staff, whose functions are to keep in close touch with the International Labour Office and to study labour problems in the Western world. As a means of doing so effectively the Japanese Government has appointed the head of this Office as its representative on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office.

† Among the technical advisers from Great Britain at the Washington Conference were Miss Mary MacArthur and Miss Margaret Bondfield, the well-known trade-union leaders, and Miss Constance Smith, Senior Lady-Inspector of Factories.

will be seen from the short statement of the Conference's work appearing in another portion of this Report the results exceeded expectations. It was indeed remarkable that, with representatives of the most backward nations (from an industrial standpoint) brought into consultation for the first time with representatives of the most highly-developed nations, questions affecting the industrial workers of the world should have been discussed with such keenness and with a genuine desire on the part of the former to bring their countries into line industrially with the more advanced and better organised countries. Common agreement was reached on many points, and it now remains for the various Governments to give legislative effect to Recommendations from the Conference.'

The arrangements for the second session of the General Conference were made by the International Labour Office with such expedition that it was possible to hold it at Genoa about six months after the close of the first. The conditions of the work of seafarers was the sole subject of discussion; but it proved so intricate and refractory that it was not possible to come to a definite conclusion on the chief question, of the application of the principle of the eight-hour working day to seamen. The Commission which considered the matter succeeded, after long and vehement debates, in framing a Draft Convention. But this failed by a fraction of a vote to secure the necessary two-thirds majority when it came before the General Conference, and no decision on the subject was reached. Draft Conventions, however, were agreed to on the following questions: (1) The minimum age for admission of children to employment at sea. (2) Unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of the ship. (3) The establishment of facilities for finding employment for seamen.

Recommendations were also passed dealing with:

- (1) Limitation of hours of work in the fishing industry.
- (2) Limitation of hours of work in inland navigation.
- (3) The establishment of national seamen's codes.
- (4) Unemployment insurance for seamen.

Further, a Joint Maritime Commission, consisting of representatives of shipowners and seamen, was elected to consider the drawing up of an international seamen's code and other questions affecting seafarers.

Although the Conference at Genoa did not arrive at a conclusion on the main item on the agenda which it had met to discuss, nevertheless, it demonstrated, by an interesting sequel, the value of the International Labour Office as an instrument for finding solutions to complex industrial problems. Shortly after the close of the Conference the International Seafarers' Federation Congress was held at Brussels. The delegates, disappointed at the negative outcome of the deliberations at Genoa on the eight-hour working day, were naturally in a combative mood, and a resolution was proposed that steps be taken to organise an international seamen's strike to enforce the reduction of the hours of labour in accordance with the seafarers' demands. To this, however, an amendment was carried which provided that, before action was taken, the International Labour Office should be requested to endeavour to bring about a conference of shipowners' and seamen's representatives for the purpose of securing an international agreement on the matter. The International Labour Office responded to this request and entered into negotiations with the International Shipping Federation. That organisation agreed to meet the seamen's representatives; and at a recent sitting of the Joint Maritime Commission at Geneva, it was agreed that a conference should be held at Brussels in January 1921, and that the Director of the International Labour Office should be invited to act as chairman. This Conference will be the first at which employers and workers organised on international lines will have met to discuss labour problems.

The next session of the General Conference will be held in the spring of 1921 at Geneva. The International Labour Office is now actively engaged in preparing the various reports on the subjects to be discussed, which include the regulation of the hours of labour, unemployment, the work of women and children, technical education, living-in conditions, protection against accidents and sickness and provision for old age (all in relation to agricultural labour); the use of white lead in paint; the prevention of anthrax; the weekly rest-day; and certain questions concerning the employment of children at sea.

This full programme includes only a small proportion of the suggestions brought forward at Washington (and those sent to the Office since from various quarters) for consideration at future meetings of the Conference. So great was the number of the subjects proposed that the Washington Conference referred the final selection to the Governing Body. The number and variety of questions brought forward indicate not only the vitality of the Conference, but the vast opportunity confronting the Permanent Labour Organisation.

The question arises as to how far the States which took part in the Washington Conference have tended to ratify the Draft Conventions which were agreed upon. It is one of the foremost functions of the International Labour Office to enter into communication on this subject, through the League of Nations, with the Governments of these States. The latest information in regard to the stages of procedure towards ratification in various countries is as follows :

‘Austria : The application of the Conventions will involve only insignificant changes in the existing law. They will be ratified speedily.

‘Belgium : The Conventions have been signed by the King, and a Bill ratifying them *en bloc* will be introduced in the present Session of Parliament.

‘Chili : Three Bills, which in their main provisions correspond to the Conventions, have been presented to the National Congress. One dealing with hours, however, departs to a material extent from the Washington Convention.

‘Czecho-Slovakia : The adoption of the majority of the Conventions and Recommendations will not call for any important modification of present legislation. It is expected that all necessary measures for the adoption of the Conventions will have been taken before the end of the present year. A Government motion to this effect was submitted to the National Assembly on Sept. 4.

‘France : Bills to ratify five of the Conventions (the exception being that relating to unemployment) have been presented to the Chamber of Deputies. French legislation already contains almost all the provisions of the Washington decisions, but difficulties of procedure have arisen in connexion with the formality of ratification.

‘Germany : The Government have in preparation a Bill to give effect to the Convention concerning hours of work.

They do not yet see clearly the legislative measures which it may be necessary to take in respect of the other Washington decisions; but they intend to submit the Conventions and Recommendations to the Reichstag shortly.

'Great Britain: The Hours of Employment Bill is under revision before being again introduced into the House of Commons. Bills have already been introduced dealing with night work of women and young persons, the age of employment for children, and the employment of women and children in lead processes. The question of the employment of women before and after childbirth is still under consideration by the Ministry of Health. The Conventions and Recommendations concerning unemployment do not necessitate new legislation.

'Greece: Parliament has passed six laws ratifying the Conventions, and a further law embodying one of the Recommendations which related to the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. The Government has sent formal ratification of all the Conventions to the League of Nations.

'India: The Conventions are being examined by the Government, in consultation with the provincial Governments and organisations concerned. No decision has yet been taken.

'Italy: A Bill consisting of a single clause ratifying the six Conventions has been presented by the Government to the Chamber of Deputies.

'Japan: Drafts of Laws for the purpose of carrying out the Conventions have been prepared for the consideration of the Legislative Office of the Cabinet.

'Luxemburg: The Government has pronounced itself in favour of ratifying the Conventions by legislative means.

'Norway: Committees appointed by the Government are examining the Conventions and Recommendations, and if any changes in existing laws are found necessary a Government Bill will be presented to the Storting.

'Poland: The Ministry of Labour is studying the Conventions and Recommendations. It has asked whether the Polish Government could ratify them, subject to reservations in regard to the employment of women before and after childbirth, the employment of women at night, and unemployment. The question has been answered in the negative.

'South Africa: The Government is bringing the Conventions before Parliament with a view to their ratification *en bloc*.

'Spain: The Conventions have been sent to the Institute of Social Reform, which is engaged in preparing the necessary

legislation. As soon as the new Parliament meets Bills ratifying the Conventions will be brought before it.

'Sweden: An Act limiting hours of work, which is in general agreement with the Washington Convention, is already in operation. The Conventions and Recommendations will be examined by Parliament during the next Session which begins in January 1921; it is doubtful whether the Convention concerning the employment of women before and after childbirth will be accepted; but no difficulty is anticipated in regard to the rest.

'Switzerland: The Department of Public Economy is examining the procedure to be followed with regard to ratification. A conference of employers' and workers' organisations has considered the Conventions and Recommendations, except that relating to hours of work, and has approved them, subject to some reservations.

'Venezuela: The Conventions and Recommendations have been submitted to the National Congress of the United States of Venezuela. No decision has yet been reported.' *

Occupation with the ratification of Draft Conventions and preparations for approaching sessions of the General Conference do not, however, by any means exhaust the list of the activities of the International Labour Office. Space will permit only of a brief summary of the more important of the other matters which it has in hand. Investigations, world-wide in extent, are being made into the urgent problem of unemployment, the results of which are to be considered by a special Commission of experts. In the same way reports are being prepared for discussion by a Commission on Emigration, with the object of arriving at an international agreement for the regulation of emigrant traffic and the treatment of working-class emigrants. A special section is concerned with the subject of co-operation. Another branch is making inquiries and preparing reports on insurance against sickness, disablement, old age and accidents, and on widows', orphans', and maternity insurance. A department, created by a decision of the Washington Conference, is engaged upon the question of industrial

* Information relating to the progress in the process of ratification of Draft Conventions by the member-States is given in the Bulletin of the International Labour Office, which is issued at intervals of about one week. This publication also records the activities of the Office.

hygiene, for the purpose of drawing up Draft Conventions and Recommendations to be submitted to future sittings of the General Conference. The Scientific Division, which is responsible for most of the publications of the Office, has already issued a number of studies and reports in English and French which will cover ultimately the following subjects: (a) Industrial relations (the activities of trade unions and employers' associations) and political activity in its relation to questions of labour. (b) Economic relations. (c) Employment and Unemployment. (d) Conditions of Labour. (e) Social Insurance. Disablement caused by the war. (f) Safety in industrial methods. (g) Industrial Hygiene. (h) Conditions of life of the workers. (i) Co-operation. (j) Protection of women and children. (k) Education. (l) Agriculture. (m) Questions affecting seamen. In addition the Division is responsible for the Legislative Series which contains reprints of the texts of laws, decrees, orders, and regulations affecting labour, issued in the different countries of the world. The series, which is published in English, French, and German, constitutes a continuation in a new form of the series published by the old International Labour Office at Basel. This Division is also conducting a special inquiry (requested by an association of steel manufacturers of America) into the three-shift system in the blast furnace industry. A monthly Scientific Review will appear shortly, which will survey the world of industry from an international standpoint. An important investigation is being made into the pressing question of the causes of decline in production and the speediest and most effective methods of removing them. The conditions of labour in Bolshevik Russia claim the attention of another section, and a report on the subject has been issued, to be followed by others, based on authentic material obtained from that country. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed to proceed to Russia; but the Soviet Government refused to allow it to enter. On the other hand, a similar Commission has visited Hungary, and a report on the industrial situation there has been prepared.

This is but a condensed and, in some respects, an incomplete statement of the work of the Permanent
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Labour Organisation during the first year of its existence. It is a record which, one may venture to say, needs no *apologia*. There are critics, by no means unfriendly, who assert that the Office is attempting too much, that it is forcing the pace too quickly. The answer to this is that the Peace Treaty has laid upon the Office imperative duties, and that if it does not attempt to perform its tasks with the utmost speed compatible with thoroughness and soundness, it will not be serving the purpose for which it was instituted, namely, the removal, as rapidly as possible, of the causes of the industrial unrest which is disturbing and disrupting the world. On the other hand, there are critics, often openly hostile, who contend that the methods by which the Organisation is bound to work are too slow, and that nations should be compelled at once to adopt in detail the principles relating to the treatment of labour set out in the Treaty. These critics forget that the means they favour are at variance with democratic ideas. If some nations are tardy in ratifying Conventions, it is in the power of the public opinion of those nations to bring pressure upon their Governments. The energy, good will, and zeal displayed at the meetings of the General Conference, prove that there are great possibilities for the peaceful and orderly settlement of industrial problems by the meeting together of Government, Employers' and Workers' representatives, as permitted by the composite and elastic character of the constitution of the Conference. But corresponding qualities are needed in each nation in order to bring the work of the Conference and the International Labour Office to full fruition.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Part XIII of the Treaty is mainly British in origin. For this reason the belief is justified that the Government and the Employers' and Workers' organisations of Great Britain will render powerful assistance to the International Labour Organisation in its efforts to ensure that the Peace is 'based upon social justice.'

ALBERT THOMAS.

Art. 12.—ENGLISH TRADITIONS IN ART.

The Walpole Society's Publications. Volumes I-VII.

Printed for the Walpole Society: Oxford University Press, 1912-1919.

'THE English,' says Coleridge, 'have a morbid habit of petting and praising foreigners of any sort, to the unjust disparagement of their own worthies.' It is a trait which has been noticed by other writers. When Coleridge said 'worthies,' he was using too general a term; he was probably thinking of artists. It cannot truly be said that in the domain of literature we have been in the habit of preferring foreign talent to English; possibly because we are not adepts in foreign languages. But of native music, as of native painting and sculpture, there has certainly been a kind of distrust, not easily overcome. A continental reputation, even the mere bearing of a foreign name, has often brought easy success in England, while native artists, of equal or superior gift, have languished in the cold. Some may maintain that the disparagement has been just, or that there has been due appreciation when our artists had proved their merit. Yet, to recall a signal instance of quite modern times, we had in Alfred Stevens a great sculptor, a great draughtsman, an artist of a completeness of mastery rarely matched since the Italian Renaissance; and how comparatively small a number of Englishmen, even now, know his work or attach a significance to his name! Slowly, very slowly, he is coming into his due of fame; and the recognition of his genius owes much to the enthusiastic admiration of a Frenchman, Alphonse Legros. The belief that we have no sculpture in England is still deeply rooted. Would any other country, we may well ask, so long neglect its greatest sculptor?

Why do we show so much quicker an appreciation of our men of letters? In literature we can boast of a long and magnificent tradition, starred with renowned names; and we take a just pride in it. That, beyond doubt, is the art in which this country has shown by far the greatest genius and the richest powers. It still remains matter for speculation how far the plastic and pictorial

arts have been depressed by neglect and indifference. For these arts demand the whole time and energy of those who practise them; they cannot be pursued in the leisure of a career devoted to more lucrative activities. Most of our poets would have starved, had they attempted to subsist on poetry alone. Is there an undercurrent of Puritanism, with its suspicion of the sensuous and plastic expression of the desire for beauty, that persists in our race, even though it no longer bursts forth in open hatred? Our streets, our buildings, are witnesses to the public indifference to dignity and comeliness in national self-expression. And then, we cling to our habit of leaving everything to private enterprise; there is no central public authority in matters pertaining to the arts; there is next to no encouragement or support by the State; no effort to express or to guide such public opinion as exists. All is left to accident.

It is not only to living artists that indifference has been shown. We have been very little concerned to do honour to English artists of the past. The great portrait painters of the 18th century, with Turner and a few other masters, have been enthroned, indeed. Auction records have given them just that prestige which impresses the average man. But how large an element of fashion and caprice enters into this! Minute study has been given to the sifting of Italian and Flemish Primitives. But the study of our own masters has remained in the uncritical stage, where every work of merit tends to gravitate to one of a few conspicuous names, and artists of great gift are forgotten. Here surely we may with justice be reproached for a lack of piety which perhaps no other country of Europe has betrayed to such a degree. It was to remedy this lack and to encourage interest in our native art of the past that the Walpole Society came into existence. It was founded in 1911, and has been the means of bringing together the few serious students of the subject. Seven annual volumes have been published. A review of the work which the Society has accomplished during the nine years of its existence will show how extensive and how little laboured the field still is, and how much remains to be done.

The Society names itself, of course, after Horace

Walpole, whose 'Anecdotes of Painting in England' remains the classic work on our subject for the period it covers. As is well known, Walpole's work was founded on the notes and documents collected by George Vertue, the antiquary and engraver. What is less well known is the fact that Vertue's notes, still existing in the British Museum, have never yet been published; and the notes contain a great deal of information, sometimes of much interest, which Walpole neglected to use. It would naturally occur to the members of the Walpole Society that here was a task which it was most fitting that they should undertake. But examination of the note-books proved that to publish them in full would be a costly undertaking, beyond the Society's resources. In the third annual volume Mr A. M. Hind gives a list of the note-books in the British Museum, forty-four in number. A few volumes of the original series are not in the Museum, and can no longer be traced. But it will be readily understood that to publish the Museum collection *in extenso* would absorb an indefinite number of the annual volumes of the Society; and, desirable as the publication is, subscribers would find it indigestible matter for so prolonged a repast.

To Mr Hind's list, Mr Lionel Cust adds some 'proposals' for the publication. He contends that to print a careful transcript would not suffice; it would be difficult to make clear what were Vertue's own actual corrections and additions to the original notes; and he suggests that the best solution would be to publish the notes in photolithography and that a special fund should be raised in the name of the Walpole Society for this purpose. The war has prevented, but we hope only postponed, any such further steps being taken. If this project be realised, it will at last be possible for us to estimate at their due value both the prodigious labour and insatiable research of Vertue and the lucid art of Walpole. The pith of Walpole's book consists of Vertue's collected material. But the writing of the Anecdotes, the translation of this mass of scattered notes into that easy, graceful narrative, is a feat that excites the greater wonder the more one reflects on the difficulties of the task and the rapidity with which it was done. As an instance of Walpole's omissions we may take the

practically unknown Gawen Hamilton (not to be confounded with the later Gavin Hamilton) about whom Mrs Finberg writes in the sixth of the volumes before us. Vertue left many notes upon this artist, but Walpole barely mentions him.

Let us briefly glance over the whole field, and see what the Walpole Society's publications have done to supplement existing knowledge.

The average educated Englishman is persuaded that there was no English school of painting before Hogarth ; and, as to sculpture, it is a received opinion that there never was an English school. Yet all the evidence proves that England in the Middle Ages had her schools of the arts and the crafts, as flourishing and active as in any country of the Continent. Arts like the illumination of manuscripts and the embroidery of vestments and hangings have happily survived in numerous and splendid examples, because such work could be hidden from the ransacking rage of iconoclasts. But the destruction of all the sculpture except the effigies on tombs in the interiors of churches, and the whitewashing of the frescoes on their walls, have left a palpable bareness which seems to accuse our Middle Ages of a poverty of imagination which is far from the reality. Some of the remains of the Westminster School of painting, still existing, and reproduced by the Walpole Society from Mr Tristram's water-colour copies, arouse poignant feelings of regret and loss. Mr Lethaby, than whom no one speaks with more authority, tells us that

'the most brilliant period of English art was the second half of the 13th century, and its chief centre was Westminster, where, under the patronage of Henry III, a great concourse of artists gathered from all parts of Europe to assist in the works which that king was always undertaking at Westminster and at his other palaces.'

Walpole says of that monarch—

'Henry's reign is one of the most ignominious in our annals ; that of Edward the First of the most triumphant. Yet I would ask by which of the two did the nation suffer most? By sums lavished on favourites and buildings, or by sums and blood wasted in unjust wars? . . . Who will own that

he had not rather employ Master William and Edward of Westminster to paint the gestes of the Kings of Antioch, than imitate the son in his barbarities in Wales, and usurpations in Scotland?’

William of Westminster was a monk and ‘the King’s beloved painter.’ Mr Lethaby suggests that he may be the author of ‘the noble wall-painting in St Faith’s Chapel in the Abbey;’ and to Master Walter of Durham he would tentatively ascribe another wonderful work also painted about 1270, namely, the retable now preserved in the Jerusalem Chamber. The Walpole Society has reproduced in colour (Vol. 1), Mr Tristram’s fine copy from one of the panels of the retable, and also his copy from the head of Edward the Confessor, painted on the back of one of the sedilia in the choir of the church. The exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum of a series of the water-colour copies on which Mr Tristram has spent so much skill and patience must have opened the eyes of many. With that severe yet ardent figure of St Faith before them they must have felt that English art in the time of Cimabue was no negligible thing.

Mr Lethaby’s researches disclose the names of many English mediæval painters (though there are few works to which we can attach the names) and yield a number of interesting particulars about the London Guild of Painters. Would that we could discover the painter of the magnificent portrait of Richard II in Westminster Abbey! There are, of course, critics who maintain that this, and the exquisite diptych at Wilton, representing the same king with saints, are foreign work; but there is no evidence that disproves their English origin. These two pictures stand out with a peculiar splendour from the English pictorial traditions of the Middle Ages. For, as Mr Strange says in his article on the Rood Screen at Cawston in Norfolk—again illustrated in colour from copies by Mr Tristram—English mediæval art for the most part, abundant and flourishing as it was, exhibits ‘a high level of craftsmanship, but little individuality.’

The history of early sculpture in this country is fairly parallel with that of the early painting. In both cases, clues and links in the history are lacking, through

the systematic destruction. But far more survives of mediæval figure-sculpture than is usually assumed. Prof. Prior of Cambridge contributed to the Walpole Society's first volume a documented and well-illustrated introduction to the subject. The 13th century was the finest period of English sculpture, of which Wells Cathedral supplies the richest series for study. To the same century belongs an extremely interesting relic of English art—the figured tiles made at Chertsey or in the neighbourhood. Mr Lethaby published in the second volume a number of tiles originally in Chertsey Abbey, illustrating the Romance of Tristram and Iseult—‘remarkable documents which have been curiously neglected.’ These tiles are in all probability the earliest extant illustrations to the Romance; but, apart from this historical interest, the designs are of real beauty, full of vigour as of grace. Such fragments speak eloquently for much that Time has lost us.

The English style of painting influenced the art of Norway and Sweden in the early Middle Ages. In the 15th century, altar-pieces of alabaster, carved in England, were exported to all parts of the Continent, and are still to be found in France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. But probably it was in manuscript illumination that our mediæval painting most excelled. From the fifth century, when Irish monasteries began to produce the marvels of pure design which distinguish the Celtic school, till the early 15th century, there is a scarcely interrupted tradition, varied by the adoption of elements and influences from outside, but fused into a style which passed through different phases yet kept a native character. Through Alcuin of York, and his long labours for Charlemagne, it helped to create the Carolingian school in France. And for part of the 13th and 14th centuries the mature Anglo-Norman school displays an excellence scarcely rivalled on the Continent. This field of art, having rich material for study, has become comparatively familiar ground; but Mr J. A. Herbert's article on the illuminations in a Royal Psalter painted in the transitional style of the beginning of the 13th century, will be none the less welcome to students. With the invention of printing, manuscript illumination received its death-blow. With

the Reformation, mediæval art and its traditions perished. And now, with Holbein, began the dominance of the foreigner in the art of England.

'Every old picture,' says Walpole, 'is not a Holbein.' The phrase sufficiently attests the power of Holbein's name; and we know how many smaller reputations have been absorbed by its splendour. Every portrait of Henry VIII is still popularly attributed to Holbein, though he was dead before the great majority of them were painted. Who were the painters who succeeded him? One of the most notable and prolific masters of the time is a painter whose signature H.E. in monogram form is found on a great number of portraits. Vertue suggested that these portraits were the work of Lucas d'Heere of Ghent, painter and poet, who came to England as a refugee from Spanish persecution in 1568 and remained here till 1576. This old attribution, to which Walpole gave currency, has been accepted ever since. The difficulty is that there are portraits signed with this monogram bearing dates ten or more years earlier than D'Heere's arrival in London. If the painter is not D'Heere, who can he be?

The problem has been solved and many of the painter's works have been described in an essay by Mr Lionel Cust (Walpole Society, Vol. II). The Lumley Inventories which have now been printed in the Society's sixth volume, supply the clue. The artist is now identified beyond all doubt as Haunce (or Hans) Eworth, variously spelt Euwouts, Ewottes, or Heward. He came from Antwerp, of which town he was native, and settled in England about 1543. He was still working here in 1574, at which time he was making designs for Masques for Queen Elizabeth's Office of the Revels. Henceforward Eworth's name must take a conspicuous place in the annals of our early portraiture. He was a master of secondary rank, but of no mean talent. Some of his work seems to have passed hitherto under the name of that masculine delineator, Antonio Moro; and who that has seen it can forget that artist's masterpiece in the Prado, the tragic portrait of Mary Tudor? Eworth also painted that queen. At Woburn is a portrait of her with her husband; she sits in a room with brocaded hangings on the walls and a window opening on the river. Philip stands beside

her; and, with Titian's portrait in one's mind, it is curious to note the puny appearance of the man. Titian had given him in some subtle way a melancholy dignity; Eworth's vision reflects him more literally.

The extensive catalogue of portraits by or attributed to Eworth, which Mr Cust has compiled, forms a very solid contribution to the history of Tudor portraiture. It has already enabled other students to add to the list of the painter's works; as witness the notes contributed by Miss Mary Hervey and Mr Richard Goulding to the Walpole Society's third volume. A similar substantial addition to our knowledge is Mr Cust's catalogue of portraits by Marcus Gheerardts the younger in the same volume. Mr Cust's concluding note of warning 'that some of the earlier portraits may be the work of Gower, and some of the later that of John de Critz or Robert Peake,' indicates that there is still plenty of research-work to be done. But Mr Cust's labours make his successors' easier; they form a landmark for the study of painting in England. The profuse illustrations to these catalogues are invaluable. Were all the old pictures in English country-houses photographed and published (portentous enterprise!), many problems now troubling students would automatically solve themselves. Meanwhile the numerous reproductions given by the Walpole Society are the best possible foundation.

But the 16th-century painter who claims our warmest interest is a true-born Englishman, and, as seems specially to befit an Elizabethan worthy, a man of Devon. Nicholas Hilliard did not compete with the panel-painters of portraits, since he confined himself to miniature. In this art he is the first great English master. Something of the old tradition of the illuminators, who made the vellum pages of manuscripts so rich and comely, seems to revive in Hilliard; he has a singular delicacy, a fine decorative sense, and a love of his materials such as the old monks had. What a refreshment it is, after the rather wooden presentments of Elizabethan men and women so frequent on the walls of old country-houses, to take into one's hands a miniature by Hilliard! It is not only that his portraits are so intimate and alive, so free from pose and pomposity, and the painter's interest

in his sitter so keenly engaged ; it is the sensitive fineness of the man's art. His drawing for the Seal of Queen Elizabeth in the British Museum shows what a firmly modulated line his pen could trace. In the little portrait of a young man leaning against a tree at South Kensington, could anything be more beautiful than the rose-leaves and rose-blossoms on the tall briars that seem to embower this curly-headed youth, and make a pattern light on his dark short cloak, and dark on the white hose that encase the slender elegance of his legs ? Beside Hilliard's art, the Flemings' robust journeyman's work seems of an altogether coarser world. Hilliard betrays a fastidious temperament, a constant choiceness, a love of fine persons and fine manners, a sympathy with aristocratic youth and its passion for distinction. Fundamentally, we find in him an affinity with Gainsborough.

A few of Hilliard's delightful miniatures are reproduced in the Walpole Society's first volume, others are reproduced in the volume which consists of an annotated catalogue of the famous collection of miniatures at Welbeck. But the first volume also contains a very important document for the history of English painting, Hilliard's treatise on the 'Art of Limning,' here published for the first time. It is surprising that no one should have thought of printing this treatise before. It is interesting not only for its account of the technical method pursued by Hilliard, but for its opinions, personal touches, and reminiscences. Hilliard has much to say in praise of Albert Dürer, 'the most exquisite man that ever left us lines to view for true delineation'; but he holds it a defect in his art that he had only German models to draw from, and not the 'faire creatures' that the Italians had seen ; and such 'rare beauties,' he maintains, 'are more commonly found in this isle of England than elsewhere.' Raleigh once posed Hilliard with a problem of portrait painting, and Hilliard showed him how it was possible to draw a tall man and a short man on two tablets of the same size and yet make it plain to the eye that one was short and the other tall. He has some shrewd remarks on light and shadow ; for, allowing that strong light and shade help a picture which is to be seen at a distance, he points out that there is no such necessity for a miniature held in the hand. He is all for what he

calls 'the truth of the line,' for 'line without shadow showeth all to a good judgment, but the shadow without line showeth nothing.' In this preference for a draughtsmanship which suggests modelling by expressive line—so to shadow as if it were not at all shadowed is best, shadowed'—and in his disdain for the easy method of getting relief and roundness by hard, strong shadows, he is at one with Holbein and with the Oriental masters. And he recalls how he discussed this matter with Queen Elizabeth when he first drew her portrait. The Queen agreed with his view, but wanted his reasons, which he gave; and she chose to sit for him 'in the open alley of a goodly garden, where no tree was near.' In short, the 'Art of Limning' (carefully transcribed and edited by Mr Philip Norman) shows Hilliard not only as a thorough craftsman but as a thoughtful student of art who was well acquainted with the work of Continental masters.

Hilliard's treatise is the earliest of a group of similar treatises still extant in manuscript. The most important of these other tracts is the 'Miniatura,' by Edward Norgate, in the Bodleian Library. This was quite recently edited by Mr Martin Hardie for the Clarendon Press. Norgate originally wrote his treatise about 1630, and revised it about 1650. It is delightfully written and full of interesting things, and has lively comments on contemporary European artists, besides elaborate technical instructions. For both Norgate and Hilliard painting was not a profession but a pastime. Perhaps it was not an uncommon accomplishment in Elizabeth's day. John White, the 'Governor' of that 'First Colonie' of Virginia, sent out by Raleigh, which disappeared before it could be firmly settled, was a good draughtsman and painter in water-colour. A book of his drawings, made in Virginia and the West Indies, is in the British Museum, and is of extreme interest from the geographical and ethnographical point of view; it has considerable interest also as art.

Exquisite as is the art of Hilliard, it is a rather isolated flower, a form of painting which has little relation to the other arts. There was no general movement in England, and no single master capable of flooding the old traditions of competent craftsmanship with the

intellectual curiosity and imaginative ardour which had carried the arts to such heights of achievement in Italy. The Renaissance came late to England. Inigo Jones brought grandeur of style into architecture, but his figure-drawing partakes to the full of the mannerisms into which the Italian style had fallen. Yet everything related to this great name is of interest. Jones' designs for masques, at Chatsworth, still await publication.

The Walpole Society has done good service by publishing, with very full illustrations, the Note Book of Nicholas Stone, preserved in the Soane Museum. This forms its latest volume. It has been admirably edited by Mr Walter Spiers, late Curator of the Soane Museum, who died in 1917. Unfortunately, he did not live to see his work published and enjoy the appreciation it has earned. It is a valuable contribution to the history of English sculpture. Stone worked under Inigo Jones for a time. He was a master mason who knew his craft thoroughly, but he was also a sculptor and architect, and his numerous memorial monuments show a remarkable variety and inventiveness of design. The diary of the younger Nicholas Stone on his travels in Italy—a document of lively interest—is printed for the first time as a supplement to this volume.

English painting in the 17th century is overshadowed by Van Dyck and by Lely. There were English painters of distinguished talent, but little has been done to sift their work and make it known. In the Garrick Club, which contains so fascinating a collection of English pictures, often by men whose names are forgotten, there is a remarkable portrait of Nat Lee the dramatist. It is well-known from engravings. This picture is still generally referred to as a work by William Dobson, though that painter was dead before Lee was born. That is an instance of the kind of indifference to any precision and the ready acceptance of casual attributions which we meet with continually. The Walpole Society has published several careful and informing articles on 17th-century portraiture. The group of Lely's English contemporaries who worked mainly in pastel presents a dark problem, on which Mr Bell, of the Ashmolean Museum, and Mr Collins-Baker have now shed some light. Edmund Ashfield and

T. Thrumton are artists to whose names known works can now be attached.

Interesting as these painters are, the one who stands pre-eminent among them is Samuel Cooper, a master who has never received anything like his due of fame from his own countrymen. Had he painted in oils, and on the larger scale—his portraits are miniatures, but there is nothing small about his style—he would doubtless be more famous. There are portraits of women by his hand which are singularly intimate and expressive of subtle personality; beside them, the women of Lely, and many of Van Dyck too, seem superficial. With this insight, he had the delicacy that only real power achieves. There is nothing in Cooper of the later vague, elusive prettiness into which miniature painting decayed; he has precision, but is never dry. This school of portraiture, which from Hilliard descends through the Olivers to Cooper, Flatman, and Hoskins, can show many a small masterpiece. In it the mediæval tradition of the manuscript painters seems to have a sort of survival or revival. The union of firm craftsmanship with a sort of modesty and reserve is characteristic in both.

The 18th century brings us to Hogarth, who for most people counts as the originator of the English school of painting. In the art of this century there is less work for investigators to do, though artists of some interest have been rediscovered in recent years. Some day, perhaps, the Walpole Society may devote attention to the 18th-century book-illustrators, who have passed into an obscurity not entirely deserved.

The beginnings of landscape art in England provide again a field in which discoveries may still be made. It is curious that England should have been so late in producing her school of landscape, afterwards so vigorous and distinguished. In the recently published 'Miniatura' of Norgate, already mentioned, we find directions for painting landscape; and though an art 'so new in England,' he writes of it as having got much credit and being 'much in request.' One cannot help thinking that even in the 17th century there was more painting of landscape than has hitherto been supposed, passing now under foreign names, or destroyed, or

lurking forgotten in country-houses. If, however, there was anything like a school of landscape painters in *gouache* at this period, it cannot have had much strength or character. Such landscape art as there was probably depended on Flemish example. The decorative landscapes by R. Robinson, published by Mr Tristram in the third Walpole volume, are curious as showing a passing influence from Chinese compositions on 17th-century art. These are panels which once decorated a house in Botolph Lane, and have happily been preserved with the room they adorned. But it is not till the 18th century that landscape art becomes serious achievement. Mr Bell contributes informing notes on some of our early masters in water-colour, bringing one or two hitherto unknown personalities to light, and correcting, from newly discovered material, received accounts. The fully illustrated articles on Turner's sketch-books by Mr A. J. Finberg also form valuable documents. All this is the kind of work which, when the subject was minor Italians of the 15th century, has been pursued by English students with solemn enthusiasm; but why should not the art of their own country receive some of their attention?

Compared with France, or with the Netherlands, England can show no persistent and commanding tradition in the arts. In the Middle Ages England was not behind the countries of the Continent; at certain times, and in certain arts, she led. The Black Death came, a destroying blight; the Hundred Years' War, the War of the Roses, unsettled life, diverted money and wasted blood, treasure, energy at once. Puritanism both obliterated all it could of the once-cherished art of the past, and frowned down beauty in its own experience of life. The Renaissance came late to these islands, too late and tired and weakened to breathe fervour and force into the English arts. Traditions had been too effectually broken. The embers were cold. The imagination of the race flowed into literature. We see a man like Blake, who, born in the later Middle Ages, with a heritage of sound craftsmanship, might have shone for later time with a glory of rare achievement generating masterpieces in his successors—we see him reaching out from the prison of his own age to the half-discerned Gothic grandeur, striving to bridge over that

immense and lamentable gap, and to recover the tradition's broken thread. Rossetti and his group, for whom Blake in his turn was a prophet, make another splendid effort to take up the interrupted story and bring back imagination to the arts of their country. But it is always a difficult fight; strife absorbs energy that should flow into creation. For this is the disabling circumstance: the arts have been divorced from the imaginative life. It is not that gift has been lacking. Any one who studies English painting in the 19th century must be struck by the abundance of fine talent—sensitive eye and dexterous hand—put to the service of an almost inconceivable triviality. The imaginative life of the century is scarcely hinted at; it is as if it did not exist. We must accuse the patron more than the artist.

Broken, obscured, beset by fatality and all kinds of untimeliness, the English tradition in the arts has been. But the capacity for expression in the arts has never died out. To recall and revive works of beauty made by our countrymen; to make known what fine traditions have been interrupted and neglected; to correct the prevalent ignorance and incredulity; this is the honourable task which the Walpole Society has undertaken. It is relevant also to the art of our own time. For the artist by instinct looks both before and after; he needs the support of previous achievement in working for the future, and he needs the faith of his countrymen in the national genius.

LAURENCE BINYON.

CORRIGENDUM.

In the number for October 1920 (No. 465), p. 365, line 4, for 'Russian' read 'Rumanian.'

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
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
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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 467.—APRIL, 1921.

Art. 1.—THE SAVING GRACE.

1. *The Life of Admiral Mahan.* By C. C. Taylor. Murray, 1920.
2. *The Victory at Sea.* By Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims. Murray, 1921.

‘God worketh all things here amongst us mediately by a secondary means, the which means of our defence and safety being shipping, and sea forces, are to be esteemed as his guifts and then only availeable and beneficiall, when he withall vouchsafeth his grace to use them aright.’—RALEIGH.

THE German Fleet, provided with everything which science and ingenuity could suggest, created for one purpose only, and superior, as Lord Jellicoe has pointed out, in many material respects to other Fleets, lacked the one thing needful; and, in consequence, lies for the most part in a dishonoured grave, as the price of its disobedience to the unchanging laws which are committed to the charge of seamen of all nations. Germany’s rulers had learned, from Admiral Mahan, the Influence of Sea Power upon history; but what they had not learned was the Influence of the Sea Spirit upon the use of Sea Power. And so the day inevitably arrived when she literally fulfilled Mahan’s prediction that her future upon the sea would end in a sail to English ports to surrender.

A great deal has been said and written about what has been termed Lord Jellicoe’s failure to achieve victory in a decisive Fleet action; and so ingrained in the human mind is the idea that the triumph of one force

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over another is the only satisfactory end, especially to a naval engagement, that the real lesson of the ultimate surrender and subsequent fate of the German Fleet has been overlooked. And yet it seems obvious enough, unless we are prepared to deny that 'God worketh all things here amongst us mediately by a secondary means.' Had the German Fleet been destroyed at Jutland, the victory would have been largely that of force over force; and, as such, nothing very new or startling. The surrender of that Fleet, however, was something far more significant; it was the visible manifestation of the triumph of the human or spiritual element over the material, and in consequence perhaps the greatest victory in history, the triumph of Right over Might.

When the nation offered up its thanks for the victory of the Right, it is to be supposed that it recognised, even in modern days, that those who fought to uphold the Right were directed by the Power to which its thanks were offered. Otherwise the thanks were meaningless or worse.

Lord Jellicoe acted, as he always would do, in accordance with what he believed to be the best for his country and regardless of any personal considerations whatsoever. As a result, his failure to achieve the end which seemed most satisfactory to human intelligence, alone rendered possible a far greater victory, and one of such deep significance that no one, except Mahan, ever dreamed of it. This is a very old story in human affairs. But there seems to be a lesson in it which eclipses any to be found in even the greatest of Nelson's victories. For it is precisely the neglect of any consideration of those spiritual forces that have been the real secret of our Sea Power, which constitutes our gravest peril at the present time.

For their recognition might in turn lead to a reconsideration of the world's problems from the only standpoint which can promise any lasting results. Great Britain would, no doubt, be extremely hard pressed to find the means to enter upon a new naval competition, by whatever name it be called; but her pause at the present time is, I believe, based upon an instinctive disinclination to demand 'guifts,' solely for the purpose of their exhibition as the strongest Fleet in the world. One writer has complained that the Jutland battle has left

us little in the way of guidance as to our future naval construction. If this be so, it seems that herein lies one of the principal lessons of the late war at sea, and one which, it may be, we are, albeit unconsciously, taking to heart.

Two facts appear to stand out from the past years of war. With the obvious peril to civilisation, naval construction took a definite form, and the ships were built, in the main, with the clear knowledge of the nature of their opponents and the principal and determining theatre of operations. The peril, in fact, was revealed, and the sea spirit or instinct was guided in providing the means by which the most obvious danger might be met. In the absence of any definite threat, or theatre of operations, since Japan and the U.S.A. are ruled out by common consent, there is also an absence of guidance as to the means of defence, which has resulted in the widely divergent views that have been expressed on the subject.

It is true that many auxiliaries and accessories were not provided; but this only emphasises the second fact. Soon after the outbreak of war, just because the waiting battle fleets dominated the position in seeming inactivity, it became necessary for the enemy to adopt methods for which we were totally unprepared, as he did on land and as will always happen, to surprise us in fact. Neglecting, however, to use those methods aright, he simply invoked in his opponents a double portion of those spiritual forces latent in a naturally maritime nation, forces of whose powers he has never had the smallest conception.

And mark what followed. Firstly, the inspired merchant seamen went about their business with renewed determination; and, secondly, there was called into active service that power of improvisation which is our greatest national asset in emergency, especially amongst our seamen. This was, no doubt, quite natural; but that is what 'secondary means' invariably are.

We habitually hold ourselves up to scorn for our seemingly chaotic methods of preparation, a national quality which might verily reassure those who accuse us of evil intent. With the necessary money and powers, it is possible, of course, to organise a whole nation until it becomes a war machine of remarkable mechanical efficiency, as the ruins of more than one dead nation

testify. It requires, however, a people with a soul to 'muddle through.' In any case, a little reflexion and facing of facts will show us that any final solution of the question of future construction of ships for the sole purpose of destroying one another is quite impossible. Any other solution will only intensify the ultimate ruin. Such a ship, from the moment her design is sealed, and to whatever type or class, generally speaking, she belongs, becomes from her very nature and mission in life the object upon which the designers of every possible opponent, as well as her own, concentrate their attention with the express purpose of finding means to compass her destruction. This is the designer's recognised, remunerative, and curious business. Until comparatively recently a new ship, built by a foreign power, produced in somewhat leisurely fashion a more or less adequate answer, and there the matter rested awhile. Their respective officers, indeed, frequently compared notes with considerable friendliness.

Germany, however, with a new and special object in view, and Mahan's works by no means completely digested, introduced a novel and intense form of competition on a scale hitherto unknown ; which, as Admiral Fiske truly remarks, must have been amazing to the man who was so largely responsible for it. Heedless of the largely artificial nature of these efforts, there seems some danger of the nations perpetuating this form of national enterprise for no ostensible object ; while freely admitting that the next great war, which, if unchecked, it is quite certain to provoke, will wreck civilisation for good and all.

Further, among the many lessons which competition should have taught those at least who participated in it, is this. Whatever be the beginnings of any particular type of ship, she will, and indeed must, inevitably grow in size and cost, in proportion to the growth and numbers of the enemies which her peculiar offensive qualities automatically create. Ultimately, in some cases, where her powers for defence or counter-attack can no longer be self-contained, she will demand attendant satellites to supplement them, and the whole will require increasing facilities for their upkeep and the possible healing of their complicated wounds.

The only criticism of a ship which I have never heard questioned, is that she is a compromise. That is to say, no ship has ever been endowed with the speed, armament, protection, range of action, etc., which the particular specialist concerned admitted to be in accordance with his ideals. It follows that there are sufficient joints in her harness to offer targets enough to provide for the efforts of the most prolific inventor.

To-day, with the impetus gathered in the late war, I have been told that there have been more new inventions since its termination than there were during its course. Thus it comes about that the effective life of a ship is being continually shortened. The Dreadnought, responsible for much, was built in 1906; but had been far surpassed by 1914.

Her first illustrious ancestor, of 1573, rendered stout service to her country for seventy-two years; and at the age of fifteen helped to save her country from a danger, in some respects even greater than that from which we have recently been delivered. It is of interest to note that she came into being in obedience to the same law as her most recent namesake, and was, too, something of a new departure, as King Philip was informed. She was one of the 'guifts' bestowed upon the country by 'secondary means,' when the danger looming ahead was abundantly revealed in the Massacre of St Bartholomew. The whole fleet in which she served, in 1588, could probably have been expeditiously disposed of by a few of our most venerable cruisers, at no risk whatever to themselves. The deliverance, however, was as great; while the odds against victory seemed considerably greater. It will be seen then, though this appears to be by no means generally recognised, that the crux of the problem is relative strengths. Who shall be materially greatest? A little thought should convince us that the solution of our difficulties lies in a different realm.

The existence of such a realm will be admitted, I think, by those even who do not consider its exploration practical; and it will be seen, in view of the pace at which things may conceivably move, that material strength will ultimately depend upon who has the most money to spend. And if from this is deduced the idea that Sea Power, the greatest instrument for good or evil

that exists, as Mahan has shown, and all that it means to mankind, is simply a question of the wealth necessary to obtain it, we arrive at a conclusion entirely opposed to the truth contained in the lines quoted at the head of this article. Power so derived, actually for its own sake, will be neither available nor beneficial; for it is debarred from any claim to the grace to use it aright, the grace which has been vouchsafed to us in the sea-spirit through all our long history, and which will be, and has been, vouchsafed to the seamen of all nations in proportion to their needs, be their fleets large or small.

'In accordance with the best traditions of the Service' is the customary description of the real secret of Sea Power; but it is a secret very rarely discussed, and still less emphasised, in Naval Histories of the usual type. Mahan, however, puts the matter in a nutshell when he refers to sailors as 'a strange race apart, neither themselves nor their calling ever understood.' Occasionally, even somewhat apologetically, naval historians lapse into quotation of incidents which point to the prevalence and continuity of a spirit upon which the whole of Sea Power depends, as a matter extraneous to the consideration of questions of strategy and operations which it is their province to analyse, but without which neither of these would be possible. The sea spirit was once defined to me by a civilian gifted with insight and imagination as 'almost a religion.' Indeed, I often think it first woke to consciousness at a time when the freedom of the seas and the freedom of our faith were so interwoven in the minds of those who were destined to defend them, that it is often impossible to distinguish between the two as the guiding motives.

The first definite record of the spirit occurs in the diary of one who was present when the doctrine was actually enunciated, and its abiding fruit is the universal brotherhood or fellowship of seamen. There was no sign of it that morning in 1578; nothing, indeed, but the most deadly discord. The little ship concerned was the pioneer of the English into the new world, when the success of the venture and all that it has meant and still may mean to mankind, hung in the balance.

That the dissension had been deliberately fostered to bar the grim gates through which she must pass, only

made it the more difficult to cope with. And at the crisis, without recourse to any material forces, a man alone changed the course of history.

‘Our general made divers speeches to the whole company,’ we read, ‘persuading us to love, unity, and regard of our voyage, and for the better confirmation thereof, willed every man the next Sunday following to prepare himself to receive the communion as Christian brethren and friends ought to do, which was done, in very reverend sort; and so with good contentment every man went about his business.’

And so the gates of the new world were not forced as Magellan had forced them; but unlocked, and Drake and his men in the ‘Golden Hind’ passed through. Truly, almost a religion.

Let us search for a few moments in the by-ways of our sea-story and we shall find traces and evidence of the workings of the sea-spirit which has been vouchsafed for the guidance of those who use the seas, that under its influence they might use their ‘guifts’ aright. Much we shall find that seems hostile; but where the spirit has been greatest, so also have been the accomplishments, and by no means always in battle.

Here, then, is an example, taken at random. The four days’ fight of 1666 is over, and Samuel Pepys has attended the funeral of Sir Christopher Myngs, who fell, on the last day, on board the ‘Victory.’ Mortally wounded in the throat, he had remained on deck, holding the wound with his hand, that he might inspire his men to the last. The famous diarist, after noting the absence of any of ‘quality’ at the funeral, proceeds:

‘There happened this extraordinary case, one of the most romantique that ever I heard in my life and could not have believed but that I did see it, which was this: about a dozen able lusty proper men come to the coach side with tears in their eyes, and one of them that spoke for the rest begun and says to Sir W. Coventry; We are here a dozen of us that have long known and loved and served our dead Commander, Sir Christopher Myngs, and have now done the last office of laying him in the ground. We would be glad we had any other to offer after him and in revenge of him. All we have is our lives; if you will please to get His Royal Highness to give us a fire-ship among us all, here is a dozen of us,

out of which choose you one to be Commander and the rest of us, whoever he is, will serve him and if possible do that which shall show our memory to our dead Commander.'

As we pass on, a remark of Sir George Rooke's has more in it than many eloquent sermons. His lawyer had commented on the unexpectedly small amount of money he was disposing of in his will. 'Not much,' said Sir George; 'but what I have was honestly gotten and never cost a sailor a tear.'

Later again, and this instance is so well known that it is only necessary to mention the name of the 'Centurion.' Sailing with every conceivable disadvantage and handicap, with her crew mostly sick and maimed, she achieved an imperishable renown through the spirit which her captain infused into his men. Through plague, pestilence, tempest, and disaster, moves the figure of George Anson, in turn captain, nurse, doctor, carpenter, and general comforter; the embodiment of that spirit of fellowship in service which brought his ship home crowned with honour and glory.

Traceable directly to that which one of his officers, among many, had learned and handed on, is the story of Admiral Duncan, pupil of Keppel, and the crew of the 'Venerable' in the face of an apparently impossible task. And here the spirit shines very brightly, as it penetrates the gloom of the clouds which had gathered and burst in the mutiny at the Nore. Even the 'Venerable' had not altogether escaped the prevailing epidemic, which had left her with only the 'Adamant' in company to blockade the whole Dutch Fleet in the Texel. A week after the symptoms had appeared on board, Duncan addressed his men; no great writer, the draft of his speech has come to us on the backs of envelopes and odd scraps of paper, and its tenour may be gathered from its conclusion: 'God bless you all, and may He always have us under His gracious protection and make us better men.' Note all that is implied in 'us.'

The reply which he evoked is too long to quote in full; but the following extracts will show the atmosphere created:

'Most honoured and worthy Sir—Not having the gift of speech of accosting you in a proper manner, we the ship's

company of the "Venerable" humbly implore your honour's pardon with hearts full of gratitude and tears in our eyes for the offence we have given to the worthyest of Commanders, who has proved a father to us, and as such we shall always honour you. Should it be your honour's orders to go to sea, and should it be our fortune to fall in with the enemy we flatter ourselves that there is not one man on board the "Venerable" but what would lose the last drop of his blood in his body before they should obtain any victory over us. . . . We, therefore, pray and put our trust in the Almighty God that it may be instilled in our minds the dangerous snares we have so lately escaped from, which we are too conscious is unbecoming the character of a Christian in whose belief we are taught, we have every reason to return you hearty thanks for bringing to our memory the indiscreet behaviour of our conduct which was not becoming the character of British seamen.'

So the tradition held, and held so firmly, that the two ships waited alone, by faith, the coming of the whole Dutch Fleet, where the soundings were such that the Admiral's flag, as Adam Duncan said, 'would continue to fly above the shoal water after the ship and company had disappeared.' Almost a religion. And in due course, as they awaited that which did not fall, the spirit woke again, and one by one the Fleet returned in time for the 'Venerable' to lead them, in quite unorthodox fashion, to the victory of Camperdown.

Yet once more, and this in the presence of no human foe; but face to face with the daily perils of their calling.

On Christmas Day 1789, the 'Guardian,' twelve days out from the Cape of Good Hope, collided with an iceberg. In a sinking condition, and apparently with only a few hours of life left to her, three boats put off to take their chance, and Captain Riou sat down on the slanting deck to write a last letter to the Admiralty that they might know the traditions had held.

'Sir,—If ever any part of the officers or crew of the "Guardian" should ever survive to get home, I have only to say that their conduct after the fatal stroke against an island of ice was admirable and wonderful in everything that related to their duties, considered either as private men or His Majesty's servants.'

With a handful of men he remained behind, and at the end of February they drifted into Table Bay and were rescued as the 'Guardian' sank. Captain Riou lived long enough to take the 'Amazon' into action at Copenhagen, and as he unwillingly withdrew in answer to the signal, fell, with the words on his lips, 'What will Nelson think of us?'

Finally, let me quote the testimony of one of our late enemies, who in five words expressed his acknowledgment of the sea-spirit for the encouragement of his own men. When the 'Gneisenau' was nearing her end, her captain addressed a farewell message to his men, for, he said, he was not coming with them. Bidding them use every possible effort to keep themselves afloat, and, to that end to keep up their courage, he concluded, 'The English will save you.'

In all these stories, the underlying motive is always the same; namely, the extinction of any individual interest for the good of ship or shipmate. It follows that, in such cases there remains room for the entry of the grace by which the 'secondary means' may be made 'available and beneficial.'

Nothing is more characteristic of the British seaman, with whom I am best acquainted, than his instinctive tendency to direct his labours solely to the good of his ship. Similarly the ship, as a whole, full of her own individuality as all good ships are, again looks ahead to the honour of her squadron; while in front of the squadron always lies the good of the service.

The whole atmosphere in every 'happy ship,' as the great majority of our ships are, is simply that of fellowship in service; and so in truth becomes almost a religion. It is this characteristic, the peculiar brotherhood of the sea, which, unless it be deliberately impeded by those who are in complete ignorance of its influence as a living force, or for worse reasons, might, through the secondary means of the strange race apart, be used for the unlimited benefit of mankind as perhaps was intended.

The testimony of Lord Beatty, Lord Wemyss, Admiral Sims, and many more, as to the gradual and natural fusion of the Fleets of the United States and Great Britain in the late war, gains striking emphasis in the

recent reception accorded to Sir Lewis Bayley in America by the U.S. Navy. The nature of the sea compliments paid to him and the atmosphere created thereby, cannot be translated into the language of the land; but it would be well for statesmen to make some attempt to understand what forces were at work. This was no official ceremony for the representative of a friendly power; Admiral Bayley was travelling as a private citizen, and the greeting was unexpected. It was, in fact, deep calling to deep, the Spirit of the Sea calling clearly above the turmoil of press and politician. Not to a British Admiral, though his flag was flown with the Stars and Stripes, but to 'Uncle Lewis.'

Few people probably will recollect an incident which occurred over thirty years ago when another message of good will went forth, under conditions sufficiently dramatic to need no emphasis. It is worth recalling. In 1889, before the post-Jutland-super-Dreadnought had cast her shadow across the gates of the New World, and the business of the Seven Seas none the less went forward with great efficiency, albeit largely under sail, Her Majesty's corvette 'Calliope,' 2770 tons, lay at Apia, Samoa, with three American and three German ships of much the same type, in company.

There they were visited by a hurricane of extraordinary violence. Six of the seven went on shore, four being reported as total losses the next morning. The 'Calliope' damaged by two of them as they dragged, slipped her cable and gathering way inch by inch, at long last successfully steamed into the safety of the open seas at a speed of one knot. And while yet her fate hung in the balance, there came a call which cannot but have eased the strain and strengthened the faith of those who were making the desperate attempt, as they realised whence and why it came. For the cheers which sped the 'Calliope' on her way were led by the American Admiral Kimberly and came from the doomed 'Trenton,' flagship of the United States.

Mahan realised the influence of the saving grace. Great Britain, he says, in the beginning of this century when she was the solitary power of the seas, saved herself and powerfully modified for the better the course of history.

In another place, however, he has put a truth which, if it were taken to heart as fully as his explanations of Sea Power have been, would undoubtedly change the course of history still more for the better.

‘To Great Britain and the United States,’ he wrote, ‘if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human progress, is entrusted a maritime interest in the broadest sense of the word.’

The Influence of the Sea Spirit on the use of Sea Power, is a work for another Mahan, and it will be even more worth study, if possible, than what he gave us. His countrymen may claim, with some justice, to continue his work and place it on the pages of history, as a tribute to his memory. Perhaps Sir Lewis Bayley’s reception is the first chapter.

May I conclude with another story, almost a parable? I have already spoken of the manner in which Drake faced the crisis of his life. If there is any lesson for us in that, there is surely as much to be learned in the tragedy of his death; and if it should have a warning in it, I am quite certain he would not have had it otherwise. For it seems to me that, in those last weeks of his life, we are permitted to see a different man from ‘Our General’ of the ‘Golden Hind.’ Then, the inspiration was fellowship and faith, leading to the new world. At the last, there is no note of fellowship, and the faith seems dim; and it is with positive relief, for it reveals a stranger, that I always read one of the saddest sentences in history: ‘Our General carried neither mirth nor joy in his face.’

Force had bred the counterforces that baffled him as it always will, and we read of him, still admitting no defeat, lying under the lee of Escudo de Veragua in the ‘Defiance,’ held by the warning west wind as he struggled in vain to go westwards. And on his lips a cry that has been the undoing of mankind from time immemorial: ‘We must have gold.’

Then the deadly sickness gripped him, and crying at last that he would take the wind as God sent it, he bid his men weigh. And the west wind took him to within sight of the peak from which he had seen the New World, and there, ‘He yielded up his spirit like a Christian quietly to his Creator.’

'God worketh all things here amongst us mediately by a secondary means, the which means of our defence and safety being shipping, and sea forces, are to be esteemed as his gifts and then only available and beneficiall, when he withall vouchsafeth his grace to use them aright.'

Nations which seriously propose to compete with one another in the construction of ships of war, simply for the purpose of having the strongest fleet, can have no excuse for mistaking the nature of the disservice they will inevitably render to mankind in the process, including those smaller nations which must be involved either directly or indirectly, and are powerless to interfere. Extenuation may be pleaded for a variety of reasons; but, in neglecting Raleigh's warning, the day will assuredly come when there will be nothing left for the originators to do, as they contemplate the universal ruins, except to speculate on the exact nature of the forces they heedlessly arrayed against themselves, as Germany, no doubt, is doing now.

What secondary means will be employed it is not possible to suggest, but the downfall will certainly come. The momentum gathered by material forces, though created for a legitimate object, is no doubt difficult to check. But unless it is checked, these forces, their original purpose forgotten, become, from their very nature and threat, the roots of that suspicion which will ultimately and certainly carry them beyond control.

When the free nations declared war for freedom they pledged themselves to any sacrifice in its cause, without reservation. Had they been asked whether the sacrifice would include certain doctrines of the old world, whether by land or sea, as the price of their deliverance, there would have been but one answer. The threat to civilisation to-day is not one that can be met by either battleship or submarine, but only by an international fellowship of service, in which each may strive legitimately to be first.

For the greatest enemy to mankind, and one which it will need the united energies of the maritime nations to defeat—for only in unity may they hope that grace will be vouchsafed to them—is the Mystery of Iniquity which is striving to hold them asunder.

RONALD A. HOPWOOD.

Art. 2.—THE WHITE MAN AND HIS RIVALS.

1. *National Life and Character*. By C. H. Pearson. Macmillan, 1893.
2. *Europe and Asia*. By M. Townsend. Constable, 1901.
3. *The Passing of the Great Race*. By Madison Grant. Scribners, 1919.
4. *The Rising Tide of Colour*. By L. Stoddard. Chapman & Hall, 1920.
5. *Children of the Slaves*. By Stephen Graham. Macmillan, 1920.
6. *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. By O. Spengler. Vol. I. Beck : Munich, 1920.

THE projecting peninsula of Asia which the ancients called Europe * covers, with its adjacent islands, less than two million square miles; an area about the same as that of India, and about half that of Canada. The homeland of the white man, if we exclude Russia, might be dropped into Australia or Brazil without anywhere coming near the coast. And yet it is no accident that Europe has taken the lead in civilisation. It is the only continent which has no deserts; and its Mediterranean shores are perhaps the most favoured region of the whole planet. Its population consists, as we are now taught, of three distinct races, each with its own characteristics. The shores of the Mediterranean belong to a dark, long-headed race which probably had its original home in North Africa, formerly connected with Europe by more than one land bridge. This race not only occupied the northern coasts of the Mediterranean, but pushed up the warm Atlantic sea-board as far as Scotland. The Mediterranean man is intolerant of severe cold, and has not maintained his ascendancy in mountainous districts. The race is not peculiar to Europe, since much of the Indian population belongs to a kindred stock, as do the Berbers of North Africa and the Semitic peoples. The round-headed element in the population of Europe, which has been not very happily called Alpine, came from Asia, and drove a wedge across the centre of the continent, forming at the present day a large part of the population

* Russia is excluded, as being geographically part of the Asiatic mass.

in France and Germany, and the main part of the Slavonic nations. The third factor, the Nordic race, is now believed to be genuinely European, being indigenous around the Baltic Sea. From this centre it flooded the greater part of Europe in successive waves of invasion. Its well-known characteristics are tall stature, light-coloured hair and eyes, and a roving disposition. Being a good fighter, though pugnacious rather than warlike, the Nordic man has been a great conqueror, and has formed the aristocracy of many countries inhabited mainly by the other European races. Being a heavy eater and drinker, he is what the Americans call a high standard man, and cannot or will not compete by the side of other races in manual labour. This habit, rather than his inability to live in a hot climate, has led to his disappearance in several countries where he conquered but did not expel the inhabitants. His high standard of living and pride of race are gradually extinguishing him in North America; and in England, while the Nordic man flourishes in the country districts and as a seafarer, he is apparently at a disadvantage under the conditions of industrial labour in the towns, where a smaller and darker type of men is already prevalent, and is becoming more so in each generation. The industrial revolution has greatly diminished the preponderance of pure Nordic blood in this country. Our frequent wars, in which the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons and Danes are usually the first to volunteer and the first to be killed, have weakened them still further. Writers like Madison Grant, who are influenced by the cult of racialism now popular on the Continent, even speak of 'The Passing of the Great Race' as a doom to which the Nordics must resign themselves. Of the remaining two races, the pure Alpine seems to be decidedly inferior to the Mediterranean in intelligence and energy; but a large admixture of Alpine blood flows in the veins of some of the most powerful nations. The vigour of the Germans is indeed a refutation of their favourite theory that the Nordic race is intrinsically superior to all others; for they themselves are not, like the Scandinavians, pure Nordics. The Germans are a mixture of Nordic and Alpine man; the British of Nordic and Mediterranean. In Great Britain the round-headed man, who was once among us

and constructed the round barrows which indicate his presence, has practically vanished. His physical characteristics are rarely found in these islands.

If we look at a map of the world as it was at the end of the Middle Ages, about 1480, we shall be startled to find how small a part of it was fully included in the European system. European culture reigned in France, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Bohemia, and the greater part of Spain, from which, however, the Moors had not yet been expelled. Russia was still a barbarous country; South-Eastern Europe had fallen, or was soon to fall, under the yoke of the Grand Turk; Scotland, Ireland, Scandinavia, and Poland were still on the outskirts of civilisation, and partially detached from the European system.

For a thousand years before the beginning of the modern period Europe had been on the defensive against Asia. Three times civilisation had been in imminent danger of being submerged by a torrent of Asiatic invaders. The first irruption of Mongols, in the fifth century, reached France, and nearly overthrew Roman civilisation at Chalons. The Arabs, within a few decades after their emergence from the desert, struck down the East Roman Empire, exterminated the Nordic Vandals in Africa, conquered Spain, invaded France, and even after they had begun to decline, drove the chivalry of Europe out of Palestine. The third period of nomadic aggression set the Tartar on the thrones of India and China, which he retained till within living memory, kept Russia in thralldom for two hundred years, obliterated the East Roman Empire, and as late as the 17th century threatened Vienna. The destruction of civilisation in all its most ancient seats has been the work of the Mongol. It is not true to say that he overthrew only decadent and feeble empires.

Such was the state of the unending duel between West and East, in the years before the great age of discovery. On the whole, the East had been the successful aggressor. The West had only once turned the tables on a large scale, in the time of Alexander the Great, who took advantage of a great temporary superiority in military science to conquer the home-lands of the Asiatic beyond the borders of India. The Roman Empire was

only a device to protect the Mediterranean enclave, so insecurely guarded by mountain and river on the north, so open to nomadic raiders in Hungary and Syria. The Mediterranean peoples, except the Jews who were themselves Asiatics, accepted the heavy hand of Rome and did not often rebel; they knew the alternative too well.

The turning-points of world-history have generally been military discoveries. The unknown genius who found out that copper could be hardened into a serviceable weapon by the admixture of a small percentage of tin probably revolutionised Europe in prehistoric times. The Altaic shepherd on his horse shattered civilisation over the greater part of the Old World. The invention of gunpowder curbed his aggression, and for the first time gave civilisation a decisive superiority over barbarism in warfare. But the turn of the tide which has now brought nearly the whole world under the political control of the European races began with two feats of naval enterprise. In 1492 Columbus, while seeking a western route to the East Indies, landed on one of the Bahama Islands; and two years later Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and crossed the Indian Ocean to Calicut. The blockade of Europe by the Moslem was broken, and the Atlantic period of history, which to the future historian will be as distinct an epoch as the Mediterranean period, began. Almost simultaneously with these discoveries, the Moors were finally driven from Spain; the tide of Moslem conquest had begun to ebb from its western high-water mark. In 1519-1521 the most wonderful of all voyages brought the crew of Magelhaës to the Philippines from Patagonia. From that time the white man has been at home on every ocean.

The ascendancy of the white man may be dated from these discoveries; but the full effect of them was not felt till the 19th century. By an amazing piece of good fortune, which can never be repeated in the history of the world, however many millennia remain during which it will be inhabited by our species, the white man, newly emancipated by the Renaissance and ready for new adventures, found a vast continent across the Atlantic, only sparsely peopled by a feeble race with no effective weapons, waiting for his occupation. He was able to

populate a great part of this enormous area with his own stock; till a second stroke of luck opened to him, in the nick of time, the only other large territories suitable for white colonisation, in Australasia. Thus two new continents, with an area of about 17½ million square miles, were added to the domains of the European.

It was not, however, till the industrial revolution in the reign of George III that the overwhelming predominance of the European declared itself. That momentous transformation of the whole economic structure of European society produced an unexampled increase, both in wealth and numbers. The population of Europe, which in 1801, after the rapid growth had begun, was only 150 millions, was about 450 millions in 1914, besides 110 million white men in America and the British colonies. Wealth in England increased about tenfold between the two great wars, a striking comment on Wellington's forecast in 1832: 'Few people will be sanguine enough to imagine that we shall ever again be as prosperous as we have been.' After 1870, the progress of Germany was even more rapid than our own. In North America material expansion was on a yet more portentous scale. The three million colonists who revolted against Great Britain in the reign of George III, are now represented by a nation of 110 millions, of whom a very large majority are of white descent. More recently, Canada and the Argentine Republic have entered on the path of rapid growth.

This expansion of the Western Europeans by no means exhausts the tale of aggression. The Russians brought under their dominion, and began to colonise, the vast expanse of Northern Asia as far as the Pacific; and practically the whole of Africa, which covers 11 million square miles, was staked out by rival white races for present or future exploitation. At the beginning of the Great War, out of the 53 million square miles which (excluding the Polar regions) constitute the land surface of the globe, only six million square miles were not under white government. The exceptions to universal white domination were China, Japan, Tibet, Siam, Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia, Abyssinia, Liberia, and Hayti. As the result of the Great War, Turkey, Persia, and Hayti may almost be

subtracted from the list. No important coloured governments remain, except in China and Japan.

It is no wonder that till a few years ago it was assumed as probable that the remaining Asiatic Empires would follow the same path as India, and fall under one or other of the European powers. Mr Meredith Townsend, writing in 1901, says, 'So grand is the prize [of Asiatic trade] that failures will not daunt the Europeans, still less alter their conviction. If these movements follow historic lines, they will recur for a time upon a constantly ascending scale, each repulse eliciting a greater effort, until at last Asia, like Africa, is partitioned, that is, each section is left at the disposal of some white people. If Europe can avoid internal war, or war with a much aggrandised America, she will by A.D. 2000 be mistress in Asia, and at liberty, as her people think, to enjoy.'

But in 1901 the tide had really begun to turn, and Mr Townsend himself was one of the first to sound the warning. The culmination of white ascendancy may almost be fixed at the date of the second Jubilee of Queen Victoria, when the spectators of that magnificent pageant could observe the contrast between the splendid physique of the coloured troops in the procession and the stunted and unhealthy appearance of the crowds who lined the streets. The shock came in 1904, when Russia, who with the help of France and Germany had robbed Japan of the fruits of her victory over China, extended covetous hands over Manchuria and threatened Korea. The military prestige of Russia at that time stood very high, and Europe was startled when an Asiatic people, poor and relatively small in numbers, threw down the gauntlet to the Colossus of the North. Kuroki's victory on the Yalu, though due to the blunder of a subordinate general, will perhaps rank as one of the turning-points of history. It was followed by a series of successes, both by land and sea, which amazed Europe, and sent waves of excitement and hope through the entire continent of Asia. A Frenchman has described the arrival of the first batch of tall Russian prisoners at a Japanese port. The white men present consisted of French, Germans, English, and Americans; but at the sight of Europeans in the custody of Asiatics they forgot

their rivalries; a feeling of horror went through them all, and they huddled together as if they realised that something uncanny was happening which threatened them all alike. There was in reality nothing mysterious in the Japanese victories. A few European officers had seen their army before the war, and a distinguished Anglo-Indian had reported that they were 'quite as good as Gurkhas.' Russia was honeycombed with disaffection and corruption, and was never able to bring her whole force to bear in the Manchurian battle-fields. But the decisive factor was the German training of the Japanese army, which had learnt all that the best instructors could teach, with wonderful thoroughness and ability. This was the momentous lesson of the war. An Asiatic army, with equally good weapons and training, is a match for the same number of Europeans; and there is no part of European military or naval science which the Asiatic cannot readily master. In these facts an observer might well recognise the fate of white ascendancy in Asia.

Mr Stoddard, in his remarkable book on 'The Rising Tide of Colour,' has collected evidence of the effect of this campaign upon the Japanese themselves. A temper of arrogant and aggressive imperialism has grown up among them. The semi-official Japanese Colonial Journal declared in the autumn of 1914: 'To protect Chinese territory Japan is ready to fight no matter what nation. Not only will Japan try to erase the ambitions of Russia and Germany; it will also do its best to prevent England and the United States from touching the Chinese cake.' The Great War seems to have raised their ambitions still higher. Count Okuma, in the summer of 1919, recommends an alliance with Russia, as soon as the Bolsheviks have been suppressed.

'Then, by marching westward to the Balkans, to Germany, to France, to Italy, the greater part of the world may be brought under our sway.'

Another plan is to arm and drill the Chinese.

'We have now China. China is our steed! Far shall we ride upon her! So our 50 millions becomes 500 millions; so our hundreds of millions of gold grow into billions. . . . How our strength has grown and still grows! In 1895 we conquered

China; Russia, Germany, and France stole the booty from us. In ten years we punished Russia and took back our own; in twenty we were quits with Germany; with France there is no need for haste. She knows that her Oriental possessions are ours for the taking. As for America, that fatuous booby with much money and sentiment but no cohesion and no brains of government, were she alone we should not need our China steed. America is an immense melon, ripe for the cutting. North America will support a thousand million people; they shall be Japanese with their slaves.'

So wrote a Japanese imperialist in 1916. Such rodomontades have some importance as symptoms of a new spirit, but otherwise need not be taken seriously. More interesting is the growing consciousness of Pan-Asiatic sympathy, which finds vent in the cry, 'Asia for the Asiatics,' and in proposals to establish a Monroe doctrine for the East. The revolution in China in 1911 was probably the beginning of a new awakening in that vast empire. In speaking of Chinese stagnation we have often forgotten the paralysing effect of the Tartar domination, which has only lately been thrown off. And the new China, in spite of its hatred of Japan, is dreaming of a Pan-Mongolian alliance. An Indo-Japanese association has existed for some years; its object is certainly not to maintain the British Raj. 'Let us go to India, where the people are looking for our help!' exclaims Count Okuma in 1907.

Many Anglo-Indian writers, and among them Mr Townsend, have commented on the extreme slenderness of the threads by which we hold India. 'Above this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, protecting all, taxing all, rises what we call the Empire, a corporation of less than 1500 men, who protect themselves by finding pay for a minute white garrison of 65,000 men, one-fifth of the Roman legions. There is nothing else. To support the official world and its garrison there is, except Indian opinion, absolutely nothing. If the brown men struck for a week, the Empire would collapse like a house of cards, and every European would be a starving prisoner in his own house. He could not move or feed himself or get water. The Empire hangs in the air, supported by nothing but the minute white garrison and the unproved assumption that the people of India

desire it to exist.' This is forcibly put; but till lately we might have answered that behind that small garrison lies the whole power of the British Empire, which could and would be used to put down rebellion. The natives, however, know that though this used to be true, it is now very doubtful whether the masses in this country would not sympathise with the rebels and paralyse the efforts of the Government. It is not surprising that the growth of nationalism in India seems to many to portend the approaching end of our rule.

Another symptom to which some of our alarmists attach great importance is the Moslem revival. Islam is a great civilising influence in Africa, and is spreading rapidly among the negroes of the interior. It is also true that a very bitter feeling has been aroused among educated Moslems, in every country where they live, by the destruction of the Mohammedan kingdoms and governments. At the present time there is not a single Moslem ruler who is really independent of Europe. The downfall of that proud and conquering faith has been, from the political point of view, almost complete. This humiliation, we are told, may lead to a great militant revival. The Moslems may put themselves at the head of the Pan-Asiatic movement. They may convert Hindus, Chinamen, Japanese, and fill them with martial ardour for a Holy War against Europe. This prediction does not seem to be very probable. There is not much danger to Europe from the African blacks. In Arabia the swarming period has passed. The Moslems in India have given our armies less trouble than other fighting races of the peninsula. And it is most unlikely that either China or Japan will adopt the Mohammedan creed.

To the present writer it seems that the danger to the white races will come only from the yellows and the browns, not from the blacks or the reds, and that this danger is not at present of a military character. No doubt it may become a military danger in the future, if the whites persist in excluding the yellow and the brown races by violence from half-empty territories in which they desire to settle. If the white man is determined to throw his sword into the scales of peaceful competition, his rivals will be compelled at last to vindicate their

rights by war. But at present the brown man will not take up arms except to obtain self-government for himself in his home, and this he is likely to obtain from Great Britain without fighting. The Japanese, in spite of a few fanatical expansionists, have no wish to try conclusions with Europe or America on the field of battle, so long as they are allowed to extend their influence on the continent of Asia. A mass-levy of Chinese for aggressive war is not to be thought of; they have none of the habits of Mongolian raiders, and, unlike the Japanese, they do not wish to be soldiers. The yellow peril, so far as it exists, is the peril of economic competition.

Until the European broke into the isolation of Asia, the life of its crowded population was self-contained and self-supporting to an extent of which the West has no experience. 'A fairly contented Indian peasant or artisan,' says Mr Townsend, 'usually seems to Western eyes to possess no comforts at all. His hut contains nothing on which a British pawnbroker would advance three shillings. The owner's clothing may be worth five shillings if he has a winter garment, and his wife's perhaps ten shillings more. The children wear nothing at all. The man never sees or thinks about meat of any kind. He never dreams of buying alcohol in any shape. The food of the household costs about six shillings a month. He could fly into the jungle with his whole possessions, his farm or hut of course excepted, at five minutes' notice. This method of life extends from the bottom of society up through the whole body of the poorer peasantry and artisans.' 'But for the Europeans, they would import nothing whatever.' And yet these people are not all poor. Silver in India disappears as if it fell through into a hidden reservoir. The man in a loin-cloth has usually his hoard, often a very large one, and the Indian 'poor' possess a mass of jewels. It is not poverty, but thrift like that of the miser in a comedy, that keeps the standard of comfort in India at the lowest possible level. And the result is a social freedom and absence of care which the Hindu not unreasonably values above all the paraphernalia of European culture. In China the standard of living is rather higher, and in Japan higher still; but even in Japan the working

class lives almost incredibly cheaply, and, apart from the disturbances caused by Western interference, society is in a state of stable equilibrium. It is needless to say that in skilled craftsmanship the Asiatic is as good as the European.

The introduction of Western industrialism into these countries has had the effect of increasing the population, of creating a class of native capitalists, some of whom, like the merchants of Singapore and the mill-owners of Osaka, are immensely rich. It has also brought the East into direct economic competition with the West. The Japanese, in their haste to make money, have tolerated a system of labour in their factories no better than that of England a hundred years ago, and discontent is already manifest among the wage-earners; but it is certain that the ratio of wages to output all over the East gives native manufacturers an enormous advantage over the European and American, and that this advantage is not likely to grow much less.

All who have had the opportunity of observing the Asiatic at work seem to agree that economically he is greatly superior to the European. Many years ago Mr Kipling, after a day or two at Canton, records the horror which overpowered him at the deadly efficiency of the Chinese. 'Soon there will be no more white men, but only yellow men with black hearts'—the 'black hearts' were perhaps the result of witnessing a Chinese execution. Mr Stoddard explains the cause of this efficiency in graphic language: 'Winnowed by ages of grim elimination in a land populated to the uttermost limits of subsistence, the Chinese race is selected as no other for survival under the fiercest conditions of economic stress. At home the average Chinese lives his whole life literally within a hand's breadth of starvation. Accordingly, when removed to the easier environment of other lands, the Chinaman brings with him a working capacity which simply appals his competitors.' That urbane Celestial, Doctor Wu-Ting-Fang, well says of his own people:

'Experience proves that the Chinese as all-round labourers can easily out-distance all competitors. They are industrious, intelligent, and orderly. They can work under conditions that would kill a man of less hardy race; in heat that would kill a salamander, or in cold that would please a polar bear,

sustaining their energies through long hours of unremitting toil with only a few bowls of rice.'

Professor Pearson bears the same testimony.

'Flexible as Jews, they can thrive on the mountain plateaux of Tibet and under the sun of Singapore; more versatile even than Jews, they are excellent labourers, and not without merit as soldiers and sailors; while they have a capacity for trade which no other nation of the East possesses. They do not need even the accident of a man of genius to develop their magnificent future.'

Lafcadio Hearn speaks of them as

'a people of hundreds of millions disciplined for thousands of years to the most untiring industry and the most self-denying thrift, under conditions which would mean worse than death for our working masses—a people, in short, quite content to strive to the uttermost in exchange for the simple privilege of life.'

An American, Mr Clarence Poe, writes in 1911 :

'We must face in ever-increasing degree the rivalry of awakening peoples who are strong with the strength which comes from poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to master and apply all our secrets in the coming world-struggle for industrial supremacy and for racial readjustment.'

Finally, to quote Mr Stoddard again :

'When the enormous outward thrust of coloured population-pressure bursts into a white land, it cannot let live, but automatically crushes the white man out—first the white labourer, then the white merchant, lastly the white aristocrat, until every vestige of white has gone from that land for ever. . . . Nowhere, absolutely nowhere, can white labour compete on equal terms with coloured immigrant labour.'

These warnings of the grim struggle which awaits the white races are confirmed by several concrete examples. In Hawaii the immigrants have been mainly Japanese, who are less formidable than the Chinese, as is shown by the fact that Japan has lately been compelled to pass laws for the exclusion of Chinese labour. Yet in those islands the Hawaiian fisherman and the American mechanic and shopkeeper have alike been pushed out of

employment. The Polynesian aborigines are withering away; the Americans are encysted as a small and dwindling aristocracy. In 1917, 5000 Japanese were born, and only 295 Americans. In Mauritius a century ago one-third of the population were whites, mostly French. 'To-day the fabled land of Paul and Virginia is becoming a bit of Hindustan, with a Chinese fringe.' Natal, which has recently passed an Exclusion Act, is 'a country of white landlords and supervisors controlling a horde of Asiatics. The working-class white population has to go.'*

These testimonies, which might easily be multiplied, and which are not contradicted, are sufficient to prove that under a régime of peace, free trade, and unrestricted migration the coloured races would outwork, underlive, and eventually exterminate the whites. The importance of this fact cannot be exaggerated. The result of the European, American, and Australian labour movement has been to produce a type of working-man who has no survival value, and who but for protection in its extremest form, the prohibition of immigration, would soon be swept out of existence. And this protection rests entirely on armed force; in the last resort, on war. It is useless to turn away from the facts, however unwelcome they may be to our socialists and pacifists. The abolition of war, and the establishment of a League to secure justice and equality of treatment for all nations, would seal the doom of the white labourer, such as he has made himself. There was a time when we went to war to compel the Chinese to trade with us, and when we ruined a flourishing Indian trade by the competition of Lancashire cotton. That was the period which it is the fashion to decry as a period of ruthless greed and exploitation. The working-man has brought that period to an end. To-day he is dreaming of fresh rewards, doles, and privileges which are to make the white countries a paradise for his class. And all the time he is living on sufferance, behind an artificial dyke of ironclads and bayonets, on the other side of which is a mass of far more efficient labour, which would swallow him up in a generation if the barriers were removed.

The American books from which quotations have

* Neame, 'Oriental Labour in South Africa.'

been made are written with the object of urging a policy of absolute exclusion. This is the remedy, and the only remedy, which finds favour in the United States, in British Columbia, in Australia, and in South Africa. There is probably no question on which the people of those countries are so nearly unanimous. 'The White Australia doctrine,' says one Australian writer, 'is based on the necessity for choosing between national existence and suicide.' Another says, 'Australians of all classes and political affiliations regard the [exclusion] policy much as Americans regard the Constitution.' 'Take down the barriers on the Pacific Coast, and there would be ten million Hindus in Canada in ten years.' A Californian echoes this Canadian protest: 'The multitudes of Asia are awake after their long sleep, as the multitudes of Europe were when our present flood of immigration began. We know what would happen on the Asiatic side, by what did happen on the European side. Against Asiatic immigration we could not survive.' And so a policy, which is rather time-discredited than time-honoured, is to be adopted, to preserve the white man in his half-empty Garden of Eden. As the Babylonians built the so-called Median Wall to keep out the roving nomads from the North, as the Chinese built their wonderful Great Wall to keep out the Tartars, as the Romans carried a line of fortifications from Newcastle to the Solway, so the white man is to erect a permanent barrier to exclude the Asiatic. All the under-populated countries are in the hands of the whites, and the overflow of China, Japan, and India is never to be allowed to reach them.

Is it likely that this policy will be successful? To begin with, it has all the well-known drawbacks of a protective system. In the protected countries the cost of living is forced up, and the consumer is deprived of the advantage which he might have gained from competition, in all trades where the home labourer can determine prices. Under this system the cost of labour has become so high that much of the wealth in the protected countries remains undeveloped. In the State of New York, and in other parts of the Union, the visitor is surprised to see many derelict farms. The explanation is that the cost of labour is so great that it pays to

cultivate only the best land. Further west, magnificent crops of fruit rot on the trees ; there is no one to pick them. The slow growth of Australia and New Zealand is the result of the absence of cheap labour. In our own country an impasse has plainly been reached. Unemployment is increasing, and must increase much further. No houses can be built for rents which the occupants could pay. The high cost of coal impoverishes the population and cripples all industries. The Government has no remedy except to endow the unemployed out of the taxes and to build houses out of the rates ; though it must be clear even to the least intelligent member of the least intelligent House of Commons that has ever sat that every five pounds so spent drives another workman out of employment for a week. Quite apart from Asiatic competition, our social order is on the verge of bankruptcy. By a well-known law of nature, a nation shielded from healthy competition becomes more and more inefficient, and less able to stand against its rivals when the protecting barriers fail.

As the conditions in the white countries become more and more unfavourable to enterprise, we may be sure that both capital and business ability will be transferred to the economically strong countries. Asia will be industrialised ; India and China and Japan will be full of factories, equipped with all the latest improvements, and under skilled management, which at first will be frequently white. Wealth will be so abundant in Asia that the Governments will be able without difficulty to maintain fleets and armies large enough to protect their own interests, and to exact reparation for any transgressions of international law by the whites. Only a wealthy country can be powerful by sea ; and a nation which has lost most of its foreign trade will not think it worth while to bid for naval supremacy. The policy of exclusion will, therefore, be powerless to prevent those races which possess economic superiority from increasing in wealth and then in military power.

The suicidal war which devastated the world of the white man for four years will probably be found to have produced its chief results, not in altering the balance of power in Europe, but in precipitating certain changes which were coming about slowly during the peace. The

period which these changes would naturally have occupied was shortened by perhaps fifty years. The first of these is the change in the relation of wages to output, which has been suddenly and enormously altered to the detriment of the manufacturer and the consumer, as the result of the war. The white workman can now live only under sheltered and privileged conditions. In England he is living on the remains of the old wealth of the country, which, as we are beginning to discover, has been almost entirely destroyed under the present Government. The second change is the transference of political and financial supremacy from Europe to the United States, a change which was no doubt bound to occur within half a century, since America has a decisive advantage in her geographical position, equally adapted for the Pacific and the Atlantic trade. The present writer, when he was at Berlin two or three years before the war, had a conversation with a leading German publicist, and endeavoured to impress upon him that in the event of a European war, the American would inevitably be the *tertius gaudens*. The argument, though absolutely sound, as the event has proved, was not very well received. Europe has thrown away her last half-century of primacy. The third change is that to which this article is directed. The peril from the coloured races, which before the war loomed in the distance, is now of immediate urgency. The white peoples, exhausted and crippled by debt, will be less than ever able to compete with Asia.

The policy of exclusion, however, must be considered as it affects the white nations separately, for the problem is not the same all over the world. In North America it is probable that the immigration of Chinese, Japanese, and Indians may be successfully resisted. Employers of labour may complain with good reason that they are unable to develop their businesses; but the labour vote will be far too strong for them. The Americans are beginning to realise that their promiscuous hospitality to immigrants, even from Europe, has fatally impaired the racial integrity of their nation, and has been accompanied by a great reduction in the birth-rate of the old Americans of Anglo-Saxon and Dutch stock. Only in

the South, where the blacks are kept in a semi-servile condition, are the white families still large. The new policy, it is plain, will be one of 'America for the Americans'; Europeans as well as Asiatics will find the land of freedom hard to enter. But Central and South America are not likely to remain barred to the yellow race. The Latin Americans have very little colour prejudice; and there is a far-away kinship between the Mongols and the so-called red men, which makes racial admixture between them by no means repugnant. Central and South America are potentially very rich; and the greater part of the continent is too hot for Europeans, but not for Chinese. The Germans in South Brazil have lost their vigour; like our countrymen in South Africa, they sit under a tree and hire a coloured man to work for them. But the Chinaman can work in worse climates than that of South Brazil.

The Australians, as we have already seen from their own writings, are fully aware that for them exclusion of the Asiatic is a matter of life and death. But will five million white men be able to guard an empty continent nearly as large as the United States? They could count on no foreign help, except possibly from America; for the mother-country is far too much exhausted to wage another great war in this century. They might save themselves by rescinding all trade union regulations, and offering homes on easy terms to competent workmen and their families from all parts of Europe. The resources of the country would then be rapidly developed, and the population might in thirty years be numerous enough to keep the invader out. But no policy of this kind is to be expected. The Australian working-man will vote for keeping his prize to himself, till the dykes burst and that splendid country falls to a hardier and thriftier race. As for the other great islands near South-East Asia, it is almost certain that they will become Chinese. It is also probable that this race will spread over Central Asia, where there are said to be large tracts of fairly good land still nearly empty.

In South Africa the danger is more from the Kaffir than from the East Indian or Chinaman. The Bantus are a fine race, and it has yet to be proved that they are incapable of civilisation. The African has at all times

and in all places, except in our West Indies, met with abominable treatment. Everything has been done to degrade him and ruin his character. Mr Stephen Graham's book about 'The Children of the Slaves' in the Southern States of the American Union makes an Englishman's blood boil. It is not easy to forget the horrible photograph of a negro burnt alive by a crowd of white savages. Even in South Africa the Kaffir has much to complain of; and the evidence of those who know the country is that the relations between the two races are growing worse instead of better. The future of that Dominion is problematical; but it does not seem likely that it will ever be a white man's country like Canada or New Zealand.

For us at home the problem is different. We are not threatened by coloured immigration, and we have nothing to fear from the armies and fleets of Asia. But we depend for our very existence on our foreign trade—that is to say, on being able to offer our manufactures to other nations at a price which they are willing to accept. In return for these manufactures we import the food on which we live. If we can no longer sell them, we shall get no food, and we shall starve. This is a childishly simple proposition, but a large section of our politicians and social reformers choose to ignore it. A double movement, combining decrease in production with increase in its cost, has been progressing rapidly, and many seem to view it with complacency. Its effects would have shown themselves earlier but for the disorganisation of industrial life on the Continent. The crash of our factitious prosperity has now begun; the war-fortunes are melting away like snow.

The criticism may be made that these arguments prove too much. If the cheaper races must always outwork and underlive the more expensive, why have China and India remained poor; and what is the use of warning us against a fate which we cannot possibly escape, since we cannot lower our standard to that of the Chinese or the Hindu? The answer to the former objection is not difficult. Agricultural Asia is overpopulated and can only just feed itself. The low standard of living has increased the population to the

margin at which existence is just possible. Industry on the European system of mass-production is still in its infancy in Asia; where it exists, it is very profitable. It is said that at the present time Japan, which till lately was a very poor country, contains as many millionaires, in proportion to its population, as the United States. The second objection—that if our premisses are true, no efforts on our part can avert the ruin of the white races, is not altogether sound. The industrialisation of Asia will undoubtedly give rise to the same labour difficulties which cripple our home industries. The wages of the Indian and Chinese operative will rise. They will certainly not rise sufficiently to prevent Asiatic merchants from capturing all our markets if we go on as we are doing; but the case of British trade is not yet quite hopeless. A great increase of production, and a cessation of strikes, with a Government pledged to peace, free trade, and drastic retrenchment, would restore confidence and give the country a chance of returning to sound business principles. We still have some advantages, including our coal, and a geographical position which, though no longer the best, is a good one. But the country must learn that our industry must henceforth be conducted under unprivileged conditions. The relation of wages to output must be approximately that which prevails in the world at large. Moreover, as our period of expansion is probably over, we cannot provide for a larger population than we have at present. The birth-rate must match the death-rate, as it does in France. It is probable indeed that we shall not be able to employ or to feed the whole 48 millions who now inhabit these islands. A gradual reduction in our numbers, by emigration or by birth-control, might save much misery.

Behind the problem of our own future rises the great question whether any nation which aims at being a working-man's paradise can long survive. Civilisation hitherto has always been based on great inequality. It has been the culture of a limited class, which has given its character to the national life, but has not attempted to raise the whole people to the same level. Some civilisations have decayed because the privileged class, obeying a law which seems to be almost invariable,

have died out, and the masses have been unable to perpetuate a culture which they never shared. Civilisation, therefore, based on inequality, has always been insecure; and there are other reasons why the ideal of equality, or at least of equal opportunity, is attractive to many. But a universal high standard of living seems to be impossible in an industrial community. It has been suggested that what Aristotle called inanimate instruments (as distinguished from the animate instruments—the slaves) may take the place of the poorly paid labourer. In other words, we may all be comfortable when we have machines to work for us. But it must be remembered that machines displace hand-labour; so that the proposed improvements would reduce the number of men and women for whom employment could be found. Further, the extended use of machinery means in practice that every worker is himself turned into a cog in a machine. His working life consists of repeating, thousands of times a day, some simple movement, like turning a screw. The human organism is not adapted to this kind of work; it is hateful and injurious. All joy in labour, all the pleasure of creation, all art and ingenuity, are killed by such excessive mechanisation. Machinery will no doubt perform many unpleasant tasks for us, as it does already; but it will not enable the whole population to live in comfortable villas, and to eat as much expensive food as they desire. Least of all will this be possible in our densely populated island, for reasons which have already been stated.

The present writer has urged these considerations before, of course with the object of demonstrating the ruinously unsound economics of the Labour movement, and of pleading with his countrymen to return to saner counsels while yet there is time. He pictured a possible reversion to the conditions which prevailed in England before the industrial revolution—a reversion which would involve the disappearance of our great towns, the death of their inhabitants, the repudiation of our debts, and the end of our position as a Great Power. He was rather taken aback when a few extremists said in effect: 'Your arguments are perfectly sound; that is the revolution which we wish to bring out. We shall be happier and healthier as a small agricultural people.' I had not

expected that any one would choose that horn of my dilemma. These extremists can hardly have pictured to themselves the dreadful misery of a starving nation and a dying social order; and it is incredible that half our population should acquiesce in such a fate, in order that the survivors might enjoy an idyllic existence in the next century. It is conceivable that such a fate may be in store for us; but if so, every patriot and every humane man would wish to spread the shrinkage over as long a period as possible, so that prudence rather than famine might effect the necessary reduction in numbers.

Lastly, have we any right to assume that the supremacy of the Asiatic would be a retrograde step in the history of the world? The Americans do assume it as unquestionable; but they seldom condescend to give their reasons. There is no physical or intellectual inferiority in the yellow races—that is certain; and the moral inferiority of the Asiatic consists chiefly in a callousness about bearing and inflicting suffering, which the Orientals themselves admit. An Indian pundit said to Mr Townsend, 'The substantial difference between the English and us is not intellectual at all. We are the brighter, if anything; but you have pity (*doya*), and we have it not.' An English officer told me that he once stood over the mangled body of a Chinaman who had met with a violent death. Noticing, as he thought, some sign of compassion on the stolid face of the dead man's companion, he said, 'This is a sad sight.' 'Yes,' said the Celestial: 'he owed me ten cents'! But there are other virtues in which the Oriental is our superior; the Japanese, especially, have achieved the boast of Pericles, that the Athenians are lovers of beauty combined with plain living, better than any other modern people. It is the plain living which sticks in the throat of the American; but it need not stick in ours. Probably the Eastern races will force upon us a general simplification of life, which will give us a social freedom to which we have long been strangers. A Russian—one of the survivors of the *intelligentsia* who have escaped from the Terror—has lately suggested that the psychological cause of the war is that people were 'stifling under the burden of civilisation,' compelled to make, to buy, and to consume countless unnecessary articles which

were 'of use neither to him who made them nor to him who sold them, nor even to him who bought them.' To simplify life by abolishing irrational and unnecessary expenditure would increase our health and happiness, and would perhaps enable us to hold our own against the races of the East, who in truth have as much to teach us as they have learnt from us. A gradual assimilation in the modes of life of all civilised countries is to be expected. There will be no more hermit kingdoms. The Asiatic will have more wants; the European and American must be content with fewer. The chief danger to the white man arises from his arrogant contempt for other races, a contempt which in America is mixed with fear and hatred, and which has provoked fear and hatred in return. Europeans have recently enjoyed an unfair advantage over their rivals, which they have abused without the slightest regard for justice and fair play. This advantage will not be theirs in the future: they will have to compete on equal terms with nations schooled by adversity and winnowed by the hard struggle for existence. Victory will go to the races which are best equipped for that kind of competition; and it may well be that a modified caste system, such as prevails in India and prevailed till lately in Europe, may prove to have a greater survival value than either democracy, which pulverises society into individuals and collects them again into mobs, or socialism, which in its present form desires to keep the whole population as nearly as possible on the same level. An English poet has given his opinion that fifty years of Europe are better than a cycle of Cathay. But the future may show that the European is a good sprinter and a bad stayer. It is better to be a hare than a tortoise; but it is better to be a live tortoise than a dead hare.

W. R. INGE.

Art. 3.—ENGLISH AGRICULTURAL WORKERS.

1. *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer.* By Dr W. Hasbach. Translated by Ruth Kenyon. Second impression. P. S. King, 1920.
2. *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832.* By J. L. and Barbara Hammond. New edition. Longmans, 1920.
3. *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer, 1870–1920.* By F. E. Green. P. S. King, 1920.

AGRICULTURE has troubles peculiar to itself. But its greatest difficulty is one that it shares with other industries. It is labour. Yet it would be fatal to think that the agricultural problem is, in this respect, identical with the industrial problem, or to attempt to apply to both exactly the same solutions. The cultivation of the soil is the oldest of our industries, and those who pursue it as their ancestral calling have, in the course of centuries, developed habits of mind that survive from generation to generation. No such complications affect our factories. They are comparatively recent growths. Of the methods of production that they have supplanted little, if anything, survives. With the extinction of the domestic handicraftsmen disappeared the ideals, customs, and traditions of their trades. In the case of cultivators of the soil it is different. The agricultural worker of to-day is a wage-earner, a hired labourer. The system under which he toils is altered. But he tills the same soil by the same processes under the same seasons. At heart he retains the native instincts, ideals, and traditions of the peasant of the 18th century, who was either a small farmer, or not exclusively dependent for his home and his livelihood on the sale of his labour on the land at competitive wages. In that direction may perhaps lie the path to contentment and stability. An interest in the land that he cultivates or in the produce that he raises, rather than successive increases in weekly wages, may prove the truer remedy for his unrest.

From the three books, whose titles head these pages, may be gathered a continuous history of the agricultural worker from the earliest times to the present day. The sympathies of the three writers are strongly, sometimes passionately, enlisted on the side of the cultivator

of the soil. It is not surprising that this should be so. From the standpoint of the 20th century there are chapters in the story which can scarcely be read without indignation. The rack and the dungeon of the Tudors are to us not more inconceivable than the callous inhumanity of the criminal law in the days of the Regent. The best, and the worst, that can be said for these instruments of brutality is that they did not outrage the public opinion of the time. Agricultural workers were not singled out for special treatment. It is the general atmosphere and contemporary standards of a period that monographs on particular branches of historical inquiry are apt to ignore. In consequence they often tend to lose perspective and to become political pamphlets. None of the three books altogether escapes this danger. The picture that they paint is too uniformly gloomy to be an entirely faithful representation of the facts. Cases of harshness and oppression do not tell the whole story. Myriads of acts of fair-play and justice, of human sympathy and neighbourly friendliness, which are not recorded in history, and do not appear on the face of legal documents, must be taken into account before we can form any accurate estimate of rural conditions.

From the 15th century onwards an agricultural and economic change had been in slow but continuous progress. It was the passage from the occupation of the land by groups of occupiers in common to its occupation by individuals. Operating by the enclosure of common-fields and the commons which were their adjuncts, it gradually transformed the mediæval peasant into the tenant farmer and agricultural labourer of to-day. By 1815 the process was practically completed under the pressure of industrial expansion, the growth of new urban centres, and, during the French wars, the menace of famine. Inelastic, adapted only to a stationary population, village farms offered little employment to surplus numbers. Close, self-supporting communities, they produced scanty food beyond the immediate needs of the occupiers themselves. Large tracts of land were withdrawn from their most productive use. Meanwhile, the cry for food rose more and more loudly from new industrial centres, and, at a later stage, was swollen by the panic-stricken clamour of a nation at war. If only

free play could be given to modern methods of production, new resources and improvements had been tested by farmers which promised to supply, and did in fact supply, the national demand for bread and meat. In these considerations lies the economic justification for enclosures.

It would be beside the present purpose to weigh the national advantages against the national losses consequent on the change, or to consider whether action, taken with Parliamentary sanction and under the existing law, was in each individual case morally justified. But it must be remembered that enclosure did not necessarily mean any transfer of ownership. The immediate effect was often to increase rather than to diminish the number of owners. What it did was to change the subject-matter of the property, and to make the change compulsory. There is no novelty in the 'blessed word'—compulsion. The general principle of enclosure was to recognise the claims of all occupiers of land and commoners who could establish a permanent independent right. Thus a freeholder, or an owner of a cottage to which common rights were attached, received a compact block of land estimated to be of the same value as his bundle of scattered strips in the common fields or his common rights of user. On the other hand, the claims of those occupiers whose title was only temporary and derivative were not admitted. Thus tenants of land or of privileged cottages received no allotment.

The importance of the point justifies one illustration. In 1767, 988 acres of common fields and commons were enclosed at Steeple Aston in Oxfordshire.* The award sets out, not only the area allotted to each owner, but the area which each had previously owned in the common fields. Land was allotted to the 23 persons who established their legal claims. The following are instances. The Rector, who owned $12\frac{1}{2}$ yardlands of glebe in the common fields, received, in lieu, $188\frac{1}{2}$ acres. Sir C. Cottrell-Dormer owned ' $3\frac{3}{8}$ yardlands and 4 "oddlands" and commons thereto belonging.' He

* Quoted by W. H. R. Curtler, 'The Enclosure and Redistribution of our Land' (1920), pp. 318-19.

was allotted 63 acres, 1 rood, 29 perches. Lucy Buswell, 'in lieu of $4\frac{1}{2}$ yardlands and commons thereto belonging,' received 84 acres, 1 rood, 6 perches. Robert George, 'in lieu of 1 yardland and commons belonging,' received 21 acres, 3 roods, 21 poles. John Clary, 'in lieu of $\frac{1}{8}$ yardland and commons belonging,' was allotted 3 acres, 1 rood, 4 poles. Eliza Davis, 'in lieu of $2\frac{3}{4}$ yardlands with commons belonging,' received 53 acres, 2 roods, 7 poles. Other illustrations from similar awards might be added. Perhaps the Return of the Enclosure Commissioners given in their annual Report for 1876, may be also quoted.* Between the years 1845-75, 590,000 acres were enclosed. They were divided among '25,930 persons . . . 620 lords of manors received, on an average, $44\frac{1}{2}$ acres each; 21,810 common-right owners received, on an average, 24 acres each; 3500 purchasers (of land sold to pay the expenses of enclosure) received, on an average, 10 acres each.' Abundant evidence exists to prove that, under the Enclosure Acts, a very large area of land was distributed among a great number of small owners in compact blocks. If the owners could have been protected against themselves in the enjoyment of their properties, and if larger provision had been made for cases in which the exercise of common rights rested on no legal basis, the social and moral injury done by enclosures might have been removed or very greatly mitigated.

The concluding stages of the agricultural change were reached at a most difficult crisis. In many parts of the country, even without enclosures, the old rural organisation must probably have broken down under the declining fertility of the land, and the disappearance of the domestic handicrafts and local industries which were migrating to the new industrial centres of the North. In the South and West of England, the heritage of this transfer of industry was the creation of an unemployed population which forced down the wages of agricultural labour. Everywhere, manufacture and agriculture were simultaneously reorganised on those commercial lines which facilitated increased production at reduced cost. Farming ceased to be a subsistence and became a trade. The united effect of the two reorganisations was to

* Ibid. p. 261.

sweep away many small freeholders, tenant-farmers, and commoners, who had lived by the cultivation or the use of land, combined with the practice of domestic handicrafts. Their places were taken by the large corn-growing farms which met the needs and fashion of the day. The organisation of the village, in which wealth and poverty, employer and employed were almost imperceptibly graded into one another, was broken up. With the destruction of the primitive framework went the traditions of the peasant, his inherited ideals, his ancestral customs, his habitual solutions of the problems of existence. The village was not idyllic. 'Auburn' never existed. But in each of these small self-supporting communities, the members lived tranquil, sequestered lives. They enjoyed some degree of independence. They knew few changes beyond those of the recurrent seasons. They rarely took any interest in the world outside their own parish. They were not forced to face the struggle of competition. They bought so little that fluctuations in prices did not disturb their minds; almost all the simple necessities of food, drink, and clothing were produced at home. Such conditions of self-supporting isolation can never be exactly reproduced in this crowded country and bustling century.

In unenclosed districts there was little or no demand for hired labour on the land except at harvest. Small freeholders, small farmers, as well as the occupiers of the intermixed strips of the common fields, worked their holdings themselves with the aid of their families. The live stock was tended by the village shepherd, cowherd, and swineherd. Nor did the style of farming tend to create employment. There were no quickset hedges to trim, or plash or weed. Roots were not grown. There were no drilled crops to clean. Nor, finally, did the common-field farm afford any opening to new-comers to acquire land. It is to causes like these that the extremely slow increase of the rural population up to the end of the 18th century must be attributed. In one direction only was it possible to obtain an interest in the use of land. The common was the pasture of the village farm, and as such was an essential integral adjunct to each arable holding. But rights of grazing and of cutting fuel were also attached to certain cottages, or might be acquired by

encroachment if the trespasser was undisturbed for sixty years. Where an owner occupied one of these privileged cottages, he enjoyed common rights as an owner. Where he was only a tenant, he enjoyed them as a tenant, and in consideration of the higher rent which he paid. On enclosure, the claim of the owner, not of the tenant, would be recognised. The number of these privileged cottages was often considerable. At Stanwell, for instance, where 2126 acres were distributed under an award in 1789, 'near 100' occupiers of cottages claimed common rights. Of these claims, 66 were recognised, and 40 owners were compensated by allotments of land varying from a quarter of an acre to over an acre. Twenty-four of the 66 cottages belonged to two individuals. It would, therefore, appear that, out of the 100 claimants who had enjoyed the rights, 34 were altogether disallowed, probably because, as squatters, they had been in occupation too short a time to establish a legal claim, and at least 26 lost them because they had only the derivative title of tenants.

It was here that enclosures, however sound the legal principle on which they proceeded, often inflicted real hardships. A number of persons, no doubt, were attracted to commons by the facilities which they afforded to a life of comparative idleness, or, to use Defoe's phrase, of 'lazy diligence.' On the other hand, to many saving and industrious men commons were of inestimable value. They provided free fuel and a run for stock to those who practised domestic handicrafts, and, at certain seasons, hired themselves out as labourers on the land. To them the common was a ladder of thrift. Even if the use they had enjoyed was admitted as the exercise of a legal right and recognised by an allotment of land, the compensation was very frequently inadequate. On the other hand, generosity to men of this type was only possible at the expense of those whose claim to the land had been established at law. To take the case of Steeple Aston, Lucy Buswell, Eliza Davis, Robert George, John Clary, and the other 18 participants would have complained at least as loudly as Sir C. Cottrell-Dormer, if their shares had been reduced in order to create allotments for persons who could show no legal title.

During the greater part of the French War, the full consequences of the change were to some extent concealed. It was a period of distress; but employment was brisk. The poorest soils were brought into cultivation for food. All available labour was used and paid for at enhanced rates. Calculations of wages in the 18th and 19th centuries are, at best, approximations. Yet it is evident that between 1790 and 1813 a substantial rise took place. It may not be possible to accept the statements of Arthur Young and of Tooke as absolutely reliable for all parts of the country. But they are in agreement that, between those dates, agricultural wages had 'about doubled.' Meanwhile the prices of provisions approximately trebled. Bread was so scarce that, if universal famine was to be avoided, rigid economy was needed. High prices were effective weapons against waste, and the Government dared not lay them aside by subsidising the loaf. But they supplemented wages out of the rates by allowances both of money and of bread. By this assistance, by the rise in wages, and by the sustained demand for agricultural labour, the effects of enclosures were temporarily obscured. It was the ebb in the tide of activity that revealed the full results.

The years 1814-36 were the blackest period in the history of the agricultural worker. The depth of misery into which he then fell is the measure of the advance that he has subsequently made. Distress was universal. The war was over; but 'Peace and Plenty' proved a ghastly mockery. Large tracts of arable land fell out of cultivation; considerable areas were even untenanted. Less and less labour was required. Wages fell to pre-war levels; but even at the lowered rates, work was hard to find and harder still to keep. Unemployment was not confined to the land. The reduction to a peace footing of the Army and Navy and of the store commissariat and transport departments threw thousands of men out of employment. Industries which the war had stimulated to unnatural activity, languished. The introduction of machinery into manufacturing processes displaced crowds of manual workers. Over-production glutted the impoverished markets of the export trade, and checked the revival and expansion of industry. Everywhere there was a fierce struggle for work and wages.

Into this strange swirl of competition agricultural labourers were plunged, when once the shelter of the self-sufficing village was disturbed. The effect of the rural changes was now brought home with tremendous force. The sale of their labour on the land had become the labourers' only means of livelihood. The domestic handicrafts which supplemented their earnings had been swept into manufacturing centres, where they supplied wages to thousands of artisans. The land which provided their food and fuel, and fed their live-stock, was turned into a factory of bread and meat for the towns. All that they had formerly produced for themselves, they now had to buy. They felt the full pressure of prices, and the lower their wages, the keener the pinch. The evil consequences of the short-sighted humanity, which, during the war, had levelled the barriers of the poor-law, completed their ruin. Wages had been supplemented by allowances, paid out of the rates, and proportioned to the size of a man's family and the price of the quartern loaf. If wages fell below the subsistence level, the deficiency was made good by the ratepayer. Bound, if necessary, to defray the whole cost of the able-bodied poor, the parish gladly accepted from an employer any weekly payment, however small, which partially relieved the charge on the rates. Thus a mass of temporary labour, subsidised, and therefore cheap, was created and made available for the cultivation of the land. To many of the men pauper-dependence was a thing to be resented as a disgrace and a curse. But however anxious they might be to support themselves by permanent work, and so preserve their independence, they were powerless. They were undersold by the rate-subsvented labour. To others, the security of subsistence, the light labour, the opportunities for idleness, made a pauper's life attractive. The demoralisation spread far and wide. It overran the South; it extended to the Midlands; it crept towards the North. Had the abuses of pauperism lasted a few years longer, a generation might have sprung up which knew no other existence, and were strangers to the fine traditions and sturdy independence of their forefathers. From that danger the country was saved, partly by the self-respecting pride of men of the older stamp, partly by the wiser administration of the

law which prevailed in many districts, partly by legislative reform, and partly by the reviving prosperity of the industry. Before 1836 the progressive deterioration had been arrested. It had touched bottom. Out of the depths the upward climb began.

The advance was neither even nor rapid. Agriculture underwent many vicissitudes of fortune, and, as a consequence, the progress of agricultural workers suffered more than one set-back. But, as compared with 1814-36, their advance has been continuous; they have never looked back. For years the odds were against them. Isolated from one another in remote country districts, commanding no capital beyond their labour, living in chronic poverty, generally in debt to the village tradesmen, dependent on their employers for both home and wages, agricultural labourers were far less capable of protecting themselves than were the artisans in the towns. Immobile, uneducated, voteless, and therefore without political influence, they found it difficult to combine and, without combination, impossible to bargain. In the agricultural prosperity of the sixties and the early seventies, they had in some districts to some extent shared. If statistics of wages can be at all relied upon, their average earnings in 1872 had nearly doubled as compared with 1820. But in the South and West the excess of the demand for employment over the supply told against them heavily.

The year 1872 stands out as a land-mark in the record of progress. One winter evening (Feb. 7) nearly a thousand men gathered at Wellesbourne in Warwickshire to listen to one, of themselves, known for miles round as a skilled hedge-cutter and a local preacher. The speaker was Joseph Arch. It was a dark night, and lanterns, swung from bean poles, shed a feeble light on the scene. Mounted on a pig-stool, set under a chestnut tree, Arch looked down on a sea of upturned faces, over which flickered the uncertain gleams of the swaying lanterns. In his mind, steeped in the imagery and phraseology of the Bible, he likened his audience to the children of Israel, 'with the darkness all about them . . . waiting for some one to lead them out of the land of Egypt.' The outcome of the meeting was the

decision to form a union. The men demanded 2s. 8d. a day ; hours 6 to 5, except on Saturday, when they were to be 6 to 3 ; and 4d. an hour overtime. Little notice seems to have been taken of their demand, and in March they struck. Public sympathy with their action was aroused ; Archibald Forbes, fresh from his triumphs in the Franco-Prussian War, pleaded their cause in the press ; considerable sums were subscribed for their support. After three months, they won a partial victory. Wages were advanced—in some cases to the 16s. which had been demanded.

At the height of its prosperity the Union mustered 70,000 members. From being purely economic, it became largely political in its scope. Many sympathisers were alienated by fear of its ultimate objects. During the great lock-out of 1874, which lasted eighteen weeks in the Eastern Counties, this loss of public support contributed to the ultimate defeat of the National Union. It never recovered the blow, and dwindled into insignificance. It had not altogether failed. It won the vote for the agricultural worker ; it obtained some slight advance in wages ; it demonstrated the possibility of combination on a large scale ; it relieved the congestion of agricultural labour by emigrating, between 1873 and 1881, some 700,000 persons.* But, during the twenty years of agricultural depression with which the 19th century closed, no expansion of the movement could possibly be expected. As prices dropped, wages fell. Land passed out of cultivation. Thousands of men were only kept in employment by the kindly feeling of employers, who were themselves tottering on the verge of bankruptcy. From 1896 onwards, the tide was turning and the industry beginning to revive. Wages crept upwards, following the gradual rise of prices. In 1914 the weekly earnings of adult male labourers in England, not being men in charge of animals, may have approximately averaged 20s. But in many counties the rates were far lower. An Oxfordshire labourer, in receipt of 15s. 3d., or less, found but hungry comfort in an average.

For months before August 1914 and the outbreak of

* The figures were given by Arch in his evidence before the Royal Commission in 1881 (Parl. Papers, 1882, vol. xiv, p. 51).

war, the agitation for an advance in wages, shorter hours, and a half-holiday was gathering strength. A minimum wage, and the machinery to enforce it, began to be discussed by politicians. In a large number of counties strikes were threatening. Trade Unions promised support to their agricultural brethren. Agriculture had the unenviable reputation of a sweated industry, underpaid and undermanned. With the declaration of war it became evident that, when every pound of food was of value, the risk of prolonged disturbance of labour conditions was not to be lightly faced. It was at first hoped that the demand for labour would enable workers to obtain substantial advances proportioned to rising prices. On this ground the Milner Committee of 1915 decided not to recommend a minimum wage. Fifteen months later, the Selborne Committee of 1916-17 advocated minimum wages and a Wages Board. Still the Government hesitated. But the policy of stimulating production necessitated the immediate establishment of machinery to deal with wages. The Corn Production Act of 1917 created Wages Boards and fixed as a starting-point the minimum wage of 25s. a week, which was offered to National Service Volunteers. In fairness to agricultural workers, no other course seemed possible. The Government was making every effort to increase labour on the land, and every additional man or woman weakened the worker's position in bargaining and in profiting by the demand for his skill. From the point of view of the agricultural worker, soldier companies, village women, the Women's Land Army, old-age pensioners, schoolboys from the public schools, National Service Volunteers, interned aliens, German prisoners, though the wages were paid by farmers, were State-assisted 'blacklegs.' Nor was the introduction of this mass of subsidised labour the only handicap which the State, in the campaign of food production, imposed on agricultural labourers in their freedom of bargaining for a rise in wages. Many of the men were exempted from military service as being indispensable on particular farms. Every one of these exempted workers knew that, in the event of his dismissal, he would at once become liable for military service. If Wages Boards and minimum wages were,

in the exceptional circumstances of the war, an absolute necessity, they have, in the opinion of many competent judges, justified their continuance, in some form or other, under peace conditions. It is scarcely possible to believe that they will ever again be abandoned.

If the general position of the ordinary adult labourer to-day is compared with that which he held in 1814-36, it has improved beyond comparison or recognition. Even as compared with 1872 or 1907 the improvement is striking. To-day the agricultural worker—and, it may be added, his wife—enjoy full rights of citizenship; they can make their influence felt in the government of their parish, the administration of their county, the direction of the affairs of the Empire. He is no longer isolated from his fellow-workers in remote country districts; he is, or can become, a member of an efficient organisation which extends to every county in England and Wales. He has himself received a free education, and his children are being educated free of cost to himself. His outlook has widened. He can read, and take an intelligent interest in the affairs of the world. Largely at the expense of the nation and his employer, he is insured against sickness, and can count on a pension in his old age. His industry is no longer overcrowded; it is, on the contrary, undermanned. His necessary hours of labour have been shortened by at least 15 hours a week. If he chooses, and his employer desires, he can work overtime beyond the 50 hours of summer and 48 hours of winter, at the rate of 1s. 2d. an hour. He has a half-holiday every week. As compared with 1815, his minimum wages—and his actual wages are often higher—have increased six times; as compared with 1872, or with 1907, they have been, in what were the low-paid counties, approximately trebled. Necessity no longer drives his wife and children to labour in the fields. Though the decline in the purchasing power of money has largely discounted the reality of the nominal advance in wages, there is a greater margin in his favour after providing the necessities of life. He is better housed than at any previous period in his history. That there is a shortage of cottages is true. But it is in urban and semi-urban areas, and not in agricultural

districts that the shortage of accommodation is most serious and the over-crowding most intense. The proportion of insanitary and defective cottages has been greatly reduced. At the same time, his tenure of his home has been strengthened, both in respect of the length of notice to quit, and, in certain circumstances, of compensation for disturbance. In a great majority of cases, he has a garden or an allotment on which his greater leisure may be profitably bestowed. If he chooses to apply, and can satisfy the moderate requirements of the local authority, he has a chance of a small holding. Finally, the health conditions in which he lives are superior to those of urban populations. The Returns of the Registrar General for 1911 and 1912 prove that this superiority is maintained at all ages of childhood up to the age of 15, and at all subsequent ages up to 70—with one exception. That exception is phthisis between the ages of 20 and 25, and the Registrar General explains it by the number of young unmarried persons who return to their rural homes having contracted the disease under urban conditions.

Yet contentment has not been attained. Rumours are rife, on the one hand, that increases of wages will be demanded in the spring, and, on the other, that unemployment is growing and that many small farmers are on the verge of ruin. Can the industry stand a further advance, or even the continuance of present rates? The decision rests with the Wages Board, whose members are possessed of such facts and figures as are available. If all farmers kept strict accounts, and were able to produce evidence of the state of their business, much mistrust and suspicion among workers would be removed. Even then, however, there would remain the question whether, with more efficient methods of management, the land might not sometimes be made to yield larger profits. A farmer has no keener or more capable critics than the men whom he employs. On the other hand, the analogy between agriculture and other industries cannot be pressed too far. There are important differences. A farm has no tally or check-weigher, no roof, no clock, no artificial light, no nerve-racking conditions of employment. On the farm there exist no means of measuring the output of labour. The land is

unprotected against rain and frost; its cultivation depends on weather conditions, and for weeks together in the winter months there is not work enough to keep the staff fully employed. On a farm the men cannot be marked in and out at the beginning and end of the day, as they can be, and are, at the gate of a factory, though agricultural time-sheets might well be introduced. In a factory, hours of labour can be made uniform by artificial light; on the land they must, of necessity, vary. In a factory the working hours are a time of concentrated strain, often spent under nerve-exhausting conditions; on the land if, at certain seasons, the hours are inevitably longer, they are less exhausting, both physically and nervously. Between agricultural and industrial problems there are essential differences which are necessarily reflected in rates of wages. The future of the industry depends on the good sense and moderation of the organised bodies of employers and employed.

ERNLE.

Art. 4.—BENEDETTO CROCE AS LITERARY CRITIC.

1. *Estetica, come scienza dell' espressione e linguistica generale. Teoria e Storia* (4ta Ediz., riveduta), da B. Croce. Bari: Laterza, 1912.
2. *La Critica. Rivista di Letteratura, Storia e Filosofia* diretta da B. Croce (1903–1920). Bari: Laterza [published bi-monthly].
3. *La Critica Letteraria, questioni teoriche*, da B. Croce. Roma: Loescher, 1896.
4. *Letteratura e Critica della Letteratura contemporanea in Italia—Due Saggi*, da B. Croce. Bari: Laterza, 1908.

ALTHOUGH the name of Benedetto Croce is probably by this time familiar to all English students of philosophy as that of one of the most vigorous and original of living thinkers, there is perhaps one aspect of his genius which has been as yet scarcely sufficiently appreciated in this country. We refer to his activities as a literary critic. Croce is an example of one of those rarest of all *rare aves*, a theoriser possessing at once the ability, the courage, and, we may add, the leisure to apply his own theories in practice; and, by the success with which he has for years been accomplishing this feat in the pages of his own monthly periodical 'La Critica,' it may safely be said that he greatly increases the claim of the principles he there adopts to be accepted as true. For we are all pragmatists enough amid the chaos of 'isms, among which it is at present our fate to live, to prefer a theory which experience has shown will work to one that is either too exaltedly ideal to endure being put to practical proof, or else breaks down at once when thus tested.

No one who has had frequent occasion to study the theories of philosophers upon Art and the productions of the so-called art-critics, can have failed to observe the mutual contempt in which these two classes of writers generally hold one another. Nor is this surprising. The philosopher's world is the abstract; the world of art is the concrete. The philosophers, even if they would, have not often the time to appreciate works of art at first hand, much less the ability themselves to create them; whereas the artist and the virtuoso in art-criticism rarely find the energy, even if they possess—

which is unusual—the intellectual equipment, required to grapple seriously with abstract ideas. Coleridge is perhaps the only English critic on record—for Shelley was too much the poet—who united the highest speculative with the highest artistic abilities; yet, as is well known, he lacked the systematising spirit required to co-ordinate logically the fruits of his philosophic reflexion—a defect which also characterised the mind of Plato. It is one of the main principles of the Crocean *Æsthetic* that ‘the judicial activity which criticises and recognises the beautiful is identical with the artistic activity which produces it.’ In other words, Taste and Imagination are one. If this be so—and let it for the moment be admitted—then in Benedetto Croce we undoubtedly find united, as it were, two personalities, the artist and the philosopher.

It is interesting to note that, biographically speaking, the artist in Croce came first in time, just as in his philosophy we are taught that the artist must come first logically. In 1896, when he was thirty years old, long before he had formulated his own system of philosophy, he published an essay under the title ‘*La Critica Letteraria*,’ in which the reader already perceives the mature critic and man of letters. In the former capacity Croce apparently looked upon himself at that time as little more than a pupil of de Sanctis, whom he regarded with an affectionate enthusiasm; and what he seems at first to have contemplated was simply a reduction to systematic form of the dicta on art and the pregnant æsthetic judgments scattered in profusion through the works of that famous critic and historian of literature. The same essay, however, records its author’s admiration of the 18th-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, whose reputation as one of the most original thinkers known to history Croce has subsequently done so much to vindicate. It was from Vico that he derived the most characteristic feature of his own philosophy, just as it was de Sanctis who laid down for him the main lines of his critical theory. Croce concluded this early essay by demanding that a book should be written advocating, on the one hand, the banishment from art-criticism of a whole series of irrelevant concepts, the retainment of which merely creates confusion; on the other, the liberation of the two notions, Art and the Beautiful, from the

bonds in which they have been arbitrarily fettered by linguistic usage—a task which could only be achieved, he thought, by recognising the intimate connexion of the so-called æsthetic and artistic facts with the other facts of the mental life. This programme he was himself destined to carry out in his own æsthetic philosophy, a glance at which is necessary if we are properly to understand his conception of the correct method of criticism.

A mere glance must suffice; and fortunately Croce's definition of Beauty (the creation of which is, in his view, the sole end of Art) admits of extremely brief statement—in three words in fact: Beauty is Expression. But the meaning he attaches to the word 'expression' demands explanation, for it is employed by him in a somewhat unusual sense. Expression is the business of the imagination, which bears in Croce's philosophy the quite literal signification of mind in its intuitive or image-producing capacity. There are, however, three important points to be emphasised. Firstly, unless the image formed by the imagination can be in fact expressed, it does not exist at all, but remains a mere impression outside the mind altogether. The ability to express it is the test of its very existence; or, more briefly, its existence and expression are one. What exactly does this mean? Simply that there is no such thing as a man knowing what he wants to say but not finding words or the right words in which to say it. If he has ideas in his head, says Croce, he can always give them expression. For by the mere fact of his having them they are simultaneously expressed.

This brings us to the second point to be noted. The term 'expression,' as employed in ordinary conversation, usually means to put an idea into words in the sense of communicating it to other people by uttering aloud or writing it down. According to Croce, expression must be thought of as wholly internal, a purely mental image, whatever its medium, whether words, colours, sounds, physical movements or marble. Language is the general term employed by Croce to cover all forms of artistic expression; for, so long as the image is thought of as retained in the mind, the need for the differentiation of the Arts by reference to the physical medium and technique

peculiar to each, does not arise. Art is essentially one and identical with language as thus defined. The image expressed is formed purely mentally, indivisible therefore into parts and at the same time undistinguished as real or unreal, simply because it is the primary activity of mind itself, mind in the state of experiencing or living the sensation, before, logically speaking, the intellect and the will have come into play. This is equivalent to asserting that the poet, painter, sculptor, or any other kind of artist must have, and as a matter of fact does have, the idea or conception of his work of art completely and definitely formed and finished (that is, expressed) in his head before he begins to put pen to paper, brush to canvas, or chisel to marble. And it is the image in his head which is the true work of art, not the recited poem, the painted picture, or the carved statue. Further, this image is not formed by the artist gradually or in sections; it springs into existence as a single indivisible whole. Whether it is the image of something really existing or is a mere hallucination the artist does not, because he cannot know; all that matters to him is that he should see it clearly. Once it is clearly seen (fully expressed, that is to say) the artist is, as it were, notified of the fact by experiencing the feeling of pure æsthetic joy:

‘Joy that ne’er was given
Save to the pure and in their purest hour.’

This active feeling of joy is not to be identified with the æsthetic activity itself, nor does it result from it, as effect from cause. It merely accompanies it. It is the self-approval of the mind æsthetically employed at the moment when it has achieved the expression of the particular intuition it was seeking to attain.

The achievement of the expression—and this is the third point to be emphasised—is the creation of Beauty, Beauty being identical with successful expression or rather with expression simply, since unsuccessful expression is not expression at all. There can, therefore, be no degree in Beauty, which is always perfect, but only in ugliness, which is failure in expression and may vary from the merely slightly ugly to the extremely repulsive. Complete ugliness—which would, if it could exist, be

negation of expression—is a pure abstraction and impossible in the concrete.

As a corollary to all this it follows, among other things, that an artist cannot choose his subject; it comes to him; he is inspired with it, as we may say, which means that all subjects alike are potentially artistic. It follows, too, that no moral value whatever attaches to the artistic fact *quod* artistic, for the will has not been engaged in its production; further, that Beauty consists in the form of art (and the form only), not in its content or in a combination of the two; and, finally, that works of art cannot be classified or referred for definition to any so-called Laws of Form, for each is unique and must be judged by its own standard and that alone,

‘If a poet,’ asks Mr A. C. Bradley in his well-known essay entitled ‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake,’ ‘already knew what he meant to say, why should he write the poem? The poem would, in fact, already be written.’ Yes, Croce would reply, that is precisely the case. So far as the poet himself is concerned, his task is achieved; the poem is as good as written, when once inwardly expressed. Yet he almost always wills to write it down for several compelling reasons, of which two are by far the most powerful. He wants to remember it himself for the sake of reproducing again at will the joy he experienced at its first creation; and secondly, he wants to communicate it to the world in general. These two motives are in most artists irresistible. The will to give them effect is, however, necessarily conditioned by the previous existence of the poem. The poet’s device for executing this double purpose is to externalise his mental image by committing it to spoken or written words, to accomplish which he requires of course the necessary technical knowledge and skill. The very essence of Croce’s theory of art is missed, however, by those who would identify the printed poem with the artistic fact itself. The poem printed to be read with the voice, the melody played to be heard by the ears, or the picture painted to be seen with the eyes, is not itself the work of art, but merely the physical or material stimulus for its reproduction mentally in the imagination of the reader, hearer, or observer as the case may be.

Such in barest outline is Croce's theory of Art, and it is a question whether it is not itself open to attack by the same critical argument he employs against the Hedonists. The latter, as he truly points out, reduce all mental activities to one, i.e. feeling, and having effected this reduction, naturally do not see anything except pleasure or pain in any activity. They therefore find no substantial difference between the pleasure of art and (let us say) that of a good digestion. Croce, perceiving quite truly that form is of the essence of all works of art whatsoever, abstracts the formal element and reduces the æsthetic activity to this alone. He thus deliberately empties the artistic fact of all value-feelings and can therefore find, as we shall see, no difference in beauty between an epic and an epigram, so long as both are perfectly self-expressive. Although by this expedient he certainly supplies a definition of the Beautiful universally adequate to all works of art, at whatever period produced and in whatever land, he only does so by sacrificing what, to most men, alone makes Art worth while.

Two, more obvious, objections to his theory together with his reply to them may be briefly referred to before turning to his method of literary criticism. The first is this. Do not many poets compose their poems by means of the very process of writing them down? Did Milton, for example, have the whole of 'Paradise Lost' in his head before putting pen to paper? The mere idea is surely absurd. And—this is the second objection—is it not equally ridiculous to assert that a poet never selects his subject, but that it comes to him? Is not such a supposition refuted by our proven knowledge of the fact that Milton did choose his subject, and that too with the greatest deliberation; and not only the subject of his poem, but the form also, when he decided to write, not, for example, a five-act drama, but a twelve-book epic?

Croce's reply to this objection, to take the latter point first, is simply that there is an ambiguity in the word 'subject' or perhaps in the word 'poet,' which is commonly applied to Milton in his capacity both as man and artist. If by subject you mean the description, general or even detailed, of what you intend your poem to be about, you can certainly choose that. But that is not the poem. If it were, we might all be Miltons, for

we can all draw up schemes for epics. The raw material of life out of which he hopes to make his poem, the dead mechanism out of which he is to create living form, is, Croce would agree, selected by the poet as man or is perhaps rather selected for him as a result of his own temperament or the suggestion of his friends or the historical moment in which he lives. But what a poet, as a man, wills to create, and what, as artist, he does create, are two quite distinct things, and have no necessary relation to one another. In this connexion Croce would probably quote a paradoxical saying of de Sanctis à propos of Dante.

'The poet,' says de Sanctis, 'sets to work endowed with the poetic theory, the forms, the ideas, and the preoccupations of his time; and the less of an artist he is, the more accurately does he reproduce the material of his selection. Look at Brunetto and Frezzi. Here everything is clear, logical, and harmonious; the reality is a mere figure. But, if the poet is an artist, the contradiction disappears; there results not the world of his intention but the world of art.'

This is equivalent to saying that you can never pass through his creation to the artist's character, save just in so far as that creation is inartistic, while it means, on the other hand, that the expression of personality, or of a 'state of soul' (the artist's soul and no one else's) is of the very essence of pure intuition. All art must be lyrical to be art at all. On the other hand, it does not *know* that it is lyrical. A poet can no more choose what the concrete thing called his poem is to be about, or what form it is to take, than a man, when going to sleep, can choose what shall be the material or shape of his dreams or, when dreaming, know that he is not awake. The dreams are his, but he is not responsible for them.

To the objection that the poet often creates his expressions not *before*, but *by*, writing them down, Croce replies that this, though an excusable, is a superficial view. For the poet—how can he?—never writes down an idea without having first seen it in imagination. The latter is the essential condition of the former. 'And, if he has not yet seen it, he will write the words, not to externalise his expression, which

does not yet exist, but as though to have a rallying-point for further reflexion and inward contemplation'—an expedient, he adds, comparable to the habit some artists cultivate of retiring into solitude when engaged in composition, or to any other eccentricity or peculiarity they may adopt for the like purpose. To this reply, however, it may reasonably be objected that Croce's is the superficial view, since it seems to imply that a logical priority must also involve a temporal.

If the end of Art is the production of Beauty, then the reproduction of it is, according to Croce, the sole end of Criticism. In judging a poem, the critic is using exactly the same imaginative powers of mind as the poet employed in creating it; only the circumstances are different. The poet produces; the critic reproduces. And the reproductive is, as it were, the inverse of the productive process. The poet begins with impressions, passes on to the inward expression of them, and then proceeds to translate the inward expression into the spoken or written word. The critic begins with the spoken or written word, and seeks to obtain a living impression of it, from which he proceeds to recover the inward expression, which thereby ceases to be the poet's and becomes his own.

This theory of criticism follows logically from Croce's theory of art, and must stand or fall with it. For it is clear that, if you identify the artistic fact not, as is usually done, with the physical or outward work of art, as given in experience, but only with the abstracted mental form or expression, of which the external fact is to be treated as the mere symbol, then, when once you have re-created the expression, you, and you alone, are the author of it. The critic, therefore, who fully and completely appreciates Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' is in that moment of appreciation Shakespeare's poetical equal. In fact, Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' died with Shakespeare. The 'Hamlet' that survives is always the critic's. To the would-be critic this is undoubtedly a very inspiring theory, if he finds himself able to grant the postulate upon which it is based—that the imagination of a great poet does not differ in quality from that of the ordinary man; in other words, that the difference between us and

Shakespeare is not that he has better eyes than we, but merely that he enjoys a more advantageous point of view, and can therefore see further. Croce, however, does not really assist us to any solution of the mystery of genius. Granted that we are all in an equal degree potential poets, how comes it that so few of us stand upon the mountain-tops of vision? Yet on one vexed question Croce is perfectly clear. The poet is not necessarily the best critic of poetry. Poetry can be made to yield up all its secrets to those incapable of writing a line of it themselves.

We have now to consider how Croce applies his theory in practice ; and a description of his method of criticism will best be given in his own words.

'It is a method,' he writes ('La Critica,' July 1907), 'based on the notion of Art as pure imagination or pure expression. It therefore excludes from Art no content or state of mind whatsoever, provided it be rendered concrete in a perfect expression. Beyond this conception of Art the criticism I am describing relies on no other theoretical presupposition at all. Hence it rejects as arbitrary the so-called rules of the literary and artistic classes and all other kinds of particular artistic laws. In order to judge a work of art, it knows of no other way except to interrogate the work itself directly and experience a living impression of it ; for this end and this alone, it admits, nay requires researches into the circumstances of the production of the work of art concerned—learned researches possessing interpretative value, which must assist in transporting us, so to speak, into the mental condition of the author at the time he produced his artistic synthesis. This living impression once obtained, the further labour only consists in determining what, in the object under examination, is the pure product of art, and what in it appears to be not truly artistic—for instance, violence committed by the author against his vision for reasons of extraneous preoccupation ; obscurities and emptiness which he allows to subsist through laziness ; excrescences he introduces for effect ; signs of academic prejudices, etc., etc. The result is the exposition or critical estimate, which simply states (and in stating has thereby judged) *wie es eigentlich geschehen*, 'how it really happened,' according to Leopold v. Ranke's brilliantly simple definition of history. Hence the history of art and the criticism of art, in my view,

coincide. Every essay in the criticism of art is an attempt to write a page in the history of art (understanding the term 'history,' as it must be understood, in its full and complete sense); it determines by analysing and characterising reflectively, what the effective production of art consists in, according to temporal succession.'

It is easy to perceive how criticism is simplified by Croce by being thus emptied of almost all that it is commonly supposed to include. For, in the first place, it is not required of the critic that he should analyse the meaning of the poem with a view to passing judgment on the truth or falsity of the ideas it contains. At least half, if not a larger proportion, of so-called 'literary' criticism, in this country at any rate, is thus deprived of any right to the title. It may be criticism of great value but—call it scientific or philosophical or what you will—it is not literary; that is, it is not criticism of literature as an art.

Secondly, the critic is absolved from the necessity of referring the particular work he is judging to the verdict of any code of abstract artistic rules. This follows from Croce's repudiation of literary classes. The critic may employ such labels as 'poetry' or 'prose, 'classical' or 'romantic,' etc., if he chooses, for the purpose of more easily handling his material as a practical man. But he is not concerned with them as a critic. You may, for instance, decide to call a poem a lyric or say that it is written in blank verse, but you will still have left it critically intact. When one considers what scores of books have been written discussing such problems as whether certain plays of Shakespeare are rightly to be called comedies or tragedies, or whether, to take another example, Walt Whitman wrote poetry or prose, one realises once again how enormously reduced in bulk becomes the extant *corpus* of what, upon Crocean principles, alone merits the name of genuine literary criticism.

Lastly, the critic may omit all qualitative comparison between one author's work and another's due to an attempt to establish a scale of merit by reference to the value of their contents. This comparative type of judgment is perhaps the commonest among all the forms of so-called literary criticism. Croce does not object to the

rough comparison of one poet with another where both are engaged upon much the same problem of expression, which happens when each is concerned in giving form to a somewhat similar subject matter. But to the conclusions which result from such a procedure he denies any scientific value whatever, since, strictly speaking, not only is every poem that has ever been written unique, and therefore incomparable, but every line in every poem is unique too, nay, every word in every line, even if the same word be many times repeated within the compass of a single stanza. In short, there is no form of criticism, common though this particular form of it be, which Croce considers more pernicious in its results than that which either openly or by implication strives to establish an absolute standard of taste by setting up, let us say, Shakespeare as the ideal type of dramatist and then depreciating the merit of other poets or dramatists by comparison.

Croce objects, of course, no less vehemently to the maxim '*à chaque homme son goût.*' There does indeed exist an absolute criterion of taste, but absolute in a different way from that of the intellect because established by no process of reasoning. The criterion of taste is absolute with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination, which cannot err, and recognises no degrees in Beauty. Thus an epigram and an epic, a savage's scrawl and the Sistine Madonna, a music-hall tune and a Beethoven Symphony, though each pair presents a difference as wide as the poles in the amount or complexity of their contents, yet all have form in common. They are all expressions; and the critic has to decide but one thing—are they coherent expressions, that is, truly and completely expressive of themselves? If his verdict be in the affirmative, he must pronounce them all beautiful and hence of equal artistic merit. The sole method by which the critic can apply this test is himself to try to see imaginatively exactly what the poet or artist has seen imaginatively—a task he can only hope to accomplish by first placing himself at the poet's point of view. Once he has reached it, and because the imagination is absolute, if the poet has seen clearly, so will the critic see clearly and pronounce the expression beautiful. If, on the other hand, the poet has not seen

clearly, the critic too will not see clearly, and will therefore find the expression more or less ugly, just as the poet himself found it.

In reaching the needful point of view lies one of the critic's difficulties ; and it is to assist him in this connexion that Croce requires that he should possess historical culture, which will alone enable him to recover the conditions under which the poet produced his work. No man living has paid higher tribute than Croce to the philologist, the grammarian, the historian, the searcher in dusty archives—to all labourers, in short, however humble, who work in those fields of scientific research that abut upon, but are not to be confused with, the domain of artistic criticism proper. Such research is invaluable for the (frequently) indispensable information it provides, information which the critic should possess, though not necessarily himself have discovered, if he is to proceed fully equipped to his task.

But, even thus equipped, he will fail in that task if he does not possess æsthetic sensibility, without which he will not find beauty when beauty is there. He must train his taste and train it on the best literature. Croce himself, whose critical activities have been largely expended upon modern Italian poets, is well aware of the danger of thereby lowering his own standard of taste. 'For my part,' he says, 'I have sought to guard myself against it by constant re-reading of the classics, which I regard as a kind of spiritual exercise, a *præparatio ad missam*, for my office of critic.'

By training the taste, however, Croce really means keeping the imagination pure, so far as that can be done by merely trying. There is a moment in the process of criticism when the critic's mind must literally be 'of imagination all compact.' It is in that moment that he will assuredly find beauty, if beauty is there to be found. But this moment, in spite of all the poet may do to assist him by even the most masterly technique, it is no easy matter for the critic to achieve. For the effort to see, and to see clearly, is again and again thwarted by the very constitution of the human mind, which is at the same time both one and complex. When poets and critics, or one good critic and another good critic, disagree (as of course they often do) about a particular

work, the divergence of opinion is more often attributable to this cause than to a difference in their respective points of view. Haste, vanity, theoretical prejudices, personal likes and dislikes, intervene and disturb the contemplative attitude. In other words, the mind insists upon thinking and willing when it ought to be all concentrated in seeing. This mental struggle, which the critic himself experiences when bent to his task, should predispose him to sympathise with the poet whose work he is judging. For it is the exact parallel of that which, taking place in the poet's mind, results in the production of his poem, that poem's failure or success depending upon its issue. If the critic be a true captain of his soul, the struggle always ends in the victory of imagination. The imagination is, so to speak, given its chance and catches that which it is seeking—a living impression of the whole, without which no amount of subsequent reflexion will enable the critic to decide with assurance upon the causes of the beauty or relative ugliness of the expression; for he will not have made it his own.

He requires the further gift of acuteness in analysing the reasons of the poet's success or failure. For it is not enough to say 'this poem has succeeded' or 'it has failed'; he must know why, he must understand. To understand a poet critically, says Croce in one of his brilliant articles on Carducci, is

'to understand the dialectic of his mind, the practical and emotional forces no less than the contemplative and poetical forces which are struggling within him. To criticise him is to show how, as a result of the struggle between these forces, his poetry is at one time advanced, at another impeded. For the non-poetical elements of his mind sometimes nourish of their own accord the poetical elements, and sometimes consume and are nourished by them.'

Too often, he adds, instead of fixing attention upon this complex yet single process, particular aspects of it are gathered haphazard by the critic and then confusedly presented; the obstructions in the way of poetry or its crude material being substituted for the poetry itself, and, conversely, its very heart's blood described as that which impedes it and causes it to fail.

The final stage of criticism consists in the synthetic

process by which the critic puts together in his exposition or critical estimate his view of 'how it happened,' the result of his analysis of the poet's mental activity immanent in the poem or rather identical with the poem. The critic is here making a judgment of fact, and, if he commits his criticism to words, is writing History. For History, as conceived by Croce, is not a dead past, but a present reality. All poetry, however long ago its author lived, is contemporary poetry, for it is non-existent or at the best a mere unintelligible hieroglyph, until it is re-created in the reader's mind, who, as already pointed out, thereby makes it quite literally his own. It is of the essence of criticism, as of poetry, to be lyrical—in other words, an intimately personal or subjective expression. To aim at what is commonly called objectivity in criticism is, according to Croce, to aim at the impossible.

The reason is thus plain why Croce lays so much stress on the enormous importance to the critic of possessing historical learning. For without it he runs the risk of using the poem he is criticising as a means, not to re-creating or reproducing the original expression created by the poet, but to producing upon it a new one of his own. It is, however, difficult to see how, on Croce's theory—the theory that the physical work of art has no artistic reality—the critic, whatever his erudition as an historian, can be certain that he is not in any case doing this. Croce does indeed take this objection, which if admitted would be fatal to his whole argument, into consideration; but stoutly denies that changes in physical and psychological conditions are, as a matter of fact, insurmountable. He claims that we are constantly surmounting them; otherwise, he says, individual life, which is communion with our past selves and with our fellows, would be impossible. Nevertheless, he might well be challenged to point out any piece of actually existing criticism of a classic, even if based on the most exact historical knowledge, which in some degree is not, or could not be shown to be, what he compares to a palimpsest, a new expression imposed on the antique. It is, therefore, perhaps not without significance that Croce's own critical powers have been chiefly exercised upon quite modern poets. For obviously, if historical culture is a necessary condition of sound criticism

(because the more we know about the circumstances in which a poem was actually written the better able are we to adopt the poet's point of view), then we are forced to accept the paradox that the verdict of contemporary men of taste must in the nature of the case be always preferred to that of posterity, when the beauty of any 'historic' poem is the subject of dispute.

But to criticise Croce's method of criticism is to criticise his theory of art. The two are rigidly welded together and, as already said, must stand or fall together. Yet it is probably true to say that one's estimate of Croce as an æsthetician will closely depend upon whether one has first approached him from the side of his philosophy or from that of his literary criticism. For the former seems rather to have arisen out of the latter than *vice versa*; and he is such a born critic that the strength and efficacy of his critical method are far more apparent in the pages of 'La Critica,' where he is putting his principles into practice, than in the 'Estetica' where he formulates them philosophically.

As a theory, his *Æsthetic* seems lean, not to say deliberately starved; but to see it applied, or at any rate applied by Croce himself, is to realise that lack of flesh need not necessarily imply absence of muscle. His method, whatever its defects, is an unrivalled instrument for detecting pose and sentimentality, the two most heinous of artistic sins; he brings them unerringly to light, however ingeniously the poet may have managed to conceal their presence in his work. It matters not to Croce whether a poem is full of wisdom, its vowel sounds charged with music, its metre impeccable, its rhythms bewitching to the sense; it may possess all these qualities and yet be an ugly thing if it is not artistically sincere, that is, imaginatively pure. Did the poet really see a vision or did he only urge himself to see one because the occasion seemed to demand it? Was he content to wait upon his imagination, or did he suffer his imagination to become wholly or in part the slave of the material it should control? What was the true state of the poet's mind when he wrote his poem? How has that state of mind been developed in the various parts of the poem? Is the poem in harmony or out of harmony with it? Does the poem express it

well or ill? These are the sort of questions which Croce seeks to answer and generally succeeds in answering in a way which brings conviction to his readers, and with a superb mastery of all the weapons of his critical armoury that arouses their enthusiastic admiration. Moreover, those very personal qualities—his downright-ness and occasionally arrogant tone, his sarcasms and delight (as he himself confesses) in '*Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro*'—which would perhaps be better suppressed in a philosophical treatise, add a force, vivacity, and sparkle to his literary criticism which are extraordinarily stimulating.

It is a question, therefore, whether his disciples in this country would not have better promoted their master's influence by giving to the English public specimens of his quality as a literary critic before they introduced the philosopher. It would be better still if some of them would themselves illustrate his method by applying it to the criticism of English poetry. He himself has recently shown them the way in his study of Shakespeare. Yet it must be admitted that it is a method which, though simple in itself and seemingly easy to handle, yet requires for its successful employment a combination of qualities not often found united in the professional critic. Croce has identified criticism with art not only in theory but also in practice, for he is himself an artist of the first rank. Hence, like the work of all great artists, his criticism may be more easily admired than imitated. He has made us free of all the secrets of his studio, has put his brush into our hands and shown us how to apply it to the canvas; yet he cannot transfer to us his skill. To attain to that we should need in the first place his intellect, and secondly his learning; and even so we could not be critics after the Crocean manner unless endowed with a highly-trained re-creative imagination.

GEOFFREY L. BICKERSTETH.

Art. 5.—IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE PEACE TREATY.

MORE than once a great Empire has passed through a crisis at Versailles. In 1871 Bismarck celebrated the German victory over France by crowning the King of Prussia German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors. This brought into being the Federal German Empire. In 1919 the Peace Treaty which consummated the Allied victory over Germany embodied far-reaching changes in the relation of the constituent members of the British Empire. In 1871 Bismarck used the immense authority developed through his successful conduct of the war and imposed on the German people a mighty instrument of Government. The changes of 1919 have a centrifugal tendency ; and, if the British Empire is to remain powerful, it will be due to the integrating influence of freedom. There is a curious contrast between the different uses to which victory has been put. The German method has been justly discredited. But it is only right to say that the war has not developed any overwhelming case for a change in Imperial relations.

The British Empire came through the war thoroughly tested but unscathed. A remarkable feature of British war effort was the high degree of co-operation which existed between the various autonomous units which formed the Commonwealth. Successful co-operation between autonomous States is a great test of enlightened policy. The recalcitrant States of America during the War of Independence showed a very different spirit. Their impracticability and mutual distrust nearly broke the heart of Washington. But, when the war broke out in 1914, the Dominions, without hesitation, put their naval and military forces under the control of the British authorities, and thus secured the unity of command necessary to success. The Imperial War Cabinet did useful work, and served a most important end by bringing the Dominions into touch with the real situation, while a vast organisation mobilised the economic resources of the whole Empire. The association and co-operation which took place involved no diminution of the freedom and prestige of the Dominions. Their actions constituted an enlightened exercise of their responsibility as autonomous States mutually interested in the victorious issue

of the war. In one fundamental respect the autonomy of the Dominions was lacking. They were not self-governing nations in matters of foreign policy. They were plunged into the war by the decision of the British Cabinet. That decision was never challenged. Several Dominions have keen interests in certain sections of the field of foreign affairs, but in general the voice of the British Government on the issues of peace and war was admitted, and there was no ambition on the part of the Dominions to share it.

The absent-minded way in which the Empire grew up has often been remarked. But the changes which took place at Paris came like a veritable thief in the night. There was no demand in Australia for a change. The press there was full of articles praising the system which had succeeded so well. In the absence of Mr Hughes, the Cabinet decided that it would be unreasonable for him to ask for separate representation for Australia at the Peace Conference. Other parts of the Empire may have desired fuller freedom and discretion within it. But there was no mandate for any revolutionary change nor has any been announced. Yet the constitutional theory of the Empire advanced by three great leaps at Paris. When the Conference assembled, those who followed it closely found the Dominions sitting at the Council table with foreign nations and classed as Powers with special interests. When the Peace Treaty was signed, it was found that the King required the advice of the representative of each Dominion; and, when its text was examined, it was found that, in the new world-order under the Covenant for the League of Nations, the Dominions were full members of the League and undertook severally all the onerous obligations implied in such membership.

These advances in status were said to be the reward for services in the war. The felicitations offered by Dominion statesmen showed no evidence of any idea that the benefits gained might have to be set against responsibilities undertaken. There is surely a vast difference between a system in which one set of diplomatists do the whole work of the Empire, the King acting on the advice of British Ministers, and one in which the Dominion representatives sit face to face with the representatives

of foreign states and advise the King separately. Such a change would seem to involve an entire remodelling of the organisation. Yet there is nothing in the speeches or actions of the Dominion delegates which indicates any appreciation of the revolutionary character of the change and its implication; and there has since been little attempt to modify the system which existed before the Conference. Never have such important changes attracted so little public attention. They were not accompanied by any explanation and they do not explain themselves. What precisely they involve has to be ascertained by working out the implications which are involved in them.

There is, of course, nothing new about this *ex-post-facto* method of working. The theory of the British Commonwealth has been built up in this way. Some notable act is done by a responsible Minister or officer of State. Immediately constitutional publicists set about working out the implications of the act done, assessing the measure of its departure from the previous practice and fitting it into their theory of the Empire. The advantages of this method are great, but it has its disadvantages. The spectacle of a learned professor discussing what a statesman, still living, accomplished when he took a certain action savours of irony. What the Empire needs, if it is to remain, is statesmen who know what they do when they do it; statesmen capable of working out the implications of their actions. For statesmen to act and constitutionalists to build up a mountain of inferences from such action leads to constitutional thought becoming unreal and casuistical. There is a strange fatalism about it too. If a Dominion took the wrong turning and walked out of the Empire, the theorist would apparently simply record the fact. The statesman used to action but accustomed to leave reflexion to constitutional lawyers might not be aware of what he had done till it was too late to amend his act.

The mood at Paris was not a mood of reflexion. While change was pursuing its rapid course no brains were wasted on the accommodation of what was done to any theory of the Empire. Certain steps were decided on. If they could be clothed with any semblance of legal formulæ it was sufficient. This divorce between

Imperial statesmanship and Imperial theory is somewhat dangerous. There is no reason why statesmen should not be guided by an intelligent and consistent conception of the relations of Empire and Dominions. Indeed, the more individual freedom you give to the parts the more necessary this is if equilibrium is to be preserved.

The war has demonstrated the extraordinary vitality of the British peoples, the reality of the underlying unity which comprises them all in whatever political form they may organise, and their capacity for co-ordinate action. The question of the form of organisation is not supremely important. Almost any form will do which gives the necessary freedom to the parts but brings them face to face with their fundamental responsibilities. But we do need some agreement as to the rationale of our unity and what it involves. The categories of freedom, autonomy and unity do not harmonise as a matter of course. Many strange and illogical pieces of statesmanship have been performed during the evolution of the Empire. But there has always been so far, besides the underlying community of race, a strong legal tie. If the latter is sacrificed, more care must be taken to work out the spiritual bases of our unity. In the last resort we cannot defy logic even under the British flag. We cannot reconcile contradiction with unity. The more we trust ourselves to freedom and autonomy and depart from the formal and legal insignia of political union, the greater the strain and the responsibility we lay on statesmanship. And it is by the test of statesmanship that the changes of the Peace Treaty must be judged. Are they based upon a consistent and intelligent theory of the Empire? Are they likely to promote the common activities of the British peoples and enable them to act together to the fullest advantage?

In order to appreciate fully the changes made at Paris, what is most urgently needed therefore is to examine what was done at Paris as an episode in statesmanship. The changes effected at Paris were of course incidental to the Peace which was being made with Germany. This accounts for their somewhat consequential character. They were not made as the result of an *ad hoc* deliberation. They suddenly became involved in some detail of the Peace, and the action

taken was in some measure determined by the nature of that detail. The leaders involved also were as much interested in the Peace as they were in the constitution and the theory of the Empire. To this circumstance is due the fact that there was no definite scheme of changes suggested.

If they had been made at a Constitutional Conference, the responsibility of leading that Conference would have rested upon Great Britain. But at Paris British statesmen were almost completely passive on this matter. With one exception the changes which came about were the result of Dominion action. Lord Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was in charge of the British Delegation for a considerable period, but he never appears to have uttered a word of advice as to the effects of changes proposed. This attitude was probably judicious. For it takes a lot to eradicate the (very ill-founded) suspicion in the Dominions that British statesmen are always endeavouring to dictate to the Dominions, and that Lord Milner in particular was at the head of a conspiracy to impose Imperial Federation. Still suspicion is the worst toxin that affects Democracy. British statesmen are, as things stood before the war, responsible for the security of the Imperial fabric, and, if they adopt a passive attitude, this responsibility is not being discharged.

With one or two exceptions, the statesmen who represented the Dominions at Paris had little in the way of experience or organisation to equip them for their task. The development of Colonial autonomy had led to their exercising a considerable degree of power in matters wherein foreign nations were involved. Behind this autonomous power there was, however, a consciousness of the legal unity of the whole Empire, which imported the certainty that the might of the Empire would be available in case independent action landed a Dominion in trouble. There was thus power without responsibility, power without a clear consciousness of the foundations upon which it rested. This was not good training for the delicate tasks of diplomacy. Statesmen, accustomed to the anxious experience of European diplomacy, have the most acute sensibility as to the proportion which must exist between their

resources and the policy they advocate. To any man with a natural gift for diplomacy this sense will come as an instinct. It would be too much to expect it in every statesman who happened to have secured high office at the time the great diplomatic Conference was summoned. As a matter of fact, Mr Hughes at Paris frequently acted, or rather spoke, not as if he were the representative of a small defenceless community, but as if he had command of the whole might of the Empire.

There was no common Dominion point of view at Paris. Co-operation was far less frequent than might have been anticipated and was never sufficient to merge the provincial attitudes of the Dominions or lead to the adoption of any principles upon which common action was feasible. Prior to the war each Dominion, owing to its peculiar circumstances, approached Imperial problems from a different angle. Nothing was done at Paris to accommodate these differences. In the case of South Africa, represented by General Smuts, one of the greatest statesmen at Paris, the racial question has an immense influence. The enlightened character of British policy in South Africa has worked wonders; but there is still a residue of dislike of the Imperial connexion, and it is still an advantage to General Smuts to be able to reconcile the Imperial connection with practical independence for South Africa. With the exception of South Africa, however, the degree of satisfaction of a Dominion with the *status quo ante bellum* is in ratio to its vulnerability to outside attack. Canada, resting under the shadow of the Great Republic, fears no external foe, and has been pressing for years for separate-ness in diplomacy. The new status of the Dominions at the Conference was the logical, if questionable, culmination of this process. In Paris, Canada leads the movement for increase in Dominion independence. Newfoundland and New Zealand, small isolated Dominions incapable of defending themselves from aggression, tend in the opposite direction. Newfoundland is not separately represented. The New Zealand representatives take all that is offered in the way of independence, but their action is severely criticised in the Dominion Parliament and is not at all popular.

Australia stands at the dividing point of these

differing tendencies. The war caught Australia at a time when the national idea was in a state of effervescence. The national consciousness was inflamed, and all the national resources were thrown without reservation into the war. At the back of all this is Australia's isolated and dangerous situation—a huge continent sparsely populated by Europeans, the masses of overcrowded India and Japan within a few days' sail. Therefore, Australia relies exclusively on the Imperial connexion for her safety. This has its reactions on Australia's attitude at the Conference. The League of Nations Covenant finds Mr Hughes in opposition. The international mind of General Smuts relies on the League of Nations and visualises the Empire as a loose association of peoples within it. The intensely national mind of Mr Hughes fears the League because of its possible solvent influence on the Empire. With curious inconsistency Mr Hughes is as zealous as Sir Robert Borden in all schemes for promoting independent status for the Dominions.

During the war a definite promise had been made to consult the Dominions as to the terms of peace, but the Armistice approving of the Fourteen Points was signed without consulting any of them, though Mr Hughes was in London. When the Dominion delegates arrived in Paris they found Mr Lloyd George pressing on a rather surprised President Wilson the independent representation of the Dominions. The Italian and French representatives on the Council of Ten heartily supported him. Mr Lloyd George won his point, and the Dominions were classed with Greece and Serbia as powers with special interests. Of course Dominion membership was of some substantial value to Mr Lloyd George. It assisted to redress the balance of non-European influence which was affected by the large number of American Powers present. Nevertheless, there is a glaring contrast between the mood of November, in which the Dominions were forgotten, and the mood of January, when the Dominions were placed in a position of full co-operation and responsibility. It cannot be said that the mind of Mr Lloyd George was penetrated with any clear and definite idea of Imperial relations.

Therefore, during the Peace Conference, the Dominions remained members of the British Empire Delegation and were guests of the British Government at the Hôtel Majestic. They shared all the confidential information and all the contributions of the skilled experts who made up the Delegation. They shared in the momentous discussions which the Delegation held, and some of them did valuable work as representatives of the British Delegation on the various Commissions. They were exposed to the arts of foreign diplomacy, and the shrewd leaders of Continental nations were in one or two instances able to play upon their weaknesses and use them. But, up to the signature of the Peace Treaty, there was a reasonably effective system of co-operation. There was no opportunity for voting combinations at which the representatives of the Dominions could vote against the representatives of Great Britain. When the Dominions were admitted to the Conference, there was no heart-to-heart talk with them at which a mutual understanding as to the conditions and limitations of the system was arrived at; and in the circumstances it is surprising that no untoward incident happened. It will be seen, moreover, that when Mr Hughes protested against the application of the mandate system to German New Guinea, it was the British press and public whose support he tried to enlist. Mr Lloyd George was at all times prepared to assert the duty of loyalty of all members of the Delegation towards its central authority; and, if any attempt had been made to intrigue outside it, he would have called upon the delegate to choose whether he would remain a member of the Delegation or not.

In assessing the value of the change to the Dominions, a good many countervailing considerations have to be allowed. Mr Hughes, when he argued the case for annexation, was bowed in at the Quai D'Orsay, stated his case, and was bowed out. The subsequent decisions were a matter for the Big Five; and even Mr Lloyd George, though a representative of the Empire, was not necessarily committed to the arguments of Mr Hughes. If Australia had not been represented independently, her leader would have had a call, as of right, upon the British Prime Minister's voice. If his appeal were not

listened to, he could have appealed to his constituency or the British public. In any case he could have given the Prime Minister a bad time. It would have been difficult for the latter to refuse to put the Dominions' case and advocate it with the whole weight of his position as Leader of the British Empire. As it was, when he allowed them to state their cases he was absolved from responsibility. A candid observer must admit that the Dominions rather lost than gained in influence by the change. When the Dominions undertook to present their own cases an embarrassing responsibility was taken off the shoulders of Mr Lloyd George, a relief of which he was not insensible.

When the Dominion delegates signed the Peace Treaty, they did so as Ministers of King George V. Each Minister separately undertook the responsibility of advising the King that it was a proper treaty to sign so far as his Dominion was concerned. The form in which the Treaty was signed was the result very largely of pressure by Sir Robert Borden, who was more or less actively supported by other Dominion Ministers. The suggestion appears to have been accepted without much opposition by British Ministers. Of course, to a large extent, the form of the signature of the Treaty was a matter of domestic concern of the Empire. The separate responsibility of the various Governments did not affect the legal unity of the Empire. There is one Sovereign with whom foreign nations can negotiate. It was easy for the acute constitutional lawyers on the staffs of the Dominion delegates to find a formula in which this multiple responsibility could be expressed; and, when the formula was found, the Dominion Ministers, like a celebrated character in fiction, were completely satisfied.

But the Dominions have always, so far as ultimate responsibilities were concerned, been working within the Empire in a rather unreal atmosphere. They have never yet suffered the full consequences of their actions. The strength of the whole Empire has stood behind them; and the Government of the United Kingdom has assumed responsibility for them. It is not altogether inexcusable if they have not worked out the full implication of the formulæ they cheerfully signed. In the correspondence

which passed before and during the Peace Conference, the insistent note in Sir Robert Borden's contributions was a stress upon the privileges Canada had won by the share she took in the war. But for the fact that it is a common mistake in democratic politics, it is rather surprising that the onerous obligations which are the obverse of those privileges were not present to Sir Robert Borden's mind. One recollects that Sir Wilfrid Laurier rather objected to be consulted on questions of Imperial Foreign policy, lest he should be implicated in the consequences of the action taken on his advice. As previously remarked, when the formula was found in Paris and put at the top and bottom of the Peace Treaty, the task of asserting the national individuality of the Dominions was considered accomplished. There was no heart-searching over it, and no attempt to arrive at a common understanding. The implications were left to work themselves out. One gathers that the conception of what was implied varied with the particular Minister and the particular Dominion. It was affected by the theory of Imperial relations dominant in the particular part of the Empire for the time being concerned, and was not unaffected by the political situation there. Australian opinion has displayed a singular lack of interest in the matter, and it has not been possible even to have it discussed in Parliament.

Nobody in Australia and New Zealand believes that anything serious happened. The Hon. W. A. Watt, M.H.R., while in England, and Mr Downie Stewart, M.H.R., of New Zealand, are the only Members of Parliament in either country who have raised a note of warning. Mr Hughes, who distrusts the League of Nations, and is insistent upon the separate status of the Dominions and the other privileges that have been won, has never suggested that any question has been thrown upon the complete integrity of the Empire by what was done at Paris. General Smuts, on the other hand, being one of the protagonists of the League, probably believes that the machinery of the League mitigates the strategic problems of South Africa, and thus renders the protection of the British Empire less essential. General Smuts is a great man, and has articulated more clearly than any other statesman in the Empire what has followed from

the separate status of the Dominions. He lays stress on the fact that he is a direct adviser of the King, and does not advise him through the British Government. This is the key-note of his position. The last shred of authority by the British Government has gone. An Act of the British Parliament no longer binds South Africa. The union between South Africa and the United Kingdom is apparently a personal one; South Africa is virtually independent. General Smuts considers it an anomaly that the Dominions still conduct correspondence through the Colonial Office, that the Governor-General is still appointed on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that the Dominions have as yet no diplomatic service.

With regard to the desirability of a single voice, he brusquely states that South Africa is not going to be coerced by any majority. The mandate for German South-West Africa is treated as coming direct from the Allied and Associated Powers; and South Africa is fully competent to accept it without any delegation from the Crown. At the same time, according to him, the Empire is one and indissoluble, the person of the King accomplishing a unity which may not exist on any single line of policy. The campaign which General Smuts has fought in South Africa since he returned, to weld together the deeply divided elements, a campaign which the recent elections have crowned with striking success, is no doubt due in some measure to this skilful reading of the Peace Treaty. It is permissible to hope that this reconciliation is not founded on a contradiction. It will be seen, however, that so far General Smuts has been talking rather than acting. He himself confesses that his theory involves a considerable alteration in the machinery of the Imperial system. No steps have yet been taken to bring about such an alteration.

Canada has always led the way towards the advance of Dominion status; and the steps taken at Paris followed not unnaturally from a series of other steps taken by Canada towards diplomatic freedom. Canadian patriotism has always boggled at the theory that Imperial unity resides only in the person of the King, long advocated by Mr J. S. Ewart, K.C. But it would be interesting to hear Sir Robert Borden distinguish the present state

of Imperial relations, as he sees it, from a merely personal union. There is little doubt that Sir Robert Borden had a mandate for a strong assertion of Canadian nationality. It is, however, the vice of democracy that the people, in their demand for privileges, forget the corresponding obligations. This vice it is the paramount duty of the statesman to correct. There is no trace in any of Sir Robert Borden's speeches that are available in Australia that he has attempted to do this. He contents himself with a plain narrative of what he has done for Canada, and never appears to have put to himself the searching questions which should accompany such a big departure as he advocated.

One of Sir Robert's Ministers, Mr A. L. Sefton, was more critical, and declared that 'the British Empire is composed of five or six nations with one Sovereign. When that Sovereign is at war, all these nations are at war; but the part that any one nation takes in that war is determined by its own Parliament exercising its own sovereign power.' In this remark he made an attempt to meet one of the deepest problems involved in the position which his chief had taken up. Will it serve? War has consequences undesirable to non-combatants. It can hardly be regarded as a very successful assertion of Canadian individuality to bring about a state of things in which she can be involved in a war, brought about purely by Australian action, in regard to which Canada has never been consulted. The implications from such a position are unthinkable. In the event of the King being at war through Canadian action, the United Kingdom not being consulted, would the British Navy support the King who had been involved by Canada, and would the people of the United Kingdom be willing to suffer the penalties of being at war, even as non-combatants? It is evident that the statesmen who proposed these suggestions do not envisage Canada really in danger. Though they probably do not admit it to themselves, they consider themselves adequately protected by the Monroe Doctrine. It is somewhat significant that Canada's first action in pursuance of her new status is to appoint an ambassador to Washington. Is the common political interest of the two countries under the Monroe Doctrine the

sub-conscious influence at the back of this? Mr Hughes has also announced that Australia intends to appoint an ambassador in America who will act in conjunction, but not necessarily in agreement, with the British Ambassador. Common interests in the Pacific can hardly be sufficient to justify the appointment. Moreover, the chances of diplomatic incident, needing handling by an ambassador, are very remote. Mr Hughes' action is merely imitative, and it represents a growing momentum in the centrifugal tendency.

The very fact that there can be so many different interpretations of the same act by the participants within a few months is rather a severe criticism upon those statesmen. In fact, save as to the bare words of the formula used in Paris, there was no mutuality. Each statesman used the formula with his own idea of what he meant. What he has been doing since is to give it some relation to a definite theory. This formula represents what is left of Imperial unity. It is not inconsistent with a very effective unity and a common effort to achieve the great purposes for which the British peoples stand. But, while statesmen get up and give varying accounts of what the formula means, while they make up their minds as to how they are going to apply it, the question of Imperial unity must be in a somewhat precarious condition. It may not be possible or desirable to set up a central instrument of government for the Empire. It should at least be possible to draw up a covenant which sets out in intelligible terms what the parties intend to do for one another.

Meanwhile, it is important to point out that, in their anxiety to assert their freedom, their virtual independence without actually parting asunder, the statesmen of Canada and South Africa have placed upon the Sovereign a serious responsibility and strain. It is all too probable that their theory would destroy the very basis upon which they seek to rest it. However far you abstract the Sovereign, he can only act in one way at once. It is contemplated that he will be receiving advice from different sources. Such advice will not always coincide. It may be contradictory, even antagonistic. In such a case, the King will have to choose whose advice he will follow. The rejection of one advice will snap the link

and lead to the dissolution of the one bond. Nor does the responsibility of choosing which advice to follow belong to the Crown. By a series of democratic victories it has been taken away. If we insist on restoring it, we place on the King an obligation which he could never sustain. The King can never become an organ in the Imperial system. He must remain what he is in the British Constitution. The idea of multiple responsibility is either a reactionary attempt to increase the prerogatives of the Crown or it is a sham. If the advice to the Crown is a mere form—something which is only meant to maintain the show of what has already disappeared—then the Empire is dead already.

Events which have transpired since the Peace was signed render it unnecessary to consider in such detail the third step in Dominion Status taken at Paris—the separate membership of the League of Nations. The refusal of the United States of America to ratify the Covenant radically affects that compact. Without the United States the League cannot function effectively. If the Covenant is finally approved, it will probably differ widely from the existing document. One of the terms at present under discussion is the status of the Dominions. Nevertheless this whole phase illustrates, in the most illuminating way, the statesmanship of the representatives of the various British Delegates. During the Peace Conference—while the Draft Covenant was being prepared—Sir Robert Borden, as he informed his House of Commons, set himself to ensure that the status accorded the Dominions in the Peace Conference and the Peace Treaty should be accorded to them in all international relationships in the future. The first drafts of the Covenant did not altogether satisfy him, and he pressed for a recognition which would be quite unambiguous. It was due to this pressure, which was supported by the other Dominion delegates, that the Dominions were accepted as original signatories of the Covenant and members of the League.

There are still two slight ambiguities in the Covenant which are relevant. The list of British signatories, commencing with the British Empire and the Dominions, are set out with an inner margin. It has been suggested that the words 'British Empire' include the Dominions, which

have thus a dual membership. It is also suggested that the inner margin groups in some way the British States. Sir Robert Borden is, however, emphatic that there is nothing whatever in the Covenant to distinguish the British Dominions from any other member of the League. To make this doubly sure, he secured a memorandum from Mr Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and President Wilson, in which they assured him that Canada is eligible for a seat on the Council of the League. Having received this assurance, Sir Robert Borden signed the Covenant, and assumed for the 7,000,000 souls in Canada the vast obligations of that document with an enviable feeling of satisfaction. It will be noticed that in the same geographical area, a nation of over 100,000,000 souls hesitates, and finally refuses, to accept these obligations. Either the American nation are caitiffs or Sir Robert Borden and his constituents are foolhardy. The difference, of course, is that the United States has for a century and a half enjoyed the responsibility of international action; whereas Canada has not. The American reluctance to assume these obligations may or may not be a paltry fear of responsibility. But surely the Canadian attitude is the carelessness of irresponsibility. And if this applies to Canada, what shall we say of Australia, which has no great Republic to nestle under, but is isolated and practically incapable of guaranteeing its own security?

Even if we pass by the obligations of the League and test the position by calculating the influence which will be exercised by the various Powers in association with or without the rest of the Empire, we must see that the Dominions have gained only the shadow and lost the substance by the change. The relative influence of the Dominions in isolation will be exceedingly small. Canada will rank far below Belgium; and Australia, taking into account her smallness of population and her strategic weakness and the small value she possesses for any system of world balance, will be one of the most insignificant influences in the League. What have these shadowy influences to compare with the extraordinary influence they would wield as 'favourite sons' and partners of the most powerful and best trusted member of the League?

General Smuts, indeed, claims that during the discussion on economic conventions it was admitted by the Peace Conference that for economic purposes the British Nation was entitled to be treated as a group and the restriction on international economic agreements should not apply to them. He argued, therefore, that defensive agreements between the various parts of the Empire were in order. If this be so, the British members of the League enjoy a position of peculiar privilege. It may be suggested, however, that the second proposition, which affects a supremely vital principle of the League, does not follow from the first, which is not at all vital. There is no justification for the doctrine of a British League within the League of Nations in the Covenant itself. A discussion at Paris, or even a clause in the Peace Treaty, cannot alter the interpretation of the Covenant.

The whole proposition that the Dominions can be linked in defensive organisation with each other and the United Kingdom and yet be independent members is fallacious. Like the other ideas we have been discussing, it is based on a contradiction. It is inconsistent with a statesmanlike interpretation of the Covenant. The Covenant is an agreement to adopt certain measures in order to prevent war amongst its members or against any of them. It relies on the guarantee given by each member and the independent and impartial exercise of the influence of each on matters which come before it. Can it be said that such a system will work if members who have an independent status and voice in the League are yet bound to one another in a complete naval and military organisation? Will they use such an organisation against one of their own League? Will the British forces and the British economic organisation be used to bring a recalcitrant Canada to book? It is often said that voting power under the League is of little importance because most of the decisions of the League have to be unanimous. Many important matters can, however, be decided by majority votes, the power of amendment being one. The voting power can be used to put a Dominion on the Council. In the proposed system the voting power could be used to prevent an unanimous vote, or in practice a two-thirds vote, being given against

any part of the Empire. Thus, in fact, none of the sanctions of the League could be put into force against the Empire. The weight of the League can, in effect, never be used against any particular part of the British Empire.

There is, of course, no reason at all why the British Empire should occupy a privileged position in the League. It emerges from the war far more powerful than any other Power. Its influence in the League will be paramount. Why should the Empire be given extra votes for the Dominions so that its voting strength will be five or six times that of other nations of greater population? When we realise the immense advantages this would give the Empire, we cannot think that it was the intention of the parties to recognise the unity of the Empire and at the same time give each British member all the privileges of independence. It will be remembered that Europe did not want the League. It was forced upon her by the Anglo-Saxon nations. Europe was, therefore, not at the moment in a mood to criticise details or work out consequences. European Powers have made mental reservations which will become apparent when the League functions in a manner hostile to any of them. Nothing could be more dangerous than an anomaly of this kind. It would never stand a real test. In case of crisis, when such an unfair advantage is given to the Empire, other nations would refuse to recognise the authority of the League.

The United States, on the other hand, has appreciated the position to the full. The separate voting power has been one of the most powerful influences in America against the acceptance of the League. Viscount Grey, when in the United States, was pressed by the logic of these objections, and on his return put forward the theory that the only reasonable interpretation of the Covenant is that the Dominions cannot vote on any question in which a British member is interested. This is a piece of constructive interpretation. There is no warrant for it in the Covenant. It mitigates though it hardly meets the force of our criticism. But, so far, no authoritative statesman in England or the Dominions has agreed to what Lord Grey considers the only reasonable interpretation. It is obvious that Sir Robert Borden

and General Smuts disagree. The whole episode, indeed, leads British policy into an awkward position. The League is a necessity to the British Empire, just as the Empire is a necessity to the Dominions. It would make a bad impression and really destroy the moral value of the League if the Covenant, which the British Delegation imposed upon the world, contains anomalous privileges inconsistent with its spirit. So far public attention has not envisaged this phase of the League situation. We go on as if there were no question as to the integrity of the Empire. This inattention is the result of war strain. Otherwise the public mind, both in England and the Dominions, would be contemplating the alternatives—the League or the Empire. It would be a strange irony if the pacific policy of the Anglo-Saxon nations has created a something which destroys the most effective instrument of the world's peace—the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Using the test we set out to apply—the test of statesmanship—we have to ask ourselves whether in the adjustment arrived at in Paris any workable and politic basis has been laid down for the future of the Empire; and we answer by suggesting the doubt whether the Empire still remains intact. As an episode in statesmanship, indeed, the history of this development is profoundly disturbing. The delegates of the different Dominions have no common ground. They do not agree in their interpretation of what they have done. They took nobody into their confidence, and they have not rendered an adequate account of the changes they have brought about. The changes apparently effected involve huge alterations in organisation. There has been no attempt to provide this. They involve consequences of great importance in our mutual relations. These consequences are not being faced.

The most conspicuous element in the whole episode has been the appetite for privilege and status on the one hand, and the blindness, on the other, to the obligations and the responsibilities which that status implies. None of the Dominions can protect itself with its own resources; and in this essential respect the basis of independence—even virtual independence—is absent. In short, there has been a failure to face the issues and the

facts—a veiling of contradictions by thin formulæ and a radical irresponsibility. The silence and inactivity of British statesmen on this matter is surprising. Have they nothing to say? no advice to give? Their inaction has been dictated by prudence. The suspicion that Downing Street is engaged in the congenial task of undermining Dominion authority is the favourite cry of politicians who are destitute of ideas on the matter. In this case the Dominions have been given their heads. Still the responsibility for securing the integrity of the Imperial structure must ultimately rest with British statesmen. At present it is not being discharged. Silence is not justifiable in the circumstances. When changes are proposed by the Dominions and Great Britain acquiesces, the Dominions are entitled to understand that the United Kingdom still retains its full responsibility. But is it clear that this is now the case? Will the British people accept responsibility for a war which has been brought about by Canadian diplomacy which the United Kingdom has been unable to influence? No British statesman has put this to the people of Great Britain. In their present overburdened position it is pretty clear that they would not feel bound by such action. Silence under such circumstances is disingenuous. We should know precisely what England stands for and what the implications of our action are, so far as she is concerned.

It is not part of the scheme of this article to suggest methods of Imperial organisation which are needed to meet the problems that have been raised. An attempt has been made to state the issue as a political problem and suggest the importance of a deeper consideration than public men have yet given to it. We have grown accustomed to treat questions of Empire development as problems in evolution. The Empire has developed by slow steps through the action of a Governor here and a Premier there, upon which actions the thought of publicists worked out the implications and consequences and gradually built up the Imperial theory. In this case one huge step has been taken and it is set down in indefinite terms in a contract with third parties. The interpretation of this document is for everybody to make.

It is not a merely domestic issue. So far every advance in the freedom of the Dominions has been an integrating factor, because the growing appreciation by the Dominions of their responsibilities has led to their realising their vital need of the strength which comes of union. Their sense of responsibility has been temporarily obscured by war. The intoxications of victory, the achievements of each, conceal the fact, which is more than ever true, that no Dominion can stand by itself. The whole problem is to bring the Dominions, as national units, in touch with their responsibilities, to make them feel the realities of the position. Thus the participation of the Dominions in the Peace Conference was absolutely correct. It gave them their first glimpse of diplomatic realities. It enabled them to try their prentice hand. The mistakes of the individual delegates will be plain to the citizens they represent. But the only way in which the responsibilities of the Dominion Leaders for the security of their own States can be discharged is by their deliberate choice of combined and co-operative action and the rejection of everything which would prevent it. This may involve the rejection of the separate voting power in the League and the provision of some machinery by which the Empire can speak with a single voice. But it will not sacrifice the national identity of the Dominions. They could have a status in the League, take part in its subsidiary organisations and administrative activities, remaining nations, but realising their nationhood in association with their partner nations in the British Commonwealth. This conception finally rules out the idea of Imperial Federation, which would destroy the sense of responsibility in the Dominions by taking the problem of national security out of their hands and placing it in the hands of an ineffective Super-State remote from their daily life. These responsibilities must be discharged through their national institutions.

Mr Lionel Curtis, in his advocacy of Imperial Federation, has endeavoured to demonstrate the impracticability of co-operation between independent States. But he bases his arguments upon the experience of the American Colonies during the War of Independence. This does not hold for the recent war. In that conflict co-operation between the various parts of the Empire attained a high

order of success, and at Paris the British Empire Delegation gave an exhibition of co-operation which left little to be desired. When the League of Nations is established in working order, the British Delegation should be organised so as to operate in the same way.

After the magnificent example of British patriotism which the war brought forth, it is not possible to doubt the vitality of the Britannic idea. The British Commonwealth is there in spirit if we can only correctly embody it in the proper formulæ and articulate an effective system. We do not want a Bismarck to come upon us like a God from the clouds with a cast-iron constitution. We want to rely upon the spirit of the race and its well-tried political capacity. This was shown better in the first days of the war than at its close, when all were suffering from war strain. The Dominion Governments never exercised a more individual and independent judgment than when they put their forces under the command of the British authorities. In that act they drew themselves up to the full stature of Nationhood. Their inability to discuss or decide questions of foreign policy, of war and peace, was a matter for which they had made no provision and which must now be attended to. But the true spirit still exists even though leadership may falter. Canada and South Africa may strain at the painter. Let it break, and their heads will immediately turn round and seek the old moorings. There is no reason to fear that the problems which face us will not be solved. We are tackling a problem which baffled the greatest Empire of the old world, the reconciliation of Empire and Liberty. We were confronted with an enemy which frankly accepted authority as its basis, and the principle of Liberty secured us the victory. There is little doubt that, if we face the position squarely and fearlessly, we shall secure an effective unity in a British Commonwealth of Nations.

F. W. EGGLESTON.

Art. 6.—THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

FOR years men have been talking and writing of Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Railway; and bewildered with 'firmans,' 'irades,' 'concessions,' and 'kilometric guarantees,' have been left with the vague idea that, probably through the fault of the British Government, the Germans realised exceedingly successful commercial and financial results from their venture in Asia Minor. Now that the end of the War has rendered available information previously only accessible to Germans, it is consoling to be able to announce that, far from having made money over the Bagdad Railway, the promoters of that enterprise incurred losses which ran into millions, and that, even had the War not taken place, it is unlikely that the Bagdad Railway could ever have become a financial success.

The idea of linking up Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean by rail is of British origin. It dates back to the Fifties, when Colonel Chesney, R.E., who conducted the first accurate survey of Mesopotamia, suggested that the Euphrates Valley might be developed by giving it railway communication with the Syrian ports of Alexandretta or Suedia. The Englishman, however, turns instinctively to water rather than to land transport; and, although Mesopotamia did attract a certain amount of British enterprise, it was through Lynch's steamers, and not through Chesney's railways.

The first railway in Asiatic Turkey was built by a British Company and has remained under British control. This line received its concession in 1856, started from Smyrna, and ran up the Meander Valley to Aidin, and eventually beyond that town, being built in successive sections, each of which was worked and made a paying concern, through the consequent development of the surrounding country, before the next section was begun.* The significance of this method will be

* Similarly, the English S. and C. Railway was built in sections by a British Company. Like the Aidin Railway it never received a subvention from Turkey. At the end of the stipulated term of years it passed to the Turkish Government, and was thereupon given to a French Company, and became the S.C.P. (Smyrne—Cassaba—Prolongement).

seen when we come to deal with the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Unlike all other Turkish lines, the Aidin railway, as it is generally called, received no kilometric guarantee; that is, the Turkish Government did not promise to make up the revenues of the railway, should they prove insufficient, to an annual gross average return of a fixed amount per kilometre. This line has played a useful and profitable part in the development of Asia Minor; but has never been able to exercise a political influence comparable to that of the younger companies.

French railway enterprise in the Near East has, on occasion, come into conflict with that of Germany; but, from a general point of view, it can be said that the Germans abandoned to French interests the railway possibilities of European Turkey and North-West Asia Minor; and to the Russians the Black Sea Coast, keeping for themselves the great road to the East, the road to Bagdad. Nor was this at first unwelcome to the British, whose ideas in regard to Turkey were still coloured by memories of the Crimean War. Already, since 1873, a railway had existed, running from Haidar Pacha, opposite Constantinople on the Bosphorus, to Ismidt, some 90 kilometres east. It had been built for the Sultan by Wilhelm von Pressel, a German engineer who played a great part in railway construction in Asia; but had been conceded to an English Company in 1880. The Ottoman Government, in 1888, bought out the original British Company, and granted to Herr Kaulla, the representative of the Deutsche Bank, not only the concession of the Ismidt Railway, but also that for the extension of the same railway to Angora. As a result of this, the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia came into being, with the Deutsche Bank as the directing force behind it and the German Government ready to assist by any means in their power.

The position of the Turkish Government cannot be understood without reference to the character and aims of the reigning Sultan. Abdul Hamid II, a man whose great ability has been seldom recognised, worked throughout his life in the pursuit of one ideal—Pan-Islamism, that is, the religious and political unity of Moslems all

over the world. None of his predecessors had laid much stress on the Sultan's claim to be Commander of the Faithful and Successor of the Prophet. But after Turkey had lost the greater part of her Balkan possessions, and her cause in Europe began to appear hopeless, the idea of recovering elsewhere all, and more than all, that had been lost became particularly attractive. So far as religious primacy was concerned, Abdul Hamid's propaganda achieved speedy success. The establishment of Turkish Consuls-General in the British and Dutch East Indian possessions was the next step. Religious and political obedience are much more closely bound together in the Moslem than in the Christian world; and because the British ruled millions of Moslems in India, the Sultan abandoned the traditional Turkish policy of friendship with this country. On the other hand, it was obviously to British interest to confine the Sultan's authority as Khalif strictly to religious matters; in view of which circumstances, it is not surprising to find that, on Aug. 1, 1899, Herr Kurt Zander, of the Anatolian Railway, wrote to Herr Siemens, the Deutsche Bank representative in Constantinople: 'For the Sultan, the Bagdad Railway is solely a weapon against the English Khalifate policy.' On the other hand, Abdul Hamid was aware of the fact that German financiers were anxious to extend their operations towards the Persian Gulf, and had decided that, far from requesting the construction of the railway she desired, Turkey should be graciously pleased to grant on her own terms the petitions of those who desired to serve her. The success of this policy is acknowledged in a letter from Zander to Siemens of March 5, 1900.

It was originally intended that the main line of the Anatolian Railway should run through Angora to Cæsarea, and continue through or near Sivas (there were several plans) to the headwaters of the Tigris at Diarbekir; and thence down the valley to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Von Pressel to the last maintained that this route, or one still more northerly, would have been preferable to that adopted. But the country was difficult, and Russia watched with jealous eyes any movement towards Armenia. As a result, the extension from Angora eastwards, though provided for in the

fresh concession granted to the Anatolian Railway in 1893, did not materialise, but a new line from Eski-Shehir to Konia, the ancient Iconium, was built and opened for traffic in 1896.

Until this time the influence of the German Government had been mainly indirect. In 1898, however, William II paid his historic visit to the East, and associated himself immediately with the Sultan's Pan-Islamic ideas. It is instructive to compare the criticisms of 'Abdul the Damned,' in most of the Western Press, with the Kaiser's speech at Damascus on Nov. 8, 1898, when he assured 'The Sultan and the 300 millions of Moslems who venerate him as Khalif that the German Emperor is ever their friend.' The Kaiser also threw himself whole-heartedly into the idea of a Bagdad Railway, and came to regard the project as particularly his own. Not only did he personally bring pressure to bear upon the Sultan to obtain the granting of a concession for a line from Konia to the Anatolian Railway; but in August 1899, when receiving the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, he said, 'Now then, get *my* railway down there finished for me.' ('Na, nun machen Sie mir da unten *Meine Bahn* fertig.') It should be noted that the German Government never quite realised the distinction between assistance and interference. The financial promoters of the scheme had frequently to complain that Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the Ambassador in Constantinople, and Major Morgen, his military attaché, with entire disregard for economic considerations, interfered in matters that should have been regarded as strictly business. So great was the eagerness of the German diplomats, that the business men in Berlin, in September 1900, wrote to inform their colleagues in Turkey of steps the Foreign Office had taken on behalf of those colleagues in Constantinople of which they themselves were not aware. Yet the Turks were secretly keener for the scheme than they pretended to be, and a letter of Zander's, dated April 11, 1902, describes the joy and relief of Zekki Pasha and another highly-placed Turkish official, when he said they might tell the Sultan that the affair could be managed.

A survey expedition went over the ground in 1899

soon after the Kaiser's visit. Not only were its chief engineers, Mackensen and Von Kapp, Germans, but the official German connexion was emphasised by the placing of the entire concern under the direction of Stemrich, the German Consul-General in Turkey. At the same time Major Morgen prepared a report on the strategic possibilities of the line. The survey party reported unfavourably on the Angora-Sivas route, and recommended an extension from Konia through the Taurus Mountains by the famous pass known as the Cilician Gates. This scheme was severely criticised by Von Pressel, who clung to his idea of a more northerly route, and it is now admitted that the prospectors vastly underestimated the difficulties of the Taurus region. Still, as it stood, their plan was considered feasible, and was approved by Berlin. Siemens was summoned to a conference at which the Emperor himself, Bülow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Miquel, the Finance Minister, were present. Siemens reported that so far as concerned the financial and technical aspects, capital could be found and construction completed within about ten years; but that the political side was out of his hands. The Emperor, with the concurrence of both ministers, guaranteed the removal of any political obstacle. It was, however, considered desirable to obtain British co-operation, and necessary, therefore, to persuade the British, not merely to ignore, but actively to assist, an enterprise which possibly threatened their Indian Empire and certainly provided a means of evading their control of the Suez Canal. As for the French, they had a long record of influence in the Near East and large sums invested there—202 million francs in railways alone—and, apart from their natural dislike of the spread of German influence and trade, it was not impossible that they should desire an extension eastwards of the French Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, which had already reached the Anatolian line at Afion Kara-Hissar, though it was not yet joined to it. The 'international' character of the proposed railway was, therefore, insisted upon; and elaborate calculations were prepared, showing the saving in time that the new route would provide for mails and passenger traffic from Europe to India and the East generally. It was

suggested that, by arrangement with the British, a fast ferry service should be established between the port of Koweit, on the Persian Gulf, and Bombay, and alternative plans were brought forward for a tunnel to be made under, or a bridge or train ferry established over, the Bosphorus. The British were to be told that in future they would be able to enter a train at Calais or Ostend, and leave it on the shores of the Persian Gulf; and the records of Russian and American railways were searched for instances of long-distance working. To quote the words of M. Huguenin, then Assistant-Director-General of the Anatolian Railway, 'It is agreed that we are to build a model line such as exists nowhere in Turkey, able in all respects to undertake efficiently an international service involving high speeds over the whole line.' It is true that Von Pressel maintained to the last that the cost of constructing a line fit to carry international expresses over the route chosen would be prohibitive. But he was not listened to; and it is certain that, once it was decided to continue the Anatolian Railway, the use of a narrower gauge for the newer sections, as urged by Von Pressel, was inadvisable. Still, the optimism of its promoters certainly exaggerated greatly the 'express service' possibilities of the new line.

The original proposal as made to the French was that 40 per cent. of the shares of the new concern should be reserved for French capital. A similar proportion was to be allotted to Germany, and the remaining 20 per cent. to other nations. In view of this, M. Constans, French Ambassador at Constantinople, and M. Rouvier, French Minister of Finance, favoured the new enterprise. The later German reports complain of the hostility of M. Delcassé towards them. But at the outset he was considered by those in France who disliked the enterprise to be too favourable to it. Needless to say, the Deutsche Bank took care that no real share in the control of the Bagdad Railway came into French hands; while the Germans obtained all they desired from the French—an absence of serious opposition; a certain amount of capital subscribed for the 'Bagdad' Turkish loans, and the assistance of the French representatives on

the Turkish Public Debt Administration in the various financial measures, such as Consolidation of the Turkish Debt, and increase of customs duties, which were necessary to provide for interest on the Bagdad loans.

The German financiers set great store on British co-operation. So far back as 1889, Siemens had stated that 'the scheme was impossible without England,' and had written to Zander, 'The English must come in with us.' In 1900 he went to London in the hope of securing British co-operation. Certain English financiers were not unfavourably disposed to the scheme of a land route to India; but the proposed increase in customs duties met with considerable opposition; and Siemens, reporting this, added the comment, 'That ends Bagdad' (*Damit fällt Bagdad*), and wrote to Schrader, 'The Bagdad business seems to be lost. England will enter into no agreement without being pushed, and our politicians will not push her. Nevertheless, we must go on working in Constantinople; but every farthing of backsheesh is thrown away.'

The French comment at a later date, '*Londres ne veut pas; Berlin ne peut pas,*' was already applicable. However, at the moment when the original capital was being subscribed, a determined effort was made to obtain British capital and assistance in the establishment of a terminus at Koweit on the Persian Gulf. On April 8, 1903, in reply to Mr Gibson Bowles, Mr Balfour gave the House of Commons to understand that the matter was under consideration, and that the suggestion was that 'British capital and control were to be on an absolute equality with the capital and control of any other power.' The subsequent refusal of Mr Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, to grant any official British co-operation was due to reasons explained in an article in the '*Financial Times*' of April 17, 1903. It was there pointed out that, as Mr Waugh, British Vice-Consul at Constantinople, had already reported, there was absolutely no guarantee that the management of the railway would bear any relation to the nationality of the capital raised to build it. Indeed, though this was, of course, unknown in British circles at the time, Marschall von Bieberstein had sent a confidential memorandum to the financiers of the Deutsche Bank reminding them of the

absolute necessity of keeping the power in German hands, and warning them that Berlin would tolerate no division of control. In any case, traffic to and from the new railway would have to pass over the Anatolian line, which already was under German control, and preferential treatment for German goods would thus be easy to obtain. As before, the proposed increase of customs duties aroused opposition in England. It was further pointed out that the Germans were keeping in their own hands the contracts for construction from which an immediate profit was expected, and that the nature of the country made it improbable that any appreciable dividend should be paid on the share capital for several years to come. Against this, only the possible political gain could be urged, with the eventual saving in time for the Indian mail, the importance of which was naturally questioned by British shipping interests.

Hence there were no British representatives among the directors of the new company. A certain amount of French capital was obtained, partly through Switzerland, and a pretence was made of French association in the directorate. M. Huguenin, of the Anatolian Railway, a French Swiss, played a leading part in the development of the new line as regards the technical railway side; but Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank, as President, and Testa, German representative on the Council of Turkish Bondholders, as Vice-President of the Board, enjoyed the real controlling influence.

On March 5, 1903, a concession for the construction and working of a railway from Konia to Bagdad, via Aleppo and Mosul, had been finally granted and signed. This authorised the Anatolian Railway Company to create a new company, to be called the Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Company, with a capital of 660,000 Turkish pounds (15,000,000 francs). Ten per cent. of the shares were to be reserved for the Turkish Government, and the same amount for the Anatolian Railway. The failure to obtain the expected amount of foreign capital compelled the new company to depend very largely upon the Turkish Government. Turkey's finances were, however, at that time in a most unsatisfactory condition. So long ago as June 1898, Von Kühlmann, then Director-General of the Anatolian Railway, had written that

almost all Turkey's financial resources were pledged for different purposes, and that, should she incur further obligations, any sudden emergency might lead to inability to meet railway guarantees. It is true that the succession of wars in which Turkey was involved between 1911 and 1918 could not have been foreseen. Nevertheless, in view of Turkey's existing liabilities it was hazardous to saddle her with the responsibility for an enterprise which involved an enormous expenditure of capital with an exceedingly problematical return. The Deutsche Bank group, however, did not know the extent to which 'strategical,' as against commercial, considerations were to be predominant. There were two logical courses—either for the Turkish Government to obtain from their German ally sufficient capital to build the strategical railway they considered necessary, lessening the cost by such profit on private traffic as they could get; or for a private company to build a line solely for commercial profit, choosing only such routes as gave promise of substantial traffic, and proceeding, as the Aidin Railway had done, by successive sections, each to become a paying concern before the next was begun.

Instead, a compromise was adopted by which a nominally private company, hoping to pay dividends to their shareholders, constructed a railway on purely strategical lines, often in wholly unprofitable country, on the strength of guarantees secured by a Turkish Government loan, which made that Government a partner in the enterprise, and entitled to the lion's share of any profits there might be. The attempt to combine business success with strategical considerations failed. The series of wars in which Turkey became involved naturally had an unfavourable effect upon business. But matters would not have gone so badly as they did, had the Bagdad Railway policy, from the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War onwards, been governed by strictly business considerations. Economic facts were disregarded in constructional plans. Pressed by the German Embassy on the one hand, and by the Turkish Government on the other, the business men sank deeper and deeper into the mire, ever hoping that better times would come and a larger measure of assistance be obtainable from the Governments concerned.

The history of the negotiations prior to the concession is interesting. The correspondence is full of complaints of the unreasonable behaviour of the Ambassador Marschall, who, as Siemens said, 'sought only political success and not primarily the carrying through of the scheme from a financial point of view.' The German diplomats were eager to force the affair through as speedily as possible, accepting any conditions the Turks might impose; while the financiers regarded that policy as 'extremely dangerous.' The final opinion of the financiers on the Embassy was as follows:—

'We must do better over the Bagdad business, and the only way is to deal with the Wilhelmstrasse in this matter, for Marschall has no comprehension of it. Marschall desires a personal success in Constantinople. Miquel and the English Embassy do not interest him. On the contrary he experiences a malicious pleasure (*Schadenfreude*) in being able to say, "I was the only one that understood the affair; but they left me in the lurch everywhere," or, as he expresses it, "The Deutsche Bank did not depart from their policy of reserve."'

The same divergence of ideas is found in the records of the disputes that raged over the new guarantees. The over-eagerness of the German diplomats had led them to disclose their plans, and placed them in the position of petitioners for the favour of being allowed to build Turkey's strategical railway for her. The eventual agreement as to provision for the expenses of working and the division of profits proved unsatisfactory. But, such as it was, it was only obtained after a long struggle on the part of the business interests. The original draft was based on a supposition that working expenses could be met out of 25 per cent. of the gross receipts, the Government taking the remainder. Such a proportion of receipts to expenses would have been regarded as impracticable in countries in a high state of economic development. In view of the nature of the territory traversed and the enormous necessary cost of maintenance and operation, the idea was ludicrous.

German politicians, however, held that it was all-important to come to an agreement with the Turks, leaving unworkable details to be modified later. In July 1900, Wangenheim, then Chargé d'Affaires at

Constantinople, told Zander that events, which he was not at liberty to divulge, would be liable in the near future to turn the Sultan against Germany and seriously delay the granting of the Bagdad Concession. Zander, therefore, informed the Turks that he would accept any route the Sultan might desire, and any further conditions other than financial. Wangenheim told Zander bluntly that the Anatolian Railway Company must accept the worst terms in their agreement sooner than delay. Even so, piteous requests for permission to wait were made to Berlin; but Berlin replied, 'It must be clearly understood that a step back on the part of the Anatolian Railway must not even be thought of.'

The financiers, therefore, entered the affair with great misgivings; and in a meeting held on Feb. 18, 1902, Arthur Gwinner, the Deutsche Bank magnate, declared openly that the proposed agreement which had been provisionally accepted by Huguenin and Zander, the delegates of the Anatolian Railway, was by no means satisfactory; but that further delay was impossible and necessary changes must be made later. Undeterred by failure in England and growing distrust in Paris, hopes were still entertained of assistance from other countries. Gwinner wrote from Berlin, on April 5, 1902, to say that after discussion with Zander he was of opinion that considerable changes should be made at the first opportunity; but that they must hope for the opportunity to come during the completion of the project. The Turkish Minister of Public Works, in an interview on May 12, 1902, strongly urged the representative of the railway to accept the agreement as it stood, leaving time to show what alterations would be necessary. It will thus be seen that, although the Bagdad Concession was a triumph for German diplomats, it was a Pyrrhic victory for German financiers.

It had been the practice for the Turkish Government to guarantee a minimum annual revenue per kilometre to the various Ottoman Railway Companies established by French or German capital. These guarantees, which varied from ten to eighteen thousand francs, were promised on the security of the taxes of certain designated districts, and their collection was supervised by the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. On the

strength of this assurance that their revenues would, if necessary, be made up to a certain sum, the various companies issued such debentures and shares as they deemed advisable. In the case of the Bagdad Railway a somewhat different procedure was adopted. An annuity of 11,000 francs per kilometre was promised. This was intended to provide for interest on, and repayment of, the capital expended on construction. This subsidy was provided for by the floating of a new 4 per cent. Turkish loan, a nominal capital of 269,110 francs being earmarked for every kilometre, issues to be made as the line was built. It was estimated that 98 years (the duration of the concession being 99) would suffice for the repayment, with the necessary interest, of this loan.

In return for this subsidy the Turkish Government proposed to repay themselves, if possible, out of the revenue of the railway. It was estimated that a sum of 4500 francs per kilometre would be required for working expenses; the State, therefore, promised to pay the difference, should the receipts fall short of that sum. Any receipts over and above the yearly average of 4500 francs per kilometre, up to an average of 10,000 francs per kilometre, were to go to the Ottoman Government. Should the receipts exceed the average of 10,000 francs the Government was to receive 60 per cent. of any such excess, only 40 per cent. going to the company. The new loans and guarantees were, as usual, secured by the pledging of various Government revenues which were placed under the supervision of the Public Debt Administration. Siemens had died in 1901, otherwise he would doubtless have protested against this abject dependence upon the Turkish Government, for he had written in September 1900:

‘A line like the Bagdad Railway cannot rely solely upon the Turkish Guarantee. The payment of a yearly guaranteed subsidy of 80 million marks (1,500,000*l.*) is too difficult for a State under absolute government without any administrative tradition. It provides too strong a temptation for ambitious and impecunious statesmen. It is not sufficient to place the guarantee obligations under international protection by means of the Public Debt. States outside Turkey must be induced to interest themselves directly in keeping the railway in operation.’

The projected line (including several branches) was divided into 14 sections of 200 kilometres each, to be considered independently in respect of any penalties incurred by the concessionaires for failure to build or operate the line according to their undertaking. These sections were to be constructed separately. The first and easiest, from Konia to Bulgurlu at the foot of the Taurus, was opened for traffic in November 1904. Work then began on other sections. The survey expedition of 1899 had laid stress on the necessity for building last of all the section through the Taurus Mountains, in order that the rest of the line should be in working order, and, if possible, earning profit before this enormous engineering feat was undertaken. The plans involved thirty-six tunnels, many of considerable length. Another recommendation of the survey was that, once through the Taurus, the line should follow the coast to Alexandretta and then strike south-east to Aleppo over the comparatively easy Bailan Pass. But fear of the British fleet and of British influence in the East was already prevalent; and the builders of the railway were ordered to proceed with the Taurus tunnel system without delay, in order that the Turks might be able easily to reinforce their troops in Syria. They were also forbidden to use the easy and commercially profitable coast route, and ordered to carry their line to Aleppo over a more difficult part of the Amanus Mountains, through a country destitute of commercial possibilities.

The expenses and difficulties of construction were already sufficient, without a further burden being laid upon the unfortunate Construction Company. This company was in reality nothing but a means of liaison with Philip Holzman & Co., a firm of Frankfort contractors. It was, however, considered advantageous to operate by means of a subsidiary company which could be represented as a branch of the Anatolian Railway, and thus evade the payment of the taxes imposed by the Turkish Government on companies operating in Turkey. In the mean time, German enterprise was busy elsewhere, and two other subsidiary companies were formed for the purpose of developing concessions granted to the Anatolian Railway—that of the Port of Haidar Pasha (1901), and that of the Irrigation of the Plain of Konia (1907).

In both cases the German directors took care that the really profitable concessions obtained by the railway and rendered workable solely by its co-operation should benefit only themselves. The Anatolian Railway as a whole, though under German direction, had maintained, to a certain extent, its international character. But it became increasingly a milch cow for the enterprises that the Germans reserved for themselves.

After five years of conflict against opposition from Russian, British, and latterly French interests, an additional convention was signed on June 2, 1908. This agreement laid down the route to be taken through the Taurus and Amanus Mountains, and made provision for construction as far as Helif. The Mosul route was chosen owing to the oilfields in that neighbourhood.

The Second Bagdad Loan, with a capital of 108 million francs, was finally floated in June 1910. Meanwhile, the progress of construction led to a desire for the floating of the Third Bagdad Loan, the amount of which had been fixed at 119 million francs. At this moment (1910) the enterprise had been well advertised, and the necessary capital might have been obtained. But Turkey was endeavouring to raise loans for other purposes; and the French, to whom she turned, began to demand in return an increased measure of control in Turkey. The Entente Cordiale, with its policy of distrust of Germany, was beginning to make itself felt, and the English Cassel-Babington Smith group of financiers, from whose desire to invest in Turkey great things had been hoped, were, to use the German comment, 'whistled back' by the combined Entente Governments. It was at this time that the Paris 'Temps' made the oft-quoted statement—
'Londres ne veut pas; Berlin ne peut pas.'

The Germans were determined to show that Berlin both could and would. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank and later a Cabinet Minister, was sent by the Kaiser to Constantinople in December 1910. His orders were at all costs to prevent any increase of French influence and power. Helfferich arranged a loan to Turkey of 7 million Turkish pounds (160 million francs) at an interest of 4 per cent. Germans and Austrians rallied to its support under the leadership of the Deutsche Bank. In the course of the year 1911 (the year of the

Agadir incident), the loan was floated at 86½. The proposed Third Bagdad Loan, being both smaller and, if anything, on better security, would have been easier to place on the market. But the interests of the railway had to be subordinated to those of Germany in her rivalry with France; and the Bagdad Railway thus lost its last chance of financial success, as it forfeited finally its claim to be considered an international enterprise.

The Turkish Revolution of 1908 had left German influence, after a period of eclipse, as strong as before; and the extremists among the men who had overthrown Abdul Hamid continued enthusiastically his Pan-Islamic policy. But the Revolution, and the temporary confusion arising out of it, had led to a considerable increase in the cost of labour and material. The calculations of the Construction Company were thus thrown out, and their profit turned into loss. Nevertheless, in spite of growing French and British mistrust, the bonds of the Third Bagdad Loan were thrown on the market at the end of 1911. Every effort was made to bring it to success. The Anatolian Railway subscribed 24 million francs. The unfortunate Construction Company, which never yet had paid a dividend, proffered the 12 million marks which comprised its entire capital and reserves.

The part played by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, which were administered and worked as one, during the years of war, is fairly well known. The German General Staff in their reports on the Balkan War attributed the preservation of Constantinople and its European hinterland largely to the Anatolian Railway and the ferry service worked in connexion therewith. The Great War hastened and completed the ruin of the Bagdad Railway; but it merely accelerated an inevitable conclusion. The accompanying balance sheet to Dec. 31, 1916, the last definite statement of accounts possible under the circumstances, bears witness to the utter breakdown of the scheme. No account is taken of the loss through capture by the British of the Samarra-Bagdad line (which cost 27 million francs), nor of the

BALANCE SHEET ACTUALLY PUBLISHED.
Balance up to Dec. 31, 1916.

*Assets.**Annex A.*

		France.		Turkish Pounds.	
Estimated cost of construction :		48,613,999.32		2,139,015.97	
Konia—Bulgurlu					10,000,664.14
Bulgurlu—Helif		227,287,821.36			406,102.72
Toprakale—Alexandretia		9,229,607.27			1,084,536.66
Helif—Bagdad		24,648,560.45			
		309,779,988.40			13,680,319.49
Rolling Stock		8,558,012.95			376,552.57
Plant		936,707.37			41,171.12
Cash in hand		66,918.41			2,944.41
Bonds : 237,117 Debentures Bagdad, Series III		118,558,000.—		5,216,552.—	
Miscellaneous		857,741.14		37,740.61	
		119,415,741.14			5,254,299.61
Securities		691,297.04			30,417.07
Debtors :					
Balance owned by Turkish Government for Military Traffic		8,185,014.09		360,140.62	
Sundries		18,201,577.05		800,969.39	
		26,386,591.14			1,161,010.01
Stores in stock		1,288,616.59			54,499.13
Workshop Plant		33,677.05			1,481.79
Due from Agents		65,510.—			2,882.44
Deficit		142,051.13			6,250.25
		467,314,111.12			20,561,920.89

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 1917.

Annex A.

Balance up to Dec. 31, 1916.

Liabilities.

	France.	Turkish Pounds.
Share Capital:		
30,000 Shares at Frs. 500	15,000,000.—	
Subsidy from the Imperial Ottoman Government:		
Subsidy received in 4 % Bagdad Loan Bonds:		
I. Series	Frs. 53,822,130	
Less 1634 debentures paid up	767,000	
	53,055,130.—	2,334,425.72
II. Series	Frs. 108,000,000	
Less 1640 debentures paid up	770,000	
	107,230,000.—	4,718,120.—
III. Series	Frs. 119,000,000	
Less 884 debentures paid up	442,000	
	118,558,000.—	5,216,552.—
Reserves:		
Statutory Reserve	562,515.91	24,750.70
Dividend Reserve	1,920,000.—	84,480.—
Special Reserve	3,696,081.13	162,648.69
	6,178,577.04	271,857.39
Creditor	166,911,663.63	7,344,113.20
Due to agents	380,740.45	16,752.58
	467,314,111.12	20,561,820.89

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 1917.

sums spent on the coast lines to Mersina and Alexandretta, which were badly damaged and rendered unworkable by the Allied Fleet. Even allowing a large discount for war losses, and taking no account of the considerable assistance in personnel, locomotives, rolling stock, etc., provided free of charge by the Germans, the deficit at the end of 1916 is shown to have been at least two and a half times the entire amount of the company's capital and reserves. The deficiencies were hidden from the public so far as possible ; it is instructive to compare the secret balance sheet submitted to Berlin with that prepared for the benefit of the shareholders. The effect of the war on Turkish credit had been such that, even had the Central Powers been victorious, Turkish 4 per cent. bonds would have been of small value. As the so-called Debentures (Obligations) of the Bagdad Railway were in reality Turkish bonds, the completion of the railway—nay, even the carrying out of the programme guaranteed by the Agreement of June 1908—was out of the question. Construction work was indeed continuing : in fact, the famous Taurus Tunnel System was completed not long before the Armistice, Allied prisoners and Armenians having provided much cheap labour ; but the line was run during 1917 and the early part of 1918 to all intents and purposes as a temporary military railway worked by the army for its own purposes, Colonel von Oldershausen, the German Director of Military Railways in Turkey (*Deutscher Chef des Feldeisenbahnwesens in der Türkei*), being the responsible authority. The constant advance of the British in Mesopotamia rendered the future even more uncertain. The German Government, therefore, took no steps to put matters straight. The Turks on their side knew that German prestige, even apart from the Kaiser's personal intervention, required the completion of the Bagdad Railway. They considered, therefore, that it was the business of the German Government to render its completion possible. Turkey had everything to gain by the projected railway, and, as Abdul Hamid had foreseen long before, she was in the ideal position of being able to rely upon Germany for its completion. The finances of Turkey were already in a state of chaos. Knowing that the military importance of the railway was such that Germany could not neglect


it, the Turks declined to assist the Bagdad Railway in any way.

Attempts were made to induce the German Government to guarantee a fresh Turkish loan. Should Turkish pride object to the guaranteeing of their State loan by a foreign government, it was suggested that Germany might pledge her credit as surety for an issue of debentures by the railway acting alone. But the Reichstag, whose consent would have been necessary for this, wisely declined to consider any such scheme.

It was then proposed that Germany should advance two hundred million marks for the purpose of extending the line to Samarra and putting it into good order generally. The Turkish Government, to whom the advance was to be made, were to take the financial responsibility and settle accounts with Germany after the War. As for the railway company and the Construction Company they would be prepared to cut their losses in the past, provided they could obtain some interest on their capital. The Turkish Government, however, declined to consider this proposition.

It was clear that any scheme for financial betterment must not count on Turkish assistance. The company, therefore, suggested that Germany should lend them a hundred million marks, at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent. As security for this advance they were prepared to hand over Bagdad Bonds of the Second and Third Loans, reckoning them at 82 per cent., a price which, needless to say, would not have been obtained in the open market. It was reckoned that the sums due for interest and repayment on these Bonds would be sufficient to provide interest at 3 per cent. and to repay 2 per cent. on the loan yearly. A table of yearly payments was prepared to show that this debt could be repaid with interest in thirty-one years.

It was hoped that twelve years would suffice for the completion and organisation of the railway and the partial development of the country traversed, and that there would be some possibility then of paying interest on and attempting the repayment of the various Bagdad Loans. It is true that the company would continue to yield no dividends; but, as the German confidential report pathetically remarks, the shareholders were



already used to that, and must continue to hope for better times in future years.

The moment at which these proposals were made (June 1917) was one of great activity in Turkey. It had been decided at the Headquarters of the Central Powers that Bagdad must be retaken, and the Germans sent Falkenhayn to supervise the operations. Large quantities of rolling stock, mainly Belgian, and of material generally, were despatched to Turkey, the question of payment being postponed till the close of hostilities. German troops poured into Constantinople. Large stocks of munitions were accumulated at Haidar Pasha, to be the base of the new enterprise. But on Sept. 2, 1917, a terrific explosion, or rather series of explosions, accompanied by fire, entirely destroyed the Port of Haidar Pasha and all that was therein. This catastrophe to the German arms has been variously ascribed to a bomb dropped from an aeroplane, to incendiary action on the part of some Allied agent, and to accident. Whatever its cause, the Entente had no greater stroke of luck. We shall probably never know the full cost in lives or money of this catastrophe. The Mesopotamian Expedition was thereupon abandoned. While continuing to control and direct the political and military activities of Turkey, the Germans decided to attempt no further adventures in the East and merely to 'mark time,' holding as many British troops as possible in Mesopotamia and Palestine, but reserving their chief effort for the West.

Thus, the Bagdad Railway, from being a factor of the first importance, became the feeder of a 'side-show.' It was allowed to struggle on in a bankrupt condition, sustained only by the supply—without payment by the military authorities—of rolling stock, material, and labour. This last was particularly useful in the Taurus, where the through line with its tunnel system was opened in time to be of service to Allenby's Army arriving from Egypt. But the Bagdad Railway during the last year of the War lived from hand to mouth, and can be regarded as to all intents and purposes part of the Anatolian Railway working almost exclusively for the Army. After the foregoing balance sheet for 1916, which was published in the summer of 1917, no further

accounts or reports were produced. The portion of the line near Bagdad appeared irretrievably lost. That near Aleppo fell into Allenby's hands, and was administered by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force till it was handed over to the French. The separation between the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways became effective; for the former was now controlled by the British in Constantinople and the latter by the French in Aleppo.

It may be asked what will be the future of the enterprise which once set half Europe by the ears? The Anatolian Railway is commercially sound; and should Asia Minor obtain the stable government it needs, Anatolia will take its proper place as one of the great granaries of the world. The Cilician plain, if properly administered, could not only rival but even might excel all other cotton-growing areas. Its harbours are few and indifferent, so that, should the difficulties involved in the maintenance of the Taurus Tunnel system not prove insuperable, the railway from Konia southwards, including the connexion between Aleppo and the coast, may prove successful under its new name, the 'Syria-Cilicia Railway.'* At the other end, the development of Mesopotamia and the movement of its produce towards its natural embouchure on the Persian Gulf will be facilitated by the existence of a railway from Bagdad to the coast and, though a pipe-line can do much, railway connexion with the coast is a natural requirement of the Mosul oilfields. But between Mosul and Alexandretta lie some four hundred miles of country, most of it mountain or desert; and now that the events of the War have placed Mesopotamia under British control, it is natural that a sea-faring people should seek to develop it down the valley of the Two Rivers to the nearest sea. Turkey ruled the land but not the sea; it was necessary for her to cross half a continent to evade British sea-power and British control of the Suez Canal. But it is improbable that under

* It would never pay to bring goods from Cilicia by Konia to Constantinople or Smyrna. All such goods must go by sea from Cilicia. The only use of the Taurus Tunnel is to carry goods from the south-eastern part of the plateau to Cilician harbours and *vice versa*.

ordinary circumstances, even given a stable administration, it should ever be financially worth while to complete and work the line from Aleppo eastwards. When Asia Minor and Syria on the one side and Mesopotamia on the other have been developed, then the question may arise.

There are enough possibilities in these lands to occupy all the capital available. They have never been properly administered since Roman days. Gradual development of natural resources will succeed; but ambitious and showy Trans-Continental ventures have been proved a snare and delusion. Speedy Trans-Continental communication will, in future, be made by air; and, though the Bosphorus may be bridged or tunnelled, the world does not need a through express from Vienna, Paris, or Ostend to the Persian Gulf.

A. D. C. RUSSELL.

Art. 7.—THE SEARCH FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT.

SELF-GOVERNMENT is the Mecca of the moral individual. And as such it is—more or less—intelligible. For government of the person by the person (but do not let us say for the person) is possible so long as the person is quite sure that he is a person. Even so, it is not an easy ideal to grasp. For to suppose that a self requires to be governed by itself implies a belief that the word ‘individual’ is a misnomer; inasmuch as a self consists, as Plato would have it, of better and worse elements, the former of which should completely dominate the latter; or, as the psychologist will have it, of instincts and reason, the latter of which may have a constitutional monarchy over the former. If an individual were really an individual, one and indivisible, he could not govern himself. He could be governed by somebody else or not governed at all; but he could not so split himself up into parts that one element in the self should govern another. Self-government is not an easily intelligible ideal for the individual, but it is not wholly meaningless, for most of us can, if we like, discern a self to govern and a self to be governed.

But to-day self-government is as much the ideal of society as of the individual. The people who inhabit certain areas of the globe want to be self-governing; the people who pursue the business of getting a living by similar means want to be self-governing. And of course it is axiomatic that any association of persons formed for a definite object—whether the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, or the Overthrow of the Capitalist System—should be within wide limits self-governing bodies. Self-government is a plural as well as a singular conception; it is identified with the government of the people, for the people, by the people, no matter how many of the people there may happen to be.

But self-government as the ambition of society is a great deal more difficult to understand than self-government as the religion of an individual. For, on the one hand, any real self-government in societies of the dimensions of those to which we are accustomed offends against that principle of specialisation, by which alone (for our

sins) we are enabled to keep going economically ; and in the second place social self-government implies a social self, just as much as individual self-government implies an individual self. On this last rock the democratic ship splits on every voyage ; and every such disaster is marked by the wreckage of cynicism and disillusionment that bestrews the course of democracy.

Consider the first point. Democracy, as its name implies, is not native to our people or (which is much more important) to our civilisation. Like so much else in our thought, our institutions and our outlook, it is Greek in origin. It has been said that there is nothing in the world which moves that is not Greek. It might as well have been said that there is nothing in this world which so much hinders movement as the homage paid to the Greek idea. Democracy was born in a city-state. Democracy according to the Greeks may be best, for under it the people rules. The Athenians, so they said, considered a man who took no active part in public affairs as something worse than merely idle. And so they might. Those whom a city-state admitted to citizenship at all may have enjoyed some real approach to self-government. Even this, however, has doubtless been exaggerated by the sentimentality of later ages. It is certain at any rate that the narrow interpretation of citizenship excluded from a share in the government of the communal self the great majority of the dwellers within the city's borders. Still it is probably only in the city-states of classical antiquity that the idea of social self-government has been realised in anything approaching a logical form. Such realisation is only perfectly attained when the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker compose both the self who governs and the self who is governed ; when nobody presumes to specialise in the representation of the popular will. For it is only in that case that we have anything comparable to the self-governed individual who is at the same time John Brown, the governor, and John Brown, the governed. But to expect that democracy should be the same yesterday, to-day, for ever ; the same for a population of 50 or 100 millions living in a small island, or spread over a great continent ; the same in the industrialised as in the agricultural state ; the same in a steam-driven as

in a horse-drawn civilisation—to expect this is to be guilty of a serious lack of historical perspective. True political democracy would imply to-day the conduct at least of legislation, if not of administration, by all the inhabitants of the State. The cruelties of economics, however, compel merciless specialisation; and the self-government of 50 million people is a ludicrous abstraction. Were we each and all to act as the fifty-millionth member of a governing body, starvation would soon bring the numbers of the body into a more reasonable compass. And even if it were not so, it is still doubtful how far such an arrangement would result in true self-government. A committee of fifty millions of people would only exhibit on the grand scale that with which we are familiar enough on the scale of a committee of five—the dominance of the one or two people who have the capacity and the will to get through the work.

We have to face the fact that true self-government is a will-o'-the-wisp not to be caught by the industrialised hands of our over-populated communities. To seize it, we must violate the fundamental laws of economics by which we are imprisoned. If the materialistic interpretation of history means that the limits to the varieties of political or social development are rigidly confined by economic necessity, then it is at once an incontrovertible and a pitiless doctrine. It is this doctrine which 'puts a stopper on' 19th- or 20th-century democracy. By specialisation we live, and specialisation is the denial of true self-government. And this is a matter of democracy itself, not of democratic mechanics. We have immensely improved our democratic machinery; we have by education and so forth no less improved the material of Demos, the governor and the governed. But these measures do not go to the heart of the problem. A century ago we believed in this country that the will-o'-the-wisp could be caught by the extension of the political franchise. That extension was won, step by step and not without bloodshed, by the devotees of the democratic idea. The disillusionment that followed the partial concessions of the first Reform Act gathered momentum in the Chartist agitation. Democracy was still unattained because the franchise was not universal, secret, or everywhere of equal value, because Parliaments lived long

enough to become unrepresentative, and because membership of Parliament was a whole-time job without a salary. A century has seen the concession of all but one of the main points of the Charter. Equally has it brought home to us that disillusionment with the first fruits of democracy is typical of disillusionment with its riper harvest. There is perhaps no disappointment more bitter than the disappointment with the working of democracy that is coming over the people of this and other countries. Improvements of democratic machinery have not sufficed, and it is questionable whether even with the last refinement of proportional representation they ever will suffice, to conceal the fact that self-government is not realised unless all the governed selves in the plural are identical with the no less plural governing selves.

If the will of each were the will of all, then there might be a possibility that representative government, even in a large community, would be self-government. In that case the general will could and would be expressed. But as things are there is no General Will; there is no social self—only a number of conflicting wills and inharmonious selves. Meanwhile, the development of democratic theory and practice has been a search for the social self. True self-government lies where the rainbow ends. But the creation of a fictitious self brings a bastard self-government ready to hand. In our pursuit of democracy we have subjected ourselves to the tyranny of a succession of such bastards. In so doing, we work a double evil. We shatter the faith of believers in true self-government, and we degrade a great idea.

To begin with, we personify the State, and persuade ourselves that democracy is attained when the democratic idea is embodied in a democratic political constitution. It is easy to see how this abstract social Self was created, and equally easy to see that in its primitive form it may not have been pernicious. A and B, who are just emerging from the pastoral stage of human development, have an idea that life would be considerably more restful if instead of perpetually roving from place to place in search of new pastures, they should assist Nature's efforts to maintain her children by some simple operations of tillage. A and B, being pushful men, like most originators

of ideas, instil this notion into C and D and a host of others, who, like most hosts, are at once suggestible and apathetic. Y and Z perhaps hold diverse opinions and stick fast to them; but it is always only too easy to coerce the Ys and Zs of society. So at the instigation of A and B the tribe settle down in a choice spot and village life begins. In process of time the village becomes a village community, at least dimly conscious of itself and zealous for its own welfare. Skirmishes are undertaken and ordinances made for the good of the village, and the whole ordering of life assumes a more social aspect.

As long as a village is a village there is nothing very pernicious in its members becoming conscious of it as an end to be promoted. Nor perhaps is the danger very great when the village has blossomed into a city-state. The city-state is still so small that its tyranny is hardly likely to be worse than the autocracy of a petted child. Athens is personified, and her citizens are bidden to regard her with an affection so intense that the language of sex-love is actually employed to describe it. Even so the social self is not unduly fictitious. But it has in it the makings of a false god. Multiply your city-state by a large enough number, and you have not Athens, but Leviathan—the modern State. The patriotism of the citizen, at once an idea and an ideal, develops into that orgy of modern State worship which represents an idea incarnate in a tyrant's form, and which springs from our passionate desire to conceive society as a personal self. Athens may not be very different from the Athenians; but the connexion between Britannia and the Britons becomes daily more and more obscure. We are, in fact, just emerging from a period of the rankest idolatry—idolatry of the political State. Tom, Dick, and Harry are bullied or cosseted, ordered to insure their health or provided gratis with a costly and inadequate education, because these things promote the good of the State of which through no fault of their own they were born members. But the organ of this State is a government which Tom, Dick, and Harry rightly regard as wholly external to themselves. It governs them; they do not govern it; nor can it be said that the democratic State as we know it embodies anything that can be called self-government. Individuals in the mass are

expected to endure anything and everything in order to ensure the prestige, the security, or the morals of a State which, if it is anything at all, is merely those same individuals with the individuality stripped off and only the mass left.

Thanks to the agency of such writers as Prof. Hobhouse, the absurdity of submission to the tyranny of the State, of exalting the State with 'chatter of a transcendental kind,' has lately become apparent. We no longer suppose that the State—which is the government—is synonymous with the community, much less with you and me. Considering the number of people who find denunciation of the government an important form of recreative activity, we may suppose that the belief in this bastard self-government is already passing.

The happiness or welfare of individuals is a conception which we can understand; but the happiness or welfare of a State viewed as distinct from the individuals of whom it is composed, is the height of absurdity and a ludicrous parody of democracy. And when it comes to sacrificing individuals, not merely occasionally or here and there but literally *en masse*, for the sake of the State whereof they are members, the absurdity becomes too blatant to be borne. The personified Idea of the State is seen in the light of day to be neither more nor less than the autocracy of mediocre men in high places.

Once more, however, we leap out of the frying-pan into the fire, and reading 'community' for 'State' devote ourselves to the creation of a new social self. Political governments are not adequate incarnations of the general will of the inhabitants of the geographical area over which their authority extends. That we realise. But there must be some social self or there could not be self-government. So for the State we proceed to substitute the community, and in order to draw an appropriate distinction between the earthiness of the former and the splendour of the latter, we endow the community with all the glories of diversity in unity. The State is only one of many forms of association. It is not the only or the best basis of organisation, since in present-day communities the ties of professional association, for instance, are frequently stronger than

those of neighbourliness, which are the basis of the territorial State. The community, however, unlike the State, consists of an ordered (it never appears how or why the ordering is done) assemblage of different organisations representing man in all his aspects. Allegiance is equally due to the political government, the trade union, the football team, the Church, the learned society, the dance club, and all the other associations of which we are members, and which in their totality constitute the Community with a very large capital C, and any one of which may, in a narrow way of speaking, be regarded as *par excellence* the community for the time being. The new tyranny—the tyranny of the community idea—will soon be as dangerous as the old. The community is in reality as abstract as the State; and if it is so diverse in character it is even harder to identify. When is the community prospering? When John Brown is prosperous in his capacity as an inhabitant of Birmingham, but unfortunate as a member of Brown's Bouncing Boxers; happy in the care which his chapel takes of his immortal soul, but most unfortunate in the partner whom the favourite dance club frequently assigns to him? It is hard enough to come to a decision about the welfare of a concrete person like John Brown. It is problem enough for him to be a self-governing self. But it is harder still to form a conception of the welfare of a community which is composed of some millions of John Browns, Mrs. John Browns, Johann Brauns and Frau Dittos, as well as Jack Browns Junior, grouped and regrouped in endless conflicting associations. Even a knowledge of permutations and combinations will not help to identify in this confusion that Community for whose sake you and I are expected to repress our anti-social tendencies. The community, like the State, has no welfare apart from the welfare of the individuals of whom it is composed. Even those, however, who recognise this are nearly always driven to fall back into comfortable servitude to the idea against which they rebel. For the difficulty of deciding in the first place who are the members of the community; and, secondly, what is to be done when their interests conflict (as they certainly will), drives the boldest spirit back to abstract terms, and reincarnates the dangerous doctrine that one

section of conflicting interests—presumably the less violent but only too often the most valuable section—must be subordinated in ‘the interests of the community.’

And there is another danger in the modern idea of the great community diverse and unified. It is not only anarchic, it also opens up fields of tyranny to hosts of fictitious social selves. We have seen how revulsion against the tyranny of the State-idea led to the view that the other forms of association are as much aspects of the community as the territorial State. But every such form of association may in its turn become personified and undemocratic. A conspicuous instance at the present time is afforded by the condition of the Trade Union movement. The idea of association on the basis of common labour, or labour in a common industry of a self-governing society of fellow-workers, becomes incarnate in the Trade Union. For awhile all is well. The prosperity of the Trade Union and the prosperity of its members are, at least, as nearly identical as the prosperity of Athens and the prosperity of the Athenians. But in process of time the Union grows in size and strength, and becomes personified. The rank-and-file worker at his bench acts under orders from officials who are as external to him as Mr Lloyd George is to you and me, and in obedience to these instructions he subordinates his immediate interests to the good of the Union. It is not impossible that a situation may arise in which almost every member is found to be sacrificing his welfare to the tyranny of the personified self, to the good of the Union. Here is self-government indeed! In such a case rebellion cannot be far removed. And in the Trade Union movement there are already signs of a disruption. The Shop Stewards’ movement has arisen from an effort to destroy the autocracy of the centralised institution, and to reinterpret the Union once more in the only terms in which it can be intelligible—the lives of the individual workers. The full-time Trade Union official having become absorbed in the mire of officialdom and divorced from his constituents, it becomes apparent to the rank-and-file that the Trade Union is not a self-governing institution. The Shop Stewards’ movement represents a reversion to the primitive, and the only genuine, conception of democracy. The people to be governed

are the men and women working in the workshop; the Stewards who govern are also to remain in the workshop, thus defying specialisation and triumphantly vindicating self-government. This is true democracy: in our age a splendid anachronism, but perhaps an earnest of better things to come.

Such a movement within Trade Unionism is an exact counterpart of the rise, the decline, and the fall of State worship or of community worship. I have no doubt that it could itself be paralleled from many other cases in which the lack of any real general will and the consequent impossibility of any true self-government cause the creation of a personified institution resplendent with all the tyranny of institutions. It is a history which is in no sense confined to any one form of association. Worship of the community may well prove no less dangerous than worship of the State; and in so far as the diversity of the community comprises diverse institutions, the new danger may be even greater than the old. For one idol we raise up many; and submit the social, religious, and economic, as well as the political animal, to institutional despotism masquerading in the guise of self-government.

Idolatry and tyranny are ever with us; and we like them. They pander to our laziness and our instincts of submissiveness. Man, everywhere in chains, is none too eager to re-assert the freedom of his birth. Searching for self-government in political or in industrial society, he finds many selves to be governed and no self to govern; he believes that the quest overreaches his strength. Cheerfully, therefore, does he weld the warring selves into this and that abstraction, that society having selfhood may be self-governed. Is the search for self-government to end in the tyranny of a personification? Shall we make a despotism and call it democracy?

BARBARA WOOTTON.

Art. 8.—A NEW LIFE OF GOETHE.

Life of Goethe. By P. Hume Brown, F.B.A., LL.D. Two vols. John Murray. 1920.

THE study of Goethe in England is mainly associated with two names. Carlyle was not the first to call attention to German literature, for William Taylor of Norwich was before him, and spirited translations by Coleridge and Scott were already on the market; but it was from his early essays and renderings and his life of Schiller that most cultivated Englishmen learned the significance of the Weimar circle and its illustrious chief. The young Scot proclaimed his momentous discovery of a new oracle when he himself was almost unknown; and the influence of the German sage grew with the growth of his interpreter's fame. A generation after Carlyle's essays, Lewes published a biography which for the first time reconstructed the personality and achievement of the greatest of German writers, and, revised for the last time in 1876, held its own in Germany no less than in England for half a century. The book, which was dedicated to Carlyle, 'who first taught England to appreciate Goethe,' possesses the sovereign merit of vivacity; and, though the faults are sufficiently obvious and the material incomplete, it contributed even more than the fragmentary appreciations of Carlyle to strengthening Goethe's hold on the intelligence of Victorian England. 'The man is too great and too good,' he wrote, 'to forfeit our love, because on some points he may incur blame'; and his readers, whether or no they shared the biographer's affection, responded to the appeal of an arresting personality and of a mind unique in range if not in originality.

As the 19th century drew to its close the star of Goethe rose as rapidly as that of Schiller paled, and an army of students commenced the patient researches which have now reached a stage where there is nothing but gleaning to be done. Some of the fruits are enshrined in the fourteen volumes of the English Goethe Society, the latest of which appeared in 1914; and among the contributions none are more interesting than those of Prof. Dowden, who for many years dallied with the

project of a biography. But though the efforts of British scholars were of no mean value, the bulk of the work was naturally carried out by Germans; and the student, to whatever country he belongs, must live laborious days with the 'Goethe Jahrbuch' and the 'Schriften der Goethe Gesellschaft.' In 1887, Erich Schmidt discovered the pre-Weimar draft of 'Faust'; and only a year or two before the war the 'Theatralische Sendung,' or original form of 'Wilhelm Meister,' was recovered and published. An immense advance was rendered possible by the Weimar edition of Goethe's works, which began to appear in 1887, and, in addition to his literary and scientific writings, included thirteen volumes of diaries and fifty of correspondence. By the end of the century the time had arrived for a full-length portrait; and Bielschowsky's biography, the first volume of which appeared in 1896, and the second after his death in 1904, surpassed all previous attempts. The book ranks with Haym's 'Herder,' Erich Schmidt's 'Lessing,' and Justi's 'Winckelmann' among the classics of German literary biography; and it is hardly likely that it will be superseded within our lifetime. The briefer work of Georg Brandes, published in 1915, is unfortunately only available to readers of Danish.

Though Bielschowsky may be read in an American translation, there was abundant room for an English biography which should incorporate the discoveries and test the conclusions of two generations of scholarship; and no one could have trained himself more carefully for his formidable task than the late Prof. Hume Brown, the author of the standard 'History of Scotland' and of scholarly biographies of Knox and Buchanan. While Scottish history was the occupation of his official life, his leisure was dedicated to Goethe. 'Goethe was his favourite teacher as well as his favourite poet,' writes Lord Haldane in a Prefatory Note, 'and his ambition was to try to make the greatness of the man clear to the Anglo-Saxon world. It was our practice to go to Germany annually to collect materials, and this we did each year from 1898 to 1912 inclusive. We spent our time mainly in Weimar, Ilmenau, Jena, Wetzlar, and Göttingen. There was hardly a book or an article which the Professor did not possess, and we spent much time

each autumn in Scotland going over his manuscript as it grew in his hands.' The first part was published in 1913 as 'The Youth of Goethe,' and the whole work was finished before the author's death in the winter of 1918, except for a chapter on the Second Part of 'Faust.' The missing link has been supplied by Lord Haldane himself, to whom and to his sister Miss Haldane the biographer entrusted the publication of his book. The 'Early Life' now forms the first part of the completed work; and in these well-printed volumes we at last possess a maturely considered biography, fully abreast of the scholarship of the age and not unworthy of its majestic theme.

The Professor brought to his task the spirit of caution for which Scotsmen are renowned; and the first impression which the book makes on the reader is one of critical detachment. To pass from the eloquence and enthusiasm of Bielschowsky to the frank censures and measured eulogies of the Edinburgh scholar is like a douche of cold water. But though we may sometimes sigh for a little more warmth and colour in the picture, we gradually gain such confidence in our guide that his praises, when they come, seem charged with special authority. For readers who know Goethe's early life through the golden haze of 'Dichtung und Wahrheit' it must be something of a shock to read the unvarnished narrative based, among other sources, on the recently published correspondence with Behrisch. The young student set out for Leipsic at the age of sixteen, and returned to Frankfurt three years later prematurely aged by dissipation. He had been wounded in a duel, he had drunk more than was good for him, and with Käthchen Schönkopf he had entered on a series of enslavements to passing passions from which he was never for long to escape. It was with the feelings of a shipwrecked seaman, he tells us, that he found himself under his father's roof; but he characteristically adds that he had nothing specially with which to reproach himself. The 'Sesenheim idyll' of the Strassburg period gave birth to some immortal poetry and to the most touching pages in his autobiography; but the story of Friederike leaves none the less an unpleasant taste in the mouth. 'From the first he never intended marriage. That he had

pangs of self-reproach for the part he had played may be accepted on his own evidence ; but alike from temperament and deliberate consideration of the facts of life he was incapable of the contrition which troubles human life to its depths. Yet it is well to remember the ideas then current in Germany regarding the relations between love and marriage. In his seventy-fourth year Goethe himself said, 'Love is something ideal, marriage is something real, and never with impunity do we exchange the ideal for the real.' The severest of moralists, Kant, was of the same opinion. 'The word *conjugium* itself implies that two married people are yoked together, and to be thus yoked cannot be called bliss.' It was in a world where such opinions were entertained by men of the highest character and intelligence that Goethe made his irresponsible addresses to the successive objects of his passion. That the Lotte episode did not develop into tragedy was due to the self-control of the lady and her betrothed, not to the hot-blooded young law student in sleepy old Wetzlar. In Lili Schönemann he found for the first time a woman of his own rank—indeed his social superior. In the eyes of the world there was nothing to prevent the engagement ripening into marriage ; but no sooner had he given his pledge than his instinctive repugnance to binding ties reasserted itself, and he broke off the relationship without formal leave-taking.

At the very moment when the breach with Lili made it desirable for Goethe to leave Frankfurt came the invitation from the young Karl August to visit him at Weimar. The two young men had attracted each other at first sight, and the burgher's son was flattered by the invitation of a Duke to become his friend and guest. Little did either the ruler or the poet imagine that their co-operation was to endure for half a century and to carry the name of the little Thuringian capital all over the world. 'Goethe's coming,' declares Prof. Hume Brown, 'was an event in the annals of human culture. For Germany it marks an epoch in her national development, and for humanity at large it was to make Weimar one of the intellectual shrines at which it will continue to pay homage for all time.' At a time when many of the German Courts were sunk in sloth and immorality,

the little Duchy could boast not only of its energetic and healthy-minded young ruler, but of its high-souled Duchess Luise, with the miniature Court of the cultivated Anna Amalia close by at Tiefurt. With Wieland and Knebel in command, intellectual life could hardly stagnate; and when Goethe persuaded his master a few months after his arrival to appoint Herder, his revered friend and teacher of Strassburg days, to the vacant post of Court preacher, the character of Weimar as a centre of enlightenment was assured.

For a year or two Karl August, intoxicated with animal spirits, shocked his sedate subjects by his madcap pranks, in which Goethe joined with full zest. 'We were all young and merry then,' declared the poet long after, as he looked back on the joyous revels of Ilmenau. The veteran Klopstock was moved to a letter of reproachful warning, which provoked a curt request to mind his own business; for graver matters were not neglected. 'I am now immersed in Court and political business,' wrote Goethe two months after his arrival; and his responsibilities increased with the lapse of years. The story of his administrative career was first pieced together by Schöll, and is fully described in the present work. Beginning as Legationsrat, with a seat and vote in Council, he was named a Privy Councillor in 1779, after which business became his chief care. He devoted himself to his duties with an ardour which told on his health and spirits, and the strain grew still greater in 1782, when he was made President of the Council. He was now able to carry through a number of financial and agrarian reforms; but his success was limited by the extravagance of his master. He admonished the Duke both in prose and verse; but Karl August none the less ranks with Karl Friedrich of Baden, Ferdinand of Brunswick, and one or two other minor potentates among the best German princes of his time. Not long before his death Goethe remarked to Eckermann that in the fifty years of his reign there was not a day in which his master had not given thought to the welfare of his subjects.

Goethe's ten years' activity in the service of the State form an honourable chapter in his life; but the work was never congenial, and as the responsibilities

accumulated the drudgery became intolerable. He could hardly have borne the burden but for the love of Frau von Stein, whose life is inseparable from his own for eleven years and to whom he sometimes wrote twice or thrice a day. After the breach she demanded her own letters back and destroyed them; and the Professor hints a doubt whether the poet's letters, meant only for her, ought ever to have been given to the world. Be that as it may, without them we should not know Goethe as we do. With the verdict that there is no more remarkable record of a man's relations to a woman we may all agree; but why are their relations described as a *liaison*? Frau von Stein was seven years his senior, the wife of an unloved husband, the mother of seven children, of delicate health and high moral principle; while Goethe remained throughout not only the intellectual comrade but the passionate lover.

'The course of their love did not run smooth, and, as it is presented to us from his side, we may doubt whether pain or pleasure was the predominant ingredient in it. Their relation to each other, as they both recognised, was an unnatural one, and neither was of a temperament that makes it easier. Frau von Stein paid the penalty of her own indiscretion. Worldly good sense might have counselled her as to the imprudence of a relation which could not run a natural course. She intermittently endeavoured to restrain the ardour of her youthful devotee, but, flattered by his worship of her, she came under a spell. Her conduct after their quarrel shows that she was not the "perfect woman nobly planned" Goethe's adoration represents her.'

Goethe set off for Italy in 1786. 'The principal object of my journey,' he subsequently told the Duke, 'was to cure myself of the physical and moral maladies which tortured me in Germany and ultimately made me useless, and to quench my ardent thirst after true art.' Next to the migration to Weimar, in 1775, the Italian journey is the most important event in his life. It closed his political activities and restored him to the creative sphere for which he was best fitted. It renewed his youth, introduced him to classical art, and furnished him with a wider perspective.

'What he saw and felt in Italy opened up to him a new

world of thought and feeling. It enabled him to estimate the comparative value of ancient and modern ideals, and thus to survey human effort as a whole and in its highest manifestations.'

It was also by far the happiest period of his life. On his return, after two years' absence, he looked at his old home with very different eyes. From the Eternal City to the toy capital was a far cry; and he soon discovered that his old friends were visibly bored by his enthusiasm for classical art.

'From Italy rich in form,' he complains, 'I was flung back into formless Germany, to exchange a cheerful for a gloomy sky. My friends, instead of offering me comfort, drove me to despair. My ecstasies over objects, distant and hardly known, my complaints over what I had lost appeared to offend them. I missed all sympathy; no one understood my language.'

Worst of all, the most precious friendship of his life was at an end. Frau von Stein had concluded from his sudden flight that she had lost her place in his heart, and she wrote to tell him so. He denied it; but Rome and Naples were to prove formidable rivals. When they met again both knew that their friendship hung by a thread; and within a few months he took a step which turned coolness into angry resentment, and made her exclaim in the bitterness of her heart that a beautiful star had fallen from heaven.

In the opening days of 1789, Christiane Vulpius, the daughter of a drunken advocate, visited Goethe to solicit his support for a brother. She worked in a flower factory, and the poet had noticed her before his Italian journey. In Italy he had renewed the dissipation of his youth, and on seeing her again he succumbed to the voluptuous charms of twenty-three. In November she was installed in his household, and on Christmas Day she bore him a son. The Duke stood godfather, and Herder baptised him; but the society of Weimar never forgave its most celebrated citizen, and Frau von Stein was foremost in her denunciation. The Professor writes with wisdom and feeling on the most distressing episode in the poet's life.

‘As the years passed, Christiane gradually settled down in her unnatural situation; but her life was a long sacrifice which excites our warmest sympathy. Naturally cheerful and affectionate, she was debarred from all society in which she could have found herself at home. For the ladies of Weimar she was a jest, and with the exception of her sister and an aunt, domiciled in the back of the house with Goethe’s permission, she does not appear to have had a single female acquaintance. And her feelings for Goethe were mixed with an awe which made impossible the full effusion of the heart. Though he constantly treated her with considerate kindness, she was never allowed to forget her position.’

In 1806, in gratitude for her devotion during a dangerous illness, he made her his wife; but the tragedy inherent in the situation remained. It was the nemesis of his shrinking from the marriage bond that the man who fled from Friederike and Lili found himself fettered to Christiane; and his latest biographer is amply justified when he observes that nothing has so damaged his fame in the eyes of posterity. On the other hand, he refuses to join in the condemnation of the poet for his neglect to visit his delightful mother except at long intervals.

If the years following the Italian journey were darkened by the sundering of friendships and loss of respect, a new period of happiness and creative effort opened in 1794 when Goethe suddenly discovered that Schiller, then Professor of History at Jena, could supply him with the stimulus and comradeship of which he was sorely in need. The story of that historic friendship is enshrined in the correspondence published by the survivor, and its quickening influence led to what Goethe aptly described as his ‘second spring.’ Schiller had already sown his Romantic wild oats, and the demagogue of ‘The Robbers’ had grown into the philosopher of the ‘Letters on Æsthetic Education.’ While Herder, the only other commanding intellect of the Weimar circle, was estranged from his old friend by his own difficult temper, Schiller’s attractive nature made an irresistible appeal. ‘I lose in him the half of my existence,’ wrote Goethe on hearing the news of his death in 1805. The Professor does not question the sincerity of his regrets, but he asks a question which will come to some of his readers with something of a shock.

'Was it fortunate for their relations that Schiller died when he did? There are some indications that there were possibilities of estrangement between them in the near future. Goethe was sometimes impatient at the insistency of Schiller's suggestions regarding his work, and this impatience would almost certainly have increased. It was significant, too, that during the later years he was showing a sympathy for certain youthful men of letters whom Schiller held in detestation. Moreover, as his past life had shown, it was a peculiarity of his temperament that new relations became sooner or later a necessity for him. From Merck, Lavater, Jacobi, and Frau von Stein he had in turn become alienated, and, though Schiller was far more to him than any of these, it is not improbable that even Schiller would have ceased to be to him what he had been. On Schiller's part we have clear evidence that latterly his position in Weimar and his relations to Goethe were not all he could have wished. If they had become estranged, the world would have been robbed of one of the noblest spectacles in literary history—genius and friendship working in perfect harmony towards the highest ends.'

The later years of Goethe's life, despite the ever-increasing stream of celebrities and humbler pilgrims to Weimar, were in a sense lonely. Though his friendship with Zelter, far away at Berlin, was a perpetual comfort, and Ottilie, his daughter-in-law, brought sunshine and grandchildren into his home, his worthless son was a sore trial, and he never again experienced such enduring and fruitful association as with Schiller or Frau von Stein. He remained susceptible to the last, falling in love with Minna Herzlieb at fifty-seven, and with Frau von Willemer at sixty-five. Poor Christiane passed away in 1816 having earned her husband's love by long years of devoted service.

'That her loss went to his heart we cannot doubt, though it is difficult to imagine a more ill-assorted pair. That he was sorely tried at times by her unfitness to fill the place he had given her we know; and his uniform tenderness and consideration for her proved his essential goodness of heart.'

Seven years later, at the age of seventy-four, he fell in love with Ulrike von Levetzow, a girl of nineteen, and informed his family of his approaching marriage; but to his intense regret her mother refused her consent.

Ulrike was the last of the long series of passions which left scars on the poet's heart and inspired him to his noblest verse.

The closing pages of the second volume contain the biographer's verdict on the character and personality of Goethe.

'Those who knew him best were most attracted to him. The devotion of his mother and sister went beyond the devotion of ordinary mothers and sisters, and throughout life he had an exceptional power of attracting friends. Jung Stilling said that his heart was as great as his intellect. Knebel, his friend for over fifty years, described him as the best of men, the most lovable of mankind. Children delighted in him and he in them—the most evident proof that he could have been neither cold-hearted nor a pedant. Sincerity, candour and plain dealing were eminent characteristics of his nature. He was singularly free from all pettiness of spirit, and envy of the gifts and reputations of others was a sentiment which he did not know. Devoid of vanity as of envy, he was fully aware of his own endowments and of the value of the work he had given to the world; but it was his habitual attitude to regard himself as simply an organ of Nature through which she communicated certain truths to the world. Yet in his character and genius there is an elusiveness which struck every observer. "In some respects I am a chameleon," he wrote in his fifteenth year; and Felix Mendelssohn declared that the world would one day come to believe that there had been not one but many Goethes. What strikes us most forcibly is the lack of controlling will when he comes into conflict with the instincts implanted in him. Susceptibility was the dominating characteristic of his nature; but along with susceptibility went the instinct to know and create, which asserted itself even when passion raged highest in him, and to which he confessed he owed his mental balance.'

The accusation of an overmastering egotism is dismissed, and Goethe's contention is accepted that a man best serves the world by cultivating the powers which he possesses.

While the main interest of this biography is the personality of its subject, the student will turn with eagerness to the author's judgments on Goethe's writings. The four years at Frankfurt between the departure from Strassburg in 1771 and the migration to Weimar in 1775

are without a parallel in literary history; for they witnessed not only 'Götz' and 'Werther,' 'Clavigo' and some lesser works, but, as we now know, the original form of 'Faust' and 'Egmont.' 'Had Goethe died at the age of twenty-six,' observes the Professor, 'his legacy would have assured him a place with the great creative minds of all time.' The years of administration at Weimar were unfavourable to production; but the newly-discovered 'Theatralische Sendung,' the chief work of this decade, bears the same relation to the 'Lehrjahre' as the 'Urfaust' to the completed drama, and is indeed its superior in vivacity and interest.

'Begun in his twenty-seventh year and engaging him till his thirty-seventh, it is the product of the period when the inspiration of youth passes into maturity, which shows itself in the wide outlook on life and the world. It may be questioned whether in any of his subsequent efforts in prose fiction we find the same equipoise of reflexion and inspiration.'

The poems of the same decade include not a few of his title-deeds to immortality, among them 'Kennst du das Land,' 'Wer nie sein Brod mit Thränen ass,' 'Der Erlkönig,' and 'Das Göttliche.'

Goethe took with him to Italy four uncompleted manuscripts, 'Egmont,' 'Iphigenie,' 'Tasso,' and 'Faust,' and finished the first two before his return. The Professor is a little severe on the works of the post-Roman period. 'Egmont,' he complains, is undramatic, 'Iphigenie' stiff, and 'Tasso' intrinsically unfitted for the stage. Had he seen Moissi act the part of the neurotic poet under Reinhardt's direction at Berlin he might have revised his judgment of the latter play. He is obviously out of sympathy with the attempt to follow classical models; but he does full justice to the beauties which sparkle in these finely-chiselled dramas. Even the exquisite 'Hermann und Dorothea' is described as a little artificial, though he allows it to be one of the permanently interesting things in literature and unmatched as a *tour de force*. The plays on the French Revolution, finished and unfinished, are interesting rather as politics than as literature; while the brilliant and sometimes cruel 'Xenien'—a joint declaration of war against the

enemies of Goethe and Schiller—are dismissed as a regrettable incident.

Apart from his fascinating autobiography the main works of Goethe's later life are the 'Theory of Light,' the 'Elective Affinities,' 'Wilhelm Meister,' the 'West-Oestlicher Divan,' and 'Faust.' The attempt to overthrow Newton was all the more audacious since it rested on a misunderstanding of his theory; but his investigations into the nature of colours founded physiological optics, while his discovery of the intermaxillary bone and the metamorphosis of plants secure him honourable mention in the history of biology and botany among the pioneers of the doctrine of evolution. Of the 'Wahlverwandschaften' (Elective Affinities) its author remarked that there was not a line in it which he had not himself experienced; and, though the end is inferior to the beginning, it presents far greater human interest than 'Wilhelm Meister.' The Professor's verdict on the longest of Goethe's three great novels is unexpectedly favourable. He admits that it has never been popular; that it lacks unity; that the hero is, as Carlyle called him, a milksop, and that Mignon alone grips the imagination.

'Yet, in spite of its imperfections as a work of art, in spite of the grossness of many of its themes and the faded sentimentalism of others, "Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre" is among the great books of European literature. . . . In hardly any other book can there be found such a wealth of thought on so many subjects of living and permanent interest.'

Goethe's writings are as subjective as Shakespeare's are impersonal; and the 'West-Oestlicher Divan,' suggested by a German translation of Hafiz and inspired by his passion for Marianne Willemer, is not only evidence of the poet's attraction to orientalism but a kind of poetical diary of the years 1814-18. If among the three hundred pieces there are traces of an obscurity unknown in the works of his prime, its wealth of reflexion will always command the attention of readers who care even more for the substance of a poem than the form. The chapters on 'Faust' are worthy of their transcendent theme. The 'Urfaust' was written between

1773 and 1775, and the finishing touches to the Second Part were only completed a few months before the poet's death in 1832. Even the First Part did not appear till 1808, though a fragment—different from the 'Urfaust'—had been published in 1790. Its emotional core was the tragedy of Gretchen, which the Professor associates with his desertion of Friederike.

'It was written with his heart's blood, which cannot be said of anything else that came from his hand. These scenes are Goethe's supreme triumph as a poet, and of all parts of the poem they make the widest human appeal; but they do not constitute its essential greatness. Its real greatness is found in its intellectual interest for the modern world. What the "Divine Comedy" and "Paradise Lost" did for their respective ages, "Faust" did for Goethe's. Dante and Milton gave poetic expression to the deposit of thought in which they were born, and which they accepted with personal conviction. Unshackled by any authority, Goethe presents no systematic body of doctrine, but in its hero he symbolises the human spirit in its limitless quest after satisfaction for soul and sense.'

The chapter on the Second Part has been supplied by Lord Haldane, who not only provides a skilful analysis of its somewhat miscellaneous fare but manfully vindicates its claim to be regarded as one of the supreme examples of reflective poetry. He does not mention that among the many triumphs of Reinhardt's art was its successful presentation at Berlin shortly before the war. The foregoing summary of the Professor's literary verdicts shows that he is no uncritical admirer of a writer who damaged so many of his works by padding and irrelevances. But in his judgment of Goethe's position as a thinker there are no apologetic half-tones. Scattered through these volumes is a string of resounding tributes, 'as great a thinker as he was a poet,' 'one of the most comprehensive minds the world has known,' 'one of humanity's enduring counsellors,' 'the first of modern independent thinkers.' For philosophy in the technical sense he had no inclination, and it was rather the attitude than the system of his favourite Spinoza that appealed to him. The sphere in which he has no rival but Shakespeare is the philosophy of life. 'His

spirit works and searches in all directions,' wrote Schiller, 'and strives to construct a whole—and for me that makes him a great man.' If we possessed nothing but the conversations with Eckermann—at once most restful and most stimulating—we should know we were in the company of a master mind. We owe indeed scarcely less to the old age of Goethe than to his youth.

'A peculiarly characteristic section of his work belongs for the most part to his closing years. Many and varied as were the works in prose and verse which he had given to the world, there was in his mind an overflow of reflexions for which he had not been able to find a place. The habit of meditating on all the experience that it presented to him, and condensing in aphoristic form the results of his thinking, became the prevailing tendency among his mental activities. The most abundant harvest was brought forth in the last decade of his life. He put many of them to a singular use; regardless of all artistic propriety, he emptied them into "Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre" simply to extend that work to its desired length. But he was unwilling that any of his words should be lost to the world, and he instructed Eckermann to publish the remaining maxims. We have many similar collections by men of the world, by men of action, and by pure thinkers; but for range, depth and suggestiveness none of these are comparable to those of Goethe. Of all men he, perhaps, lived the fullest life of intellect, soul and sense; there was virtually no field of human experience closed to him.'

Matthew Arnold described Goethe as the clearest, largest, and most helpful thinker of modern times, and Byron hailed him as the undisputed sovereign of European literature for fifty years. Lord Haldane expresses a hope that Germany, confronted with the unexpected summons to build her life anew, will turn more closely to the greatest of her teachers; and English readers, though their need is less and they are not ill supplied with counsellors of their own, will be grateful to Prof. Hume Brown for retracing the career and reinterpreting the message of the most imposing figure in the republic of letters since Shakespeare.

G. P. GOOCH.

Art. 9.—ELEONORA FONSECA AND THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION OF 1799.

1. *Una Poetessa Partenopea*. Nuova Antologia LXXXII, August, 1899.
2. *The 'Monitore' of the First Parthenopean Republic*. Feb. 2—June 8, 1799.
3. *La Rivoluzione Napoletana del 1799* (New edition of 1912). By Benedetto Croce. Bari: Laterza, 1912.
4. *La Rivoluzione Napoletana*. By Salvatore di Giacomo.
5. *Naples in 1799*. By Constance H. D. Giglioli. Murray, 1903.
6. *Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins*. Edited by H. C. Gutteridge, for the Navy Records Society, 1903.

ON Jan. 16, 1752, the infant daughter of a Portuguese nobleman resident in Rome, Don Clement de Fonseca Pimentel, was baptised in Santa Maria del Popolo. According to the register, a stately series of names was bestowed on the baby of three days old, but Eleonora was the one selected for general use. On the lips of the younger members of the family, it doubtless assumed some shorter form; for, though its owner was the eldest child of the Marquis de Fonseca and his equally aristocratic spouse, Catarina Lopez, the household included two small boys, related to Eleonora by a double cousinship. They had come from Portugal with their mother, who was the sister of Donna Catarina and the widow of Ferdinand Fonseca, brother of Don Clement.

No light has been thrown on the reasons which brought this little company of relatives from Braganza to Rome; but there they continued to reside till Eleonora was in her ninth year, and there her brothers, Michele and Girolamo, also were born. Swift was her progress from the nursery to the schoolroom, where her cousins were already at work under the supervision of Abbé Lopez. To her uncle Eleonora was probably indebted for her escape from the cramping influence of 'female education,' and for her early association with men of letters. Her childhood in Rome was in itself a goodly gift of fortune. Whether the city spoke to her in its ancient or its modern tongue, she was equally ready to respond. Latin was the staple of the

teaching she shared with her brothers and cousins; and for her there was never any deadness in the language of the great writers of the Augustan age. Their spiritual kinship was the discovery of a later day, but her schooling gave her the passport to their realm of gold; and from the first it had a homelike aspect to the young explorer, familiar with the city of the Cæsars.

Strained relations between the Papal Curia and the Court of Lisbon were the inevitable outcome of the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal in 1759. In the summer of the following year, Portuguese subjects in Rome were commanded by their King to quit the city within three months. In Naples the Fonseca family found a new home and a congenial social environment at the predominantly Spanish Court. Thus it came about that another ancient city laid its spell upon Eleonora. Of its ugly, repellent side, she had as yet no conception. To her delighted gaze, Naples revealed itself in all its loveliness of situation and surroundings.

Happy in the place of her nativity, Eleonora was no less happy in the date of her transplanting to Naples. That city of startling contrasts was on the eve of an outburst of intense intellectual vitality. The quickening influence was the literary and philosophical revival in Northern and Western Europe, which for lack of a better name is loosely summed up as the Romantic Movement. Originating in revolt against the rationalism and pseudo-classicism of the early 18th century, it became, in its ultimate issue, a change of attitude towards the whole of life. Its demand for the free play of the emotions was soon seen to be incompatible with any intellectual thralldom of women. In the wake of the pioneer Romanticist, Samuel Richardson, comes the modern woman-novelist, Fanny Burney; in the wider pathway opened up by Rousseau and his followers, appears the modern woman-journalist, Eleonora Fonseca.

These representatives of the spirit of the New Age were born in the same year. While, however, the English girl, 'with very little education but what she gave herself,' made straight for her appointed course, Eleonora's classical training predisposed her to mistake an exceptional facility in Latin and Italian verse for the poet's high vocation. And, since the writing of passable

sonnets is an easier achievement than the production of enduring fiction, it is not surprising to find that, whereas Fanny Burney was six-and-twenty when 'Evelina' appeared, Eleonora's compositions were being handed about in manuscript when she was sixteen.

Outward resemblance there is none between the shy, shrinking Fanny, whose fame no mortal foresaw, and the daughter of the South, with her swift advance to maturity and her finely-wrought intelligence, in whom the fire of youth burned with exceeding brightness, of whom we catch delightful glimpses in the letters of contemporary travellers and, more astonishing still, in the verses and compliments addressed to her by her every-day associates. Amidst companions neither dull nor halting in speech, she was singled out for her mental attainments, her overflowing vivacity and her felicity of expression; and, withal, her learning was worn so lightly, her brilliance was so spontaneous, that no one was aggrieved, no one jealous. 'Here is her portrait painted by herself,' writes one enthusiast, as he encloses a sonnet of Eleonora's in a letter to a friend. Unfortunately, this portrait has disappeared.

Not for their intrinsic excellence, but just because of their authorship, do we prize the meagre handful of Eleonora's poems which have escaped destruction. Even the most juvenile evince unusual knowledge of poetic form and easy command of word and phrase, together with all the wealth of classical analogy and allusion pre-eminently associated with the School of Metastasio, the Italian Laureate of the Court of Vienna. Seldom does he rise to any great poetic height but he is assuredly a very prince of *improvvisatori*. Fanny Burney studies Italian in order to read the works of Metastasio, her father's personal friend. Eleonora Fonseca, craving some more authoritative verdict than that of her admiring kinsfolk and acquaintance, gathers up her most cherished productions and sends them off to Metastasio, albeit with a letter more calculated to disarm than invite criticism. His reply left her with no further misgiving as to being on the right track.

One of the first poems on which Metastasio was invited to pass judgment was 'Il Tempio della Gloria, an epithalamium celebrating the marriage of Ferdinand

IV of Naples and Marie-Caroline of Austria in 1768. It secured for its author a special welcome at Court; and thenceforward no birth, journey, or other event in the royal circle failed to evoke its appropriate tribute of ode or sonnet. With '*La Nascita di Orfeo*,' a cantata in honour of the birth of the eldest son of Ferdinand and Caroline in 1775, Eleonora reveals complete mastery of all the niceties of Metastasian craftsmanship. The immediate popularity of these compositions is the surest proof that they showed no trace of original genius. A few lines and descriptive passages might be cited as evidence of the writer's possession of 'a thin vein of true poetry,' but, in the main, they simply illustrate the conventional adulation of royal personages under mythological names.

Less inspiring subjects for a minstrel's lay than Ferdinand and Caroline can hardly be imagined. Untutored, undisciplined, left to his own devices, the young King had consorted with idle aristocrats for the slaughtering of preserved game, and with coarse-minded fishermen and boatmen in the pursuit of other sports, growing up uncouth of speech, depraved in taste, good-natured, and not wanting in natural shrewdness, but inconceivably lazy, ignorant, and superstitious. Thus he was at a disadvantage as compared with the ambitious daughter of Maria Theresa, to whom he was married when he was nineteen and she fifteen. Her first attempts to play a political part were promptly suppressed by her father-in-law. Though the latter had become Charles III of Spain, he continued to control the policy of the Two Sicilies by making his able minister, Tanucci, the responsible functionary at Naples. Marie-Caroline's endeavour to obtain primary consideration for Austrian interests was naturally resented at Madrid. She was on safer ground when, in imitation of the reigning Hapsburgs and other benevolent despots, she proceeded to show favour to eminent representatives of science, art, and literature.

The years immediately following her marriage are associated with the institution or extension of libraries, museums, and schools of art, and with the founding of new chairs in the University of Naples. Amongst the professors of those days were men of European renown, such

as Mario Pagano, who wrote and lectured on criminal jurisprudence; Pasquale Baffi, the professor of Greek; and the outstanding authority on medical science, who at the age of twenty-one had become professor of botany, Domenico Cirillo. These men and certain of their fellow-workers constituted the nucleus of a small but growing element in the life of the community, which stood for efficiency and social reform. With this element Eleonora Fonseca came to be closely identified. Not as a mere adjunct to classics but for their own enthralling interest, she had studied mathematics and natural science. There are contemporary references to her grasp of physics, astronomy, and botany. Her love of botany was probably due to intercourse with Cirillo, the friend of Linnæus, the friend and correspondent also of the foremost scientific and literary men in England and France. Far-travelled, everywhere welcome, a member of the Royal Society of London and of many another learned body, detesting the sordid atmosphere of the Neapolitan Court, yet accepting the office of royal physician as a means of launching his schemes of medical reform, Cirillo might pass for a Renaissance scholar strayed out of his own epoch.

For the irksomeness of his attendance on royalty, he may have found compensation in closer acquaintance with the little group of thoughtful, studious men and women of aristocratic birth, who formed the connecting link between the Court and the University. Their familiarity with current French literature, especially the writings of Rousseau and the Encyclopædists, was impelling them to take disquieting views of the social conditions in their own country. For the time being, this tendency escaped adverse comment. Pride in the position of her sister, Marie-Antoinette—the only person for whom she felt any strong affection—was one reason why it suited Marie-Caroline to encourage French literature and French fashions; but she was chiefly moved by her determination to counteract the influence of Spain. She never forgave an opponent, and was merely biding her time to be avenged on Charles III for thwarting her political ambition. In 1777, she dealt a severe blow to her adopted country by compassing the downfall of Tanucci. Two years later, her ascendancy over her easy-going husband

enabled her to instal, as Minister of Marine, the astute political adventurer, Sir John Acton.

These same two years mark the turning-point, not only in the history of the reign, but also in the life of Eleonora Fonseca. In 1777, at the age of twenty-five, she was married to an officer in the Neapolitan army, Pasquale Tria de Solis. Beyond the facts that he was her equal in rank and her senior by fifteen years, we have no positive information concerning him. There is no outside testimony as to the happiness or otherwise of the union. Yet the true poetic note is struck, and all conventional phraseology discarded, in the sequence of five sonnets, in which Eleonora pours out her grief for the death of her infant son in 1779. No other child came to take the place of the little lad who had evoked this passion of motherhood. Casting about for some new centre of interest, hard study seemed the likeliest means of keeping at bay the haunting sense of sorrow that threatened to overwhelm her. Thus she came to be more and more attracted to the University circle, to become more and more affected, albeit at first unconsciously, by its liberalising atmosphere.

Few and brief are the references to her life during the ensuing period of fourteen years, in the course of which her intellectual powers attained their full maturity. With the breaking of the spell of Metastasio, the poets of the Roman Empire resumed their sway. To Eleonora, as to Dante, Virgil became in very truth 'master and guide.' When her father procured a patent of nobility in the country of his adoption, she became a Neapolitan citizen. But Virgil claimed her for the wider world of Italy, set his seal on her outlook on nature, and communicated to her his own sense of the grandeur and sanctity of the human race. Penetrated by the spirit of Virgil, Eleonora found in the study of economics and political history not only fresh channels of thought, but also possibilities of service and an outlet for patriotism. Count Joseph Gorani, a sojourner in Naples between 1786 and 1788, comments on one of her vanished prose works, a dissertation on the project of establishing a national bank. Again, when Ferdinand IV abolished the humiliating custom of paying tribute for his kingdom as a fief of the Papal

See and was fiercely attacked in consequence, his supporters found their most convincing arguments in Eleonora's translation of Caravita's Latin 'History of the Pontificate in the Two Sicilies.' This was published in 1790 with a dedication to Ferdinand. The preface and copious notes bear witness to exceptionally wide reading on the part of the translator.

While 1790 was still a new year, she was fêted at Court and awarded a State pension. It was the last time that Ferdinand and his consort figured as patrons of learning and literature. Horrified at the course of events in Paris, they contemplated a journey to Vienna to devise in concert with the Queen's brother, the Emperor Leopold II, some means of overthrowing the Revolutionary Government of France. In good hope of the ultimate success of his efforts, they at length recrossed the boundary between Austria and Italy. All might have gone well but for an unfortunate break of journey in Rome, which enabled the travellers to hold supplementary consultations with the aunts of the French King and other titled emigrants. Their tales of woe sent Marie-Caroline home in a frenzy of wrath and terror. She was persuaded that only stern repression could save the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons from the experiences of the royal family of France.

A more enlightened despot might have perceived that the elements of a successful revolution were utterly lacking in Naples. At one end of the social scale there was indeed a progressive group, more intent on Rousseau's 'Émile' than his 'Social Contract,' and sanguine about schemes of education and legal and economic reform. At the other extreme were the toilers of the sea and the hosts of the Lazzaroni, who toiled not at all, since begging and enforced exactions supplied their every need. 'King of the Lazzaroni' was a fitting name for Ferdinand, who understood their speech and had no illusions as to their amenability to social uplift. He might perchance have bridged the gulf between the populace and the apostles of progress, had he not been disqualified for playing any effective part by want of education and of training in the duties and responsibilities of kingship. So it fell out that the course of events was determined by the sinister influence of

Caroline. She insisted on immediate preparation for war on France by land and sea, and on a vastly augmented police force endowed with inquisitorial powers; and she took into her direct service an army of spies, who were instructed to keep a sharp outlook on all who had formerly shown any interest in French literature or politics. 'A word was enough to send the most respected citizen to prison.' The harassed professors, artists, writers, staunch royalists of earlier days, were forced into opposition to the Government,

Among the strong minds of Naples must be reckoned that of Eleonora Fonseca. The scholarship, which in bygone days had brought her into favour at Court, now rendered her an object of profound suspicion. Still, it was not apparently until the winter of 1794-1795 that, as a frequenter of Jacobin clubs, she was definitely placed on the Queen's black-list. The date is very significant. By the death of her husband, early in 1795, Eleonora was left with no home ties. Thenceforward, in accordance with Italian custom, she resumed her family name; but her older relatives seem to have finished their course, while those of the younger generation were military officers, none of them as yet openly numbered amongst the friends of liberty.

The year 1794 had witnessed the complete disappearance from the Court circle of the gifted men and women who had hitherto been its chief ornament. Distracted by grief for the execution of her sister, craving for vengeance, if not on French revolutionaries, then on any one suspected of sympathy with their tenets, Caroline could no longer be appeased by the imprisonment of her husband's subjects. It was said that 'the King's first impulses were always right,' and that he was inclined to laugh at the stories of Jacobins and conspiracies which were poured into his ears. But, because 'he was afraid he might be mistaken,' he sanctioned the setting up of a Junta, nominally to try the prisoners, actually to condemn them. The first victims were three young students, little more than boys. 'They had no fault beyond aspirations, discourses, and hopes.' Their defence was voluntarily undertaken and ably conducted by Mario Pagano, but all in vain. The great lawyer was himself flung into prison; the youths were hanged.

The fate of these lads and the arrest of their defender aroused widespread indignation, and abhorrence of the Queen and all in league with her. Cirillo discontinued his attendance at Court. Eleonora Fonseca became more closely identified with those who could see no way of escape from intolerable tyranny, save by co-operation with the Revolutionary Government of France. The success of Bonaparte's campaign in Northern Italy, in 1797, gave a definite direction to their hopes—hopes which seemed on the verge of fulfilment when, in February 1798, Berthier's victory in Central Italy substituted a Roman Republic for the Temporal Power of the Pope. Great, therefore, was the dismay of the reformers and equally great the jubilation at Court, when Nelson's triumph in the Battle of the Nile (Aug. 1, 1798) left Bonaparte and his army stranded in Egypt.

Not till Sept. 5 did the news reach Naples. The intensity of the Queen's relief and delight find utterance in a letter sent off on the spur of the moment to the woman she now delighted to honour, the wife of the British ambassador, Sir William Hamilton. To prevent the French from landing troops in the Two Sicilies was, indeed, a primary object of Nelson's operations in the Mediterranean; but it was an evil fate that brought the hero himself to Naples while still suffering in mind and body from the stress of the Nile campaign. Unable to resist the spell of Lady Hamilton, 'his outlook on continental events ceased to be that of a British admiral; it became, for a time at least, that of a Neapolitan Bourbon.' Hence his failure to protest vigorously against the Queen's demand for an immediate attack on the French army in occupation of the new Roman Republic. The project had not the remotest chance of success, but all the warnings from London and Vienna fell upon deaf ears. The preliminary steps included a further rounding up of suspected Neapolitans. On Oct. 8 Eleonora Fonseca was imprisoned.

The French fell back before the unexpected invasion. On Nov. 29, Ferdinand made a triumphal entry into Rome. It was a short-lived triumph. He was defeated and driven out again, on Dec. 9, by General Championnet. With the victors in pursuit, Ferdinand and the remnant of his host fled back to Naples. The

Lazzaroni rallied to the defence of their popular King, who solemnly promised not to abandon them to the advancing enemy. But Queen Caroline had decreed otherwise. By midnight on Dec. 21, the whole royal family, with the Hamiltons and the chief ministers, had escaped unseen to Nelson's flag-ship. Next morning they set sail for Palermo.

The flight of the despots was followed by the collapse of the whole system of government. The Lazzaroni refused to believe that their idol had been a free agent, and proceeded to denounce as anti-royalists all whose power they feared or whose possessions they coveted. Murder and pillage became the order of the day. On Jan. 15, it fortunately occurred to the rioters to throw open the prisons. Along with the criminals, the reformers also regained their liberty, and, powerless to stay the horrors of mob-rule, sent an urgent appeal to Championnet to come and restore order. The first hint of his approach turned the attention of the rioters to measures for the defence of the city—measures foredoomed to failure, for the fall of Naples was a mere question of time from the moment when the reformers, by a successful stratagem, gained possession of the dominant fortress of St Elmo. The satisfaction of the new garrison was marred by anxiety lest their families should be exposed to the fury of the outwitted mob. But the one woman associated with the enterprise was equal to the occasion. Before the news of the event spread abroad, Eleonora Fonseca had gathered together the imperilled women and children and marched them into the captured stronghold.

Championnet's all-round ability was evident both in the taking of the fiercely defended city and in the skill with which he afterwards handled its turbulent populace. Even the Lazzaroni were won over to the establishment of the Parthenopean Republic, partly by the obvious futility of resistance, partly because Ferdinand's prestige had been eclipsed by the discovery that the absconding monarch had carried off the contents of the Treasury and ordered the destruction of the ships, which might have been sent in pursuit of him and his spoil. By the middle classes and many of the nobles the change was eagerly welcomed. Hence, with promise of well-nigh

unanimous support, Championnet's Provisional Government assumed office. Imposing from the intellectual standpoint is the list of its twenty-five members. It includes the names of Mario Pagano and Pasquale Baffi, of their colleagues the professors of mathematics and chemistry, of lawyers and literary men, all actuated by the highest motives, all bent on emulating the efficiency of the French Jacobins, and sublimely unconscious of the fact that they were moving on a totally different plane. In France, the tree of liberty was a sturdy outgrowth of the will of the people. In Naples it was precariously rooted in the apex of the social structure. The French Republicans had made a clean sweep of their dynastic and aristocratic opponents, whereas the King of Naples had only removed to his second capital; the majority of the nobles and clergy were on his side, and all the resources of the island of Sicily and of British naval power remained at his disposal.

The sole chance of success for the Parthenopean Republic lay in prompt, united, and decisive action on the part of its rulers, and this was not forthcoming. It was left to Eleonora Fonseca, the editor of the '*Monitore Napoletano*,' the bi-weekly journal of the young Republic, to insist that matters of urgent importance should take precedence of the pursuit of the ideal, and to keep the fire of patriotic zeal aglow. So systematic was the destruction of the '*Monitore*' during the subsequent reactionary period that a complete set is nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, by going from one Neapolitan library to another, it is still possible to see and handle all the thin, greyish, ill-printed sheets, stained by age and worn with use, which can make Time's wheel run back to the year 1799 and bring the reader face to face with Eleonora.

The first sheet she offers is dated 'the 14th Pluvius in the Seventh Year of Liberty and the First Year of the Neapolitan Republic, one and indivisible [Feb. 2, 1799].' Her prelude recalls that of Wordsworth. 'At last we are free. For us too the day has dawned on which we can utter the sacred words liberty, equality, and claim to be worthy children of the Mother-Republic and worthy confederates of the free peoples of Italy and Europe.' A brief summary of the successful operations

of the French army leads on to a telling contrast between 'the expelled despot, following up his insensate entry into Rome by a cowardly flight with treasures amassed by pillaging the people,' and Championnet's message to the conquered citizens: 'You are free. Your liberty is the sole fruit of victory desired by France.'

In the second number of the 'Monitore,' we are at once aware of a jarring note in the new-found harmony. There have been 'breaches of the peace and signs of adhesion to the tyrant amongst the Plebeians.' The editor sees trouble ahead if the recalcitrants are not brought into line forthwith. The only ground of opposition must needs be ignorance, yet how to get into touch with them was a problem. Eleonora makes an urgent appeal to patriots, whether clerics or laymen possessing the gift of persuasive speech, to betake themselves to places of public resort, and to relate in simple language the story of the wondrous transformation. A supplement to the second 'Monitore' reflects a more joyous mood.

'Happy is the Republic, born under the auspices of the great Republic of France, no whirlwind or tempest marring its advent—the outcome of civic harmony, obtained almost without bloodshed and safeguarded by a victorious and liberalising army. Naples has now seen the sacred tree of Liberty, meet symbol of her future welfare, planted within her walls. Even Vesuvius is thrilled by this astounding political revolution, recalling to newness of life a people long pent in a tomb; and the fires of Vulcan, unseen for many a year, are adding their splendour to the illumination of this great capital.'

All too few were the days on which care could be put to flight by a summons to the spirit of joy; but never once did the 'Monitore' fail to reflect its editor's dauntless courage, her sense of proportion, concentration of purpose, and marvellous self-restraint. The literary *causeries* and philosophical disquisitions, beloved by contemporary journalists, must have had for her a well-nigh irresistible fascination, yet from her own newspaper they are rigidly excluded. Every inch of space is devoted to reports of current events, to the records of Government proceedings, and to vigorous grappling with the burning questions of the day.

One perpetual source of disquietude, the relationship of the Parthenopean Republic to the Mother-Republic of France, could not be safely dealt with in a public print, though there are clear indications of divergent points of view. Championnet fully realised that he would not be able to get his subordinate officers to take risks on behalf of the new Republic so long as its responsible rulers were straining after ideals, instead of making a determined effort to raise an army strong enough to keep the Bourbons at bay, pending the conquest of Sicily. There was, therefore, needless and disastrous delay in sending a contingent of the French army to restore order in the provinces, ravaged by Fra Diavolo and other robber-chiefs, in conjunction with stray bands of Royalist soldiers. Championnet had also to reckon with officials in Paris, envious of his popularity and suspicious of his leniency. Through their influence with the Directory, a certain Faypoult was sent to Naples as Civil Commissioner. His edicts made it perfectly clear that he and his agents were bent on the merciless fleecing of the Neapolitans. When the indignant Championnet expelled them from the country, his enemies persuaded the Directory that this was a matter for judicial investigation. Championnet was recalled to Paris. His successor at Naples was General Macdonald, who brought back the banished Faypoult, and incidentally gave to the Royalists the opportunity of fomenting discord.

Now was to be revealed the full significance of the failure to find an answer to that other vexed question—how to secure for the Republic the whole-hearted support of the people in general? In spite of all the efforts to win the allegiance of the Lazzaroni, week after week had gone by, bringing no advance towards mutual understanding and co-operation between them and the revolutionary leaders. No one was more conscious of this fatal gap than Eleonora, no one more fertile in expedients for bridging it. An early number of the 'Monitore' advocates the issue of a news-sheet in the Neapolitan dialect, to be read in all the churches of the land on Sundays and Saints' days. It was further suggested that men familiar with the dialect were to be employed by the municipalities to spend the afternoon in places of public concourse, reading aloud this

'summary of the most important instructions, decrees, and enactments of the Government.' A newspaper on the seedifying lines was hardly calculated to catch the ear of the populace; but, with some admixture of lighter material, more than one periodical in dialect did actually appear and circulate precariously for a week or two. A few born orators, with the republican cause at heart, harangued the multitude in unconventional terms and made a certain number of converts; but, for the most part, the political instruction of the people was undertaken by Franciscan friars, whose homilies on civic duty were too often delivered to a jeering congregation.

Under ingenious management the proposal, supported by the 'Monitore,' to disseminate republicanism by means of the popular puppet-shows might have had a measure of success had there been time to give it a fair trial. Public opinion was certainly influenced by social gatherings and intermingling of classes at the Jacobin clubs. There women as well as men had opportunities of commending the Revolution to their fellow-citizens, and of entertaining them with patriotic songs. In the Hall of Public Instruction, the editor of the 'Monitore' took part in the educational work in which she so firmly believed. Sometimes she recited to her audience a 'Hymn of Liberty' and other poems that she had composed in prison. She did her best to attract 'that part of the community which, inasmuch as adequate instruction has not yet raised them to the true dignity of People, we must continue to call Plebeians.'

That one sentence throws a flood of light on the whole situation. The speaker's point of view was not peculiar to herself; it was shared by the other revolutionary leaders. They never dreamed of setting themselves above the populace. Their error was rather in arguing that the rank and file were exactly like themselves with refining influences left out. Only let the educative leaven be set to work, and presently there would be a nation of Cirillos and Eleonora Fonsecas. In the end the reader of the 'Monitore' is left wondering if Mrs Browning had not found the inspiration of her longest poem in the tragedy of the Parthenopean Republic. On a great historic stage there was enacted something akin to Romney Leigh's experiment with the

Phalanstery. There are the same well-meant, ill-judged attempts at 'keeping summits by annulling depths,' the same failure to apprehend all that is involved in the 'raising of the masses,' the same growth of a spirit of antagonism between the would-be benefactors and those to whose welfare they had devoted themselves. The 'Plebs' were moved by no feeling of admiration when they referred to Eleonora as 'the mathematical woman.' Unlike some of her learned contemporaries, she was no advocate of education apart from religion. She was overjoyed when the Government nominated a commission of priests to draw up 'a moral catechism which could be easily understood by people of all classes,' and appealed in the 'Monitore' for a return to 'the simple religious missions of bygone days.'

During the latter part of April, speculation was rife as to what would happen on the first Saturday of May. This was the spring festival of St Januarius, the patron saint of Naples. The most precious relic in the Cathedral was the vessel containing what was believed to be some of the blood shed at his martyrdom. The liquefaction of this blood at the festal season was regarded as the outward and visible token of the Saint's continued goodwill towards the city. Since the withholding of the miracle was to be interpreted as a sign of his opposition to the new order of things, it was clear that the announcement of the result of the time-honoured rites could not be left entirely to ecclesiastics of Royalist sympathies. The Republic had already drifted into a position of extreme danger. From the south it was threatened by the advance of King Ferdinand's plenipotentiary, Cardinal Ruffo, with an army of Royalist soldiers, brigands, and malcontents of all sorts, while Naples itself was left almost defenceless by the withdrawal of the French army to Caserta. Save in the Fortress of St Elmo, there were no longer any French troops either in or near the city. The remaining fortresses were inadequately garrisoned by Republican soldiers, few in number and ill supplied with munitions.

In these days of gathering storm Eleonora Fonseca still contrived to make the same newspaper both the mainstay of the Government and the recorder of every fluctuation of the civic pulse. It is a safe conjecture

that her influence had much to do with the return of General Macdonald and his staff to take part in the festal procession of St Januarius and to remain near the altar at the subsequent ceremonial. With great exultation she describes, in the 'Monitore,' the incidents of the day, enlarging on the fact that, by the liquefaction of his blood, the Saint had ranged himself on the side of the republicans. Again she calls attention to the illumination of Vesuvius by flames that played gently around its summit.

But even in this last outburst of rejoicing there is an under-current of disappointment. The legislators had failed to see the importance of identifying themselves with the people and joining in the procession; while, in the ensuing days the clergy made no effort to deal with the event from the pulpit, and prove that there was no ground for the widespread belief that Jacobinism was synonymous with Atheism. In truth, the miracle came too late to create more than a momentary impression in favour of the Republic. The Bourbon adherents boldly asserted that the Saint was under a misapprehension, and that the Royalist cause was being vigorously championed by St Antony of Padua. In vain did Eleonora plead, exhort, and find most unexpected grounds for hope and courage. Ruffo and his hordes were tightening their grasp on Southern Italy, and Ferdinand and Marie-Caroline were gloating over the approaching day of vengeance.

From first to last the 'Monitore' had no more diligent reader than the exiled Queen. If a number failed to reach her, a reminder was promptly sent off to Lady Hamilton, who had departed with her husband on Nelson's flag-ship. In the Queen's letters to this strange confidante, we see her noting carefully every contemptuous reference to 'the vile tyrant and his wanton consort,' registering the name of every one commended for service to the Republic, and generally treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath.

What was presumably the last issue of the 'Monitore' is dated June 8, 1799. In her anxiety to encourage her readers, Eleonora had not waited to verify a rumour of advantage gained by the Republican troops in a battle near the northern frontier. In point of fact the French

troops were too few in number to offer effective resistance to the Royalists, and were retiring towards the north. The readers of the 'Monitore' were promised further particulars in the ensuing number. If it was ever printed, it has been irretrievably lost. The issue of June 8 probably had no successor; for by that date Ruffo's troops were already closing in on the doomed city. Five days later they were in possession of all but the fortresses—an easy victory, seeing that the Lazzaroni were on their side.

There followed days and nights of outrage and slaughter and pillage, unequalled till our own day. Not till June 19 was Ruffo able to establish some control over the lawless rabble; and he could claim no conquest of Naples while the fortresses held out. Their demolition was likely to cost the lives of many Royalist prisoners retained as hostages. The sole Royalist protection from the sea was a British squadron under Captain Foote. If the Franco-Spanish fleet were to elude Nelson, there would soon be an end of the Counter-Revolution. Ruffo therefore sought security by making terms with the French in St Elmo and the Republicans in the other fortresses. One article of the treaty provided that the garrisons might take their choice of remaining unmolested in Naples or being conveyed with their property under safe conduct to Toulon. They were, however, to retain the castles until the ships were ready to sail. On June 19 the treaty was signed by Ruffo, by the Commandant of St Elmo on behalf of the French, and by General Massa, the Commandant of Castel Nuovo, on behalf of the Republicans. On the 23rd it was signed by Captain Foote.

When the city was taken, the revolutionary leaders effected a temporary escape by seeking refuge in the fortresses. There is some doubt as to whether or not Eleonora Fonseca was included amongst the members of the capitulated garrisons, but she was certainly on board one of the transports, on which they ultimately assembled to the number of 1500. It was, however, with no confidence of safety that they left the strongholds. On the day following the signature of the treaty, Nelson and the British Fleet arrived in the Bay of Naples. To the dismay of Ruffo and Captain Foote, he refused to regard the treaty as binding. 'Kings,' he said, 'do not

make terms with rebels.' This was precisely what had been said to Ruffo over and over again in letters from Palermo. Hence he had no reason to suppose that 'their Sicilian Majesties' would accept the treaty without demur. Had Ferdinand been left to himself, the chances are that, though he had been breathing out threats of slaughter, he would have fallen in with the Cardinal's proposal to quell the populace and finish the revolution by 'a few bombs and a general amnesty.' It was not, however, the will of the Queen and Acton that the Revolution should end with the Cardinal dominating the situation. So far as they were concerned, he had served his purpose; and no inconvenient rivalry could be tolerated. Ferdinand had therefore been induced to make Nelson the supreme representative of Bourbon interests. It was a safe proceeding, inasmuch as the British Government also desired that the French should be cleared out of Naples and the monarchy reinstated.

While still at sea, Nelson was informed of the conclusion of an armistice. He decided that the French garrison was to be given two hours in which to evacuate St Elmo, prior to being conveyed to France. As for the rebels in the other two castles, 'they must,' he declared, 'throw themselves on the clemency of the King, for no other terms will be allowed them.' Confronted with the signed capitulation, Nelson insisted on adhering to his predetermined course of action. When Ruffo was reluctantly forced to perceive that, to all intents and purposes, he had been superseded, he did not decline Nelson's suggestion of a compromise. The terms of the armistice were to be fulfilled; i.e. the Republicans were to be allowed to go on board the ships, but these transports were to remain in the harbour, pending instructions from Palermo.

On June 28, two days after the embarkation, Nelson received letters from the King, the Queen, and Acton, all insisting that the treaty was to have no effect. The Queen, indeed, was beside herself with fury when she heard of it. She had a long list of Republicans who were to be tried for treason. Some of them were eligible for the King's pardon; but from all benefit of the royal clemency two names were expressly excluded, viz. those of General Massa and Eleonora Fonseca.

In accordance with Nelson's instructions, the transports were anchored within range of the English guns. By royal command the infamous Junta was reinstated. Every day boats put out to the transports and brought back fresh batches of victims, few of whom escaped execution. By the end of July the fifteen hundred persons covered by the treaty had been reduced to five hundred, and the Junta announced that the transports were free to set sail. There was, however, further delay. The Queen's black-list was not wholly exhausted. Her wrath was specially directed against the scholarly adherents of the revolution. No extenuating circumstances could be urged in favour of those who had manifested 'such ingratitude' towards their royal patrons. In the revolting alliance between a degenerate Court and a brutalised populace, every civilising element in the life of Naples was ruthlessly stamped out. On Aug. 3 Cirillo and Pagano were transferred from the ships to the appalling dungeons on shore. They were hanged on Oct. 29. Their colleague Pasquale Baffi was executed a week later.

Not till Aug. 12 were the transports actually allowed to depart. Shortly beforehand, the dreaded boat appeared once more and took off one solitary victim—Eleonora Fonseca. Some tortured wretch had doubtless revealed, what short hair and a suit of man's clothing had hitherto kept secret—that the object of the Queen's most virulent hatred and determined search was likely to make good her escape. On Aug. 17, she was subjected to the mockery of a trial and condemned to death. When she claimed the privilege of her rank to execution by beheading, she was informed that such a mitigation of punishment could only be conceded to those who had been born Neapolitan subjects. The woman who had loved and served her Italian fatherland was to be hanged as a Portuguese felon. Seven other persons were appointed to die on the same day, Aug. 20. Some lingering sense of decency prompted the suggestion that victims who included a woman and a bishop might be executed within the precincts of the Carmine prison. But this would not have suited either the Queen or the blood-thirsty crowd. It was decreed that the executions should take place as usual in the great Piazza del Mercato,

where gallows trees had taken the place of the uprooted trees of liberty.

Repudiated by Naples, and faced with death in most appalling form, Eleonora seemed to feel that she had been reclaimed by her native city. She could still maintain the heroic attitude of the great days of Rome, still sustain her own spirit and encourage her fellow-sufferers by recalling passages of Virgil. On the morning of the 20th, she calmly arranged the old, rusty-black dress which had been given her in place of her disguise, and obtained a cup of coffee. It was an oppressive day of impending storm. Nevertheless a huge concourse had assembled to witness the unusual features of the executions. Every window of the tall surrounding houses was filled with hostile, vociferous spectators. As the victims emerged from the adjacent prison, Eleonora turned to her comrades with the words of Virgil, 'Forsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit.'

Doubtless by royal command, she was the last to suffer. Daylight was fading as she issued from the guard-house. Unmoved by the execrations of the mob, heedless of the demand that she should cry *Viva il Re*, she turned with a gesture of salutation towards the great gibbet whence hung the bodies of those 'lost adventurers her peers.' Then, bound and blindfold, she was dragged up the ladder, on the topmost rungs of which the noose was adjusted. 'As she fell' (says de Nicola) 'the shouts of the populace went up to the stars.'

'No worse thing can be said of our age than this, that a Mario Pagano died upon the gallows,' says a contemporary historian; and the words are equally applicable to Eleonora Fonseca. Had her part in the Revolutionary drama been played on the greater stage of Paris, the name of one so gifted and so heroic would long ago have been familiar as a household word. Her last utterance was eminently characteristic; and we may add to it the words which Mrs Hamilton King puts into the mouth of a later Neapolitan martyr for liberty: 'Italia, when thou comest to thy kingdom, remember me.'

MARY MAXWELL MOFFAT.

Art. 10.—THE BOOK OF REVELATION.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St John. By R. H. Charles, D.D. Two vols. T. & T. Clark, 1920.

THERE is, perhaps, no book of the Bible on which modern study has cast more light than the last, the Revelation of St John. If we imagine an intelligent reader without previous knowledge working through the New Testament till he came to this, he would at once realise that he had passed to a type of literature very different from the Gospels and Epistles. He would find in these things hard to be understood, perhaps things hard to be believed; but he would have no insuperable difficulty in grasping their general principles. In Revelation, however, he would find himself in a different world—a series of bizarre pictures, purporting to have been revealed to the writer as ecstatic visions and to describe events leading up to the end of the world. If he had read the Old Testament, he might be reminded of similar features in Daniel and Zechariah, and would be inclined at times to recall half-remembered fragments of modern theological literature or of automatic writing. Questioning whether what he read could really be intended as literal, he might try to apply the key of allegory. But he would not get far before he abandoned the attempt in despair. And this is just what most readers of Revelation have done. They feel sure that attempts to extract from these visions an esoteric forecast of history, whether secular or ecclesiastical, are fundamentally unscientific; they content themselves with a *florilegium* of passages, such as the picture of the redeemed before the throne, which can be appropriated at once on account of the directness of their emotional appeal, apart from the context or their original significance.

There is, however, a key which does actually fit the lock; but it is like one of those patent safe-keys which require the knowledge and application of a complicated code word or phrase; for even with the key, the Revelation as a whole can never be a book for him who runs to read. The code word is 'Apocalyptic.' As we have already remarked, the *prima facie* impression as we pass

to this book is that we are dealing with a special type of literature; and modern scholarship confirms this impression. From 200 B.C. onwards, Judaism produced a series of such books, visions of the future and of the end (always regarded as near), clothed in symbolical language, attributed to some great name of the past, and having as their main theme the triumph of the cause of God by a series of catastrophic interventions which were to bring the world's history to a close and usher in a final golden age. Though the Jew often thought his country wrong, he never thought that every country except his own was right; he identified the cause of God with that of his nation, or at least of that part of it with which he found himself in agreement.

It will be seen that this would serve as a general description of Revelation, with the important differences that it is ascribed not to a figure of the dim past, but to a 'John' who is still alive, and that the Christian Church takes the place of the Jewish nation. Of other Apocalypses many have come down to us, usually in translations; but they were little known or studied until recently. The study of them is associated with the name of Dr Charles, now Archdeacon of Westminster. He has won a world-wide reputation as the pioneer and leading authority in this literature; and it is in every way fitting that in the book before us he should crown his work with a standard edition of the great Christian Apocalypse.

This edition is the fruit of twenty-five years of study. Whether all his conclusions will be finally accepted in detail or not, it will remain undoubtedly the standard edition for years to come. The many-sided learning, embracing Apocalyptic and other contemporary writings, the accurate and painstaking elaboration of linguistic and textual details, the sympathetic literary and religious insight, combine to make it an example that enables English scholarship to speak without fear or apology with its adversaries in the gate. It has all the qualities which have been popularly associated with the best German scholars, and, while Dr Charles knows and has used anything of value which has come from them, he is original, firsthand, and independent. We may illustrate from the elaborate section of forty pages on the Grammar of the Apocalypse. In this, Dr Charles investigates the

usages of words, phrases, tenses, and so on, comparing them with corresponding usages in the other Johannine books. Of the conclusions drawn we shall speak later; at the moment we are concerned with the labour involved. Such results are not to be gathered in a few minutes from dictionaries or concordances; they can only come from repeated re-readings of the documents with a single eye to each particular feature which is the subject of investigation. And often the work is complicated by intricate textual questions as to the correct reading.

What, then, are the results? Our first questions relate to authorship and date. The Christian Apocalypse, unlike others, is not pseudonymous. It claims to be by one 'John,' and Dr Charles urges strongly and rightly that we must accept the claim. But who was this John? Here we enter upon one of the most disputed and complex questions, a question which affects not only the Apocalypse but the other co-called Johannine writings of the New Testament, the Gospel and the three Epistles. A full discussion of this question is not possible here; but it may be useful to give the reader some idea of the situation. It is not a case where criticism interferes arbitrarily to upset an unequivocal claim made by our documents or the consistent evidence of early tradition.

Briefly, the data on which criticism has to work are these: none of these books claim to be written by the Apostle, the son of Zebedee. The Apocalyptist describes himself as 'your brother and partaker with you in tribulation'; he speaks of himself as a prophet, and of the apostles as a separate body. The second and third Epistles are by an unknown Presbyter or Elder; the first Epistle is anonymous; the Gospel is apparently by an unnamed 'disciple whom Jesus loved.' From the end of the second century all these were ascribed, with some hesitation as to the Apocalypse, to John, the son of Zebedee. But in earlier Christian literature the case is not so clear. There is evidence of at least two Johns at Ephesus. In a well-known passage, quoted by Eusebius, Papias speaks in the same sentence of a John who figures in a list of apostles, and also of an 'elder' John, who is coupled with Aristion. Eusebius accepts the statement and says that it is confirmed by

the existence in his own time of two tombs in Ephesus bearing the name of John. While, then, there is general agreement that the Gospel and, generally, the other Johannine literature were written by a John of Ephesus, there is considerable hesitation in identifying him *sans phrase* with the apostle, the son of Zebedee, who figures in the Gospels. Even Irenæus, though he implies the identification, always calls John the disciple of the Lord, or some such name; never 'the Apostle,' or the son of Zebedee.

There is, further, some evidence that the apostle was martyred by the Jews, almost certainly before 70,* in which case he cannot be the aged John whom we hear of at Ephesus, or the author of any of the books in question, since these date from the end of the first century A.D.† This evidence of martyrdom, which is certainly slight, is usually brushed aside altogether; but Dr Charles lays weight upon it, the point being that once the Ephesian John had been identified with the apostle, as was the case by the close of the second century, the contradictory evidence of martyrdom would disappear.

Further, on internal grounds, it is difficult to ascribe all the Johannine books to the same writer. Ideas, style, and language make it difficult, in spite of some points of contact, to believe that the Apocalypse and the Gospel come from the same hand. We may note especially the difference found in the attitude towards eschatology. In the Gospel the coming of Christ and the Judgment are spiritualised; they have already taken place in the experience of the believing soul. In the Apocalypse the eschatology is consistently regarded under its popular and external aspects; a literal and immediate judgment

* The references to the date of Galatians on pp. xlix f. are not very clear. The Epistle cannot be dated as late as 64 A.D., and in any case the important point is the reference to John the Apostle in ch. ii as indicating that he was alive at the time of the events there described, i.e. at the Council of Jerusalem in 49 A.D., or more probably at an earlier conference. In other words, so far as the evidence of Galatians goes, John may have been martyred, if he was martyred, any time after 50 A.D. This does not, however, affect Dr Charles' general position.

† The question of the date of the Apocalypse is complicated; but Dr Charles agrees both with the earliest external evidence and with the conclusions of most modern scholars in placing it in the last years of Domitian's reign.

and end of the world are expected. All this was seen by Dionysius of Alexandria, who died A.D. 265, and is widely recognised. But Dr Charles, by his investigation of the language and usages of the different books, has made the difference of authorship almost indisputable; in particular he has shown conclusively that the theory which attributes the second and third Epistles to the writer of the Apocalypse is impossible. His view is that the Gospel and the three Epistles belong together and come from the Presbyter; while the Apocalypse is by an otherwise unknown John, a prophet who migrated late in life from Galilee, the home of Apocalyptic,* to Ephesus. All the books, therefore, come from the same school; and this fact sufficiently explains the linguistic and theological agreements between them. Dr Charles, then, agrees with the majority of modern critics in separating the books; he differs from the right wing in assigning neither to the Apostle, whom he regards as having suffered an early martyrdom.

In other respects he is by no means an adherent of the left wing. There are inconsistencies, repetitions, and varying points of view in the Apocalypse which have suggested to many critics that the work, as we have it, is a combination of sources of various dates, some Jewish, some Christian, some originally in Hebrew or Aramaic, others in Greek. And on this basis the fascinating game of disentangling the sources has gone on merrily; but with no very convincing result. Dr Charles disagrees with this method, and his main reason is derived from the meticulous analysis of language and style already referred to. This shows that, with a few exceptions, the book is a real unity, and represents, as it stands, the mind of the author, not of an editor who has pieced together disjointed and half-understood fragments.

This matter of style is very important and significant, because the Apocalypse is so peculiar in this respect. It is customary to speak of it as very bad Greek, the worst in the New Testament. And so, from one point

* Granting that Galilee rather than Judæa was the home of Apocalyptic, the conclusion that the writer of any given Apocalypse was a Galilean can only be probable; there may have been exceptions. But the point is not of great importance.

of view, it is; we find nominatives in apposition to accusatives, neuter nouns followed by masculine participles, and similar solecisms. The usual remarks about what would happen to the Fourth Form boy may be taken for granted; and we go on to ask, under Dr Charles' guidance, whether all this is due to ignorance and carelessness. Ignorance, in a sense, yes; but carelessness, no. The grammar is clearly that of one to whom Greek remains a foreign tongue; it is also that of one accustomed to think in Hebrew. Granting this, it is self-consistent and extraordinarily effective. It is not, as old commentators used to say, the Greek of the Holy Ghost, with the implication that grammar is superfluous in Heaven; but the Greek of a Jew of Galilee who thinks in his native tongue and translates directly into the foreign medium which he must use if his message is to reach his hearers. Dr Charles points out that Prof. Moulton, who in the light of his study of the vernacular Greek of the Papyri had denied the existence of Hebraisms in the Apocalypse, afterwards came round to his own view.

But while there is this general unity of style, the writer has not spun his material out of his own head. Like most other ancient and modern writers, he is indebted to predecessors in the same field, and sometimes has incorporated considerable sections of their work. He has used 'sources,' i.e. visions of previous seers. These comprise nearly one-fifth of the work; some being in Greek, others in Hebrew or Aramaic. The chief are chaps. vii 1-8, xi 1-13, xii, xiii, xvii, xviii. These however, have all been recast and adapted, so as to become an integral part of the general scheme. In other words, the book is not a patch-work of inconsistent writings clumsily placed together by a compiler, but a real unity. In the case of the 'Letters to the Seven Churches' (ch. ii-iv) Dr Charles holds that these were originally written by John himself before the outbreak of a universal persecution, and were worked in at the time of the final writing of the book, which, as we have seen, he places under Domitian.

But though there is this general unity we do not escape altogether from the sinister figure of an 'editor.'

Dr Charles holds that the book was left unfinished ; the writer died suddenly or perhaps was martyred, and an unintelligent pupil gave it its final revision. Sometimes he transposed and misplaced verses, e.g. xviii 20 to end. In viii 7-12 what were originally Three Woes or Trumpets have been transformed into seven, by the addition of Four Woes at the beginning. The first scheme was one of Seven Seals, Three Trumpets, and Seven Bowls. The added Trumpets are commonplace, and repeat what has already occurred under the Seals.

A further important addition is to be found in xiv 3-4. To the picture of the hundred and forty and four thousand of the redeemed before the Throne, the editor adds the description, 'These are they who were not defiled with women ; for they are virgins.' It is impossible to explain away these words. As they stand they imply an exaggerated and even heretical regard for celibacy which would have excluded Peter and other Apostles from the number of the Redeemed on Mount Zion. Another addition is found in verses 15-17 of the same chapter, which represents the judgment as the Harvest, and only doubles the picture in the following verses where it is depicted as the Ingathering of the Vintage. As the passage stands the first act is ascribed to Christ, the Son of man, the second to an angel, and 'the Son of man is treated as an angel, a conception impossible not only in the Apocalypse, but in Jewish and Christian literature as a whole.'

But far the most important traces of the editor's work are to be found in the last three chapters. These, in particular, it is suggested, were left in a very fragmentary state, and have been put together in such a clumsy way that no one has been able to discover any real sequence of thought in them. We shall say something about this later. Other minor passages should be added to this list ; but, lest the influence of the editor should be exaggerated, we may remark that the additions he has made, according to Dr Charles' view, come to no more than twenty-two verses. This faithful disciple comes off rather badly at Dr Charles' hands.

He is 'an arch-heretic' and 'betrays a depth of stupidity all but incomprehensible.' 'The irony of it is that, despite his abysmal stupidity and heresies, he has achieved immortality

by securing a covert in the great work which he has done so much to discredit and obscure.' 'This shallow-brained fanatic and celibate, whose dogmatism varies directly with the narrowness of his understanding, has often stood between John and his readers for nearly 2000 years.'

Assuming that this hypothesis is at all true, it is obviously the business of the critic to restore, if he can, the text as written by the author, or, in the case of the unfinished portions, to recover his original intention. There is no doubt that Dr Charles' reconstructed text does give far better sense than the book as we have it. In particular, he is able to dispense with the hypothesis of 'recapitulation,' according to which the writer goes over the same ground several times under the Seven Seals, Seven Trumpets, and Seven Bowls. Such a view inevitably suggests a more or less mechanical use of 'sources.' But by getting rid, as we have seen, of the first four Trumpets, which only repeat what we have already heard, and by insisting that the faithful are removed from the earth by a universal martyrdom after the Seals, Dr Charles is able to show a steady progress in the drama. And in the closing chapters he is able to educe an intelligible sequence—the binding of Satan, the Millennium with the Heavenly Jerusalem on earth, the First Resurrection of Martyrs and the Conversion of the Gentiles, followed by the final conflict, the second general resurrection and the Judgment, coming to its climax with the New Jerusalem in the new heaven and earth, when all evil has been completely destroyed.

Granting that such a rearrangement is an improvement, there will always remain the question whether it is justified. Many will be *a priori* impatient of the attempt and of the hypothesis on which it is based. But ancient MSS. and ancient literature do give clear examples of wrong editing with dislocations, omissions, and additions. Death before the completion of a work is not in itself an unparalleled or improbable event. And with regard to the Apocalypse we have the fact that the book, particularly in the last chapters, does not always make sense as it stands; there would seem to be something wrong. Many of the passages suspected by Dr Charles present a real difficulty, even on a casual reading. No doubt books have been, and are, written,

which are badly arranged and inconsistent; the faults of the Apocalypse may, therefore, be due to the writer. But judging by the power and literary skill of the bulk of the work, we have some right to say that this is not probable. The way is then open for hypothetical reconstruction. There is this to be said for Dr Charles' view, that in many cases the evidence of differences of style and language coincides with internal difficulties of the subject-matter. An example may be seen in the section already referred to, in which the Judgment is depicted as a Harvest (xiv 15-17). Here there are real, though very subtle, differences, mainly turning on the use of prepositions, which do not seem to belong to the style of the author himself. Or, again, in the opening clause of vii 11 ('The name of the star is called Wormwood') we find the only case in the Apocalypse in which λέγειν is used in the sense of καλεῖν, a use, be it noted, which is frequent in the Fourth Gospel. The clause also breaks the four-line rhythm of the section. It must be pointed out, however, that the whole passage is regarded by Dr Charles as due to the editor!

We may, perhaps, be less certain about the details of the rearrangement suggested by Dr Charles. Assuming that John died and left portions of his book in the form of notes on separate slips, it is at least possible that he had not made up his mind where he was going to work them in. In that case, any reconstruction can only represent the sort of arrangement he might have made. We must be content to leave it at that.

Nor again are we quite convinced about the universal martyrdom which was to come to all the faithful after the Seals. Are the passages which suggest it more than rhetoric? And even if it were intended strictly, are we justified in assuming that the idea was carried out consistently through the rest of the book?

The main objection, indeed, which will be, and has in fact already been, brought against Dr Charles' reconstruction is not that it is superfluous or bad in itself, but that it mistakes the nature of Apocalyptic literature. It is urged that we must not look for too great a unity or a logical development of thought. Dr Charles has anticipated and dealt with this objection. He holds that Apocalyptic writers, in contrast to prophets, do show

this structural unity and steady development of thought
With our book in particular,

‘The work of this artist and thinker is seen not only in the perfectness of the form in which many of the visions are recorded, but also in the skill with which the individual visions are woven together in order to represent the orderly and inevitable character of the divine drama.’

Now when Dr Charles finds in this unity and development a characteristic of Apocalyptic literature we can only listen respectfully. But it must be admitted that it is not the *prima facie* impression made on the reader. It seems very often a disconnected series of visions ; and in fact Dr Charles only gets unity and consistency in other Apocalypses by breaking up our existing documents into sources of different dates and with different points of view, e.g. in Enoch. The question whether he is right depends largely on a subject which has been too little studied, the psychology of the Apocalyptic writers. Are their books the direct result of actual psychic experiences, of trance-visions, or something very like automatic writing? If so, we should expect on the analogy of modern examples a good deal of inconsequence and diffusiveness, with a lack of logical consistency. On the other hand, it is possible that, while such experiences really played a large part in the conception of the books, these as we have them are a literary product, in which the attempt was made to give order and sequence to the fragmentary ‘revelations’ received psychically. It is now a matter of honour that if trance-writings are published they should be published as received, in order that we may be able to test their evidential value. But the ancient world was not interested in psychic phenomena as such ; there was no reason why material received through the subconsciousness should not be worked up into an ordered whole ; and there would also be a natural tendency to use phrases such as ‘I saw’ in cases where there had been no actual vision. The present writer is inclined to believe that in the Apocalypses there are such literary and conventional elements ; and if so Dr Charles’ treatment is in principle justified ; but we shall be wise if we exercise a certain suspension of judgment for the present.

There remains a more fundamental question. Is the book really worth the labour spent on it? When we recover the original form and meaning, has it any living message for us to-day? The question is perfectly fair. Not only is it written in view of a definite historical situation which has long since passed away, but it embodies a theory of the future and of God's methods in the world, which are simply impossible for most of us to-day. The situation which forms the background is one of relentless persecution in which the sharp division between the Church and the world becomes emphasised. There is no question of permeating human society or the State with even the slightest leaven of Christian principles. Any such hope is postponed by the writer to the Millennial Age after the descent of the Heavenly Jerusalem. Meanwhile, it is war to the death. The Apocalypse does not suggest two opposing principles of Right and Wrong embodied in varying degrees in every institution and movement, even in the heart of every individual. They are represented absolutely by the Church and the Roman Empire. If the choice between the two called for a high degree of courage, it was at least clear cut and unmistakably defined. But the real difficulty of life is that this choice is so often confused and blurred. Where is the Mark of the Beast, and where is the Seal of Christ?

Equally different is the cosmic outlook. Apocalyptic presupposes a universe manageable both in duration and in extent. It had its origin in a definite act of God at a comparatively recent time, and it will come to an end in the same way. Heaven is literally above the earth, and intercourse between the denizens of the two realms is easily conceived. The earth, with man, is the centre of the universe. God is transcendent, Creator, and Judge in a literal sense, interposing when and how He will. Convulsions in society, and disturbances in Nature, are His direct judgments, decided upon and sent *ad hoc*, and the end is to come by a supernatural catastrophe. This way of looking at things robs the struggle between good and evil of its deepest significance; for in the last resort God can always cut the knot by the intervention of omnipotent power. He is a chess player who, when He will, can sweep His opponent's pieces off the board and order the opponent away to execution. This

ends the game; but it does not win it. The battle against evil cannot be won by a mere destruction of evil men; but only by such transformation of their wills and personalities that they come to be identified with good. This is the method of love and of the Cross. It implies a slow and patient process. But it is the unshaken conviction of Christian faith that it means a completer triumph in the long run. Apocalyptic, on the other hand, is always impatient. It cries, How long? It looks for an immediate parousia and judgment. And the solution it finds in a display of power destroys evil; but it does not conquer it.

And so we hear even in the Christian Apocalypse a note of fierce vengeance, which instead of praying for its enemies and for the turning of their hearts, exults in their approaching downfall and punishment. Such a mood may be readily excused in view of the circumstances of the time; it springs, indeed, from a religious and ethical root, from the conviction that God is indeed a God of righteousness, and from the cry for justice. But it does not embody the highest conception of God or of the moral sense. The last word of Christianity is that God is Love and that sin can only be overcome by transforming the sinner into something better, not by burning him.

And yet our Apocalypse is not guilty of the worst excesses of later ecclesiastical thought. It does not teach an unending Hell of hopeless torments. There are indeed passages which might suggest this. In xiv 11 we read that the smoke of the torment of the worshippers of the Beast 'goeth up for ever and ever.' In xix 3 the same phrase is used of Babylon. In xx 10 the Devil is 'cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where are also the Beast and the False Prophet; and they shall be tormented, day and night, for ever and ever.'

We note, however, in the last passage that these torments are only for the three supreme embodiments of evil. Their followers are devoured by fire; in xix 21 their flesh is given to the birds. The contradiction between this conception and the previous passage in xiv 11, shows that we are far removed from any cut-and-dried doctrine of an unending Hell. And in each case there is a direct quotation from Isa. xxxiv 10,

which refers to the desolation of the *land* of Edom; there is no reference to the unending torture of its inhabitants. It is obviously precarious to attempt to extract formal doctrine from rhetorical passages such as this. While we are bound to admit that the doctrine of Hell, with its everlasting and hopeless punishment, is in fact directly derived from the pictures of the punishment of sinners as presented to us in Apocalyptic literature, it represents the dogmatic hardening of a conception which was not really thought out. Annihilation of sinners or punishment till 'the last Day' is the general idea in these writers.

This suggests yet a further difference which is not so generally realised. It concerns the life after death, and especially that which we call 'the Intermediate State.' When the final judgment was expected soon this was unimportant. The departed could be thought of as 'souls beneath the Altar,' living a kind of half-life, waiting for the resurrection from the dead and the assumption of their spiritual bodies or garments of light. The Apocalyptic scheme implied the death of some and the survival of others (in the Pauline Epistles, if not in the Apocalypse), with a speedy judgment and resurrection. Any intermediate state was so brief that its conditions could be ignored. In the Apocalypse, as Dr Charles rightly points out, the familiar pictures of the redeemed before the Throne, in chaps. vii, xiv, and xv, are 'proleptic,' anticipating either the Millennium or the final bliss of Heaven; they are not intended to refer to the present state of the departed. But the long postponement of the Second Coming, even if we continue to expect it in anything like its literal sense at the end of time, has dislocated the scheme. It becomes more and more difficult to conceive of increasing numbers of the departed existing for lengthening centuries in this imperfect condition. We rightly ascribe to them now the fullness of life with God and Christ; whatever we mean by spiritual body or resurrection we place it at the time of death. 'Therefore are they before the throne of God and they serve Him day and night in His temple.' Descriptions such as these are not to us anticipatory; they refer to the state of the departed as we conceive it now.

It is, indeed, sometimes said that the insistence on these differences of outlook and the assumption that the Apocalyptic scheme was intended at all literally are based on a misunderstanding. We are reminded that we are dealing with poetry, not with prose; that we must not interpret oriental writers with their fondness for picture and their exuberant imagination as though they were matter-of-fact journalists. The reminder is useful, but it will not carry us all the way. We must distinguish between two types of symbolism or allegory. These may be illustrated by the difference between Watts' pictures and a 'Punch' cartoon. In the former we have, let us say, the figure of a woman with a broken lyre, and it stands for the abstract idea of Hope. In the latter we may have precisely similar figures, but in most cases they do not represent general principles, but concrete persons, countries, or events. So, when Enoch represents the nations under the figure of animals—sheep, bulls, lions, and so on—he is speaking symbolically of certain definite events, not merely allegorising facts of the spiritual life or recurrent tendencies in human nature and history, after the manner of Bunyan. He describes the actual nations of the world, and the details of their history under the cloak of this symbolism. And the point is that he passes from a quite literalistic survey of Israel's history in the past to his anticipation of the future, the setting up of the throne, the Judgment, the fiery abyss, the New House (i.e. Jerusalem on earth), and the Resurrection. Clearly, these are intended as actual events of the future, just as the preceding chapters describe what has happened in the past.

In the same way, when we read about the light of the sun being seven-fold, or of the sun and moon being darkened, it is not enough to say that light is a natural symbol of happiness and darkness of calamity. These are not merely poetical expressions for the joy that no man taketh from us, or for the gloom of separation from God. They denote something physical, an actual increase of the light, however brought about, which would be visible to the eye, or an actual darkness. The trumpet at the last judgment may not have been intended to denote a literal 'brass band,' but it did mean a sound audible to the ears of men. The stars

falling from Heaven implied an actual convulsion of Nature, though the details might be poetical or exaggerated. The Son of man coming on the clouds might not mean strictly His riding on the cloud as a chariot, but it did imply His visible appearance in the skies. The nearness of the end meant more than a nearness relative to the infinite vistas of eternity. No doubt there is a margin of uncertainty as to where the line is to be drawn between figure, allegory, and poetry on the one hand, and actual events on the other. But there can be no question as to the general method of interpretation. The Apocalyptic books were not written as allegories of the working of general principles, or dramatic representations of the triumph of right and wrong in the abstract, or of spiritual experiences of the individual soul. They expressed the beliefs of their age as to what was actually to happen in the near future. A fair parallel may be found in the sense in which the Middle Ages interpreted the beliefs in Heaven, Hell, Purgatory, and Judgment; in the general thought even of educated people these were understood in a matter-of-fact way at their face value. Of course, in both cases, the interpretation included spiritual values; but it presupposed a primary literal meaning.

We hold then that these differences of outlook cannot be explained away. It is worth while insisting upon them, because it is only when they have been frankly recognised and allowed for that we are in a position to extract for ourselves the full value of the underlying spiritual truths. So long as we are trying to compromise, either by the pretence that our scheme of things is the same as that of the Apocalypticist, or by half-suggestions that his scheme was really ours, there is always a sub-conscious feeling of unreality. Even Dr Charles, though in general he insists so clearly on the necessity of the primary historical interpretation, seems once or twice to allow himself an undue latitude of reading modern ideas into our writer.

'John the Seer insists not only that the individual follower of Christ should fashion his principles and conduct by the teaching of Christ, but that all governments should model their policies by the same Christian norm. He proclaims that there can be no divergence between the moral

laws binding on the individual and those incumbent on the State, or any voluntary society or corporation within the State.'

But it is surely alien to the outlook of the seer to suggest that he has any idea of the permeation of international morality by the gradual sway of Christian principles, or by the evangelisation of the world in anything like the modern sense. 'The kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ'; the kings of the earth bring their glory and their homage to the New Jerusalem; but, as Dr Charles himself recognises, such conceptions refer only to the final triumph or to the Millennial reign of the saints when conditions have been altered by a miraculous intervention of God and the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem. In the world as we know it, the Apocalyptist sees only bitter hostility between the nations and the Church. It is true 'the triumph is to be realised on earth'; but is not to be realised under the ordinary conditions of human history and development. John is not asking or expecting the Roman Government or the local State to adopt Christian principles in their social and foreign politics.

But once we recognise without reserve the complete difference of outlook, we can go on with a clear conscience to make our modern applications. In Dr Charles' words, 'No great prophecy receives its full and final fulfilment in any single event or series of events. . . . But if it is the expression of a great moral and spiritual truth, it will of a surety be fulfilled at sundry times and in divers manners and in varying degrees of completeness.' Antichrist, for example, is not to us a single figure of horror who is to appear at the end of time, but a principle of evil which incarnates itself in various ways and in various degrees. We can follow John in insisting that there can be no compromise between Babylon and the Church, between the Beast or the False Prophet and the Lamb and His followers, not as standing for different sets of people whom you will find in 'Who's Who,' or for organisations tabulated in 'Whitaker'; but as representing the eternal principles of wrong and of right, of hatred and of love. We can read our Apocalyptist and bathe ourselves to the full in his magnificent conviction of the certainty of the final issue. We can learn his

lesson of the supreme value of courage and faith in dark days. Always is it true that cowards or the faint-hearted are among the first of those 'whose part is in the second death.' Always is it true that those who are sealed with the mark of the Lamb, who enroll themselves on His side, are safeguarded from all the spiritual assaults of our ghostly enemies. Always do we pray and work for the coming of that city which is both the gift of God descending from Heaven, and yet also the creation of men who are ready to dare all in the service of the Eternal values of righteousness, truth, and beauty.

Of all this the Revelation is one of the supreme expressions in literature. It more than justifies its place in the canon, and the labour spent on it; it is 'a tract for hard times,' a vision of hope which has a fresh application for every generation. But in order to taste its full flavour, it is not enough to be content with those outstanding passages to which, as we suggested, the ordinary reader tends to confine his attention. Their full force can only be felt when they are placed in their context. The book must be read as a whole. It is a dramatic unity in which the plot unfolds itself in an ordered sequence. The very grotesqueness and horrors have their place as a counterfoil to the visions of peace and joy. Almost breathlessly we watch for the coming of the final triumphant *dénouement*, as chapter by chapter we follow the alternations of the conflict between the Church and Babylon. Only in the light of the fierce and relentless bitterness of the maddened powers of Antichrist can we do justice to the suppressed fury of righteous indignation which finds its climax in the Judgment on Babylon the Great—'the Mother of harlotries and of the abominations of the earth.'

'And the voice of the bridegroom and the bride
Shall be heard no more in thee;
And no craftsmen of whatever craft
Shall be found any more in thee.
And the voice of the millstone
Shall be heard no more in thee;
And the light of the Lamp
Shall shine no more in thee.
Rejoice over her, thou Heaven,
And ye Saints, and ye Apostles, and ye Prophets,
For God hath given Judgment in your cause against her.'

And only when we realise the human inevitableness of this righteous indignation against the cruelty of the world can we feel the divine pathos which breaks out in the yearning invitation.

‘And the Spirit and the bride say, Come.

And let him that heareth say, Come.

And let him that is athirst come :

Whosoever willeth let him take the Water of Life freely.’

The words belong in their setting only to the future Golden Age when persecution and opposition shall have ceased ; it is the task of the Christian consciousness to transfer them to the world as it is and to sublimate the desire for vengeance and a dramatic destruction of evil into the effort to win the sinner to the Kingdom of God with the divine message of a love that never faileth and which hopeth and believeth all things for all men.

Apart from details, it is the outstanding service of Dr Charles’ book that he has brought out the dramatic power and unity of the Apocalypse. In the commentary before us he writes as a scholar for scholars. The linguistic and textual discussions and the technical details of interpretation will be a mine of information for students. They give the grounds on which his conclusions are based, and the work is rounded off by very full indices. He and his publishers are to be congratulated on the production of such a work under difficult conditions of printing and publishing. But they would confer an equal benefit on the ordinary reader if they could be persuaded to issue a much smaller edition of the Commentary embodying the new translation and rearrangement of the text, printed in such a way that it could be read as literature, and accompanied by just such extracts from the introduction and notes as would give the average man the right way of approach and the necessary explanation of difficulties and obscurities.

C. W. EMMET.

Art. 11.—THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BALKANS.

1. *The Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed Sept. 10, 1919.* Treaty Series No. 11 (1919), Cmd. 400.
2. *The Treaty of Trianon, signed June 4, 1920.* Treaty Series No. 10 (1920), Cmd. 896.
3. *The Treaty of Neuilly, signed Nov. 27, 1919.* Treaty Series No. 5 (1920), Cmd. 522.
4. *The Treaty of Sèvres, signed Aug. 10, 1920.* Treaty Series No. 11 (1920), Cmd. 964.

THE object of this article is to examine some of the problems bound up with the Balkans, and in particular to discuss the post-war position in that Peninsula as I found it during a comprehensive tour made at the end of last year. Before embarking on this task, however, let me remind my readers that various events which have taken place since the outbreak of the European conflagration—particularly the disappearance of Austria-Hungary—have extended the district in question, or more correctly, the Balkanised zone, not merely as far as the Rivers Danube and Save, but up to the Baltic on the north and to the frontiers of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy on the west. This means that, whilst I shall only touch upon the foreign policies of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, I must refer in detail to the situations prevailing in Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, and Albania—situations directly influenced by the Treaties of Peace made by the Allies with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as respectively listed above. Besides these documents there are the Treaties for the protection of Minorities, signed by the Allies with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State,* with Roumania,† and with Greece.‡ There is, too, the unpublished Treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, and Czecho-Slovakia relative to the confines of those States, signed at Sèvres on Aug. 10, 1920. The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan and the small States are the signatories; and its provisions take the new States in order, define their

* Treaty Series, 1919, No. 17, Cmd. 461.

† Treaty Series, 1920, No. 6, Cmd. 588.

‡ Treaty Series, 1920, No. 13, Cmd. 960.

frontiers, and recognise their sovereignty within those frontiers.

The truth about the Balkans can only be realised after a brief allusion to two idealistic conditions which were desirable of realisation in the documents by which the war has been terminated. There was the necessity for establishing a barrier between Germany and the Near East—a barrier which at one time might possibly have been created by one of two distinct policies. The first of these was represented in Mr Wilson's tenth 'Point,' where he said that 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.' Whilst securing to the various nationalities concerned some form of government with the consent of the governed, the Dual Monarchy would then have remained at least more or less intact, the present economic crisis in Central Europe would have been avoided, and, with the possible disappearance of Germanic influence, an anti-Prussian barrier might have been established. For better or for worse, this policy was not adopted, and we, therefore, come to the second alternative, which entailed the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the attempted creation of a Balkan barrier largely to the south and east, but partly lapping over into that former Empire. The Allied decision in favour of this policy was made clear in Mr Wilson's reply, sent to Vienna on Oct. 18, 1918, wherein the President of the United States said that he was 'no longer at liberty to accept the mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis for peace,' and that the United States had already recognised the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and of Jugo-Slavia. Whether one approves or disapproves of this decision, which was probably unavoidable in the circumstances, it must have had, and still must have, its bearing upon the fulfilment of the second Allied obligation; namely, the obligation to endeavour to establish peace upon the principle of nationalities, and to redistribute the various territories in dispute upon a basis sufficiently just to be a safeguard against future wars. This is the case because, whilst the above-mentioned recognition of Czecho-Slovakia and of Jugo-Slavia was itself in conformity with the formula of nationalities, once it was determined to gratify the

aspirations of these peoples, it became necessary to establish them upon a basis enabling them to exist and to play their part in support of an anti-German policy, even if that basis carried with it infringements of some of the tenets enunciated during the war. Equally well, the Allied attitude towards Roumania and, to a less extent, towards Poland, follows as a natural consequence; for, as these countries are requisite as part of the anti-Prussian barrier, it was probably advisable to reward them in a way not strictly justified by the avowed objects for which the war was fought.

Whilst it only came into existence in the late summer, and after the signature of the larger treaties now under consideration, reference should be made here to the Little Entente, intended as an Allied bulwark in Central and Eastern Europe. This arrangement, though perhaps for the moment more or less still-born, may yet be of considerable significance in its relation to Germany, to Russia, and to the Balkanised States. Here we find that Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia have signed a definite alliance, which, though defensive in nature, is aimed directly at Hungary.* Over and above this alliance, Roumania is believed to have gone so far as to arrive at some sort of an understanding with one or both of these countries—an understanding supposed, at least in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, to include a condition that the return of a Habsburg to Hungary is to be considered as a *casus belli*. When I was in Central Europe just before Christmas, the delay, following these arrangements, seemed to be due to the fact that if the actual Alliance is to be enlarged beyond its original limits of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, then it should include not only Roumania, but also Poland, and perhaps Greece as well. Such an enlargement had its difficulties; for, whilst nobody can forecast the future development of events in Greece, until quite recently the relations between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland were such as to place obstacles in the way of these two countries arriving at an arrangement destined to commit either party to a war for the

* The terms of this Alliance, signed on Aug. 14, 1920, were published in the 'Gazette de Prague' for Nov. 13, 1920, and in 'The Contemporary Review' for January 1921.

benefit of the other. During the last few weeks, however, France, who has always encouraged the new Entente, seems to have had a renewed success in that direction; for the Franco-Polish Agreement* and the Roumano-Polish Military Convention would appear to further the construction of this diplomatic edifice from a slightly different angle.

Coming to a detailed discussion of the situations prevailing in each of the Balkan countries, we find that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, usually called Jugo-Slavia, has an approximate area of 90,000 square miles, and an approximate population of nearly 13,000,000 souls. It is, therefore, the second largest State to fall within the confines of this article. Occupying the north-west corner of, and extending beyond, the strict confines of the Balkans, the new Triune Kingdom came into existence as a result of the decision of a representative National Assembly, held in Zagreb in October 1918, which declared the independence of the Southern Slavs from the Dual Monarchy, and as a consequence of a subsequent proclamation, issued by a Congress held at Neustad in November 1918, to the effect that a union had taken place between the formerly Austro-Hungarian Provinces and Serbia, and that Prince Alexander had been appointed Regent of the new State. The situation created by these events was subsequently recognised in documentary form by the Treaties made between the Allies and Austria and Hungary, and Jugo-Slavia received further areas of territory from Bulgaria.

Once the principle of the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy is accepted, and as the question of Macedonia, which was Serbian before the war, forms no part of the present discussion, I think, with certain comparatively minor exceptions, that the inclusion within Jugo-Slavia of her present territories is fair and satisfactory. Speaking generally, and for the moment ignoring Montenegro, that inclusion results from the declared wishes of the inhabitants, and constitutes an adequate reward for Serbia in that most of the Slavs domiciled in this part of Europe have joined hands and because she has secured access to the Adriatic. As to the

* For the text of this Agreement see 'The Times,' Feb. 22, 1921.

exceptions, firstly, on the north and in connexion with the district lying to the north and east of the Rivers Drave and Danube, it is open to argument that, whilst this was claimed by the Jugo-Slavs on historical, racial, and strategic grounds, it might well have been wiser to leave it for division between Roumania and Hungary. The great, outstanding advantages of the adoption of such a course would have been that the Danube, the Drave, and the Teiss form natural frontiers in this locality. Their acceptance as such by the Allies might, therefore, have avoided some of the evils of the three party division of an area the present allocation of which is hardly natural. On the other hand, the disadvantages of such a settlement would have been that Belgrade must have remained a frontier capital, and that a further Slav population would have been doomed to partition between Roumania and Hungary. And, secondly, on the east, although it was natural for the Serbians to desire to make Bulgaria pay the price of her war policy, there were not sufficient arguments in favour of the changes made in the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier by the Treaty of Neuilly. Indeed, with the exception of the Strumnitza area, which commanded the Vardar Valley Railway, those changes, considered merely on strategical grounds, are so unimportant to Jugo-Slavia as never to compensate her for the renewed feelings of hostility which they have created in Bulgaria.

Since the conclusion of the above-mentioned arrangements there have occurred two events connected with the foreign relations of Jugo-Slavia. Firstly, the Klagenfurt plebescite, held in October last, and under the Treaty of Saint Germain, terminated entirely to the disadvantage of the Triune Kingdom; for, as the inhabitants of the first or southern zone voted in favour of Austria, no vote has been or will be taken in the second zone. The Treaty of Rapallo* appears finally to terminate the Adriatic question, the settlement of which, as we know from the published Correspondence,† had been causing so much anxiety to Europe for more

* This Treaty was signed on Nov. 12, 1920. So far, its full text has not been published in English.

† 'Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question.' Miscellaneous No. 2, 1920, Cmd. 586.

than two years. Presumably intended to destroy the fatal Treaty of London of April 1915, and recognised by the Allies so far as its territorial dispositions are concerned, the Rapallo arrangement effects a compromise between the rival claims of the two parties; for, whilst Italy abandons her aspirations in Dalmatia—except at Zara and in some of the islands—Jugo-Slavia has made a great sacrifice in connexion with Fiume.

Although the Government of Belgrade considers that the destiny of Montenegro was decided by the vote of a so-called National Assembly held at Podgoritzza, in November 1918, and although serious opposition upon this subject is likely to be terminated by the death of King Nicholas on March 1 last, brief reference must be made to this highly disputatious question before proceeding to a discussion of the internal affairs of the new Kingdom. So much has, however, been written upon the subject and so few reliable details are available, that I propose to confine myself to some general remarks upon a matter which has been badly handled by all concerned. When I was in Montenegro in the autumn of 1913, I found there was already a definite movement in favour of union with Serbia. This state of things, coupled with what was and is the decided mystery concerning various events which took place during the war, undoubtedly created most favourable ground for pressing home the Serbian claim, both abroad and in Montenegro. Whilst, therefore, I feel strongly that the Belgrade Government has taken up a foolish and unjustifiable attitude towards the problem, I do not believe, even before the death of the King, that any considerable section of Montenegrin public opinion was opposed to some form of union. If this be so, and my impression is confirmed by the Memorandum of Major H. Temperley,* by the report of Mr Bryce,† and by the result of the election held by the Constituent Assembly last November, then the question is one of detail rather than of principle. Upon this point I think that a large number of people objected, and probably still object, to the compulsory termination of their independence and to the

* Miscellaneous No. 1 (1921), Cmd. 1123.

† Miscellaneous No. 2 (1921), Cmd. 1124.

arbitrary abrogation of their national entity. If this be the case, then the future largely depends upon the manner in which the Constituent Assembly accomplishes its task at Belgrade; for, whatever may have happened during the last few years, and as the Montenegrins surely do not wish to see the return of either of King Nicholas' sons, the promulgation of a Liberal Charter would undoubtedly have the advantage of converting all but a negligible minority of the Montenegrin people into faithful supporters of the Jugo-Slav cause.

Turning to the internal position and particularly to the economic and political situations, which are very closely allied, there are naturally still great difficulties to be overcome. From the former standpoint, one of the principal problems is concerned with the fact that whilst the Serbian has always been used to pay a comparatively high price for manufactured articles, of necessity imported from abroad, the people of the ceded territories have been accustomed to acquire what were to them home-produced goods upon more reasonable terms. Consequently, as there must now be the same tariffs throughout the Kingdom, the natural financial disadvantages to be suffered by the former inhabitants of Austria-Hungary will require careful explanation and handling. Politically speaking, too, considering that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia each possessed various degrees of autonomy under the old régime, and that administrative autonomy is still in the hands of the local governments of each of these districts, who dispense the pre-war laws, it is obvious that any present or future attempt to create a Greater Serbia or to rob the people of privileges which they have enjoyed in the past, would be fatal to the destiny of the country. On the other hand, I was equally struck by two facts which speak well for the future. Firstly, the Prince Regent, Prince Alexander, is a material asset and a binding force in the country; for he is not only popular in Serbia and throughout the army, but the visits which His Royal Highness paid to his new possessions last year created a very favourable impression among practically all classes of the inhabitants. And secondly, I found nobody in Croatia or Slovenia (where I saw representative men of the various political

parties) who was opposed to some form of union with Serbia. As parliamentary government, ministerial responsibility to parliament, and the free rights of the citizen are already accepted axioms, the great problem of the moment therefore concerns the nature of the Constitution to be drawn up by the newly-elected Assembly. Whilst presumably this document will include clauses re-instituting a monarchy, defining whether there shall be one or two Chambers, and establishing the relations between the State and the Church, its momentous sections will obviously be those dealing with the question of centralisation or decentralisation. Moreover, in the case of the acceptance of the latter principle, there will still remain decisions as to whether such a measure shall be political or merely administrative, and as to whether it shall be applied to the present distinct territorial units or to smaller and more numerous areas.

Although it is too soon to forecast what may be the form of Constitution now to be adopted, or to express any opinion as to the broader results of the election held last November, certain general observations are possible upon the political situation thereby created. Its first outstanding feature is that no one Party secured a majority, and that, whereas the Centralists and the Decentralists are about equal in numbers, in most cases the areas directly interested in decentralisation voted in favour of such a measure in its wider or more limited form. The result of this and of the highly confused composition of the Chamber is that the Radicals and the Democrats, who together do not possess quite half the seats, have formed a more or less loose Coalition under M. Pashitch, who has acquired, so I understand, the support of the Bosnian Moslems and probably also that of the Serbian Peasants. As the Radicals in principle favour some form of autonomy and as the Democrats stand for the complete unification of the country, this would seem to mean that, in the face of the present danger, the two great opposing political groups have decided to sink their differences and to work for the larger interests of the country. On the other hand, whilst the importance of M. Raditch with his fifty-one Croatian Peasant supporters and the

influence of the Communists should not be exaggerated, it must be remembered that the power of these sections is an unknown quantity, and that, at a given moment, either or both might assume a rôle of considerable significance within or without the Chamber. The future, therefore, almost entirely depends upon whether M. Pashitch, who is the most experienced statesman in the country, is capable of adapting and broadening his ideas to suit the new circumstances by which he is surrounded, and upon whether the present or another Government is able to arrive at a compromise upon the Constitutional question—a compromise which must be acceptable not only to the Cabinet assembled at Belgrade, but also to the peoples of the component parts of the present State.

As Roumania is affected by some of the same international arrangements as Jugo-Slavia, I will pass next to that country, whose war gains must be considered under two headings. On the west and as a direct result of the Treaties of Trianon and of Saint-Germain and of the arrangements made by the Great Powers for the partition of the Banat between Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, the former country obtains very large areas of new territory, most of which used to be Hungarian, but a small part of which was formerly Austrian. And then, on the east and north-east, the frontier of Roumania is now formed by the River Dniester and not as heretofore by the Pruth. This means that she has secured Bessarabia and, therefore, in this direction all or more than all the territory to which she has laid stout claim for over forty years. This development, which certainly would not have been possible but for the exit of Russia from the war, originally depends not upon an Allied decision but upon events which took place locally. They began soon after the Muscovite Revolution, for in the summer of 1917 the Bessarabians demanded an autonomy which at that time intended to leave them within a federated Russian Republic. By December of that year, however, a declaration of independence had been made; and in the following April, when terms of peace had been imposed by the Central Powers upon Roumania, a Bessarabian National Assembly voted, by a large majority, in favour of a qualified form of union with

Roumania. This union which, together with subsequent events, may have been furthered by Roumanian propaganda, and was almost immediately sanctioned by Germany and Austria-Hungary, was re-voted (this time unconditionally) in December 1918, and therefore directly after the Armistice. Thus, officially speaking, matters stood until Oct. 28, 1920, when Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan signed a Treaty* with Roumania, by which they recognised the sovereignty of that country over Bessarabia, and in which the contracting Powers undertook to invite Russia to adhere to the said Treaty as soon as there is a government in Russia which is recognised by them.

Speaking in a general way these additions to her dominions mean that Roumania is by far the largest State with which I am concerned here, that both her size and population have been more than doubled as a result of the war, and that her area and number of inhabitants are respectively about 122,000 square miles and about 17,000,000 souls. Whilst such a distribution places a large number of Magyars, domiciled in South-Eastern Transylvania and near to the former Roumanian frontier, under alien rule, this was almost unavoidable, and it, therefore, cannot be too heavily criticised on the basis of nationalities; for any other arrangement would have left a big Roumane element (located to the west of these Magyars) still in Hungary. Equally well, whereas the Roumanians, particularly M. Bratiano and the Liberal Party, contend that the whole of the Banat should have gone to them as arranged by the Treaty under which they entered the war in 1916, the division of this zone should give rise to no serious condemnation except on points of detail; for I understand that the Roumanes and the Serbs each constitute the largest element of the population in the area allotted to their respective Governments. On the north-east, on the other hand, it is believed that Bessarabia is about 70 per cent. Roumane by race, and this fact, coupled with the popular vote in favour of union, precludes any present-time censure so far as as that province is concerned.

The most important questions in Roumania are,

* This document has not yet been published.

therefore, those connected with the system of government in the new territories, with the manner in which the existing administration is being carried out, and with the *present* feelings of the people towards their changed status. Although there has, as yet, been no time for the introduction of uniform legal or agrarian systems, the whole territory is governed as a single and united country, Transylvania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia having no political autonomy. Each of these districts, however, possesses a Minister in the Cabinet. He is a sort of Governor-General, and at the same time a political link between his Province and Bucharest. With regard to the administration and judging from information derived from reliable sources, many of them Roumanian, the attitude of the Government seems to leave a great deal to be desired, for it is acting in the spirit of a conqueror and not of a friend, particularly in Transylvania. Houses have been commandeered in large numbers, local officials have been replaced by others sent from Bucharest, and the Executive is faulty and corrupt. Such a policy means that the populations compare the present state of things with that which previously existed, and, perhaps without allowing sufficiently for the fact of conditions being universally worse than before the war, that they consider Roumania responsible for everything disadvantageous which now occurs. The result is that the people (Roumanes and others) of all the new areas, and especially those of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, who are far better educated than those of old Roumania, are becoming more and more dissatisfied. Indeed, as things stand, I believe that discontent is rife and widespread in the new territories (particularly in those which used to form part of the Dual Monarchy), and that, unless their peoples, who at one time favoured union, are given the very considerable voice which they deserve in the government of the whole country, there may be a most serious movement either for independence or for union with Hungary, the government of which, though severe, was always correct.

As to the general situation, and although something has been done to solve the Agrarian and Jewish questions, it must be pointed out that this is the only country in the Balkans where little attempt has been made to set up

a policy of reconstruction and where chaos and corruption exist on all sides. In the year 1918, an Act was passed for the expropriation of large properties in favour of the peasants; but up to the present the working of this Act seems not to have been entirely satisfactory. Since the summer of 1919, too, Jews have been allowed to acquire the full rights of citizenship, and the Chamber is now composed of members elected, nominally without interference, by the direct vote of the population. On the other side of the picture, and in spite of the absolute necessity for Roumania to introduce reforms, one finds that from the time of her entry into the war up till last December, there had been no proper budget, and the current expenses of the State, so far as paid, were met largely by internal loans and issues of paper money. The taxes are not properly collected, and they have been augmented hardly, if at all, since the outbreak of hostilities. The railways are in a condition which render travel, except by one or two international trains, well-nigh impossible—a condition which also has an appalling effect upon trade and the military strength of the country. Again, the corruption, for which Roumania has always been notorious, has increased to a degree which makes the present state of things more dreadful than that which existed in Turkey during the worst days of Abdul Hamid, when bribery there was at its height. These conditions depend upon the attitude of mind of the upper and middle classes, who do not seem fully to realise their great seriousness, upon the fact that the old gang are neither able nor willing to deal with the new situation, and upon the all-important part played by politics and political intrigue in the life of the country. They will only be mitigated when the interested parties are ready to make sacrifices, when the governing clique really surrenders the privileged position which it has enjoyed for years, and when the leaders of the various political groups decide to work for the good of the country rather than for the destruction of their own particular enemies.

As I have dealt earlier with the Little Entente, I will only briefly refer to the relations of Roumania with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia. There are certain outstanding questions with Bulgaria, the most important of

which concerns the Roumanian attitude towards the Bulgarian population in the Dobrudja ; but neither this nor the allotment of the southern part of that province to Roumania seems likely to be the cause of any serious development in the immediate future. So far as Hungary is concerned, almost everything depends, and must depend, upon the course shaped by events in, and connected with, the new western provinces of Roumania. As to Russia, and considering that the Bolshevist programme seems to include the attempted reconquest of all the territories formerly belonging to that country, there is naturally an ever-present risk that Roumania may be singled out in this connexion. The army of King Ferdinand is reported to be well under the control of its officers, and whilst the people, who are mainly peasants, are believed not to have been widely impregnated by Communism, this Bolshevist danger is naturally strengthened by the conditions to which I have referred. It is here, I think, that one of the real perils lies ; for, with home and foreign affairs everywhere more closely connected than heretofore, it is impossible to foresee the national or international developments which might follow a crossing of the Bessarabian frontier by the forces of the enemy.

The position of, and in, Bulgaria is in many ways more changed by the war than has been that of any other Balkan country. Reduced in size from an area of about 43,300 square miles to one of about 37,400 square miles, the Treaties of Neuilly and of Sèvres, together with an unpublished Treaty * signed with Greece at the latter place, will probably make Bulgaria the smallest country in the Near East except Albania. In spite of this, the dogged, stolid, persevering nature of the people is answerable for the fact that, whilst everybody is depressed, no

* This Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the one hand, and by Greece on the other, on Aug. 10, 1920. Consisting of sixteen articles, its most important features are that it cedes to Greece the territories renounced by Bulgaria under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, and that it lays down certain provisions as to the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Ægean. The port of Dédeagatch is declared of international interest, and if Bulgaria makes the demand to the Council of the League of Nations, an International Commission is to be appointed to insure the proper carrying out of the arrangements made in regard to Dédeagatch and the approaches thereto.

feeling of despair exists. Indeed, it is here that I found the position to be unique, for there is not a single other Balkan Kingdom which could have suffered the disaster of 1913, still less that which has recently occurred, without a revolution. Instead, however, of any signs of revolution, the administration, the public services, and the daily life of the inhabitants are working uncommonly well, and this because the Bulgarian realises that the best policy is reconstruction, which is now in progress in all departments and throughout the country.

From the political standpoint there is a new atmosphere. In the place of an autocratic ruler and a puppet Government, there are now the youthful Tsar Boris and the Peasant régime of M. Stambolisky. Beset by innumerable difficulties and left entirely alone so far as family advisers are concerned, His Majesty, who is twenty-seven years of age, is playing the part of a constitutional ruler in the best sense of these words. He is *au courant* with everything that is going on, he is quickly getting to know personally a vast number of his people, and he is identifying himself with the spirit and interests of a country in which he was born and brought up. These facts, coupled with a policy of non-interference with the constitutional rights of the Government, are rapidly converting what at one time seemed to be a tottering kingship into a national institution, which institution appears destined even to become popular with the masses of the people. Thus, when I saw him in December, M. Stambolisky expressed the opinion that, were Bulgaria to be called upon to elect a President, her choice would fall upon Boris, which opinion, on being repeated during the Peasant Conference held at Sofia in February, called forth cheers from the representatives of that Party. Moreover, running parallel to this new position of the Monarchy, and forming part of the change due to the abdication of King Ferdinand, is the power now possessed by the Bulgarians to choose their own Government, a power not vested in them before the war. Thus, instead of Ministers and Parliaments being manœuvred and dismissed at the will of one man, we now have the Peasant Government of M. Stambolisky, who has introduced legislation so drastic and far-reaching as to test his

influence, even in a democratic country like Bulgaria. In spite, however, of the very strong hostility of the other political groups and of their criticism of his prolonged European tour, this legislation, which includes a statute instituting compulsory labour, has in no way robbed the Premier of the confidence of his own Party. Indeed, when M. Stambolisky and his colleagues formally resigned in February and during the Peasant Conference which represented the organised Peasant Party at Sofia, they were immediately re-elected to office, notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition had raised a doubt as to what would be the standpoint assumed by that gathering.

With regard to the future, there are two questions of great significance. It is essential, primarily, whether he be in power or in opposition, that M. Stambolisky should realise the necessity for moderation, temperateness, and good judgment; and that, bearing in mind the recent trend of historical events in Greece, he should never lose sight of the facts that a one-man régime is a dangerous expedient, and that experienced and balanced politicians have their ways of bringing about the fall of leaders to whom they are opposed. In the second place, if we ignore, as I must here ignore, the difficulty in which Bulgaria is placed by her obligation to recruit the army by voluntary enlistment, and the fairness or unfairness of the solutions maintained or adopted in regard to Macedonia and the Dobrudja, there are still the questions of Western Thrace and of Bulgarian commercial access to the *Ægean*. The position in regard to these questions is remarkable; for whilst, under the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria definitely agreed to her frontiers with Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, she renounced her *Ægean* coastal strip of territory in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers (including the United States), whose settlement as to this territory she undertook to accept. This area was subsequently handed over to Greece by the above-mentioned unpublished Treaty or by the Treaty of *Sèvres*, to neither of which documents America was or is a party.

Whatever be the Allied decision upon the larger and broader aspects of this question, a Bulgarian access to

the *Ægean*, guaranteed by the Treaty of Neuilly, has been again recognised. Nevertheless, to those who know the Balkans, it must be obvious that, as the pre-war outlet possessed by Serbia at Salonica was unsatisfactory to that country, so will be the Bulgarian exit upon the *Ægean* unless, and at least until, that exit is really and directly maintained under Allied control. Such control is, however, foreseen in the above-named unpublished Treaty, for by Article 16, Bulgaria has the right to demand from the Council of the League of Nations the appointment of an International Commission responsible for the proper execution of the arrangements about *Dédéagatch*. This demand may, or may not, have been made; but in any case I believe that Bulgaria is still compelled to export and import her goods only by way of her Black Sea and Danubian ports. Such a restriction, which hampers the trade of that country, is also disadvantageous to Western Europe, for it delays the arrival and increases the cost of the Bulgarian cereals of which we are in need. Consequently, unless there is to be territorial revision in regard to Western Thrace, especially as Bulgaria has now become a member of the League,* it is to be hoped that an early opportunity will be taken to facilitate her trade by its natural route down the Maritza Valley, and that something will be done to give her that free use of a port which has been promised. The adoption of such measures will not only be in accordance with justice, but it will tend to increase the chances of Balkan peace.

The position in Turkey and in Greece, and the final attitude of the Powers towards the Treaty of *Sèvres*, are so obscure that it is useless here to dogmatise upon these questions. Indeed, although at one time it seemed possible that the Near Eastern Conference, which met in London on Feb. 21, would be able to come to an immediate and definite decision upon these all-important subjects, things are changing so rapidly from day to day, that I shall only attempt briefly to allude to the situations which I found existing in Constantinople, in the Smyrna area, and in Athens, pointing out in as few

* Bulgaria was admitted as a member of the League of Nations at Geneva on Dec. 16, 1920, by a majority of 35 votes to 2.



words as possible the meaning of these positions and their effect upon the future trend of political events in this part of the world.

To begin with, in theory there are, or were, two Turkeys—Constantinople, and the greater part of Anatolia. The former area, the one with which I am now directly concerned, extends only just beyond the Chatalja Lines and in Asia roughly up to Ismid. As defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey in Europe thus includes merely European Constantinople and its immediate precincts, which have an area of about 1500 square miles and a population of approximately 1,200,000 souls. On the other hand, whilst almost the whole of Anatolia, to the east of a line drawn more or less south approximately from Broussa to the Mediterranean, forms nominally a second Turkey under the Nationalists, the Hellenic Army is in occupation of a large zone over and above the Smyrna area allotted to Greece under the Treaty. The whole country is, therefore, in chaos and, so to speak, in the melting-pot; for whereas the Constantinople Government has signed, and could be compelled to stand by, the Treaty of Sèvres, most of, if not all, its members, together with practically the entire Turkish population, are in sympathy with, and prepared to support, Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the Angora party. This state of things, which was clearly demonstrated by the attitude adopted by the two Delegations who attended the London Conference, means that we can now take Turkey as being represented by one policy—the policy of so-called Nationalism.

There are two distinct aspects of the Treaty of Sèvres which are worthy of consideration—the fairness and the wisdom of originating that document and the honesty or the desirability of revising it. Knowing well the difficulties and the dangers besetting any solution of the Ottoman problem, and realising that there are two sides to any question, I feel decidedly that this international instrument was both unjust and ill-advised. Whilst an enemy may not be entitled to be dealt with on the basis of equity, the Treaty was unjust because it does not fulfil the policy defined by Mr Lloyd George and implied by Mr Wilson; because there is good reason

to suppose that it does not realise the principle of nationalities; and because it places both Constantinople and Smyrna in positions which are not natural from the economic standpoint. Equally well, considering the present political situation in Europe, and taking into account the difficulties of a far-reaching campaign in Asiatic Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was ill-advised, because of the obstacles to be overcome in, and the expense of, its enforcement, because of its effect throughout the Moslem East, and because it could not tend to the establishment and maintenance of good relations between Turkey and Greece. These considerations, which should have been given the fullest weight more than two years ago, before the Greeks were allowed to land at Smyrna in May 1919, and even up to the time of the presentation of the Treaty in May 1920, are not equally applicable to-day. This is the case since, in the existing circumstances, and considering events which have taken place in connexion with the Treaty, its far-reaching revision or redrafting would now be almost as impracticable and unjust as was its original inception. The demands made by the Turks, gratified by diplomatic victory, would be entirely incapable of satisfaction, the withdrawal of the Hellenic armies from districts where they are firmly established, might well require the administration of pressure so firm and so concrete as to have its percussions elsewhere, and the work done by the Greeks in Asia Minor and to a lesser extent in Thrace gives them a claim which they did not possess at the time of the Armistice. Considering the sacrifices they have made, that claim would, in any case, be a real one; but its magnitude is enhanced by two distinct conditions. The Hellenic advance made in Asia Minor last summer and at the instigation of the Allies, was probably the means of saving Constantinople and the Dardanelles from falling into the hands of the Nationalists. And whilst M. Venizelos himself does not attempt to deny the terrible nature of the events which took place at Smyrna at the time of the original Greek landing, I feel sure, from personal observation in that town, in Broussa, in the area lying between these places, and in Adrianople, that the conduct of the Greek Army has been on the whole excellent, and that the administration instituted

by M. Sterghiades * and M. Saktouris † left but little to criticise. In what at one time appeared to be a deadlock, therefore, all that can be added is that every care should be taken to safeguard the lives and interests of the non-Turkish populations left or given back to Turkey, and that those answerable for the framing of this disputatious document are, and must, remain responsible, either for its enforcement or its modification, and thus for the early settlement of a question the prolongation of which is disastrous to all concerned.

With regard to the present situation of, and in, Greece, the complications surrounding the Treaty of Sèvres and the uncertainty concerning what may be the ultimate results of the election of last November, render it impossible to enter into details here. It may, however, be said that, whether or not the Treaty of Sèvres now be subjected to modifications, the war will have changed the position of Greece from that of a Balkan State of secondary importance into that of a Mediterranean Power whose influence must be far-reaching. Thus, even if the present arrangements as to the future of Smyrna be modified, nothing seems likely to prevent the Hellenic people from securing a wide extension of territory in Europe, and from obtaining, firstly, the *Ægean Islands*, formerly in dispute with Turkey, and, secondly, the *Dodekanese Islands*, now in the occupation of Italy.‡ Likewise, although the change may be primarily a legal one, Greece has gained a great moral advantage by the abrogation of the special rights of control and supervision which formed the legitimate

* M. Sterghiades was appointed by M. Venizelos to the post of Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna in May 1919. As the result of the exhortations of M. Venizelos, he remained in the same post after the advent to power of the Royalist régime at Athens, and, so far as is known to the present writer, he is still at Smyrna.

† M. Saktouris, who was appointed Greek High Commissioner of Thrace by M. Venizelos when the Greeks took over that area in July 1920, was replaced after the election of November last.

‡ By an arrangement made between Italy and Greece, in August 1920, the *Dodekanese Islands* which are ceded by Turkey to Italy under the Treaty of Sèvres, with the exception of Rhodes, are to be transferred to Greece. The people of Rhodes are to be provided with an autonomy by Italy, and, after fifteen years have expired, if and when Great Britain gives Cyprus to Greece, then a plebiscite shall be held to decide as to whether Rhodes shall also be handed over to that country.

excuse for Allied intervention in Hellenic affairs during the war. The place of these rights has now been taken by the Greek obligation for the protection of minorities.*

Coming to the election of November last and to its results, there are only two points which I wish to make. The defeat of M. Venizelos was influenced not by foreign but by home policy. Thus, whereas there may be those who fear the burdens now undertaken in Europe and Asia, the developments connected with the London Conference prove that the Hellenic people were not critical of the ex-Premier as a consequence of the gains which he had secured for them, and that they were unwilling to sacrifice any territory which has now passed into Greek hands. Also, whatever may have been the attitude of King Constantine and of his supporters during the war, now that the Central Powers are beaten, there is no longer any question of their advocating a policy of friendship for Germany, which country is cordially disliked by the vast majority of Hellenes. Consequently, for this reason, and since it was obviously impossible for the victorious Powers to stand between the Greek people and the ideal for which they voted, the only course was to accept the new situation, however disappointing it might be. With respect to the future, and whereas such an acceptance forms the limit of our obligations, it is to be hoped that the relations between the Allies and Greece may soon become normal, even if not cordial, and that the two great sections of the Hellenic people may be able to reconcile their differences before those differences have reacted to the widespread disadvantage of a State which at one time seemed destined to occupy an entirely new position in the Balkans, in Europe, and in the world in general.

Albania, now the smallest Unit in the Peninsula, is the only country which remained neutral during the

* A Treaty dealing with these questions was signed between Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the one hand, and by Greece on the other, at Sévres on Aug. 10, 1920. According to it, Great Britain and France renounce the special rights of supervision and control in relation to Greece, which formerly devolved upon them under various Treaties and Conventions made between 1830 and 1864, and Greece confirms certain rights given to the population of her territories, and extends these rights to the peoples of the areas now added to that Kingdom. Treaty Series 1920, No. 13, Cmd. 960.

war. As her frontiers cannot, therefore, legitimately be reduced from those fixed by the London Ambassadorial Conference of 1912-13, there are only two questions of external politics to which allusion is necessary. Firstly, whatever may have been the events occurring since the Armistice, an end should be put to the existing Albano-Serbian discord, and the troops of Jugo-Slavia, now in occupation of several districts in Northern Albania, ought to be retired to within their proper territory. And, secondly, although the official details of the arrangement signed between Italy and Albania at Tirana on Aug. 2, 1920, have never been published, and whilst this arrangement has not been officially communicated to or recognised by the Allies, it is known that Italy then undertook to withdraw her troops from the whole of Albania, except the Island of Saseno, which lies at the entrance to Valona Bay; and it is further believed that she agreed to recognise the full sovereignty of that country. From the internal standpoint, little is known concerning the situation prevailing during the last two years. In January 1920, an Assembly, consisting of about sixty delegates, chosen by Municipal and Communal Councils, was held at Lushnia. That Assembly in its turn elected a Parliament or National Council, and appointed a Government of six members and a Directorate or Regency composed of four notables. Such authorities, on whose application Albania was permitted to become a Member of the League of Nations,* seem destined to remain in control of the country until the promulgation of a Constitution which will probably be drawn up by an Assembly chosen under the new electoral law.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to give some account of the present conditions in Central and South Eastern Europe. In so doing, I have avoided a discussion upon Macedonia, the recent repartition of which would have been most difficult, and I have refrained from any far-reaching criticism, for once several of the treaties herein mentioned were ratified, the exigency of the situation not only calls for their preservation in the letter and in the spirit, but it

* Albania was admitted to the League by a unanimous vote on Dec. 17, 1920.

imposes responsibilities upon the parties accountable for that preservation. Thus, whatever may be the disadvantages of the manner in which the map of Europe has been redrawn, it is for the League of Nations or for the victorious Powers to see that the obligations assumed by the smaller States, particularly those guaranteeing the rights of minorities, are fulfilled, and to insist that no unfair advantage be taken of those countries who have been compelled to accept disarmament. On the other hand, as every Balkan country must share some of the blame for former conditions, the dawn of a new era can only take place when recriminations are at an end, when passions are buried, and when tolerance is practised by all concerned. Rivalry and war have been fatal in the past. Reconciliation and peace must take their place for the future.

H. CHARLES WOODS.

Art. 12—THE SCIENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

1. *Report of the Machinery of Government Committee.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1918. Cd. 9230.
 2. *Reports of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1914, etc. Cd. 7338.
 3. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1915. Cd. 8382.
 4. *Report of the Committee on the Scheme of Examination for Class I of the Civil Service.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1917. Cd. 8657.
 5. *Reports of the Committee on the Organisation and Staffing of Government Offices.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1918, 1919. Cd. 61 and 62.
 6. *Reports of the War Cabinet.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1918, 1919. Cd. 3250 and 9005.
 7. *Local and Central Government.* By Percy Ashley. Murray, 1906.
 8. *Industry and Trade.* By Alfred Marshall. Macmillan, 1919.
- And other works.

PRACTICE is not infrequently in advance of science ; and, though Englishmen have long and wide experience of the practice of public administration, I have been unable to include in the foregoing list any systematic treatise in English on the theory of the subject as a whole. The authorities I have quoted consist for the most part of discussions, some formal and others incidental, of particular aspects of the subject ; and it is mainly from such sources that the English student must at present draw his knowledge of the theory. Its study is indeed provided for in the University of London, but, so far as I can learn, it has not yet won formal recognition at Oxford or Cambridge, or in the most important universities of the Empire ; and hitherto it has found no place in the principal public examinations.

The reasons for the dearth of systematic literature are not far to seek. Until the last few years the chief triumphs of British administrators have been won in distant countries and have passed almost unnoticed in the West. At home Englishmen have been familiar with the post-office, the tax-collector, and perhaps an occasional

inspector, but, as individuals, they have been very little concerned with the working of the central government; and the able men by whom it has been conducted have been under no temptation to expound the principles of their art. The position is now materially changed. For the civil administration the War meant the inception of new tasks on an unprecedented scale. The public witnessed remarkable successes, spectacular failures, and the gallant retrieval of initial blunders, while control of the food supply and constant interference with many aspects of social life brought the existence of the administration home to every individual. The Press has helped. Journalists have been called to administer, while administrators have striven to become journalists; terms of esoteric import, such as departmentalism or co-ordination, have travelled from Whitehall to Fleet Street, and have become firmly established in popular usage; the paragrapher now seeks material in the blue-book; and the whole subject has acquired an interest which it did not previously possess. The permanence of this change is still doubtful; but, whatever may be the fate of particular enterprises, it is improbable that the central administration will ever shrink to its former dimensions, while the insistent demand for nationalisation of railways, mines, and other means of production indicates the possibility of an extension of its activities so large as to compel the sustained attention of all classes of the public. It may be worth while, therefore, to offer a sketch in outline of the science underlying these activities, to state a few leading principles which appear to rest on a firm basis of experience, and to mark out some of the regions which are as yet imperfectly explored.

The scope of the science can be defined most clearly with reference to the relations between Policy and Administration. Policy decides on the objects to be aimed at, Administration puts Policy into execution, or, to speak in monosyllables, gets things done. The established science of Politics deals essentially with the methods by which public policy is formulated; and the cognate science of Public Administration begins where Politics leaves off. It is true that the dividing line between Policy and Administration is often crossed in practice; on the one hand, administrators may have a

voice in determining policy, on the other hand, statesmen may be employed also in administration; but these facts serve only to increase the need for a clear recognition of the distinction. Administrators of the English school are under no misapprehensions on this point; the tradition of perfect freedom of counsel but perfect loyalty in execution is so firmly established that it reads like a truism, and its existence is recalled only when some individual attempts to contravene it. The dual function of statesmen who are also administrators is more apt to cause confusion since it is embedded in popular language; a ministry, as the name denotes, is mainly an administrative organ, but *the* Ministry, or the Administration, is concerned primarily with the formulation of policy, and a Minister without portfolio is an exceedingly useful contradiction in terms. The arrangement under which Ministers formulate policy in concert and direct its execution as individuals goes far back into history; but there are some indications that it requires adjustment to meet present needs, and this complicated question will demand our attention at a later stage. For the moment it must suffice to say that the union of functions does not affect the validity of the distinction between the two processes.

The other distinction indicated by the phrase 'public' administration is based on convenience rather than scientific accuracy. Any one can distinguish between, let us say, a post-office and a joint-stock bank; but in some countries State banks and private banks are working side by side with substantially the same methods, and then the distinction becomes almost meaningless. Railway administration again was 'private' in this country until 1914, but in many countries it must be classed as 'public,' while in others the two systems coexist. The scope of public administration depends, as we have seen, on policy; and, so long as some States undertake enterprises which others leave to private initiative, that scope cannot be defined by any general formula.

There is, however, a closely allied distinction which deserves more definite recognition than it commonly receives. Some forms of administration are concentrated, while others are diffused; and it so happens that most branches of public administration are diffused, while

private administration is still as a rule concentrated. The typical business enterprise, whether it be a factory or an office, is in one place; the owner or manager is in personal touch with his principal subordinates; he can see them at any moment, can tell them what to do, and can watch their conduct from day to day; while, if he has to employ agents at a distance, he can usually regulate their remuneration by the volume and quality of their work, and thus rely on the direct economic incentive. The activity of a typical ministry is, on the other hand, diffused over a large area; it may have to execute policy simultaneously in all the towns, or all the villages, of an extensive country; it cannot ordinarily settle remuneration by results; and consequently it depends for success on a type of organisation with which a concentrated enterprise can dispense.

The coincidence of public with diffused administration is not indeed absolute, but the exceptions help to bring out the force of the distinction. A State mint or powder-factory is a concentrated unit, and its internal administration should, and usually does, conform closely to the methods of private business; a railway, whether it be State or private, requires diffused administration, and its methods in either case tend to approximate to those of the older Government departments, as may be inferred from the fact that the commonest criticisms brought against English railways under private management insisted on their 'hide-bound uniformity,' their undue centralisation, and their 'bureaucratic' habits and traditions. Examination of these and other types of activity leads to the conclusion that diffused administration requires different methods from concentrated administration; and, since most public administration is diffused, the student may for the time being confine his attention to the former, leaving the exceptional cases of concentrated public administration for consideration in connexion with the study of business enterprise.

It is possible that this distinction may become less important in the future. The aggregation of private enterprise, which at present is perhaps the most obvious tendency in economic development, may be followed by an approximation to the methods now described as 'bureaucratic,' while on the other hand the progress of

science may be expected to produce some alteration in those methods by bringing subordinates into closer touch with their superiors. For the present, however, the distinction holds good; and incidentally it furnishes a useful test of the validity of the recurring demand for 'business government.' There is no absolute reason why a man who has achieved success in concentrated administration should not prove equally successful in the more difficult branch of the art, but there is also no particular reason why he should. It may be hoped that, some day, an impartial scrutiny of the results of war-administration will throw light on the comparative value of recruitment from different sources in emergencies for which the trained staff does not suffice; but, subject to such new information, theory suggests that the State should look primarily to railways and other private activities where the system of administration is diffused.

Public administration may be either central or local, the relative importance of the two branches depending on the policy adopted by the State. The administration of a great city may be almost as intricate as that of a small country; but, speaking generally, local problems are comparatively simple, except when they involve relations with the central government, and in a first sketch it is permissible to pass them over, and concentrate attention on the larger and more complex subject. We may, therefore, proceed from the scope of the science to consider the principal units with which it is concerned. In England these are known by different names, Office, or Board, or Department as the case may be, but it is most convenient to speak simply of Ministries, a term which is rapidly gaining ground in current usage. A unit engaged in diffused administration consists of the establishment at headquarters, the local agencies, and the mechanism connecting the two; and, to begin at the base, we may notice three well-marked types of local agencies. A Ministry may operate through bodies elected locally, such as Town or County Councils (including committees of these bodies strengthened by additional members); or it may operate through its own subordinates located at convenient centres; or, lastly, it may depend upon agents appointed to represent the Administration as a whole. Much of the civilised world relies mainly on

the last-named type ; but the French *préfet*, or the Indian Magistrate and Collector, has no counterpart in England other than the shadowy figure of His Majesty's Lieutenant, and the strength of the central administration is thereby substantially reduced. To take a striking illustration, in some European countries the duty of 'making the elections,' or of influencing voters in favour of a particular party, falls naturally on the *préfets* or similar officers ; supposing that an English Government should desire to adopt this course, what local agencies has it at command ? The Postmaster, the Inspector of Taxes, the Employment Exchange, a Committee of the County Council—the list is nearly exhaustive, and it is sufficient to indicate the limitations on the power of the central administration. A formal treatise would have much to say on the comparative advantages of these different types of agencies in regard to the various operations to be undertaken, but I must pass the subject by, remarking only that the facile system of grants-in-aid to complacent local authorities would by itself require a lengthy chapter.

Assuming then that a Ministry is provided with a sufficient number of local agencies, distributed over the country with reference to its needs, we have next to consider the nature of the connecting mechanism. It is a recognised principle that no individual authority should control more than a limited number of agencies, the number being defined roughly by the urgency of the services to be rendered. In military administration, where success may be essential to the national life, this limited number is very small indeed, usually less than four ; and we have brigades of three regiments, divisions of three brigades, corps of three divisions, and so on. The degree of urgency is normally less in civil administration, and the limit for efficiency is consequently larger ; but in countries where the business of the State is highly organised, it is usually less than ten. To take an example from India, an administrative district in the United Provinces contains usually from four to six subdivisions ; when the number rises to eight or nine, the charge is recognised as unduly heavy. A Commissioner supervises five or six districts ; and, while there are as many as ten Commissioners under the Lieutenant-Governor, it is generally agreed that, for

strictly administrative purposes, the Provinces constitute too large a unit, though considerations of a different order may negative suggestions for their subdivision.

It will be apparent, then, that where a Ministry has to operate over a large and populous area intermediate localised organs become necessary, and that two or more stages of control must be provided. Each stage involves a break in personal contact; and, where the superior cannot see and speak to his subordinates at a moment's notice, he is forced to rely on other methods of communication—correspondence, statistical returns, periodical reports, and inspections made by himself or a member of his staff. In this brief outline I must pass by the numerous questions regarding the due use of each of these methods, and their harmonisation so as to produce the desired result—the efficient execution of the policy with which the Ministry is charged; but, in view of the popular contempt for official statistics, it may be worth while to point out that the use of ‘ton-mile figures,’ the most spectacular advance in methods of statistical control, comes from private, not public, administration; and that the systems of ‘scientific management,’ for which also we are indebted mainly to America, are based on statistics more detailed than can be found in an ordinary public office.

At this point something must be said of two conceptions which are intimately connected with the mechanism of diffused administration, and which are spoken of as Uniformity and Centralisation. Uniformity is in many cases an obvious convenience to the public as well as to administrators; for example, a separate issue of postage stamps for each county would be merely a nuisance. On the other hand, uniformity may be convenient to the administrators, but not to the public; and a Ministry of Agriculture would soon be rendered unpopular by a system applied uniformly to large and small farmers, or failing to distinguish between the needs of arable, grazing, and dairying localities. Uniformity is always convenient to the administrator, at least for the moment, but it is sometimes opposed to the wider public interest; and the principle is clear, though it may not always be followed, that each proposal for uniformity should be dealt with primarily with regard

to the convenience of the public, to which the convenience of administrators must if necessary give way.

Centralisation, which in essence means the curtailment of the discretion of local agencies, is closely connected with uniformity; convinced advocates of such curtailment may indeed be found, but it is in great measure a by-product of ordinary administrative activity. An inspector, let us say, finds a particular course of action to be convenient, he enjoins it on the agencies subordinate to him, and their discretion is *pro tanto* curtailed; presently the attention of headquarters is attracted, the same course of action is enjoined generally, and is given a place in the Ministry's code of rules. Little or no harm may be done by each separate curtailment of discretion, but the cumulative result is to centralise all authority at headquarters; the intermediate organs, and still more the local agencies, can do nothing but apply the rules or refer a question for orders; members of the public find themselves shut off from the seat of power; and the régime of impersonal correspondence becomes established. It must, I think, be recognised that the tendency to centralisation is inherent in all diffused administration, and that no mechanical check on its extension is possible; its restriction within due limits depends on pressure from outside, exerted either by a statesman brought in as Minister or through the organs of public opinion.

We must now turn to the headquarters of the Ministry. In countries where popular government is established, the direction is ordinarily shared between the Minister, whose tenure depends mainly on the Legislature, and the Permanent Chief, who is necessarily an experienced administrator; and the precise division of functions probably depends less on principle than on the idiosyncrasies of Minister and Chief. Below them, the Ministry is organised into branches or departments, each responsible for some particular subdivision of the prescribed activity; and engaged in drafting orders, supervising their execution, and seeing that effect is given to the policy indicated by the Minister. This internal organisation is complex, and requires detailed study; all that can be said here is that it appears probable that this branch of administration, more than

any other, can benefit by the experience of progressive business offices in simplifying and accelerating the routine of procedure.

Now the segregation of departments within the Ministry involves a certain danger of discord, or at least failure to preserve complete harmony; and here we approach the important subject of Co-ordination. The Minister must be in a position to drive his departments as a team, each doing its own share and making things easier for the others; and in this matter we may accept the principle formulated by Lord Haldane's Committee on the Machinery of Government, that Councils should be formed within at any rate the larger ministries, similar to the Army Council or the Board of Admiralty.* A Council of this kind serves a twofold purpose: it advises the Minister on policy during the stage of discussion, and it co-ordinates administration when the policy has been formulated; but its utility for either purpose will be greatly increased by the establishment of an Intelligence branch, charged with the systematic study of what other Ministries, and Ministries in other countries, are doing. Formerly an organised intelligence system was practically confined in this country to Defence administration; but some years ago the Board of Education gave an admirable lead on the civil side; other Ministries followed during the period of the War; and Lord Haldane's Committee have recommended similar action in all but the smallest units, a recommendation which will be supported without qualification by the great majority of experienced administrators.

This recognition of the need for internal Councils and organised intelligence systems may be taken as a definite advance in administrative theory; the position in regard to the all-important subject of financial control is less satisfactory, for it is not yet possible to point to any system which can be recommended on a firm basis of experience. The principle is established that individual

* These Internal Councils must be distinguished both from the old Boards and from the new Advisory Councils. The Board was, in theory at least, collectively responsible to Parliament; the Minister is responsible individually, and must therefore be free to accept or reject the views of any Council, whether it be internal or external.

Ministries cannot be given an entirely free hand either to frame estimates of their expenditure or to spend the grants when allotted, and from an early stage of development we find powers of control in these matters assigned to a separate Finance Ministry, known in this country as the Treasury. Experience has, however, shown that, while this arrangement may secure momentary economy, it may be costly in the long run, because it may be so worked as to weaken the sense of financial responsibility throughout the administration as a whole.

A Ministry charged with certain services aims primarily at rendering those services efficiently; efficiency requires, or seems to require, money; and, when the sense of responsibility is weak, the estimates framed by the Ministry will inevitably tend to be maxima, since an administrator dreads nothing more than to be caught short of funds in an emergency, while money which has been granted will usually be spent lest subsequent grants should be curtailed. The Treasury, on the other hand, aims primarily at economy; and the conflict between these ideals tends to degenerate almost into a game. In order to safeguard itself against Treasury reductions the Ministry asks for more money than it actually needs; the Treasury knows that there is a margin for curtailment but has to guess at its extent; and the tendency is for that Ministry to be best provided with funds which is most importunate in pressing its needs upon the Treasury. The difficulty, which is rooted deeply in human nature, has been recognised by Lord Haldane's Committee, and their proposals are in accordance with theory, in that they aim at strengthening the sense of financial responsibility within the Ministry; but they cannot be regarded as a definite solution until more experience of their practical working becomes available. I do not know of any country where the difficulty is not present in greater or less degree; and the only conclusion which can be offered is that the matter is one for well-planned and sustained experiment.

The difficulty is perhaps greatest in regard to the strength and remuneration of the staff to be employed, a question which has of late been brought prominently before the public in this country. It is certainly asking too much of human nature to expect uncontrolled

Ministries to go on working with a minimum staff. Desire for efficiency, fear of being caught short in emergencies, reluctance to part with brains which may be wanted later, desire to offer terms of employment at least as good as those offered by competitors—all these motives tend towards inflation, and some measure of external control is indispensable. Suggestions which appear to be valuable have recently been put forward by Lord Haldane's Committee, and in greater detail by the Committee on Staffs, but their discussion would take us too far. In connexion, however, with the question of staff, a few words must be said regarding the mental attitude known as departmentalism. It is a fact of human nature that men who are working with a common object tend to develop a common spirit; and *esprit-de-corps* is nearly the greatest asset a Ministry can possess. But it has dangers as well as advantages; and its degeneration into departmentalism is in the long run fatal to efficiency. The term scarcely requires definition. The public are quick to recognise the evil when the officials of a Ministry think first of themselves and their traditions, ignore outside opinion, and appear to act on the principle that the country was made for their convenience. The regulation of this corporate spirit and tradition is among the most important functions of the administrators at the top; the 'wise Chief' is eminently the man who knows how to direct it into the worthiest channels, and prevent its extension along dangerous lines. His action in this matter cannot be reduced to formal principles, but it is a matter of experience that departmentalism develops most readily in small establishments; and this consideration is of real importance in regard to the question of the proper size of individual ministries.

So far we have dealt with the internal affairs of the Ministry; what can be said concerning its relations with the public? The old tradition is undoubtedly one of secrecy; and 'Never give your reasons' is a maxim which must have been impressed on the majority of administrators. But this attitude may fairly be described as obsolescent. The transaction of business through elected agencies means that the action of the Ministry may have to be justified before the local public, while the

provision of advisory councils at headquarters, an innovation the extension of which is recommended by Lord Haldane's Committee, brings the general public in, and puts the Ministry in close touch with the knowledge and experience of those sections of the community which are most directly affected by its activities. Councils of varying types are common in several European countries; and it may perhaps be said that the principle of association between the public and the administration is well on the way to general acceptance, and that in future the absence of such association will have to be justified by special circumstances affecting a particular Ministry. It may be added that the need for association is probably greatest in the case of those Ministries which have to protect individuals against the action of powerful business combinations, a new branch of administration which is being pioneered effectively in the United States, and the need for which is just beginning to be felt in this country.

We have now to consider the relations between the Ministries, which have so far been treated as independent units. The time is past when a single Ministry could control the business of even a small State; differentiation began at an early stage of development, and has proceeded sometimes at haphazard, sometimes on a more or less definite plan, until it has become possible to base on experience a statement of the principle on which the spheres of ministries should be distinguished. The discussion of this subject is one of the most interesting portions of the Report of Lord Haldane's Committee; and nearly every administrator of experience will accept the conclusion that the allocation of functions must be based on the services to be performed, rather than on the classes to be dealt with. The State requires a Ministry of Education, not a Ministry for Children; a Ministry of Employment, not a Ministry for the Unemployed.

Working on these lines the Committee reduce administrative activities to ten main heads: 1. Finance, 2. Defence, 3. External Affairs, 4. Research and Information, 5. Production, Transport, and Commerce, 6. Employment, 7. Supplies, 8. Education, 9. Health, and 10. Justice, though it is recognised that the volume of work may involve the formation of two or more Ministries under a

single head. Any one who wishes to know what the haphazard growth of Ministries may involve need only read the Committee's account of the administration of justice in this country, with its lurid description of the functions of the Lord Chancellor. Organisation which is inefficient in this particular matter increases seriously the need for co-ordination between Ministries whose spheres either overlap or leave debateable ground unoccupied ; but, however perfect the allocation of functions may be, the need for co-ordination will still exist, and provision to meet it is an essential part of an administrative system. The principle may be laid down that the desired result should be obtained where possible by consultation ; and the Report of Lord Haldane's Committee recommends in certain cases the creation of standing joint bodies for this purpose. Failing agreement, however, the co-ordination must be effected by superior authority ; and, as things now stand in this country, this can be done only by the Prime Minister or by the Cabinet as a whole. The extent of the need may be studied in the Reports of the War Cabinet, which bring out very clearly the importance of the administrative functions of a body whose primary business is the formulation of policy.

We have thus arrived at the apex of the administrative pyramid, and we find ourselves confronted with the problem of the constitution of the ultimate organ of government, or, as we say in this country, the problem of the Cabinet. That problem has many sides, and all that can be attempted here is to state certain considerations of the administrative order which are relevant to its solution, but are not by themselves conclusive. In the first place it is generally recognised that an administrator differs from a statesman, not so much in specific quality as in emphasis. Given the requisite knowledge of the facts, it is easy to classify the great majority of public men on one side or other of the dividing line ; and the growing complexity of affairs points to the need for some advance towards specialisation of function in accordance with this recognised diversity. In the second place, while each separate Ministry very properly claims a voice in the Cabinet or other ultimate authority, all are agreed in demanding from it a reasonable degree of

promptness and vigour; nothing is more demoralising to a body of administrators than to be kept waiting indefinitely for guidance in regard to the policy to be carried out. Experience appears to indicate that in highly organised States some development of existing arrangements is required to satisfy these claims. Even when the number of separate Ministries has been reduced to the minimum, a Cabinet including all the Ministers remains too large for administrative efficiency; and in the light of recent history the alternatives seem to be progressive inefficiency, the informal development of some effective organ within the Cabinet, or a definite breach with tradition. The War Cabinet constituted such a breach, but the conditions attending its institution were so exceptional that it cannot be entirely relied on as a precedent for more normal times.

So much, however, may be said, that the administrative considerations which have been advanced would be satisfied by a Cabinet consisting of a small number of members, some 'without portfolio' as the phrase goes, others representing groups of Ministries, and responsible individually for co-ordination within the group. To take a concrete example, the British Cabinet might consist of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, some of the 'great officers of State' such as Privy Seal, and members in charge respectively of (a) Defence, (b) External Affairs, and (c) the internal Ministries arranged in two or three groups. There would then be a body large enough for counsel but not too large for vigour, and one to which each Ministry would have access, not indeed directly but through the appropriate member; while among the members as a body the emphasis would be upon statecraft rather than specialised administrative ability, which would find its principal scope in the charge of individual ministries. Whether such a body would be justified by the principles of political science, and whether it would be possible from the standpoint of practical politics, are questions with which this article does not profess to deal; a concrete instance is stated as an example of the type of ultimate authority indicated by progressive administrative theory. It may, however, be observed that the grouping of Ministries for this purpose has been advocated of late in various quarters, and that

there appears to be a strong body of opinion behind the proposal so far as the Defence Ministries are concerned.

I have kept to the last the extensive group of what are known as 'Service Questions.' The literature of this topic is voluminous, and it would be impossible to state in a few words the principles which have been formulated by the various Commissions on the Public Services, but stress must be laid on the fact that the central problem is to provide an adequate incentive. In earlier stages of development much reliance was placed on the economic motive which dominates so many private activities—the hope of immediate personal gain. But the practice of entrusting administrative duties to farmers of the revenue has lost its vogue; the retention of fees by officials survives only in some minor departments; and it is now generally agreed that the incentive to efficiency must be found in the career which the public service offers when viewed as a whole. This statement will be found to cover most of the hotly contested questions regarding salaries and pensions, promotion, the grant of honours and the like, but we must pass these questions by, and can glance only at the result which follows from the offer of a reasonably attractive career. Speaking very broadly, such an offer tends to secure a high average of competence, marked by assiduity rather than initiative; and, while very exaggerated views of this defect are commonly expressed, there is little doubt that the chief weakness of the system is the danger of 'staleness at the top.' Various partial preventives of this danger are known in practice, such as the enforcement of retirement at a fixed age, or the introduction of a fresh mind, as when a Governor is sent out to an Indian province, or a politician is appointed Minister at home; but their operation is neither uniform nor certain, and it does not appear to be probable that any safeguard of universal efficacy can be devised.

The danger is greatest in cases where every official is required to start at the bottom of the ladder; and the recognition of this fact is prominent among the reasons for the formation of *corps d'élite*, consisting of men of exceptional attainments, employed almost from the outset on dignified and responsible duties, and entitled

to succeed to at least the great majority of the posts at the top. Assuming that a suitable career is offered, the success of an administration depends in great measure on the methods adopted for choosing and training the young men who are to lead ; and, in the writer's opinion, we in this country are still some distance from finality in this matter.

Recent discussions disclose a sharp difference of opinion on the question whether recruits should be chosen at the end of the ordinary university courses and put to work without further training, or should be selected while at school, and required to proceed to a university, where they would complete a liberal education in studies which would at the same time afford definite professional training for the work before them. The former system is at present accepted by the authorities in this country, while the latter was recommended for India by the last Public Services Commission, but has been rejected by the Secretary of State. The arguments by which the alternatives are supported are too elaborate to be presented adequately in a brief summary ; and it is quite possible that both sides may be right, and that different administrations may rely with advantage on different methods of recruitment. But, without going further into this discussion, the suggestion may be offered that the next move should be made by the universities. The proposal has been put forward that they should establish special Honour Schools for the small number of candidates selected annually for the Indian civil service ; it would perhaps be more in accordance with the needs of the situation that they should establish Honour Schools of Public Affairs, designed for the benefit of all portions of the Empire, and providing the last stage of a liberal education which would fit the student either for administrative duties or for a political career.

There are obvious objections to the indefinite multiplication of courses, but the question turns largely on the resources of different institutions ; and in some cases only minor modifications would be needed to bring an existing school within the definition I have given. The course of reading would inevitably be based mainly on the cognate sciences of jurisprudence, politics and

economics, arrangements for the teaching of which are already in existence, but its value, both to future public men and to future public servants, would be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of the science of administration and the provision of adequate equipment for its study. Most aspirants to a public career hope eventually to take a prominent part in the work of administration; and it is surely desirable that they should start with a knowledge of the underlying theory, knowledge which is already indispensable to the expert administrators of the future. Opinions will doubtless differ as to the merits of this specific proposal; the precise arrangements to be made for facilitating the study of administrative theory are matter for separate and detailed discussion, but of the need for increased facilities there can be no serious question.

I have now sketched the main lines of that theory as it presents itself to me. The account which I have offered is not only summary but incomplete, since in order to bring it within reasonable limits I have had to omit reference to many important branches of the subject, such as the theory of discipline, the limits of associated action by the staff, the scope of administrative law, the particular principles applicable to the administration of dependencies, the conflict between Service and professional ideals, and other topics which bulk largely in the discussions of the present day. Moreover, the scope of the science is likely to extend as time goes on. If we were to accept the views of some schools of thought which are prominent to-day, we should have to recognise that administration is destined to occupy much of the ground now assigned to jurisprudence and economics, if not also to politics; and, while the realisation of these ideals may appear to be improbable, there can be little doubt that administrative activities will increase. Even, however, at the present day their sphere is sufficiently extensive to claim the attention not merely of those who direct them, but of the wider public which bears their cost and experiences their effects.

W. H. MORELAND.

Art. 13.—CO-OPERATIVE LABOUR IN ITALY.

1. *Manuale per le Co-operative di Produzione, Lavoro e Agricole*. By Felix Manfredi. Lega Nazionale delle Co-operative: Milan, 1914.
 2. *Co-operative Farming Societies in Italy*. By Profs. Mami and Serpieri. International Institute of Agriculture: Rome, 1913.
 3. *An Irish Commune* (Ralahine), adapted from the history by E. T. Craig. Dublin: Martin Lester, 1920.
- And other works.

THE tentative efforts which were recently made in England towards the organisation of building and furnishing activities on a guild basis naturally suggest a search for precedents. The theory of collective labour has survived to us from the Middle Ages; and here and there in every country and in certain trades we find it still being put into practice in a greater or less degree. Perhaps the most definite instance is that of the Russian 'artels' or self-governing workshops, in which a number of the poorer persons in agricultural districts combine their labour—particularly during the winter, when work on the land is at a standstill—for the manufacture and sale of small articles belonging to the category generally known as 'home industries.' The same method has also been applied to dairying and to the extraction of tar for export. These 'artels' are clearly derived from the early Russian village commune or 'mir,' and thus have a definite and continuous line of descent from an earlier age of collectivism. Precedents of this kind, however, like the 'fruitières' of the Basque mountains and the 'positos' or grain-banks of Spain and Portugal, which are said to trace their origin to the activities of the Emperor Justinian, and are cited by a certain school of historical economists, following Prof. Gide, as the prototypes of co-operation in its modern sense, must be handled very carefully. Investigation discloses the fact that they are distinctly survivals rather than sources, and that, under pressure of modern conditions, they are rapidly weakening and disappearing instead of crystallising into new and fruitful forms of organisation.

When we turn to what may be called deliberate efforts

in comparatively modern times to organise production on a collective basis, we have to admit that the results have been anything but encouraging. The most determined attempts were those made in France in the first half of the 19th century. Under the influence of such men as Lassalle and Fourier, self-governing workshops of various kinds, of which the 'lunetiers' were probably the best known, sprang up in Paris and other French cities in considerable numbers. But, with the disappearance of the leading enthusiasts and the rapid growth of large-scale industrialism, their decay was almost as swift and complete as their birth; and to-day, with the exception of a few scattered remnants, hardly any trace of them remains. It is true that Godin's celebrated 'famillière,' the great iron foundry which perished only when Guise came under the fire of German guns, may be claimed by some as a monument to the possibilities of this type of association. But the Familistère, though it was unquestionably based on control by the workers, had nevertheless a large share of capitalism of a benevolent type in its constitution, and must properly be referred to the category of profit-sharing institutions, with the benevolent intentions of the proprietors carried out more completely than is usual.

The principles introduced in France by Lassalle had their reaction in England, where the Christian Socialist group, headed by Neale, Hughes, and Kingsley, endeavoured to imitate their example. The resulting societies have a history less meteoric than those of France but hardly more successful. In spite of the valiant efforts of the Co-operative Productive Federation of Leicester, which still represents a certain number of them, the majority either collapsed or sold out to the Co-operative Wholesale Society and other representatives of the organised consumer. The chief causes of this dissolution have been lack of discipline and difficulties in finding the necessary capital and markets. Viewing the situation as a whole, we may say that the workers have not proved the possibility of competing, with their own small capital, against the powerful organisation of modern factory plants and marketing agencies.

The significance of the Italian combinations, to which we may now turn, lies in the fact that they are specially

designed to meet the existing conditions of industry. No attempt is made to eliminate capital or to create a new market. Tenders for definite work are accepted on the ordinary terms, and the collective feature is only introduced in such a way as to allow to the workers themselves the determination of the amount of work and remuneration to be allotted to each man. It is in fact simply an extension of the principle of direct labour, with which we are familiar in the methods of those who take contracts for such work as road-mending and certain building operations.

In order to understand the appeal made by these societies in Italy, it is necessary to grasp the fact that in the northern parts of that country there is a very large reservoir of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and unemployment reaches proportions unknown in most countries. So lately as 1910, the ordinary labourer could only count on an average of 95 working days in the year ; and for the remaining three-fourths of the period he had to subsist on the very low wages of those days. To a certain extent the problem has been solved by emigration to America, but in many parts of Northern Italy it is regarded with deep aversion, and of Romagna Preyer records that 'the Romagnol does not emigrate.' Accordingly we find that, in the troubled times from 1850 onwards, the lot of the Italian labourer was a desperate one. The Italian Government and the local authorities seized the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, by undertaking large works of reclamation, drainage of rivers, road and railway making, and so forth, which would relieve unemployment and cost little owing to the cheapness of labour. The execution of these undertakings was entrusted to contractors at a fixed price ; and the profit made by these middlemen depended of course almost entirely on the extent to which they could victimise the gangs of labourers employed by them. This form of enterprise reached large proportions in the beginning of the eighties ; and within a few years discontent began to manifest itself among the workers. The first articulate sign of this discontent was the formation of bodies similar in many ways to Trade Unions, under the name of 'Leghe di resistenza o miglioramento,' the objects of which were (1) the raising of wages ;

(2) equal distribution of work; (3) the fixing of a reasonable working day. The establishment of these Unions was followed immediately by prolonged and bitter strikes; and the efforts of the contractors to fill the places of the unionists with cheap and docile 'black-leg' labour broke down in face of the remarkable solidarity of the workmen, backed up, it must be admitted, by a considerable display of violence. Finally, a number of contracts were indefinitely suspended, and the contractors showed reluctance to embark upon new work which they might not be able to carry out at a profit.

It is at this point that we have to admire the behaviour of the Italian labour leaders. Instead of being content with merely destructive work and settling down to a series of strikes and lock-outs varied by rioting, they turned their minds to definite constructive organisation, based on the theory that the contracts in question could be just as well carried out by themselves without the aid of an extortionate middleman. From this theory was born in 1883 the first co-operative labour society, the *Co-operativa di Lavoro di Ravenna*. The object of this society was to contract direct with the local authorities and the central government for the carrying-out of public works. In spite of many serious difficulties success was soon achieved, and the example was speedily followed by other Unions. There are now some 300 of these societies in Italy—mainly in the northern provinces—and they carry out between them, with the aid of local federations, work running into millions of pounds in a year.

The organisation of these societies is simple. They are governed by three bodies: a general committee, elected from the body of the members and composed of workers only, which has charge of general matters of policy; a small supervisory committee, responsible directly to the general meeting of the members, which audits the accounts and sees to the proper keeping of the books and observance of the rules and by-laws of the society; finally, a technical committee, which, generally speaking, consists only of an expert engineer and a secretary with legal training, to look after the taking of contracts, the distribution of work, and the fixing of wages and salaries.

When a piece of work is definitely undertaken, employment is given to the various members of the society in rotation. A maximum working day is fixed in such a way as to spread the work as far as possible while allowing a living wage. If there is more than enough work for the members, outside labour may be taken on. All wages, whether to members or non-members, must be at the rate fixed by the local *Ufficio di Lavoro* or Trades Council, and are paid weekly. The advantage of members over non-members, besides the fact that they have a prior claim to employment, lies in their right to share in the profits. These profits are put in the first place to the reserve fund for the purpose of building-up capital for new enterprises; and any surplus remaining after this provision has been made is divided among the members in proportion both to the capital supplied by them (which as a rule is very small) and to the number of days' work done. The individual society as a rule is composed entirely of members of one particular trade or branch of a trade—such as bricklayers, carpenters, brass-workers, etc.—and, for the purpose of carrying out a complete contract, a number of such societies representing allied trades are grouped together in a federation. The federation takes the contract itself, and then turns over each separate part of it to the appropriate federated society. Thus in Genoa we find a federation of Ligurian societies representing some sixteen or seventeen different trades. During the early years of the war this federation undertook the building of a very large hospital to the orders of the municipal authorities; and the total amount finally expended upon the contract was the equivalent of 500,000*l.* at pre-war rates of exchange. The whole of this work was conducted by co-operative societies affiliated to the federation, from the excavation of the foundations to the erection of the electric light fittings, and the completed buildings are generally acknowledged to be thoroughly satisfactory and exceedingly cheap.

The two chief difficulties with which societies of this type were met at the outset were the maintenance of discipline and the provision of working capital sufficient

to finance undertakings which would keep all the members employed. The way in which discipline has been enforced throughout the movement is a source of amazement to those who hold the traditional idea of the Italian labourer as a volatile and explosive individualist. It must be remembered, however, that most of our ideas on this subject are drawn from the Neapolitan and Sicilian type of emigrant, while the pioneer work of these societies was done for the most part by the hard-headed and comparatively unemotional dweller in the northern plains. Furthermore, necessity, in her capacity as the mother of invention, has always proved the greatest foster-mother of the co-operative movement; and the labourers who formed these societies were always under the necessity of either bringing them to a successful issue or leaving the country. Even so, the fact that the danger was clearly realised and faced is easily seen by a reference to the rules of the early societies, which abound in signals of warning. Thus it is provided that immediate expulsion, with total loss of share-capital, shall be the fate of any members '*che con parole sediziose insisteranno a voler mettere il disaccordo nella Società, che daranno causa ad alterchi o disordini sul lavoro.*' And again we find in the provisions with regard to liquidation that, if at any time the number of members falls below twenty, the Society automatically ceases and the survivors divide the funds, whereas, if it dissolves '*in causa di divergenze irreconciliabili,*' the whole of the money goes to the Commune—a rule which must have a strong deterrent effect on the schismatic.

The actual division of the work is very carefully provided for. The men engaged on a job are arranged in sections of about twenty men; each section has a foreman who is nominated by the executive committee, the appointment being subject to ratification by the general meeting. These foremen, in addition to the ordinary day's work, are charged with the supervision of their men and the preparation, checking, and payment of time-sheets. Each worker in the section contributes 1 per cent. a day on his wages towards the remuneration of the foreman. Thus, if there are twenty men in a section, with an average of 30s. a week each, they would

pay about 3½d. a week for this purpose, and the foreman would receive 36s. in all.

A more formidable difficulty even than that of establishing discipline was the provision of adequate working capital for these societies. Even in cases of unskilled labour where no machinery or plant is required there is still the necessity of providing weekly wages for the workers who have no other means of subsistence, and also of purchasing raw material of one kind or another. The share capital and reserves of newly-formed societies are hopelessly inadequate for this purpose; and, although the State, from which a large number of the contracts are obtained, has made a considerable number of concessions in favour of the societies, its methods of payment are exceedingly slow and encumbered with even more than the usual amount of red tape. Efforts to raise money from private capitalists and ordinary banking firms naturally met with very little success, as their interests were radically opposed to those of the societies; and, although a large measure of assistance was forthcoming from other co-operative institutions such as Signor Luzzatti's *banche popolari*, Wollemborg's *casse rurali*, and some of the distributive stores, this was quite inadequate to meet the case, and many of the earlier societies were seriously restricted in their operations by this cause. Even where credit was obtained, the rate of interest was never less than 6 per cent., more frequently it was 8 per cent., and even rose sometimes as high as 10 per cent., and this in days when the ordinary rate was not as a rule above 4 per cent. Efforts were made, both at Reggio Emilia and at Milan, to meet the situation by the establishment of local banks. But, owing to the political and sectarian cleavages which unfortunately mar the harmony of the Italian co-operative movement, there has been little or no co-ordination between the co-operative credit societies. They have had no large central institution such as one would naturally expect to find; and the big sums of money which they take in as deposits, instead of flowing back into the productive side of the movement, are for the most part invested in Government Bonds or gilt-edged securities. Consequently the effect of these institutions was purely local.

A feeling soon sprang up that the societies which had obtained a certain degree of favour and legal concessions from the Government in return for the official contracts they undertook were entitled also to State support in regard to credit, pending the payment of their bills. Thus we find that the Congress of Reggio in 1905 asked for State advances, repayable by easy instalments at 4 per cent. ; - and later a group of prominent co-operators in the Parliament, headed by Luzzatti, made an unsuccessful attempt to inaugurate a State-aided central bank for co-operative societies. The scheme lapsed for some years, but in 1913 it was revived in a new shape with the establishment of the *Istituto Nazionale di Credito per le Co-operative*. This body is not directly controlled or financed by the State, but it has a public charter and administers Government grants, having representatives appointed by Government on its Board. The capital is provided mainly by the large public savings-banks (which are themselves non-profit-making bodies with State charter), together with a few of the biggest People's Banks and the two central workers' Insurance Societies. Advances are made to Labour Societies against the certificates issued to them by the public authorities whose contracts they take; and credit is also granted to consumers' stores, farming and building societies. Special grants in aid of these loans are made by Government departments; and the rising power of the Socialist party, which is closely identified with the co-operative movement, has brought about an increase in the amounts so allocated. In this way the problem of the provision of working capital has been largely solved, while the exemption from certain taxes and a greater degree of freedom in tendering than is allowed to private companies has put these societies in a specially favoured position.

The co-operative farming societies, alluded to above, have attracted even more attention in Europe than the purely labour societies; and it is interesting to note that they were in their origin more or less a by-product of the societies we have been describing. The first contracts for direct labour which were undertaken were mainly for purposes in which unskilled labour or at least semi-skilled

work alone was required. The usual objects were drainage, road-making, irrigation, levelling, and similar works of reclamation or reconstruction. The greater part of this work was provided by the authorities, with the dual purpose of finding employment for large bodies of poor and discontented labourers and of carrying out, at a small cost, necessary improvements which would later bring in a large national return. Naturally enough, the amount of work of this kind which was available gradually diminished, and the less-skilled members of the societies found themselves once more threatened with unemployment. As most of them were in the first place drawn from the rural population and had a certain amount of familiarity with agricultural methods, their tendency was to look to the land to provide an alternative means of support when other work was not available. Consequently we find the same societies which took contracts for labour also renting land from public bodies and landed proprietors, to the exclusion of the prevailing middleman tenant, and using this land to give agricultural work to their unemployed members. It was no later than 1887 that the first co-operative labour society, which was itself founded at Ravenna in 1883, took up land in this way and started farming on a small scale. The example was speedily followed by others; and of the considerable number of co-operative farms now to be found in Emilia practically all had their origin in, and are now closely connected with, the *Co-operativa di Produzione e Lavoro*.

The example thus set was imitated by the small tenant farmers (*coloni*) and purely agricultural labourers who had no connexion with the socialist workers with whom we have been dealing so far. Thus it is that in the domain of collective farming, as in other branches of co-operation in Italy, we find the familiar semi-political, semi-religious cleavage between the 'Socialist' and the 'Catholic' type of society—a division reminiscent of the conditions existing before the war in the co-operative movement of Belgium. The part played by the two divergent bodies of doctrine is illustrated by the existence of two types of farming societies known respectively as the '*affitanze a conduzione divisa*' and those '*a conduzione collettiva*.' In each type the land, which may consist of

one large farm or a number of smaller ones, is rented direct from the owner by a group of workers organised in a co-operative society. The difference consists in the manner in which this land is afterwards administered. In the collective type, which corresponds to the socialist ideal, the land is worked in common under the guidance of a foreman or expert technical manager; the produce is sold on behalf of the society; and the proceeds, after payment of rent and provision for reserve fund, are divided among the members in proportion to the number of days worked by each. In the Catholic type, where the sanctity of individual property is upheld and any experiments in communism are deprecated, the land is parcelled out among individuals, and the collective element is confined to bargaining over the rent and to a certain amount of combined purchase and sale.

The collective type obviously suits those districts where the primary object is to provide occasional employment for unskilled labours, while the Catholic is more adapted to the population which aspires to live entirely by farming and has a natural desire for fixity of tenure. Accordingly we find that one type predominates among the semi-industrial population of the North, the other in the more backward districts of the South. But this general statement must not be accepted without qualification; in practice there has been a disinclination on the part even of the labourers, except in the best-disciplined districts, to accept the full measure of communism; and considerable compromises have been made by the Socialist leaders for the sake of expediency. In general it may be said that the number of farms where the collective system is worked in its entirety is comparatively small; but the results attained by them in recent years have been so striking that it is probable that they will shortly come to predominate over the other type.

So many descriptions have been given of the detailed workings of these societies that it is unnecessary to go into the matter at greater length. But it is of particular interest to note that, just as the methods of the labour societies are being paralleled by the new guilds in industrial England, so there is a movement in Ireland to adapt to the peculiar needs of that country the lesson of Italy's co-operative farming societies. The newly-founded

National Land Bank is partially modelled on the lines of the Istituto Nazionale, and is rapidly bringing into existence local societies which will take up land on one or other of the two methods described above. There are, of course, certain outstanding differences between the conditions in the two countries. The Irishman, as his history has clearly indicated, has a passion for the actual ownership of land which is as yet unknown in Italy; and, as a consequence, the co-operative farming societies will seek to buy and not to rent estates. For the same reason collectivism in the actual farming of the land will be a new and delicate experiment; and this type of society is likely to be rare at the outset. Yet it is worthy of note that the first successful instance of actual collective farming, to which many of the Italian leaders point as their most encouraging precedent, was that carried out nearly a hundred years ago on the Vandeleur estate at Ralahine, in the most disturbed district of County Clare.

Those who take a gloomy view of the present state of Ireland, and find it impossible to believe that an experiment in economic reconstruction can succeed in the midst of political turmoil, may find matter of good augury in the fact that the original account of this experiment, now many years out of print, has just been republished in Dublin, under the title of 'An Irish Commune,' and given a warm welcome. Simultaneously a practical attempt is being made to revive the spirit of Ralahine, and there is every hope that it may succeed. There can be no doubt that the establishment of a number of co-operative communities on these lines would do more than any other single measure to allay the land agitation, which is once more raging, and to solve the vexed problem of the relations, social as well as economic, between the employing farmer and the landless labourer. England, no doubt, is less keenly interested in these particular questions, but she has her own difficulties to face; and it may well be that a thorough investigation of the practical working of the guild system in Italy, carried out by leaders of the English Labour party, would indicate the way of approach to a better and more harmonious social order.

LIONEL SMITH-GORDON.

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